The 2002 National Security Strategy: The Foundation of a Doctrine of Preemption, Prevention, or Anticipatory Action by Ewing, Troy Lorenzo
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Graduate Program in International Studies Theses &
Dissertations Graduate Program in International Studies
Summer 2013
The 2002 National Security Strategy: The
Foundation of a Doctrine of Preemption,
Prevention, or Anticipatory Action
Troy Lorenzo Ewing
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds
Part of the American Politics Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, International
Law Commons, Terrorism Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ewing, Troy L.. "The 2002 National Security Strategy: The Foundation of a Doctrine of Preemption, Prevention, or Anticipatory
Action" (2013). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/
8f8q-9g35
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/46
THE 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE FOUNDATION OF




B.A. May 1992, Rutgers Univers i ty  
M.B.A. May 2001, W eb s te r  U nive rs i ty  
M.S.S.I. May 2007, Nat iona l  In te l l ig e n ce  U nive rs i ty
A Disser ta t ion  Subm it ted  to the  Faculty  of 
Old D om in ion  U nivers i ty  in Par t ia l  Fu l f i l lm en t  of  the  
R equ irem ents  for the  Degree  of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
OLD DOM INION UNIVERSITY 
August  2013
ABSTRACT
THE 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE FOUNDATION OF 
A DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION, PREVENTION, OR ANTICIPATORY
ACTION
Troy Lorenzo Ewing 
Old Dom in ion  Univers i ty ,  2013 
Direc tor :  Dr. Simon Serfaty
The te r ro r i s t  a t tacks of  Sep tem ber  11, 2001, in i t i a t e d  a strategic  
shift  in A m erican  na t iona l  secur i ty  policy.  For th e  Uni ted  States, 
t e r ro r i sm  was no longer  a d is tan t  p h e n o m e n o n  vis i ted  up o n  faraway 
regions; it  had come to America  w i th  s tark  b r u t a l i t y .1 Consequently ,  
the  adm in is t ra t ion  of  P re s id en t  George W. Bush sought  to advance a 
securi ty  s t ra tegy  to cou n te r  th e  p ro l i fe ra t ing  t h r e a t  of  te r ro r ism .
The ensuing  2002 N a tio n a l S e cu r ity  S tra teg y  a r t icu la ted  the  
w il l ingness  of the  U n i ted  States to oppose  ter ror is ts ,  and  rogue n a t io n ­
states by merging  the  stra tegies of  “p re e m p t iv e ” and  “p re v e n t iv e ” 
warfare  in to  an u n p re c e d e n te d  s tra tegy of  “an t ic ip a to ry  a c t io n ,” know n 
as the  D octr ine  of P re em p t io n  (DoP).
During  the  Global W a r  on Terror ism, the  DoP was used to 
pro tec t  the  Uni ted  States against  te r ror ism ;  how ever ,  it  in i t ia ted  
“spi l lover  e ffec ts” th a t  in f luenced  o th e r  pol i t ica l  dom ains  in the
1 Arthur F. Lykke, Mili tary Strategy: Theory and Application (Carlisle,
Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 3-8.
i n te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty .2 Many scholars  argued th e  DoP leaned 
tow ard  un i la te ra l i sm ,  w h i le  o thers  asser ted  th e  s t ra tegy  was in l ine 
w i th  th e  U n i ted  S ta tes’ h is to r ica l  t r a d i t io n  of  using m il i ta ry  force to 
in f luence  global  events  favorable  to its s t ra tegic  objec t ives .3 
Accordingly ,  th is  d isse r ta t ion  examines the  post-9/11 global  securi ty  
e n v i ro n m e n t  from 2001 th ro u g h  2008 to analyze  th e  strategic  
charac te r is t ics  of the  DoP, and  the  geo-pol i t ical  cond i t ions  tha t  
s t im ula ted  its m a tu ra t io n  as a s t ra tegy  o f  a n t ic ipa to ry  act ion.
2 The Global War on Terrorism was of f ic ial ly  ended by the Obama  
administration in March 2009 and replaced wi th  “Overseas Contingency  
Operation.” See Scott Wilson and A1 Kamen, “Global War on Terror' Is Given New  
Name,” Washington Post, accessed May 10, 2012, w w w .w a s h in g to n p o s t . 
com /w p -d yn /content/ar t i c le /2009 .
3 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New  
World Order (New York: Random House, 2003) , 61.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
“For m uch  of the  last c en tu ry ,  A m e r ic a ’s defense re l ied  on the 
Cold W ar  doc tr ines  of d e te r ren c e  and c o n ta in m e n t .  In some 
cases, those  stra tegies  st i ll  apply, b u t  ne w  th rea ts  also require  
new  t h in k in g .”
— George W. Bush, June 20021
BACKGROUND OF STUDY
The a ttacks of  Sep tem ber  11, 2001 (now b e t te r  k n o w n  as simply 
“9 /11”), on  the  W o r ld  Trade Center ,  and  the  P en tag on  d em on s t ra ted  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes’ vu ln e ra b i l i ty  to t e r ro r i s t  a ttacks. As of  th a t  horr i f ic  
day, te r ro r i sm  was no longer  a d is tan t  p h e n o m en o n ;  it  was a th rea t  
th a t  had come to U.S. t e r r i to ry  w i th  a g lar ing harshness .
The p ro fo u nd  rea l i ty  of the  te r ro r i s t  t h r e a t  b lu r red  
W a sh in g to n ’s t rad i t io na l  concepts  of  na t iona l  secur i ty  policy.  A key
1 George W, Bush, Presidential  Com mencement  Speech at West  Point ,
June 1, 2002.
them e  th a t  em erged  from this  d i lem m a was the  need  for U.S. 
pol icymakers  to go beyond  c o n ven t io na l  th in k in g  re la t in g  to  na t ional  
securi ty .  America  needed  to develop a more c o m p rehens iv e  secur i ty  
s t ra tegy  to address n o n - t r a d i t io n a l  cha l lenges  from t ran sn a t io n a l  
te r ro r is ts ,  and  regimes th a t  had, or were  capable  of  develop ing  
weapons of mass d es t ru c t io n  (W M D).2
Pr io r  to 9/11, th rea ts  to the  U n i ted  States w e re  cyclical ,  in 
scope, w hereas  d is t inc t ive  na t iona l  secur i ty  s t ra teg ies  allowed 
pol icym akers  in W ash in g to n  to keep conven t iona l  enem ies  at a 
dis tance to vary ing  degrees of opposi t ion .  The asym m etr ic  m agni tude  
of  9/11 im m ense ly  raised the  stakes, and  for t h e  first t im e  in  his tory ,  
an enem y overcame A m er ica ’s geographic  advantages  and  in f l ic ted  
massive devasta t ion .
The a ttacks of  9/11 c rea ted  a new  awareness  in  th e  Uni ted  
States th a t  s t im ula ted  a h e ig h te n  p e rc ep t io n  of th re a t .  This new  
dynamic  genera ted  fear in  the  A m erican  c i t izenry ,  p rovoked  a 
na t ional  longing  for re t r ib u t ion ,  and loosened domestic  cons t ra in ts  on 
the  use of U.S. na t iona l  power to p ro tec t  U.S. in te res ts  from 
ter ror ism .  Consequently ,  the  a d m in is t ra t io n  of  P res iden t  George W.
2 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig. “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003),  32.
3Bush faced the  d a u n t in g  chal lenge  o f  in s t i tu t in g  a secu r i ty  s t ra tegy  to 
c o u n te r  n e w  th rea ts  of the  21st c en tu ry .  The re su l t ing  Nat ional  
Securi ty  S tra tegy  (NSS), re leased  in Septem ber  2002, focused  on using 
U.S. na t io na l  power ,  to “d is ru p t  and destroy  te r ro r i s t  o rg an iz a t io n s ,” 
and  “sta te  sponsors of  t e r ro r i s m .”3
Nat iona l  pow er  is a c o u n t r y ’s ab i l i ty  to in f luence  global  events 
and achieve n a t io n a l  secur i ty  ob jec t ives .4 The concep t  of  na t iona l  
power  in  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  is u n iq u e ly  im por tan t ;  how ever ,  it 
can be an imprecise  concept  because na t ions  are ab le  to pro jec t  
na t ional  pow er  by various means.  For the  purposes o f  th is  s tudy, 
A m erican  na t iona l  pow er  is f ramed by the  concept  o f  d ip lomatic ,  
in fo rm at iona l  ( in te l l igence) ,  m il i ta ry ,  and  economic (DIME) e lements  
of  po w er .5 6
The Car te r  a dm in is t ra t ion  f irst  used  th e  co n te m p o ra ry  DIME 
cons t ruc t  in  Pres iden t ia l  Direc t ive  18. The d irec t ive ,  declared  the
3 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States of  
America,” September 2002, 6.
4 Sam C. Sarkesian and others, U.S. National  Security: Pol icymakers,  
Processes,  and Pol it ics  (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002),  33.
5 David A. Deptula “Toward Restructuring National  Security,” Strategic  
Studies Quarterly (Winter  2007): 7. accessed January 10, 2010, t tp: / /oai .dt ic .  
mil/oai /oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPref ix=html&identif ier=ADA510489.
6 John R. Mills,  “All  Elements of National  Power:  Re-Organizing the  
Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War,” Strategic  
Insights,  Volume V, Issue 6 (July 2006),  accessed May 10, 2011, h t tp : / /oa i . 
dtic .mil /oai /oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identif ier=ADA519822.
4United  States had  an advantage  over  th e  Soviet  Union  because  of its 
“economic  s t ren g th ,  techno log ica l  supe r io r i ty ,  and p o p u la r  pol i t ica l  
su p p o r t , ” bo ls te red  “by a com b in a t io n  of  m il i ta ry  forces,  pol i t ical  
efforts,  and  econom ic  p rog ram s.”7
The Reagan a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s N a t io na l  Securi ty  Council  
expanded on th is  concep t  in  Na t iona l  Securi ty  Decision Direc t ive  32. 
P res iden t  R egan’s d i rec t ive  advocated  for  “[bolster ing] the  in f luence  
of the  U.S.,” t h ro u g h  “a full range of d ip lom atic ,  pol i t ica l ,  economic  
and in fo rm a t io n  e ffo r ts .” th a t  “con ta in  and  reverse  th e  expans ion  of 
Soviet con tro l ,  and m i l i ta ry  presence  th r o u g h o u t  the w o r l d . ”8
U nder  th e  adm in is t ra t ions  o f  George H .W . Bush, and W il l iam  
Jefferson Cl in ton ,  the  DIME co ncep t  m atured .  D ur ing  the i r  
adm in is t ra t ions ,  num erous  m il i ta ry  d o c t r in a l  pub l ica t ions  and 
na t ional  secu r i ty  journals  use the  DIME con s t ruc t .  The D e p a r tm en t  of 
Defense Joint  Staff Off ice r ’s Guide prov ides  the  fo l low ing  DIME 
depiction:
7 James E. Carter, Jr., Presidential  Direct ive ,  “NSC-18,  United States  
National  Security Strategy,” August 24, 1977, accessed November 20, 2012,  
ht tp : / /w ww.jimm ycarter l ibrary .gov /docum ents /pddirec t ives /pdl8 .pdf .
8 Ronald W. Regan, “National  Security Dec is ion  Direct ive 3 2 ,” United  
States National  Security Strategy, May 20, 1982, accessed November 20, 2012,  
http:/ /w ww.fas .org / i rp /offdocs /nsdd/n sdd-32 .pdf .
The U.S. Nat iona l  Securi ty  Stra tegy is a s t ra tegy  of active 
engagem en t  th ro u g h o u t  the  world .  U.S. engagem en t  abroad is 
carr ied  out  t h ro u g h  th e  four e lem en ts  of n a t io n a l  power:  
d ip lomatic ,  in fo rm at iona l ,  m il i ta ry ,  and economic  (DIME).9
Pres iden t  George W. Bush’s 2003 N a tio n a l S tra teg y  fo r  
C om bating Terrorism  refe rences  all o f  the  e lem ents  in the  DIME 
construct .  It  st resses the  Uni ted  States “must  f igh t  t e r ro r i s t  ne tw orks ,  
and all those  w ho  suppor t  th e i r  efforts  to spread fear  a round  the  
world,  using every  in s t ru m e n t  of na t io n a l  p o w e r— diplomatic ,  
economic, law en fo rcem en t ,  f inancial ,  in fo rm at ion ,  in te l l igence ,  and 
m il i ta ry .10
The DIME e lem ents  of power  are  s ignif icant  to this  s tudy 
because th ey  rep re sen t  the  most  no tab le  a t t r ibu tes  o f  U.S. na t iona l  
power. All the  DIME e lements  of  pow er  w o rk  toge ther ;  however ,  
diplomacy is th e  f irst  and p r incipal  means by w h ic h  th e  U.S. achieves 
its foreign pol icy  objectives.  In th e  2002 NSS, P res iden t  Bush called
9 Department of  Defense,  JFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff O ff icer’s Guide,  
Washington D.C., National  Defense University,  Joint Forces Staff College,  2000,  
2 - 1 1 .
10 George W. Bush, “The National  Strategy for Combating Terrorism.” 
February 2003,  1.
6for the  State D epa r tm en t  to take the  lead  in m anaging  b i la te ra l  U.S. 
re la t ionships  w i th  o th e r  nat ions  whi le  th e  U.S. m il i ta ry  used  force to 
defend A m er ica ’s in te r e s t s .11 As a resu l t ,  Secre tary  of State 
Condoleezza Rice o u t l ined  a vision for “t ran s fo rm a t io n a l  d ip lom acy ,” 
w here  U.S. d ip lom ats  would  “work  w i th  ou r  m an y  pa r tn e rs  a round  the  
world  to bu i ld  and sus ta in  democrat ic ,  w e l l -g o v e rn ed  sta tes th a t  wil l  
respond to th e  needs of  the i r  people  and  conduc t  themselves  
responsibly  in  the  in te rn a t io n a l  sys tem .”12
In te l l igence  is also an ind ispensab le  e lem en t  of  po w e r  th a t  has 
enabled the  successful  advancem en t  of n a t ions  for cen tu r ie s .  The U.S. 
in te l l igence  co m m u n i ty  collects, processes, in tegra tes ,  and  analyzes 
in formation  co n ce rn in g  foreign ent i t ies ,  and g o v e rn m e n ts .13 Accura te  
in te l l igence  con tr ib u te s  to the  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  m i l i ta ry  act ion,  and 
the  deve lo p m en t  of analy t ical  processes and p roducts  associated w i th  
all the  DIME e lem ents  of power.  This  process o f  co l lec t ing  and 
disseminat ing  in te l l igence  data is vi ta l  to  any g o v e rn m e n t ’s ab il i ty  to 
p ro tec t  its in te res ts .
11 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002, 30-31.
12 Condoleezza Rice, “Transformational  Diplomacy," Remarks at 
Georgetown University,  January 18, 2006,  accessed November 5, 2012.  
ht tp : / /2001-2009 .s ta te .gov /secretary /rm /2006/59306 .htm .
13 Jeffrey Richelson.  The U.S. Intel l igence  Community (Boulder,  CO: 
W estv iew Press),  1995.
After  9/11, in te l l igence  fai lures w i t h i n  the U.S. in te l l igence  
com m uni ty  w ere  b rou g h t  to l ight . As a resu l t ,  the  Bush 
adm in is t ra t ion ,  im p le m e n te d  the  In te llig e n c e  R efo rm  and  Terrorism  
P reven tio n  A c t  in  2004, w h ic h  codif ied th e  need for co l labora t ive  
na t ional  in te l l igence .  Subsequent ly ,  the  2005 N a tio n a l In te llig e n ce  
S tra teg y  dec lared  th e  p r im ary  role  of the  U.S. in te l l igence  com m uni ty  
was to in teg ra te  domest ic  and foreign d im ens ions  of U.S. in te l l igence  
so th a t  th e re  were  no gaps in u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  in te l l igence  ana lys is .14 
In the  pages of the  N a tio n a l In te llig e n c e  S tra tegy, D irec to r  of 
Nat ional  In te l l igence ,  John N egropon te  stressed,  “in te l l igence  is 
A m er ica ’s first l ine  of de fense ,” and  “in te l l ig en ce  can, and should  be 
used to aid d ip lom acy ,” in  add i t ion  to “e n su r in g  v ic to ry  [in war] in 
the  even t  confl ic t  is u n a v o id a b le .”15
A l th o ug h  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  co m m u n i ty  is comprised  of a va r ie ty  
economic  e lem ents  t h a t  have b rou g h t  u n p r e c e d e n te d  levels of 
economic  pow er  to W e s te rn  c iv i l izat ion,  th e  2002 NSS securi ty  
s tra tegy did not  place m uch  emphasis  on us ing  economic  power  to
14 Office of  the Director of  National  Intel l igence ,  N ation a l  In te l l ig e n c e  
S tra te g y  o f  the  U n ited  States o f  A m erica:  Transform ation  through In tegra tion  
and Innova tion ,  Washington,  D.C.: Government Printing Office,  2005,  1.
15 Ibid, 2.
8defeat  global  te r ro r ism ;  th e re fo re ,  economics  is n o t  a s ignif icant  
aspect of  th is  s tu d y .15
Lastly, the  2002 NSS em braced  the  use o f  m i l i ta ry  force as the  
most essent ia l  DIME e lem en t  of  power.  The s e cu r i ty  s tra tegy 
descr ibed  t e r ro r i sm  as th e  most  serious th re a t  facing th e  U n i ted  States 
and aff i rmed Am erica  w ou ld  use its m i l i ta ry  pow er  to overcom e this 
emerging  t h r e a t . 17 It made i t  c lear  th a t  the  D oc tr ine  of  P reem pt io n  
(DoP) w ou ld  be a s ign if ican t  e lem en t  in  defea t ing  te r ro r i s t s  dur ing  
the  Global W a r  on Terro r ism  (G W O T ).18 The p r im ary  t e r ro r i s t  th rea t  
to the  U n i ted  States was from al-Qaeda,  w hose  leader;  Osama bin 
Laden, even  before  9/11, issued an t i -A m er ican  fatwas t h a t  d i rec ted  his 
fo llowers to kill  Am ericans  a n y w h e r e .19 20
Post-9/11,  W a s h in g to n ’s h e ig h ten e d  pe rcep t ion  of  an emerging  
th rea t  from al-Qaeda was re in fo rced  by its spokesperson  Sulaiman 
Abu Ghai th ,  who  stated:
16 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of America ,” September 2002,  17.
17 Ibid, 15.
18 The term “GWOT” was of f ic ial ly  ended by the Obama administration  
in March 2009 and replaced with “Overseas Contingency Operat ion.” See Scott  
Wilson and A1 Kamen, “Global  War on Terror' Is Given N e w  N am e,” W ashington  
Post, accessed May 10, 2012, w w w .w ash in g tonp ost . com /w p -d yn /content  
/art ic le /2009.
19 Osama bin Laden’s 1996 Fatwa, accessed August 10, 2011,  w w w .p b s . 
org/newshour/terror ism/international / fa twa_ 1996.html.
20 Osama bin Laden’s 1998 Fatwa, accessed August 10, 2011,  w w w .p b s . 
or g/ne wshour/ t  err or ism/internationa l / fatwa_ 1998.html.
W e have not  reached  p a r i ty  w i th  them . W e have  the  r igh t  to 
kill  4 m il l ion  A m ericans— 2 m il l ion  of  them  c h i l d r e n — and to 
exile tw ice  as m any  and w o u n d  and cripple  h u n d red s  of 
thousands .  F u r th e rm ore ,  it  is o u r  r ig h t  to f igh t  th em  w i th  
chem ica l  and biological  weapons ,  so as to  afflict th e m  w i th  the  
fatal  maladies th a t  have aff l ic ted the  Muslims because  of the  
[Americans]  chem ica l  and  biological  w eap o ns .21
Because of th is  p ro l i fe ra t ing  th rea t ,  th e  Uni ted  States loosened 
its cons t ra in ts  on the  use of  na t iona l  pow er  to p ro tec t  its in te res ts .  As 
a w ar t im e  stra tegy,  the  DoP o pe ra t ion a l ized  po l i t ica l  assert ions 
w r i t t e n  in  the  2002 NSS. The s t ra tegy  was based  on h a rd  power ,  and  
was ch a rac te r ized  as a d is t inc t  A m erican  m eth o d  o f  dea l ing  w i th  
th rea ts  to its secu r i ty .22 In  th is  con tex t ,  Rober t  Kagan suppor ts  this 
premise  and claims A m e r ic a ’s ex t ra o rd in a ry  m i l i ta ry  p o w e r  shapes its 
pol i t ica l  v iew  of global  securi ty .  He m ain ta ins  th a t  t h e  U n i ted  States 
perceives th e  wor ld  as an e n v i ro n m e n t  fi lled w i t h  p o ten t ia l  th rea ts  to
21 Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, ‘“W hy We Fight America’: A l -Q a’ida Spokesman  
Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Mil l ion Americans with  
Weapons of  Mass Destruct ion,” The Middle East Media Research Inst i tute  
Special Dispatch No. 388 (June 12, 2002) .
22 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of  the United States 
of America ,” September 2002,  ii.
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be co n t ro l le d  by m il i ta ry  force, w h i le  o thers  in th e  i n te rn a t io n a l  
com m uni ty  may p re fe r  to use soft po w er  and d ip lom acy to manage 
th rea ts .23
W a s h in g to n ’s re l iance  on ha rd  p ow e r  has been e v id e n t  since the  
attacks of 9/11, and  one can m ake  a s t rong  case t h a t  A m erica  may 
c on t inue  to use ha rd  power  if th e  t h r e a t  of  t e r ro r i sm  co n t inu es  to 
jeopardize  U.S. na t iona l  securi ty ,  and  d is ru p t  global  peace and 
stabil i ty . The 2002 NSS re inforces  th is  asser t ion  by  dec la r ing  the 
following:
[The U n i ted  States] wil l n o t  h es i ta te  to act  alone, i f  necessary, 
to exercise  our r igh t  of  se lf -defense  by  act ing p ree m p t ive ly  
against  such ter ror is ts ,  to p rev e n t  th em  from doing  h a rm  against  
our people  and  our  c o u n t r y .”24 The grea ter  th e  th rea t ,  the  
grea te r  is the  risk of in ac t io n — and the  more com pe l l ing  the
23 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and  P ow er:  A m erican  and E urope in  the  
N e w  W orld  O rd e r  (New York: Random House,  2003) ,  61.
24 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002,  6.
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case for t ak ing  an t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion  to de fend  ourselves ,  (italics
added)25
A l though  th e  pages of the  2002 NSS uses the  t e rm  “p r e e m p t io n ” 
to refer  to com b a t t in g  perce ived  th re a ts  u nd e r  a “range of 
c i rcum stances ,” the  DoP is essentia l ly  an  am algam at ion  of t rad i t iona l  
“p ree m p t iv e ” and  “p r e v e n t iv e ” strategies.
Doc tr ina l ly ,  p ree m p t io n  is the  use of m i l i ta ry  force in the  face 
of an “i m m in e n t” th rea t ;  however ,  p r e e m p t io n  is not  an in n o v a t io n  of 
the  Bush adm in is t ra t ion ,  w a r r in g  na t ions  have used i t  for centur ies .  
In the  2002 NSS, the  Bush a d m in is t ra t ion  b roaden  th e  t rad i t iona l  
meaning  of p re e m p t io n  to also encompass  p reven t io n ;  w he re  
an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  ac t ion  is used against  “in e v i t a b le ” th rea ts  to 
ensure  th e  poss ib i l i ty  th a t  those  th rea ts  do n o t  gather ,  or  grow over 
t im e .26
There  are c lear  d ifferences b e tw ee n  a p reem p t iv e  use of force, 
and a p reve n t iv e  use of  force. According  to th e  U.S. D ep a rtm e n t o f  
D efense  D ic tio n a ry  o f  M ilita ry  Terms, a p reem p t iv e  s t ra tegy  is one
25 Ibid, 15.
26 Ibid, 14-16.
based on  in co n t ro v e r t ib le  ev idence  th a t  an en em y  a t t ac k  or invasion 
is im m inen t ,  and is used w h e n  a t tack ing  first (or  p reem ptive ly )  would  
give a s t ra tegic  advantage  in an unavo idab le  co n f l i c t .27 For instance, 
co u n try  (B) takes an  im m in en t  a t tack  pos i t ion  against  n a t io n  (A), and 
n a t ion  (A) decides tha t  it  is advantageous to  a t tack  p reem ptive ly  
before  c o u n t ry  (B) can lau n ch  its attack.
On the  o th e r  hand ,  a n a t ion  w ou ld  use a p rev e n t iv e  s t ra tegy  to 
mit igate  the  fu tu re  degrada t ion  of  its c u r r e n t  s tra tegic  advantage.  A 
p reven t ive  s t ra tegy  is less u rg en t  and  focuses on  a conf l ic t  th a t  is not  
im m in en t  b u t  may be inev i tab le .  This approach  p reven ts  an adversary  
from acqu ir ing  more  s t reng th ,  as a delay in confl ic t  w ou ld  involve 
g rea ter  risk in the  future.
The terms im m in e n t  and inevi tab le  p rov ide  a measure  of 
d i s t inc t ion  b e tw ee n  p reem ptive  and p rev e n t iv e  uses of  force .28 In 
M ilita ry  S tra tegy: T h eo ry  and  A p p lic a tio n , Dr. A r t h u r  F. Lykke 
d is t inguishes b e tw ee n  im m in en t  and inev i tab le  th rea ts  as th ey  rela te  
to p reem pt ive  and p reven t iv e  war  in the  fo l low ing  m anner :
27 Joint Staff, J-7, Joint P u b lica t ion  1-02, Department of  Defense  
Dictionary and Associated Terms, Washington,  DC: U.S. , 2012.
28 Arthur F. Lykke, M il i ta r y  S tra tegy:  T heory  a n d  A p p l ica t io n  (Carlisle, 
Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1993),  38.
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-  A p reem p t iv e  w ar  is based on expec ta t ions  and  ev idence  tha t
an enem y  a t tack  is im m in e n t .29
-  A p rev en t ive  war  is based on th e  b e l i e f  th a t  a rm ed  confl ict ,
w hi le  no t  im m in en t ,  is inevi tab le ,  and t h a t  de lay ing  such action
w ould  involve  unaccep tab le  r i sk .30
I n te rn a t io n a l  law suggests th a t  a p reem p t iv e  use o f  force against  
an im m in e n t  t h r e a t  is acceptable  for a n t ic ip a to ry  self-defense,  
whereas  a p reven t ive  use of force against  and inev i tab le  th r e a t  is an 
act of aggression. This a p r inc ipa l  issue conce rn ing  th e  deba te  over 
the  use of the  DoP. Cri tics of th e  DoP focus on th e  d if fe rence  b e tw een  
p ree m p t io n  and p reven t ion ,  to  raise geopoli t ical  inq u ir ie s  on its 
legality,  effectiveness , and its in f luence  on es tab l ished  norms of 
in te rn a t io n a l  coopera t ion .
The Stanley Founda t ion  commissioned and i n d e p e n d e n t  task 
force to analyze w h e th e r  the  Uni ted  States should  use a s t ra tegy  of 
p re v e n t io n .31 The task  force publ ished  a com m enta ry ,  t i t l e d  “Strategies
29 Ibid, 386.
30 Ibid, 386.
31 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W inning  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation, October 2003) ,  7.
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for U.S. Na t iona l  Securi ty:  W in n in g  th e  Peace in th e  21st C e n tu r y .” 
The rep o r t  professes the  Bush s t ra tegy  of  war  has severa l  advantages 
and disadvantages.  The advantages are th e  following:
- I t  prov ides  a c o h e ren t  and vigorous response  to  an exis ten t ia l  
t h r e a t . 32
- I t  leverages U.S. m i l i ta ry  and economic  p o w e r .33
- I t  ensures  t h a t  U.S. in te res ts  are no t  sub o rd in a ted  to na t ions  or 
organ izat ions  whose  goals may be d i f fe ren t  f rom  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes .34
- I t  enables the  U n i ted  States to act u n i la te ra l ly  for global  






The d isadvantages  are th e  following:
- I t  can lead to im per ia l  o v e rs t re tch  or th e  de facto c rea t ion  of 
an A m erican  empire  th a t  w ou ld  c rea te  an e v en tu a l  backlash 
against  the  U n i ted  States and  its allies by r is ing  st ra tegic  
com peti to rs ,  36
—It may fail to take in to  accoun t  reg iona l  d i f fe rences .37
- I t  rel ies a lmost  exclusively  on m i l i ta ry  in s t ru m e n ts  and  ad hoc 
“coal i t ions  of  the  w i l l in g ” to solve in te rn a t io n a l  cha l lenges .38 
- I t  may no t  fully address  the  g rowing  th rea t  o f  fai l ing states 
and t ran sn a t io n a l  t e r ro r  g roups .39
- I t  risks c rea t ing  a new in te rn a t io n a l  norm  for  th e  use of 
m il i ta ry  force (for instance,  p rev en t iv e  war and p reem ptive  






Kashmir d ispu te  w i th  Pakis tan ,  or  by China in  regard  to the  
d ispu te  over  Taiwan) .40
- I t  implies  a selective s tandard  for  n o n p ro l i f e ra t io n  efforts  th a t  
many o th e r  na t ions  are  u n c o m fo r tab le  w i t h — namely ,  by
focusing a lmost  solely  on “rogue s ta te s” in  its d e f in i t io n  of the  
W MD th rea t ,  r a th e r  t h a n  v iew ing  the  weapons them se lves  as 
in h e re n t ly  destabi l iz ing,  and by st ressing th e  need  for
p rev e n t io n  or p reem pt ion  of rogue sta te WMD ho ld ings  w hi le  at 
the  same t ime sharp ly  de -em phas iz ing  th e  need  for  un iversa l  
arms con tro l  and d isa rm am en t  efforts  t h a t  w ou ld  inc lude  the  
nuc lea r  arsenals  of the  U n i ted  States and its fr iends and  al l ies .41
W ith  its advantages and disadvantages,  the  DoP ind ica ted  the  
United  States was ready to combat  th rea ts  to  its n a t io n a l  securi ty .  
Many argue the  pr inc ip les  of  the  DoP leaned  tow ard  un i la te ra l i sm ,  
and a wi l l ingness  to act w i th o u t  th e  cus tom ary  sanc t ion  of




u nan im ous  approval  of  t rad i t iona l  U.S. allies. W h i le  o th e rs  assert,  th e  
DoP open ly  conveys the  t rad i t io n a l  u n d e rp in n in g s  of  U.S. na t iona l  
secur i ty  pol icy  and lays a durab le  fo u n da t io n  for  the use of  m il i ta ry  
force. Rober t  Kagan art icu la tes  th is  po in t ,  w h e n  he accen tu a te s  th e  
2002 NSS was a r e s ta tem en t  of over ha lf  a cen tu ry  of  hab i tua l  
A m erican  n a t io n a l  secur i ty  pol icy, d u r ing  w h ic h  the  U n i ted  States 
cons is ten t ly  sought  to shape global even ts  in  ways favorable  to 
A m erican  p r inc ip les  and in te re s t s .42
RESEARCH QUESTION
Topics of  na t iona l  secur i ty  c o n t in u e  to be an im p o r ta n t  topic  of 
in te res t  in the  field of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions.  T h ro u g h o u t  its his tory ,  
the  U n i ted  States has used its DIME e lem en ts  of p o w e r  to mit igate  
th rea ts  th a t  arise in  anarch ic  in te rn a t io n a l  system. John  M earshe im er  
wri tes  about  the  in te rn a t io n a l  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  na t iona l  p o w e r  in The 
Tragedy o f  G reat P ow er P o litics. He w ri tes ,  “I n t e rn a t io n a l  pol i t ics  has 
always been  a ru th less  and  dangerous business, and  it  is l ike ly  to
42 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the  
New World Order (New York: Random House, 2003) , 61.
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rem ain  th a t  w a y .”43 M earshe im er  also asserts great  pow ers  have the  
incen t ive  and  advantage  of  power  to act aggress ively in  secur ing  the i r  
na t ional  objec tives in  the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty .44
Indeed,  one of  the  most  famous edic ts  on  the  use  of  m il i ta ry  
power in  global  pol i t ics  is Baron Carl  von  C lausew itz ’s On War, 
w here  the  concep t  o f  m il i ta ry  m igh t  is recognized  as “a c o n t in u a t io n  
of polit ics  by  o th e r  m eans .”45 As such, ana lyz ing  the DoP th ro u g h  the  
lens of in te rn a t io n a l  polit ics  prov ides  an in te l lec tua l  bridge of 
u nd e rs tan d in g  of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  t h e o ry  and th e  rea l -w or ld  
applica t ion  o f  U.S. na t iona l  secur i ty  policy.
The s tudy  of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  has long been  a leading 
p ro po n en t  in  develop ing  concep tua l  f ram eworks  th a t  p rom ote  
u nd e rs tan d in g  of  w or ld  politics . Scholars of in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  
have con t in uo u s ly  debated  issues of w a r  and  peace. Accordingly ,  
in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  theor ies  have  logical  and  subject ive 
in te rp re ta t io ns .  Regardless of w h e th e r  a t h e o ry  supports  a pa r t icu la r  
occurrence  or not,  most  theories  share  a comm on charac te r i s t ic  of
43 John Mearsheimer,  The Tragedy of  Great Pow er  Pol it ics  (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company,  2001)  2.
44 Ibid, 21-22.
45 Peter Paret, C la u sew itz  and th e  S ta te  (London: Oxford University  
Press, 1976), 25.
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s t r iv ing to i n te r p r e t  how  h u m an k in d  s tr ives to sa t isfying its need for 
securi ty.
Critics of  th e  DoP argue th a t  th e  s t ra tegy  seeks out 
c o n fro n ta t io n  and th rea te n s  collect ive  p rosper i ty .  On the  contrary ,  
suppor te rs  of  the  DoP assert  the  s t r a te g y ’s h a rd -p o w e r  tactics 
rep resen t  a p ro v en  m ethodo logy  th a t  p ro tec ts  th e  lo n g - te rm  in te res ts  
of the  U n i ted  States. The l inks b e tw e e n  th eo ry  and policy 
im p lan ta t ion  is to uched  up o n  th r o u g h o u t  th is  s tudy  because the  
s ignif icance of  th e  issues debated  in scho lar ly  circles are  re levan t  to 
co n tem pora ry  and fo r thcom ing  dialogue on global securi ty .  This in 
tu rn  casts a long shadow on fu ture  studies of  i n te r n a t io n a l  rela t ions.
Empirical ,  and th eo re t ica l  views on the  DoP p ro fo u n d ly  ref lect  
an inescapable  l ink  b e tw ee n  the  w or ld  of  th eo ry ,  and the  applica t ion  
of na t iona l  secu r i ty  policy. The d iverg ing  views on  how  to use 
m il i ta ry  pow er  dem on s t ra te  the  in t r icac ies  of im p le m en t in g  na t iona l  
securi ty  stra tegies, and indicate  the  im po r tan ce  o f  inves t iga t ing  
con tem po ra ry  and  h is to r ica l  debates on U.S. na t iona l  secu r i ty  policy. 
As such, this  body  of w ork  seeks to evaluate  th e  DoP by analyzing  a 
wide range of l i t e ra tu re  to respond to the  fo l low ing  research  question:
20
-  Research  Quest ion:  Was the  D oc tr ine  of  P re e m p t io n  a 
p reem p t ive  s tra tegy,  a p reven t ive  s t ra tegy ,  or an amalgam ation  
of bo th  strategies.
-  Null  Hypothesis :  HO = The Doc tr ine  o f  P re em p t io n  was n o t  a 
p reem pt ive  s t ra tegy ,  or a p rev en t iv e  s tra tegy.  It  was an 
amalgam at ion  of  st ra tegies  of p ree m p t io n  and p r e v e n t io n .46
-  A l te rna t ive  Hypothesis:  HA = The D oc tr ine  of  P re e m p t io n  was 
solely  a p reem ptive  s tra tegy,  just  as its n am e  d e n o te s .47
This s tudy is a h is to r ica l  inves t iga t ion  o f  the  global  post-9/11 
secur i ty  e n v i ro n m en t ,  from 2001 th ro u g h  2008. It cen te rs  on how the 
2002 NSS merged w h a t  is t r ad i t io n a l  k n o w n  in  in te rn a t io n a l  law as a 
p reem ptive  secur i ty  s t ra tegy  w i th  a p rev en t iv e  s t ra tegy  to create  the  
DoP. To satisfy the  resea rch  ques t ion  th is  s tudy focuses on  several  key 
issues. The research  examines h is to r ica l  funct ions  o f  U.S. na t iona l
46 The null  hypothesis  (symbolized as HO) is a hypothes is  set up to be 
null i f ied or refuted in order to support an alternative hypothes is .  W hen  used,  
the null hypothes is  is presumed true unt i l  evidence indicates  otherwise .
47 The alternate hypothes is  (symbolized as HA) and the nul l  hypothesis  
are the two rival hypotheses .
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secur i ty  polic ies from th e  Cold W a r  th ro u g h  the  GWOT. This 
approach  dem ons tra te s  h o w  various U.S. P res iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t ions  
c rea ted  na t iona l  secur i ty  polic ies to con f ro n t  em erg ing  th rea ts .  In 
addit ion ,  th is  s tudy  con tras ts  h is to r ica l  cond i t ions  u n d e r  w h ich  
s tra tegies  o f  p reem pt ion ,  p rev en t ion ,  and the  DoP are  used; and 
analyzes the  advantages, disadvantages,  and consequences  of the  
im p le m e n ta t io n  of each s tra tegy.
RESEARCH PROBLEM
According  to in te rn a t io n a l  law, the  use of  m i l i ta ry  force is legal 
only for na t iona l  or collec t ive  se lf-defense,  or  as a u th o r iz e d  by the  
U ni ted  Nat ions  Securi ty  Council  (UNSC). This premise  of  legali ty  is a 
founding  p r inc ip le  of th e  UN C h ar te r  and is a p r in c ip a l  issue of 
c o n te n t io n  over the  use of  the  U.S. DoP dur ing  the  GWOT.
T hrou g ho u t  h is tory ,  the  U n i ted  States, and  o th e r  na t ions  have 
used p reem pt ive  and p reven t ive  strategies,  b o th  of  w h ic h  are m ethods 
of offensive m il i ta ry  ac t ion  to respond  to perce ived  secu r i ty  th rea ts .  
Both p reem ptive  and p rev en t iv e  stra tegies  seek to give an advantage  
to the  aggressor. Both s tra tegies  are designed to in i t ia te  confl ic t  on
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terms th a t  are more  favorable to the  aggressor. As such,  one  can make 
a s trong case t h a t  bo th  s tra tegies  revolve  a ro u n d  a n a t i o n ’s pe rcep t io n  
of  a pa r t icu la r  th rea t ,  and how  a n a t ion  reacts  to those  th rea ts .
It  is c lear the  a t tacks of  9/11 d ras t ica l ly  increased  A m erican  
percep t ions  of th rea t ,  and  because of  those  a t tacks,  t h e  U n i ted  States 
sought to em ploy  the  DoP to m it iga te  the  p ro l i fe ra t in g  th rea t  of 
te rror ism.  P re s id en t  Bush’s in te n t io n ,  as e x h ib i ted  in th e  DoP, was to 
seize the  offensive advantage ,  and reduce  t e r r o r i s t s ’ ab i l i ty  to a t tack 
America.  P re s id en t  Bush made these  in te n t io n s  clear in th e  fo l lowing 
passage from the  2002 NSS:
Our enem ies  have openly  declared  th a t  th e y  are seeking 
weapons of  mass des t ruc t ion ,  and ev idence  ind ica tes  th a t  th ey  
are doing so w i th  de te rm ina t ion .  The Uni ted  States wil l  not  
allow these  efforts to succeed . . .A nd,  as a m a t t e r  of common 
sense and self-defense,  America  wil l  act  against  such  emerg ing  
th rea ts  before  th ey  are fully formed.  His tory  wil l  judge harsh ly  
those w ho  saw this  coming danger  but  fai led to act. In the  new
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w o rld  we have en te red ,  the  only p a th  to  peace and  secur i ty  is 
th e  p a th  of ac t io n .48
As s ta ted  ear l ier ,  the  2002 NSS con tex tua l ly  b ro adened  the  
t rad i t io na l  in te r p r e t a t i o n  of p reem p t io n  to inc lude  concep ts  genera l ly  
regarded  as a p rev en t iv e  use of fo rce .49 F u r th e rm o re ,  a s t rong  case can 
be made th a t  the  2002 NSS was cast  in am biguous  te rm s  to allow the  
Uni ted  States to take  e i th e r  p reem p t ive  or p rev e n t iv e  measures to 
a t tack  te r ro r is ts ,  and states possessing, or p u rsu ing  W M D. The United  
States secu r i ty  s t ra tegy  specif ically  proclaims:
The U n i ted  States has long m a in ta in ed  th e  op t ion  of  p re e m p tiv e  
act ions to c o u n te r  a suff ic ien t  th re a t  to  our  n a t io n a l  securi ty .  
The grea ter  th e  th rea t ,  the  g rea ter  is th e  risk of  in a c t io n — and 
th e  more  compell ing  the  case for tak ing  a n tic ip a to ry  action  to 
defend  ourselves, even  if u n c e r ta in ty  rem ains  as to the  t ime and
48 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America ,” September 2002, v.
49 Lawrence Freedman,  “Prevention,  Not Preem pt ion ,” W ashington  
Q u a rte r ly  (Spring 2003) , 113. Freedman describes the 2002 NSS “as a doctrine of  
prevention,  not preempt ion .”
place of  th e  e n e m y ’s at tack. To fores ta l l  or  p r e v e n t  such  host i le  
acts by our  adversaries,  th e  U n i ted  States will,  i f  necessary ,  act 
p re e m p tiv e ly .  The Uni ted  States w il l  no t  use force  in  all  cases to 
p r e e m p t  emerging  th rea ts ,  nor  shou ld  na t ions  use  p re e m p t io n  as 
a p re te x t  for aggression. Yet in  an age w he re  th e  enem ies  of 
c iv i l iza t ion  openly  and act ive ly  seek the  w o r l d ’s most  
d es t ruc t ive  technologies ,  the  U n i ted  States c a n n o t  rem ain  idle 
w hi le  dangers  ga ther .  The purpose  of  our  act ions wil l  always be 
to e l im ina te  a specific th re a t  to the  U n i ted  States or our  allies 
and fr iends.  The reasons for  our act ions wil l  be c lear ,  th e  force 
m easured,  and the  cause just,  (ita lics a dded)50
The d isposi t ion  of  the  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s secu r i ty  s tra tegy 
clearly  focuses on p ro tec t in g  U.S. in te res ts  w i th in  th e  anarchic  
“in te rn a t io n a l  sys tem .”51 In the  academic field o f  in te rn a t io n a l  
re la t ions,  the  in te rn a t io n a l  system refers  to a set of in te rac t io n s  and 
re la t ions  b e tw ee n  na t ions  th a t  make up the  system. For ins tance ,  in
50 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of  the United States 
of  America.  September 2002 ,” 14-16.
51 Alan Isaacs, D ic t io n a ry  o f  P h ysics  (Oxford University  Press, 1996),
160.
The E xpansion  o f  In te rn a tio n a l S o c ie ty  Hedley  Bull and  Adam W atson  
argue th e  behav io r  of each n a t io n  factors in to  the  necessary 
calcula t ions  o f  the  o the rs .52 For Bull, “A system of  s ta tes  (or the  
in te rn a t io n a l  system) is formed w h e n  two or m ore  states have 
suff ic ien t  con tac t  b e tw een  them ,  and  have  suff ic ien t  im pac t  on one 
ano the r 's  decisions,  to cause th em  to  b e have—at least in  some 
m easure— as parts  of a w h o le . ”53 As such, the  system allows th e  most  
powerfu l  na t ions  to es tab l ish  rules for them se lves  as w e l l  as for o the r  
nations. The signif icance  of  na t iona l  p o w e r  in in te rn a t io n a l  pol i t ics  is 
fu r the r  d em o n s t ra te d  by th e  h is to r ica l ly  com m ents  m ade  by Prussian 
Chance llo r  O t to  von Bismarck w h e n  it appea red  Poland, m igh t  regain 
its sovere ign ty  in the  ear ly 1860s, Bismarck declared:
Restor ing  the  Kingdom of Po land  in any  shape  or form is 
t a n ta m o u n t  to c rea t ing  an ally  for  any enemy th a t  choses to 
a t tack  us. Prussia  shou ld  smash those  Poles till, losing all hope,  
th ey  lie dow n and die; I have every  sym pa thy  for  th e i r
52 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson,  The Expansion o f  In te rn a t io n a l  S o c ie ty  
(Oxford University Press, 1984), 26-43.
53 Hedley Bull, The A n arch ic  Soc ie ty :  A S tu d y  o f  O rder in  W o r ld  P o l i t ic s  
(Colombia Univers ity  Press, 2002) ,  9.
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s i tua t ion ,  bu t  if we wish  to surv ive  we have no choice  b u t  to
wipe  th e m  o u t .54
A l th o ug h  B ism arck’s rad ical  p re v e n t iv e  s t ra tegy  was c lear ly  
deplorable;  his pe rcep t io n  dem ons t ra te s  th a t  na t ions  wil l  do w h a t  is 
in the i r  best  in te res ts  to ensure  na t ion a l  survival  in the  anarchic  
in te rn a t io n a l  system. For the  U n i ted  States, t h e  DoP was a s tra tegic  
dem o n s t ra t io n  of  its p rep o n d e ran t  m i l i ta ry  po w er  to de fea t  actors  th a t  
th rea te n ed  U.S. secur i ty  and survival.  Thus, t h e  Bush ad m in is t ra t io n  
clearly judged  th e  DoP was a viable e lem en t  of  pow er  to safeguard 
America,  as th e  2002 NSS, establ ishes ,  “[the  Uni ted  S ta te s ’] best  
defense is a good offense .”55
In The Tragedy o f  Great P o w er P o litic s , M earshe im er  asserts,  
“great  powers  are p r im ed  for o ffense .”56 Again, the  ac t ions  of the  
Uni ted  States are not  h is to r ica l ly  u n iq ue  w i th in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  
system. This idea is also touched  u p on  in A rc h ite c ts  o f  D elusion , 
where  Simon Serfaty argues tha t  a f ter  9/11 P res iden t  Bush took the
54 John Mearsheimer,  The Tragedy o f  G rea t P o w e r  P o li t ic s  (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company,  2001)  3.
55 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America ,” September 2002, 5-6.
56 Ibid.
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posi t ion  to de fend  the  Uni ted  States, as any  o the r  p re s id en t  would  
have t a k e n .57
A l th o u g h  pow erfu l  na t ions  have th e  la t i tude  to enforce  the i r  
wil l  on th e  global  stage, some h is to r ians  a rgue  t h a t  th e  DoP was 
l imited in  its ab i l i ty  to inf luence  th e  lo n g - te rm  behavior  of te r ro r is ts  
and rogue na t ion -s ta te s .  Consequently ,  the  DoP has caused  various 
spil lover  effects  th ro u g h o u t  the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty .58 One such 
spi l lover  effect  is th e  expressed c o n c e rn  t h a t  the  s t ra tegy  set a 
p receden t  for th e  expor ta t ion  of U.S. m i l i ta ry  power,  w i th o u t  the  
sanct ion  o f  its allies, and in te rn a t io n a l  bodies such  as the  UN.59
METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
The resea rch  design provides the  founda t ion  for the  
deve lopm ent  and conclusions  of this s tudy.  To defend th e  hypothes is ,  
th is  d isse r ta t ion  follows a qua l i ta t ive  resea rch  design, re ly ing  heavi ly
57 Simon Serfaty, A r c h i te c ts  o f  D elusion: Europe, A m erica , and  the  Iraq  
War  (University Park: Pennsylvania Univers ity  Press, 2008) ,4.
58 Robert J Art and Kenneth N. Waltz ,  The Use o f  Force: M i l i ta r y  P o w e r  
and In tern a tio n a l  P o lit ics ,  6th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,  2004) ,  14. 
Spillover effects  ate  consequences of  mil itary encounters  that in f luence  events  
in other po l i t ical  and pol icy domains.
59 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  10-11.
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on deduct ive  logical analysis  of l i t e ra tu re  to es tab l ish  facts re la t ing  to 
u nd e r ly in g  assum ptions  and perspect ives  c o n ce rn in g  th e  DoP.
The o v e ra rch in g  research  q ues t ion  examines  w h e t h e r  the  DoP 
was a p reem pt ive  s tra tegy,  a p reven t ive  s t ra tegy ,  or an am algam ation  
of bo th  stra tegies.  Accordingly ,  the  s tudy  examines  th e  post-9/11 
secur i ty  e n v i ro n m e n t  from 2001 th ro u g h  2008 to  analyze th e  s tra tegic  
charac te r is t ics  of th e  DoP and the  geo-po l i t ica l  cond i t ions  th a t  
s t im ula ted  its deve lopm en t  and  applica t ion .
DATA COLLECTION
This s tudy  uses a m u lt ip l ic i ty  o f  l i t e ra tu re  to research  the  
effectiveness of  DoP from 2001 th ro u g h  2008. These sources include  
various p r im ary  and secondary  sources of  da ta  from gove rnm en ta l  
documents ,  databases, h is tor ica l  and c o n te m p o ra ry  l i te ra tu re ,  and 
professional  journals .  The l i te ra tu re  focuses o n  two re levan t  areas; 
hypotheses  of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  t h e o ry  t h a t  rela te  to U.S. foreign 
policy, and exper ien t ia l  assessments t h a t  re la te  to th e  post-9/11 
na t ional  secu r i ty  env iron m en t .
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DATA ANALYSIS
This research  analyzes the  essence of th e  DoP by exam ining  
supposit ions p ro v id ed  by diverse  l i t e ra ry  resources.  I n d e p e n d e n t  and 
in te rd e p e n d e n t  variables  of analysis  of these  diverse  l i t e ra ry  resources 
allow for the  qua l i ta t ive  t r ia n g u la t io n  of d a ta .60 In addit ion ,  the  
research  analyzes h is to r ica l  exper ien t ia l  po l icy  op t ions  used by 
several  U.S. P res iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t ions .  This in t u r n  com plem ents  
analysis re la t ing  to geopoli t ical  factors t h a t  a ffected  A m erican  
policymakers  du r ing  the  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  the  DoP d u r in g  the  
GWOT.
INSTRUMENTATION
One of the  basic assumptions in  th e  field of  in te rn a t io n a l  
re la t ions is tha t  se l f - in te res ts  m otiva te  the  actions o f  na t ion-s ta tes ;  
therefore ,  one c an n o t  overs ta te  the  s ignif icance  of hav ing  an effective 
securi ty  s t ra tegy  to p rom ote  a n a t io n ’s se l f - in te res ts  in  the  global
60 J. W. Creswell,  Research Designs: Q u a li ta t iv e  and Q u a n ti ta t iv e  
A pproaches  (Thousand Oaks, California,  Sage, 1994).
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arena. Accord ing ly ,  th is  s tudy  uses game th e o r y  to d e m o n s t ra te  how 
global  actors  seek to achieve  specific objec t ives  based on  calculated 
se l f - in te re s ted  in te rac t io n  w i th  o th e r  actors.
Game th e o ry  and in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  have in f luenced  one 
o th e r  s ince the  p u b l ica t ion  o f  The T heory  o f  Games a n d  E conom ic  
B eh a v io r  by John von  N e u m an n  and Oskar M orgens te rn .  A f te r  W orld  
W ar  II, game th eo ry  was applied to s t ra teg ic  m il i ta ry  applica t ions  
because it p rov ided  a m ethodo logy  to analyze  re la t ive  and  absolute  
gains b e tw ee n  com pet ing  actors.  61 62. More specifically, Von N eu m an n  
used game th eo ry  to explore th e  p robab i l i ty  o f  nuc lea r  w ar  be tw een  
the  Uni ted  States and the  Soviet  Union.
The basic theo re t ic  models in th is  s tudy  d e m o n s t ra te  how 
p rac t i t ion e rs  of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions ,  secur i ty  analysis ,  and 
in te l l igence  analysis  can use game th eo ry  to analyze  th re a t s  to U.S. 
securi ty .  The game th e o ry  models in  this  s tudy focus on  th e  confl ic t  
b e tw een  the  U n i ted  States and  al-Qaeda.  This prov ides  an i l lus t ra t ive  
u n d e rs tan d in g  of the  d iam etr ica l ly  opposed goals of the  two actors.
The objective  of  the  U n i ted  States was to defeat  global  te r ro r ism  
and p ro tec t  the  status quo, w hi le  th e  objec t ive  of a l -Q aeda  was to
61 James D. Morrow, Game T h eory  fo r  P o l i t ic a l  S c ien tis ts .  P r inceton ,  
(Princeton NJ, Princeton Univers ity  Press), 1994, 4.
62 Ibid.
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destabi l ize  th e  status quo. Both actors  sought  to ach ieve  specific 
objectives based on se lf- in teres ts .  This ac t ion - re ac t io n  eva lua t ion  of 
those o ccu r rences  is w h a t  allows for th e  fo rm u la t io n  of  th e  game 
theo ry  models.
CASE STUDIES
The m an n e r  in  w h ich  leaders in W a sh in g to n  have  re sponded  to 
h is tor ica l  th re a ts  to U.S. na t iona l  secur i ty  is w ide -ran g ing .  The 
at tacks of  9/11 were  not  the  f irst  t im e  a surpr ise  a t tack  changed  
A m erican  assumptions  about  n a t io n a l  securi ty .  T h ro u g h o u t  its 
his tory ,  the  U n i ted  States has used a va r ie ty  o f  s tra tegies  and  polic ies 
to sat isfy its n a t io na l  secur i ty  needs.  For example ,  th e  Br i t ish  a t tack  
on W ash in g to n  D.C. in 1814 gave rise to the  Monroe  D oc tr ine ,  w h ich  
sought  to m a in ta in  U.S. s t r e n g th  t h r o u g h o u t  the Americas .  After  
W orld  W ar  II, the  United  States abandoned  it  i so la t ion is t  polic ies, 
and emerged as a w or ld  leader  dur ing  the  Cold War.
The case studies p rov ided  in appendix  A examine  U.S. polic ies  
used du r ing  th e  Cold W ar  w h e n  tens ions  b e tw ee n  the  U n i ted  States, 
the  Soviet Union,  and China escalated to a po in t  w h e r e  leaders  in 
W ash in g ton  c lam ored  for p reven t ive  and p reem ptive  w a r  against  bo th
nations.  The first case s tudy dem ons t ra te s  h o w  the  Soviet  U n i o n ’s 
a tomic  d e to n a t io n  in  1949 caused m any U.S. po l icym akers  to advocate  
for p rev e n t iv e  w ar  against  the  Soviet  U n io n  th ro u g h o u t  the  1950s. 
The second s tudy i l lus t ra tes  how  the  P e o p le ’s Republic  of China 
(PRC) aspired  to develop nuc lea r  weapons  du r ing  the  ear ly  1960s, 
w h ic h  cause m any  U.S. po l icym akers  to q ue s t io n  how a n u c le a r -a rm e d  
PRC would  affect  global balances of  power .  The t h i r d  case s tudy 
focuses on th e  dynamics  of b r ink sm ansh ip  du r ing  th e  1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis.
These case studies  reveal  how  percep t ions  of  t h r e a t  affect  
pol icymakers  facing secur i ty  d ilemmas. In  each case, th e  U n i ted  States 
sought  to create  effective defense s t ra teg ies  to combat  the  
p ro l i fe ra t ion  of nuc lear  weapons  or the  growing  in f luence  of 
communism. One can argue th a t  th e  p e rc e p t io n  of th r e a t  d u r ing  th e  
Cold W ar  is comparable  to the  h e ig h te n e d  sense of t h r e a t  th e  Uni ted  
States exper ienced  after  9/11. In bo th  eras, W ash in g to n  sought  to 
create  effect ive  stra tegies  in  a w or ld  rad ica l ly  a l te red ,  one era 
th rea te n ed  by atomic weapons,  and the  o ther  by te r ro r ism .  
Ult imate ly ,  the  case s tudies use h is to r ica l  c ircum stances  to 
dem ons tra te  how th rea ts  to na t iona l  secu r i ty  spurred  various U.S.
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Pres iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t ions  to im p lem en t  s t ra teg ies  to p ro tec t  U.S. 
interests .
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
It has been  over a decade since 9/11; how ever ,  th is  research  is a 
re levant  and  compell ing  add i t ion  to c u r r e n t  works  on  U.S. na t iona l  
securi ty  pol icy, and in te rn a t io n a l  confl ic t .  As a h is tor ical  
inves t igat ion  of th e  global post-9/11 secu r i ty  e n v i ro n m e n t ,  this  
research  focuses on how the  2002 NSS f ram ed  the DoP dur ing  the  
GWOT. The research  makes a u n ique  c o n t r ib u t io n  to cu r re n t  
knowledge by exam in ing  h is tor ical ,  th eo re t ica l ,  and  c o n tem po ra ry  
factors th a t  a ffected  the  d eve lopm en t  and  app l ica t ion  o f  the  DoP and 
judges the  DoP was an u n p re c ed e n ted  amalgam at ion  of  p reem ptive  
and p reven t ive  s tra tegies  of war.
This s tudy is a m u l t i - lay e red  u n d e r t a k in g  th a t  examines the  
post-9/11 secu r i ty  en v iro n m en t ,  and  analyzes th e  st ra tegic  
charac ter is t ics  of  the  DoP, and the  geo-pol i t ica l  cond i t io n s  th a t  
s t imula ted  its deve lopm ent .  One of the  most  re levan t  cond i t ions  tha t  
s t imula ted  the  use of the  DoP was th e  p e rc ep t io n  o f  th re a t  from
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fu tu re  t e r ro r i s t  a t tack.  The at tacks o f  9/11 g e n e ra ted  fear  in  the  
c i t izen ry  of America ,  and gen era ted  a h e ig h te d  p e rcep t io n  of th rea t  
from te r ro r is ts ,  and rogue na t ion-s ta te s .  Consequen t ly ,  th e  at tacks of 
9/11 changed  the  way  in w h ic h  America  in te rac ted  w i th  its allies and 
adversaries  in the  i n te rn a t io n a l  com m uni ty .
The DoP focused on proac t ive ly  seek ing  out enem ies  of the  
U ni ted  States ins tead  of re ly ing  on Cold W ar  s t ra teg ies  of de te r rence  
and c o n ta in m en t .  A m er ica ’s ra t iona le  for choosing  th e  DoP ra the r  
t h an  de te r ren ce ,  s tem from th e  p e rcep t io n  of  th rea ts  from te rro r is ts ,  
and assumptions on how  to co n fro n t  those  th rea ts .
In C o n ven tio n a l D eterrence, John M earshe im er  discusses how 
decisions to engage in  war  are d e p en d e n t  on h o w  a n a t ion  pro jec ts  the  
confl ic t  wil l  cu lm inate .  M earshe im er  asserts  t h a t  d e te r ren c e  is likely 
to work  i f  a p o ten t ia l  a t tacker  believes th a t  a re ta l i a to ry  a t tack  will  
be costly. Conversely,  i f  a p o ten t ia l  a t tacke r  reasons th a t  an a t tack 
wil l  en ta i l  low costs, t h e n  d e te r ren ce  wil l  not  l ike ly  w o r k .63
D ete r rence  assumes th a t  one can adequa te ly  u n d e rs t a n d  the  
calcula t ions  of  an opponen t ;  however ,  d e te r ren c e  was inadequate  
against  te r ro r is ts  whose  behav io r  the  Uni ted  States had  l i t t le  ab il i ty
63 John Mearsheimer,  C o n ven tio n a l  D e te rren ce  (New York: Cornell  
University Press), 1983, 165-168.
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to in f luence .  Therefore ,  g iven  th e  choice  b e tw ee n  th e  two stra tegies,  
one could  argue th a t  the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of th e  DoP was a p lausible  
way for  the  Uni ted  States to con tes t  te r ro r ism .  As P re s id e n t  Bush 
sta ted in  the  2002 NSS:
O ur  p r io r i ty  wil l be f irst  to d is rup t  and d es t roy  te r ro r i s t  
o rgan iza t ions  of global reach  and a t tack  t h e i r  leadership ;  
com m and,  contro l ,  and com m unica t ions ;  m ater ia l  support ;  and 
f inances.  This wil l have a d isabl ing  effect  upon  th e  t e r r o r i s t s ’ 
ab i l i ty  to plan and op e ra te .64
P res id en t  Bush’s call for m i l i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion  a larmed 
many in  the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  w h o  believed th e  U n i ted  States 
might  use its ove rw he lm in g  pow er  to exact  a price  f rom na t ions  th a t  
did not  play by U.S. rules. P res iden t  Bush gave one of  his f irst  public  
declara t ions  o f  the  s t ra tegy  to the  cadets of the  U.S. M il i ta ry  Academy 
at W est  Po in t ,  w h e n  he announced:
64 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002, 5.
[In th e  past] A m er ica ’s defense re l ied  on  the  Cold W a r  doc tr ines  
of  d e te r re n c e  and c o n ta inm en t .  In  some cases, those  stra tegies
still  apply, b u t  new th rea ts  also r eq u i re  new t h i n k i n g  our
secur i ty  wil l  requ ire  all Am ericans  to be fo rw ard - look ing  and
resolu te ,  to  be ready  for p reem pt ive  a c t io n  [T]he m il i ta ry
must be ready to s tr ike  at a m o m e n t ’s no t ice  in  any  da rk  corne r  
of th e  world .  All na t ions  th a t  decide  for  aggress ion and te r ro r  
wil l  pay a p r ice .65
Pres iden t  Bush’s com m encem en t  speech  is com parab le  w i th  
Thomas F r i e d m a n ’s supposit ions in T he L exus and th e  O live  Tree, 
w h ich  argues th a t  m il i ta ry  force is a s tab i l ize r  in  global affairs, and is 
a h id d en  fist th a t  persuades rival  actors to com ply  w i th  global  n o rm s .66 
A l though  F r iedm an  perspec t ive  is s im ila r  to P re s id e n t  Bush’s 
perspect ive ,  John Ik e n b e r r y ’s “A m erica 's  Imper ia l  A m b i t io n ” argues 
th a t  the  DoP negat ive ly  recas t  h is to r ic  concepts  of  na t iona l
65 George W, Bush, “Presidential  Commencement  Speech at West  Po in t ,” 
June 2002.
66 Thomas L. Friedman,  The Lexus and th e  O l iv e  Tree: U n ders tan d in g  
G lobaliza tion  (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) ,  464-468.
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sovere ign ty  and nu l l i f ied  in te rn a t io n a l  no rm s of  se l f -defense  as 
e n sh r ined  by Art ic le  51 of  the  UN C har te r .
I k e n b e r ry  fu r th e r  asserts the  DoP took America  d ow n  a s l ippery 
slope, because  it  obl igated the  U n i ted  States to be p repa red  to 
in te rvene  any w h ere  and at any t ime. He c la imed these  obligat ions 
might  necess i ta te  overs tepp ing  the  sovere ign  borders  o f  w eak  na t ions  
th a t  are unab le  to enforce  th e i r  own domest ic  laws and have  suspected 
te r ror is ts  w i th in  t h e i r  c o u n t r y .67
Richard  Haass, pol icy and p lan n ing  d i rec to r  at th e  State 
D epar tm ent ,  re in fo rced  I k e n b e r r y ’s concerns  over  na t iona l  
sovereignty ,  w h e n  he  asserted  th a t  o th e r  n a t i o n s ’ sovere ign  r igh t  to 
contro l  t h e i r  bo rders  would  not  e n cu m b er  th e  Uni ted  States from 
p reem ptive  act ions, Haass asserted:
W h a t  you ' re  seeing from this a d m in i s t r a t io n  is th e  em ergence  of 
a n ew  p r inc ip le  or body of ideas about  w h a t  you m igh t  call the  
l imits  of sovereignty .  [One should]  not  suppor t  te r ro r i sm  in  any 
way. If  a g o v e rn m en t  fails to m ee t  these  obligations,  t h e n  it
67 John G. Ikenberry, “America's Imperial  A m b i t io n ,” Foreign Affairs v. 
81 no 5 (Sept./Oct .  2002) 44-60.
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forfei ts some of  th e  norm al  advantages  o f  sovere ignty ,  inc lud ing
the  r igh t  to be lef t a lone inside y ou r  ow n t e r r i t o r y .68
The va ry ing  assessments of  Fr iedman,  Iken be r ry ,  and Haass, 
reveal  the  n a tu re  o f  the  s tra tegic  e n v i r o n m e n t  is an e ver -chang ing  
topic of debate  in w or ld  affairs. As w i th  m ost  con trove rs ia l  topics, 
suppor te rs  and  cri t ics  of  the  DoP d em o n s t ra te  s t ren g th s  and weakness  
in  th e i r  arguments .
Critics of  the  DoP believed th a t  it  p rom oted  U.S. m il i ta ry  
primacy, rad ica l ized  te r ror is ts ,  h e ig h ten e d  global ins tab i l i ty ,  and set a 
p receden t  for o th e r  nat ions  to act s im i la r ly .69 They cons idered  the  
stra tegy to be a tem po ra ry  so lut ion,  n o t  an en du r ing  rem ed y  to the  
pro found  prob lem  of  global  te r ro r ism .  F u r the rm o re ,  t h e y  suggested 
th a t  the  aggressive n a tu re  of the  DoP g e n e ra te d  negat ive  d ip lomatic  
and poli t ica l  costs for the  U n i ted  Sta tes .70 On th e  o th e r  hand,  
suppor te rs  of th e  DoP declared  th a t  the  s t ra teg y  allowed the  Uni ted  
States to take advantage  of its un r iva led  m i l i ta ry  p o w e r  to p ro tec t
68 Nicholas  Lemann, “The Next  World Order,” N e w  Yorker, April  2002,  
accessed February 10, 2011 ,h t tp : / /w w w .new yorker .com /arch ive /2002 /04 /01 /  
020401fa_FACTl .
69 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W in n in g  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  10-11.
70 Ibid.
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U.S. in te res ts  in th e  m ann e r  best  su i ted  the  apoca lyp t ic  cha rac te r  of 
te r ro r i sm .71
U lt im ate ly ,  no one knows to w h a t  e x te n t  the  U n i ted  States will  
use m i l i ta ry  an t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  in  the  coming decades.  However ,  if 
the  t h re a t  of t e r ro r i sm  con t inues  to pose a ser ious cha l lenge  to global  
s tabil i ty ,  one can make a s t rong case th e  U n i ted  States wil l  con t inue  
to combat  te r ro r is ts ,  and rogue regimes th a t  suppor t  them .
DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
This in t ro d u c to ry  c h ap te r  provides  background  in fo rm a t io n  on 
how  9/11 d e m o n s t ra ted  U.S. v u lne ra b i l i ty  to te r ro r i s t  a t tacks.  It also 
depicts  how  the  2002 NSS prov ided  a grand s t ra teg ic  v is ion  for the  
Uni ted  States to p ro tec t  its global in te res ts  d u r in g  the GW OT th ro u g h  
the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of the  DoP. In  addit ion,  th i s  ch ap te r  accen tua tes  
the  m ethodo logy  of  the  study. It  describes th e  s tu d y ’s qua l i ta t ive  
research  design,  w h ic h  relies  on deduct ive  logical  analysis of h is tor ic  
l i t e ra tu re  to es tab l ish  facts regard ing  u n de r ly in g  assum pt ions  and 
perspect ives t h a t  expound  u po n  th e  research  ques t ion ,  and defend the
71 Ibid.
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hypothes is .  Lastly, th is  c hap te r  gives ins igh t  on  the  m e th o d  of data 
co l lec t ion  and  data  analysis used to sup p o r t  th e  hypo thes is ,  as well  as 
iden t i fy  pa t te rn s  or com m onal i t ie s  re la t in g  to th e  research .
C h ap te r  II, “L i te ra tu re  Rev iew ,” focuses on p re s e n t in g  re levant  
theore t ica l ,  h is tor ical ,  and  p o l icy - re la ted  l i t e ra tu re  specif ic  to the  
ongoing  debate  on the  DoP. The l i t e ra tu re  focuses on  two pr im ary  
areas: hypo theses  of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  th e o ry  th a t  re la te  to U.S. 
foreign pol icy, and  exper ien t ia l  perspec t ives  f rom past  and 
c o n te m p o ra ry  pol icymakers .  In addit ion ,  the  l i t e ra tu re  rev ie w  points  
out  how  percep t ions  of t h r e a t  in f luence  decis ions about  going to war,  
and shapes behav io r  w i th in  the  in te rn a t io n a l  system.
Chap te r  III,  “Func t ions  of U.S. N a t iona l  Securi ty  Policy: The 
Cold W ar  to the  G W O T ,” dem ons t ra te s  h o w  A m erican  securi ty  
stra tegies have h is to r ica l ly  p rov ided  co o rd in a t io n  and  d i rec t io n  for 
using U.S. na t iona l  pow er  to real ize  global objectives. This  chap ter  
evaluates  various A m erican  p res iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t io ns  f rom the  Cold 
W ar  th ro u g h  the  GWOT, and expla ins how  U.S. po l icym akers  created,  
and adapted  secur i ty  s tra tegies  to secure  A m e r ic a ’s secur i ty ,  and 
global primacy.
Chap te r  IV, “Mil i tary  A n t ic ipa to ry  Action: C ond i t ions  for
P reem pt ion  or P r e v e n t io n ,” expla ins the  doc t r in a l  d i f fe rence  be tw een
a s t ra tegy  o f  “p r e e m p t io n ” and  a s t ra tegy  of “p r e v e n t io n ,” and  it  tests 
those de f in i t ions  against  debatab le  cond i t ions  tha t  call for th e i r  use. 
This ch ap te r  also examines t rad i t io n a l  and nuanced  p e rcep t io ns  of 
p ree m p t io n  and p rev en t io n ,  and  how  those  views suppor t ,  or c r i t ique  
the  DoP. In  addit ion ,  it provides  tang ib le  h is to r ica l  ev idence  showing 
the  advantages and disadvantages associated w i t h  such stra tegies .
Chap te r  V, “Diplomacy: P e rcep t ions  and Effects o f  In te rn a t io n a l  
Law and Legi t im acy ,” analyzes the  i n te r n a t io n a l  legal d im ens ions  of 
p reem ptive  and  p reven t ive  uses of  force. A l though  p ree m p t iv e  and 
p reven t ive  s tra tegies  have been  used  th ro u g h o u t  h is to ry ,  the re  
remains  confus ion  over th e  legal i ty  and leg i t im acy  of  the i r  
im p lem en ta t ion .  Therefore ,  this  c h ap te r  examines th e  var ied  
d ip lomatic  responses to the  U.S. GWOT and  h o w  in te rn a t io n a l  law, as 
d ic ta ted  by the  UN, fai led to a rb i t ra te  n um erous  d iscrepancies  p r io r  to 
the  war  in  Iraq. It  also shows th a t  the  UN was unab le  to d raw clear  
and un iversa l ly  applicable  de l inea t ions  be tw een  p ree m p t iv e  and 
p reven t ive  stra tegies ,  or define  an accep ted  or  un accep tab le  ra t iona le  
for the  use of  the  strategies.
Chap te r  VI, “A Quest ion  o f  In te l l ig e n ce ,” addresses the  
r e la t ionsh ip  b e tw een  the  U.S. in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  and U.S. 
policymakers .  It  evaluates th e  alleged fai lures  of th e  in te l l igence
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com m uni ty  and examines how  po l icym akers  perceived ,  and  u t i l ized  
stra tegic  in te l l ig ence  post-9/11.
C hap te r  VII, “Game T heory  and N a t iona l  Securi ty  S t ra tegy ,” 
promotes  game th eo ry  as a usefu l  s t ru c tu re  to evaluates  past  
occurrences  and p red ic t  fu ture  p robab i l i t ie s  o f  th r e a t . 72 This  chap te r  
reveals how  th e  analy t ica l  process of  game th e o ry  allows analysts  and 
policymakers  to make informed jud g m en ts  re la t ing  to U.S. na t iona l  
securi ty.
Chap te r  VIII ,  “Find ings ,” inc ludes  a focused d iscuss ion  on the 
f inding  on chap ters  III th ro u gh  VII and  forms the u n d e rp in n in g  for 
the  conclus ion  chap ter .
Chap te r  IX concludes  th e  s tudy; readdresses  th e  original  
research  quest ion ,  ident i f ies  research  l im i ta t io n s  tha t  in f lu e n ce d  the  
data, and  p resen ts  suggest ions for fu tu re  research .
Append ix  A, “Case Studies ,” examines a rgum ents  re la t ing  to 
na t ional  secur i ty  pol icy  put  fo r th  in  the  early  years  of th e  Cold W ar,  
and h igh l igh ts  the  advantages and d isadvantages  of offensive  m il i ta ry  
action.  In addit ion ,  case studies rev iew  geopoli t ical  c ond i t ions  th a t  
fostered pe rcep t ions  of th re a t  th a t  raised the  poss ibi l i ty  of  confl ic t
72 Game theory has also received attent ion in popular culture,  
particularly through the prominence of  Nobel  Pr ize -w in n in g  game theorist  John 
Nash, who was the subject  of  the 1998 f i lm A B eau tifu l  Mind.
dur ing  th e  Cold W ar .  Six o th e r  appendices in  this sec t ion  expound 
upon  im p o r tan t  n a t io n a l  securi ty  direc t ives ,  the  I raqi  war  m il i ta ry  
coalit ion,  in su rg e n t  groups, the  U.S. na t io n a l  in te l l igence  leadership  




'Since W o r ld  W a r  II, the  Uni ted  States has faced th e  diff icult  
task  of f ind ing  polic ies w h ic h  w ou ld  be adequate  for securi ty  
and  peace and at the  same t ime com pa t ib le  w i th  its t rad i t ions .
Never  before has a g reat  n a t ion  been  cal led  u p o n  to adjust  its
th in k in g  and its ac t ion  so radical ly  in so shor t  a p e r i o d . ”
—John Foster  Dulles, Apri l  19541
INTRODUCTION
This l i t e ra tu re  rev iew frames the  body o f  w ork  in  th is  s tudy, 
and provides con tex t  for the  resea rch  u n d e r ta k en .  It  describes,
summarizes, validates,  and provides the  th eo re t ica l  basis for the
research ,  w h ic h  is g rounded  in l i t e ra tu re  c en te re d  on em pir ica l  U.S. 
na t iona l  secur i ty  pol icy, and  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  theo ry .  The 
conceptions  p re sen ted  in  the  l i te ra tu re  regard ing  na t ional
1 John Foster Dulles,  “Policy for Security and Pe ac e ,” Foreign Affairs, 32 
(April 1954), 353.
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sovereignty ,  funct ions  of g overnm en t ,  s t ra tegy  deve lopm en t ,  and the  
use of na t iona l  power  offer  a b road  spec t rum  of m a te r ia l  for this  
research.
Few areas of  scholarsh ip  have  a t t r ac ted  more c o m m e n ta ry  th an  
U.S. na t iona l  secur i ty  policy;  consequen t ly ,  th e re  are  num erous  
diverse po in ts  of v iew in  the  l i t e ra tu re  review. The l i t e ra tu re  rev iew 
focuses on two re levan t  areas. First,  it examines hypo theses  of 
in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  th e o ry  to i l lu s t ra te  w h y  th eo ry  is im p o r tan t  to 
analyzing  U.S. foreign  policy, and issues p e r ta in ing  to global  confl ic t  
and coopera t ion .  The second area of emphasis  includes  exper ien t ia l  
po l icy - re la ted  l i t e ra tu re  specific to th e  ongoing  deba te  on the  
d is t inc t ion  b e tw ee n  p reem ptive  and p rev en t iv e  stra tegies ,  and  specific 
opin ions  re la t ing  to the  use of th e  DoP d ur ing  th e  GWOT.
The l i t e ra tu re  rev iew  is extensive  but  n o t  exhaust ive;  
never the less ,  it provides ample ev idence  th a t  th e  DoP is a n o te w o r th y  
topic of scholast ic  study. P r im ary  and secondary  sources are  used to 
underscore  h is to r ica l  p receden ts ,  t h e o re t ic a l  p robab i l i t ies ,  and 
cu r re n t  rea l i t ies  regard ing  U.S. na t iona l  securi ty .
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THEORETICAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
The level of  analysis  for this  s tudy  focuses on th e  U n i ted  States 
as a major  actor  in the  in te rn a t io n a l  system. There  is subs tan t ia l  
academic l i t e ra tu re  in  the  field of i n te r n a t io n a l  re la t ions  th a t  re la te  
to U.S. n a t io n a l  secur i ty  policy,  and  th e  resea rch  analyzes  h is to r ica l  
exper ien t ia l  pol icy  opt ions used by several  U.S. P res iden t ia l  
adm in is t ra t ions .
W h e n  expla in ing  h is to r ic  U.S. secu r i ty  polices, one  has to 
examine s t ra teg ic  issues th a t  s t r e tc h  over num erous  U.S. Pres iden t ia l  
adm in is t ra t ions ,  w h e re  h is tory ,  cu l tu re ,  t r ad i t io na l  gove rnm en ta l  
pract ices ,  and perce ived  th rea ts  f rame th e  ideological  fo u n da t ion  of 
U.S. policy.  This  raises quest ions  of  w h e t h e r  one sho u ld  focus on 
specific decisions made by a single ind iv idua l  or a sequence  of 
decisions made by h is to r ica l  factors. The l i t e ra tu re  suppor ts  th e  la t te r  
asser t ion  because h is to ry  com plem ents  con tem po ra ry  analysis  re la t ing  
to geopoli t ical  factors th a t  affected A m erican  po l icym akers  du r ing  the  
d eve lopm en t  and im p le m e n ta t io n  of  the  DoP.
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THEORETICAL LITERATURE: PRIORITIES OF NATIONAL
BEHAVIOR
Histor ica l ly ,  the  concept  of  w a r  has been a topic  of  great  
in te res t .  The a t tacks  of 9/11, n o t  on ly  changed  th e  way  in  w h ich  
America  in te rac ted  w i th  the  i n te r n a t io n a l  com m uni ty ;  it  in tens i f ied  
realis t and l ibera l  debate  on the  reo ccu r r in g  p h e n o m e n o n  of war.  The 
l i te ra tu re  rev iew ed  in  this s tudy is rep le te  w i th  abstrac t  theo r ies  th a t  
endeavor  to fac i l i ta te  exp lana t ion  con ce rn in g  observed  p h e n o m e n a  of 
war in w or ld  polit ics .
Indeed,  h is to r ians  con tem pla te  on  w h e th e r  w a r  is a pa r t  of 
h u m a n i ty ’s in s t in c tu a l  makeup, or is it  caused by ideological  or 
na t ional  differences.  Thomas Hobbes th e  1 6 th -c e n tu ry  ph i lo sopher  
and a u th o r  of  L evia than  asserts h u m a n i t y ’s state of  n a tu re  is a 
pe rpe tua l  co n d i t io n  of war.  Hobbes claims th e r e  are th r e e  com m on 
aspirat ions t h a t  govern  h u m a n k in d ’s n a tu ra l  drive for  confl ic t .  He 
writes ; “In th e  n a tu re  of man, we  f ind  th re e  p r inc ipa l  causes of 
quarrel .  First,  com peti t ion :  secondly,  d i f f idence :  th i rd ly ,  glory. The
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first, m ak e th  men invade for gain: th e  second,  for safety: and the  
th i rd ,  for  r e p u t a t i o n . ”2 Moreover,  Hobbes asserts:
W ar  cons is te th  not  in  ba t t le  only, or  the  act of f ight ing;  bu t  in  a 
t rac t  of  t ime,  w h e re in  the  w i l l  to co n tend  by ba t t le  is 
su f f ic ien t ly  known:  and the re fo re ,  the  no t io n  of  t ime,  is to be 
cons idered  in the  na tu re  of  war;  as i t  is in  th e  n a tu re  of 
w ea the r .  For as the  n a tu re  of foul w e a th e r ,  l ie th  no t  in  a show er  
or two of rain;  bu t  in  an in c l in a t io n  th e re to  of  m any  days 
toge ther :  so th e  n a tu re  of war, co ns i s te th  not  in actual  f ighting;  
but  in  the  kn o w  disposi t ion  th e re to ,  d u r in g  all th e  t ime th e re  is 
no assurance  to the  c o n t ra ry .3
H obbes’ desc r ip t ion  of h u m a n k in d ’s d isposi t ion  to w ar  speaks of 
realis t po l i t ica l  theory ;  w h e re  power  is th e  p r im ary  end,  and  m il i ta ry  
might  is necessary  to ensure  the  survival  of t h e  na t ion-s ta te .  Indeed,  
realis t pe rcep t ions  such a Hobbes offer  a s t ra ig h t fo rw ard  and
2 Thomas Hobbes,  Leviathan  (1651),  accessed February 12, 2012,
ht tp :/ /ebooks.adelaide.edu.aU/h/hobbes /thomas/h681/  contents .html.
3 Ibid.
au tho r i ta t iv e  exp lana t ion  for war. The s t ruggle  for po w e r  and survival  
be tw een  actors is also r ep re sen ted  in E. H. C a r r ’s The T w e n ty  Years 
Crisis and  Hans M o rg e n th a u ’s P o litic s  A m o n g  N ations. Both works 
feature  the  aggressive n a tu re  of the  hu m an  c o n d i t io n  as the  source of 
confl ict .  M o rg e n th au  avows th a t  objec t ive  laws have th e i r  roots in 
h um an  na tu re .  He con tends  th a t  h u m a n  beings have  a desire to 
dom ina te  o thers ,  w h ic h  leads them  to f ight  w a rs .4
Neoreal is t  theor ies  pu t  fo r th  by K e n n e th  W altz  in M an, th e  
State, and  War, asserts great  powers  w i l l fu l ly  t ransgress  th e  norms of 
o thers  w h e n e v e r  th e i r  na t iona l  in te res ts  d ic ta te  it. He proposes a 
th ree - im age  v iew  of in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  behavior .  The  fi rst image 
is the  ind iv idua l  and h u m an  na tu re ,  the  second image is the  n a t i o n ­
state, and the  th i rd  image is the  in te rn a t io n a l  sys tem .5 Each image 
ident ifies  d i f fe ren t  causat ions for behav io r  in  the  in te rn a t io n a l  
community .  W al tz  argues th a t  the  first  image com plem ents  
h u m a n k in d ’s na tu ra l  desire for pow er  and inf luence .  He reasons th a t  
at the  s ta te  level  a c o u n t r y ’s react ions  to p a r t icu la r  s i tua t ions  are 
dr iven  in pa r t  by na t iona l  t rends  in cu l tu re ,  society, and  domestic  
polit ical  in s t i tu t ions .  At the  in te rn a t io n a l  level,  systemic  constra in ts ,
4 Hans J. Morgenthau,  P o li t ic s  A m o n g  N ations: The Struggle  fo r  P o w er
and Peace, Fifth Edit ion, Revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) , 4-15.
5 Ibid.
50
and impera t ives  of  power ,  and securi ty  com pel  na t ions  to p ro tec t  th e i r  
na t iona l  in te r e s t s .6
In T h eo ry  o f  In te rn a tio n a l P o litic s , Waltz  m ain ta ins  the  
in te rn a t io n a l  sys tem is key, because it consis ts  of a n u m b e r  of weak 
states and grea t  powers,  all seeking to survive w i th  no cen tra l  
au th o r i ty  to p ro tec t  states f rom one an o th e r .  W altz  emphasizes  th a t  
th e  world  exists in  a sta te  of pe rpe tua l  in te rn a t io n a l  anarchy ,  lacking 
a cen t ra l  enforcer :  the re fo re ,  states act in  a way th a t  ensures  th e i r  
secu r i ty .7 He reasons rec u r r in g  pa t te rns  of  s ta te  behavior ,  are due to 
the  in te rn a t io n a l  system. For example, the  b ipo lar  re la t io n s  b e tw een  
Sparta and A thens  resemble  the  re la t ion sh ip  be tw een  the  Uni ted  
States and the  Soviet  Union  dur ing  the  Cold W ar .
Conversely ,  Barry  Buzan, in “In te rn a t io n a l  Rela tions 
Recons idered ,” con tends  th a t  W a l tz ’s image analysis is too narrow ,  
because the  key q u es t io n  is n o t  w h e th e r  th e  levels  exist bu t  how  th ey  
in te r a c t .8 J. David Singer takes the  m iddle  g ro u nd  b e tw ee n  W al tz  and 
Buzman, in  his art icle ,  “The Level-of-Analysis  Prob lem  in 
In te rn a t io n a l  R e la t ions .” Singer d if fe ren t ia tes  th e  levels of  analysis  by
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 116-128.
8 Barry Buzan, “The Levels o f  Analysis Problems in International  
Relations Recons idered,” in In tern a t io n a l  R e la tion s  T h eory  Today, edited by 
Ken Booth and Steve Smith (The Pennsylvania Un ivers ity  Press, 1995)  200.
51
assessing descr ip t ive ,  exp lana tory ,  and p red ic t ive  levels of 
capabil i ties .  He classifies th e  in te rn a t io n a l  system level  as the  one 
most  su i ted  to p red ic t ive  genera l iza t ions ,  b u t  reasons th a t  theo ry  
based on the  in te rn a t io n a l  system loses specif ic i ty  of  analysis  at the  
na t iona l  level.  Singer appeals to a ba lance  o f  systemic  and na t ional-  
level analysis , because a p reoccupa t ion  w i th  one  level over  th e  o ther  
risks exaggera t ing  s imila r i t ies  and d ifferences  among n a t io n s .9
Scholars have con t in u ou s ly  deba ted  the  causes o f  war ,  and John 
M earshe im er  w r i tes  about  th e  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  pow er  in  The Tragedy  
o f  Great P o w er P olitics. He wri tes ,  “In te rn a t io n a l  pol i t ics  has always 
been  a ru th less  and dangerous  business, and it  is l ikely to rem a in  th a t  
w ay .”10 M earshe im er  adds to the  neorea l is t  parad igm  by asserting 
n a t ion -s ta te s  not  on ly  s t r ive  to gain pow er  in th e  in te rn a t io n a l  
system, th ey  c o n t inu e  to drive for power  u n t i l  they  are a regional 
hegemon;  he d e te rm ines  pow er  in i tse l f  is n o t  enough;  hegem ony  is 
the  u l t im a te  goal .11
Accord ing  to Samuel  P. H u n t in g to n ,  in The  Clash of 
Civil izat ions and  th e  R em a k in g  o f  W o rld  Order, one  of  th e  most
9 David J. Singer, “The Leve l-o f-Analysis  Problem in International  
Relations,” W o rld  P o l i t ic s , vol . 14, No. 1 (October 1961) , 77-92.
10 Ibid, 2.
11 John Mearsheimer,  The Tragedy o f  G reat P o w e r  P o li t ic s  (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2001)  126,141,251.
compell ing  reasons to go to w ar  c en te rs  on cu l tu ra l  d i f ferences .  In 
The T h ird  W ave: D em o cra tiza tio n  in  th e  L a te  T w e n tie th  C entury, 
H u n t in g to n  w r i tes  about  th e  rise of  d emocrac ies  in u n s ta b le  regions of 
the  w or ld ,  s t ressing tha t  uns tab le  na t ions  cou ld  easily t u r n  to o ther  
forms of  gov e rnm en t  if  cond i t ions  of ex trem e despair  are 
o m n ip re se n t .12
W h i le  H u n t in g to n  focuses on the  peri ls  of democracy ,  l iberal-  
based theo r ies  speak o f  m ax im iz ing  po ten t ia l  peace th rou g h  
com m onal i t ies  of m utua l  in te res t  and  in te rd e p e n d e n c e  be tw een  
nations.  For instance,  Spencer  W e a r t ’s N e v e r  at W ar  argues th a t  
democracies  t en d  no t  to go to war  w i t h  one an o th e r  due to th e i r  
shared values,  cu l tu re ,  and o p en ness .13
Liberal  theor ies  do no t  assume th e  inev i tab i l i ty  of  war, and 
assert th e re  are c o n t inuous ly  op p o r tu n i t i e s  for peace and  coopera t ion  
b e tw een  nations.  Liberal th o u g h t  deems in te rac t ion  b e tw e e n  nat ions  
enhances  coopera t ion  due to h e ig h ten e d  fam il ia r i ty  and  t ransparency .  
K enneth  O y e ’s C ooperation U nder A n a rc h y  supports  th is  cons t ruc t .  In 
“The False Premise of  Real ism,” Ruggie deems states and  indiv iduals
12 Samuel  Huntington,  The Third  W ave: D e m o c ra t iza t io n  in  the  Late  
T w en tie th  Century.  (Norman: Univers ity  of  Oklahoma Press, 1993) ,  291-293.
13 Spencer R. Weart,  N e v e r  A t  War: W h y  D em ocrac ies  W il l  N o t  Fight  
One A n o th e r  (Yale University  Press, 1998) , 4.
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have a p ro p en s i ty  for peace and  coopera t ion  w h e n  in s t i tu t io n s  fashion 
norms to govern  in te rac t io n  b e tw ee n  states.
Liberals th o u g h t  ref lects  a n o t io n  th a t  world  po l i t ics  is n o t  a 
con t inuous  road to war  or confl ic t ,  bu t  an incons is ten t  s ta te  of  affairs 
th a t  o f ten  varies be tw een  co l labo ra t ion  and opposi t ion.  Therefore ,  
complex in te rd ep e n d en c e  discourages confl ic t  because  warfare  
th rea ten s  co l lec t ive  p rosper i ty .  Robert  Keohane and  Joseph N y e ’s 
P ow er a nd  In te rd ep e n d en c e  advocates  for in te rd e p e n d e n c e  th ro u g h  
collect ive  secu r i ty  co l labora t ion .  The au tho rs  recognize th e  real i t ies  
of in te rn a t io n a l  confl ic t ,  bu t  assert  t h a t  global  in s t i tu t io n s  increase  
coopera t ion  and the  l ike l ihood  of peace.
A h is to r ica l  example  of coopera t ion  b e tw een  na t ion s  was the  
Marshall  Plan, as described in S tephen  K rasne r’s In te rn a tio n a l  
R egim es. Krasner  depicts  the  O rgan iza t ion  for  European  Economic 
Coopera t ion  (OEEC) as the  regime th a t  com pel led  p o s t -W o r ld  W ar  II 
European na t ions  to cooperate  to fash ion  com prehens ive  programs for 
European peace and recovery .14 Pos t -W or ld  W a r  II co o pera t ion  did 
not stop at th e  economic  level; the  c rea t ion  of  the N o r th  At lan t ic
14 Stephen Krasner, In tern a tio n a l  R eg im es  (Cornell  Univers ity  Press,  
1983) 195-200.
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Treaty  O rg a n iza t io n  (NATO) in teg ra te d  E uropean  se cu r i ty  concerns  
u n d e r  a single o rgan iza t iona l  umbrel la .
Charles and  Clifford Kupchan  also suppor t  th e  concep t  of
collect ive  secu r i ty  in “The Promise  o f  Collect ive  Sec u r i ty ,” where  
they  classify col lec t ive  secur i ty  as an effec t ive  balancing  m echanism  
th a t  creates opp o r tun i t ie s  for c o o p e ra t io n  th ro u g h  in te rac t io n
be tw een  n a t io n s .15 Accordingly ,  one can observe  tha t  NATO is much 
more th a n  a m il i ta ry  organizat ion;  i t  is a pol i t ica l  co l lec t ive  securi ty  
unde r tak in g ,  w h ic h  has fostered global  s tab i l i ty  since its incep t ion .
On the  con t ra ry ,  M earshe im er  c r i t ic izes  l iberal  concepts  of
collect ive  secur i ty  in “The False P rom ise  of I n s t i tu t io n s .” 
M earshe im er  declares  collect ive  secu r i ty  regimes to be imprac t ica l  
during  t imes of  crisis. Robert  Keohane  and  Lisa M a r t in  r ebu t  
M earshe im er  in “The Promise  of In s t i tu t io n a l i s t  T h eo ry ,” and argue 
M earshe im er  fails to explain the  i r re levance  of  i n te rn a t io n a l
ins t i tu t ions .  They  au thors  declare in t e r n a t io n a l  in s t i tu t ions  “reduce  
t ransac t ion  costs, make com m itm ents  more  credible ,  e s tab l ish  focal
15 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan,  “The Promise of  
Collect ive Security,” International  Security,  vol . 20, No.  1 (Summer 1995), 52-  
61.
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points  for coo rd ina t ion ,  and in  genera l  fac i l i ta te  th e  ope ra t ion  of 
r ec ip roc i ty .”16 F u r th e rm o re ,  the  authors  wri te :
[ Ins t i tu t ions]  mit iga te  fears of  chea t ing  and  so allow 
coopera t ion  to emerge and fac i l i ta te  c oo p era t io n  by he lp ing  to 
se ttle  d i s t r ibu t io n a l  confl ic ts  and by assur ing sta tes th a t  gains 
are evenly  d iv ided  over time, for example  by disclosing 
in fo rm at ion  about  th e  m il i ta ry  ex p end i tu re s  and  capacities of 
a l l iance m em b ers .17
In S tra teg y  in  th e  C on tem porary  W orld , John Baylis focuses on 
the  realm of na t iona l  policy s t ra tegy  w h e re  d ip lom atic ,  in fo rm at iona l ,  
mil i tary,  and economic  e lem ents  of pow er  overlap .  These p r inc ip les  of 
overlapping  e lem ents  of  power  enable  n a t ions  to in f lu en ce  o th e r  
countr ies .  Buzan, in  “Change and In secu r i ty  Recons idered ,” also 
a r t icula tes  th is  premise. He asserts s tudies in  i n te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  
have changed since the  end  of the  Cold W ar ,  w i th  th e  ideological
16 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of  Inst i tut ional ist  
Theory,” In tern a tio n a l  Security ,  vol.  20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), 39-51 .
17 Ibid, 86.
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emphasis  sh i f t ing  from more  m il i ta r is t ic  “s t ra tegic  s tu d ie s” to more 
th eo re t ica l ly  based “secur i ty  s tud ies .”18 F u r th e rm o re ,  in  The E vo lu tio n  
o f  In te rn a tio n a l S e c u r ity  S tud ies, Buzan e labora tes  on  how  the 
th eo re t ica l  field of secur i ty  studies g rew out o f  debates  on  how  a state  
could p ro tec t  i tse lf  from domest ic  and ex te rna l  th rea ts  a f te r  W orld  
W ar  I I .19 His w ork  focuses on how  h is to ry ,  pol i t ica l  them es ,  au tho r i ty ,  
legit imacy, and  sovere ign ty  re la te  to discussions on secur i ty .  This is 
pa r t icu la r ly  re lev an t  to this research  because it  focuses on evaluat ing  
th rea ts  and  looking  for ways to allevia te  them.
Beyond th e  t r ad i t io n  concepts  of  rea l ism and l ibera l ism ,  the  
cons t ruc t iv is t  school sc ru t in izes  cu l tu re ,  iden t i ty ,  and norm s to frame 
concepts  th a t  expla in  state behavior .  Const ruc t iv ism  traces  its roots to 
the  p ionee r ing  w ork  of A lexander  W en d t ,  w ho ,  in Soc ia l T heory  o f  
In te rn a tio n a l P o litics, reasons anarchy  is a cond i t ion  o f  th e  system of 
states because states choose to make it tha t  w a y .20 A l th o u g h  W e n d t  
acknowledges power  t ru ly  m at te rs  in global polit ics , he believes 
perspect ives  de te rm in e  w h e th e r  states go to w ar ,  m a in ta in  a balance 
of power,  or cooperate  w i th  one ano the r .  As a result,  cons t ruc t iv is ts
18 Buzan, Barry. “Change and Insecurity Reconsidered .” Contemporary  
Security Pol icy,  Volume 20, Issue 3 (1999) , 1-17.
19 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen.  The E volu tion  o f  In tern a t io n a l  S e c u r i ty  
Studies  (Cambridge University  Press, 2009) ,  30-32.
20 Alexander Wendt,  Social T h eory  o f  In te rn a t io n a l  Po lit ics ,  (Cambridge  
University Press, 1999)1-5.
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m ain ta in  the  fund am en ta l  s t ru c tu re s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l  poli t ics  are 
social r a th e r  th a n  materia l .
Cons t ruc t iv ism  has become an inc reas ing ly  im p o r tan t  approach  
to secur i ty  s tudies , b u t  it does not  focus on  po w er  pol i t ics  as m uch  as 
it  emphasizes norms th a t  f rame idealis t  concepts  of u n d e rs t a n d in g  and 
coopera t ion .  Paul  W il l ia m s’ S e c u r ity  S tu d ie s  a r t icu la tes  cons t ruc t iv is t  
approaches  a l low for  a b e t t e r  u n d e rs tan d in g  of  realis t  posi t ions  and 
liberal  concepts  of th e  in te rn a t io n a l  system. Moreover ,  cons t ruc t iv is ts  
u n d e rs tan d  th e  cen t ra l  role  of  securi ty ,  bu t  co n te n d  t h a t  societal  ideas 
are a major  c o n t r ib u to r  to the  secu r i ty  polic ies  im p le m e n te d  by 
na t ion-s ta tes .  Fu r the rm ore ,  societal  ideas p u t  fo r th  by na t iona l  
leaders codify beliefs  w i th in  a n a t io n -s ta te  and push agendas forward  
to the  masses.21 Construc t iv is ts  v iew  th is  as a social p h en o m e n o n ,  
ind ica t ing  th a t  e n t i re  na t ions  can acquiesce to good and  bad social 
norms.  A p r im e  example  of th is  t e n d e n c y  is th e  fanat ic ism displayed 
dur ing  W o r ld  W ar  II by the  Axis powers,  or m ore  recen t ly  by 
con tem po ra ry  Islamic ex trem is t  o rgan iza t ions  such  as a l-Qaeda,
From a theo re t ica l  perspec t ive ,  m ains t ream  in te rn a t io n a l  
rela t ions  th e o ry  is more o f ten  associated w i th  mascul ine  objectively;  
however ,  gender  cons t i tu tes  the  most  basic source o f  d i s t inc t ion  in
21 Paul D. Wil l iams,  S e c u r i ty  S tud ies  (New York: Routledge 2008) , 59-67.
percep t ive  u n d e rs tan d in g .  In  G ender and  In te rn a tio n a l R ela tions, 
Rebecca G ran t  and  Kath leen  N e w la n d ’s iden t i f ies  g e nd er  as a major 
variable  e le m e n t  in  a field t r a d i t io n a l ly  d o m in a ted  by mascul ine  
p r inc ip le s .22 Accordingly ,  fem in is t  approaches  to i n te rn a t io n a l  
re la t ions  focus on the  differences be tw ee n  t h e  social cons t ruc ts  of 
mascul ine  and fem in ine  iden t i ty .  Fem in is t  t h e o ry  does n o t  side w i th  
any p a r t i cu la r  th eo re t ica l  perspec t ive  o f  secur i ty  studies;  ra the r ,  it 
focuses on h o w  w o m en  v iew the  w o r ld  a n d  offers  re le v an t  theo re t ica l  
d iscourse to th e  d isc ipl ine  of i n te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  theo ry .
Feminists  assert  th e y  ex trac t  gender  o u t  in to  th e  open and 
incorpora te  o th e r  methodologies  b o r ro w e d  f rom  disc ipl ines such as 
sociology to look  for u n ders tand ings  of chan g in g  collect ive  iden t i t ies  
in the  world .  In G endering  W orld  P o litics, J. A n n  T ickner  asserts the  
feminis t  school looks beyond m il i ta ry  and na t iona l  issues, and 
considers the  causes and consequences  o f  wars.  Ticker adds feminis ts  
are con ce rned  w i th  w h a t  happens d u r ing  wars; however ,  feminis ts  are 
pa r t icu la r ly  c o n ce rn ed  on how w ar  affects indiv iduals ;  p a r t icu la r ly  
women, ch i ld ren ,  and  the e lderly .  For T ickner ,  gender  is an  analy t ica l
22 Rebecca Grant, and Kathleen Newland,  G en der  and I n te rn a t io n a l  
R ela tions  (Indiana Univers ity  Press, 1991),  45.
tool  r a th e r  t h a n  m ere ly  a descr ip t ive  ca tego ry .23 Conversely ,  in 
“W om en in  the  Evolu t ion  of  W o r ld  Po l i t ic s ,” Francis  Fukuyama 
claims th a t  th e  fem in is t  view is f lawed because  m ains t ream  a t t i tudes  
toward  vio lence ,  power ,  and status are no t  w h o l ly  th e  p roduc ts  o f  a 
p a tr ia rcha l  c u l tu r e .24 Fukuyama, adds it  is an ov e r reach  for feminis ts  
to general ize  all sta tes ru n  by men seek to maximize  power.
This co l lec t ion  of  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t io ns  scholar  provides  an 
u n d e rs tan d in g  of  a wide  range of issues and concep tua l  f rameworks  
re la t ing  to the  complexit ies  of w or ld  polit ics .  This in  t u r n  assists in 
the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of na t ional  secu r i ty  policy in  th is  study. 
Consequently ,  a case can be made th a t  w h e n  theo ry  and  empir ica l  
experience  are com bined  th ro u gh  an ana ly t ica l  “lenses” it  allows one 
to d raw u p o n  var ious  perspect ives and  cu l t iva te  objec tive  conclusions.
M il i ta ry  th eo r i s t  Baron Von Clausewitz  s ta ted  th e  role of  t h eo ry  
is to p rov ide  “a th in k in g  man w i th  a f rame of r e fe ren ce  for the  
movements  he has been  t ra ined  to car ry  out, r a th e r  t h a n  serv ing  as a 
guide w h ic h  at the  m om ent  of ac t ion  lays d o w n  prec ise ly  the  pa th  he
23 J. Ann Tickner,  G endering  W orld  P o l i t ic s  (Columbia Univers ity  Press,  
2001), 134.
24 Francis Fukuyama, “Women and the Evolution of  World Po l i t ic s ,” 
Foreign Affairs 77, No. 5 (1998),  36.
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must  t a k e .”25 U l t im ate ly ,  th e o ry  is advan tageous  w h e n  it  is plausibly  
consis ten t ,  and  has empir ica l  value;  th e re fo re ,  w h e n  th eo ry  has 
“exp lana to ry  p o w e r ,” is can assist po l icym akers  com preh en d  
ph en o m en a  th a t  th ey  w ou ld  o therw ise  f ind  obscu re .26
EXPERIENTIAL LITERATURE: AMERICA AND THE W ORLD
Since th e  at tacks of 9/11, th e re  are  few areas in global polit ics  
th a t  have a t t r ac ted  more  analysis th an  th e  GWOT. N um erous  pr ivate  
organizat ions ,  pol icymakers ,  and po l i t ica l  advisors have p e n n ed  works 
th a t  reveal  s ign i f ican t  in fo rm a t ion  on  th e  post-9/11 secur i ty  
env iro nm en t .  These works  examine  th e  im pl ica t ions  of the  U.S. 
na t iona l  secu r i ty  post-9/11 policy shift ,  and  amass an in t r igu ing  
segment  of th is  study.  For ins tance,  in “The New N a t iona l  Securi ty  
Strategy and P re e m p t io n ,” Ambassador Susan E. Rice, and o thers  
compiled a s tudy  at the  Brookings In s t i tu t io n  t h a t  conc luded  the  Bush
25 Peter Paret, C lau sew itz  and the  S ta te  (London: Oxford Univers ity  
Press, 1976),  25.
26 Anatol  Rapaport, “Explanatory Power and Explanatory Appeal  of  
Theories ,” Synthese,  September/October,  Volume 24, Issue 3-4, (1972) , 322.
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adm in is t ra t ion ,  b ro ad en ed  th e  meaning  of  p reem p t ive  w a r  in  the  2002 
NSS to encompass p rev e n t iv e  w a r .27
It is un d en ia b le  th a t  the  at tacks of 9/11 caused a change  in 
A m e r ic a ’s v is ion of i tse l f  and its post-9/11 ro le  in t h e  in te rn a t io n a l  
system, w h ic h  has caused immense  debate  in th e  in te rn a t io n a l  
comm unity .  The l i t e ra tu re  indicates  th a t  th e re  were  four  major  issues 
of  d isagreem ent  over  the  invas ion  of in Iraq. First,  th e  DoP was too 
mil i ta r is t ic  and  it  r isked  c rea t ing  a new norm  for  th e  use  of m il i ta ry  
force. Second, i t  d id  n o t  respect  the  sovere ign  bo rders  of  n a t i o n ­
states. Third ,  th e  s t ra tegy  fai led to d is t ingu ish  b e tw ee n  p reem pt ive ly  
s t r ik ing  te r ro r is ts ,  and  p rev en t iv e ly  a t tack ing  Iraq. F o u r th ,  the  DoP 
did not  cons ider  th a t  regime change in Iraq necess i ta ted  subs tant ia l  
na t ion  bu i ld ing  and  s tab i l i ty  opera t ions .  All  of  these  factors 
complica ted  A m erican  and European  abi l i ty  to forge co m m on  ground 
to combat  te r ro r ism ,  and caused the  Uni ted  States to reeva lua te  its 
re la t ionsh ips  w i th  its t rad i t iona l  allies.
For the  U n i ted  States, the  invas ion  o f  Iraq was a necessary  
measure. In 2002, Nat ional  Securi ty  Advisor  Condoleezza  Rice 
asserted th e re  has never  been  a h is to r ic  moral  o r  legal r e q u i r e m e n t  for
27 Susan E. Rice, and others. “The New National  Security Strategy and 
Preemption, Brookings Ins t i tut ion Pol icy Brief #113 .” Brookings Inst i tut ion,  
December 2002.
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any co u n t ry  to wai t  for an a t tack  before  it cou ld  address  th rea ts  to its 
securi ty ,  she sta ted,  “Pres iden t  Bush's new  N a tio n a l S e c u r ity  S tra teg y  
offers a bold vis ion for p ro tec t in g  our n a t io n  tha t  cap tu res  today 's  
new rea l i t ies  and  new  o p p o r tu n i t i e s .” 28 In  addit ion ,  Rice specified:
[The 2002 NSS] calls on  Am erica  to use our  pos i t ion  of 
u np a ra l le led  s t r e n g th  and in f luence  to c rea te  a ba lance  of  power 
th a t  favors  f reedom. As the  P res iden t  says in th e  cover  let ter :  
we seek to create  th e  cond i t ions  in w h ic h  all na t ions  and all 
societ ies can choose for them se lves  the  rewards  and  chal lenges 
of  po l i t ica l  and economic  l ib e r ty .29
In d i rec t  con tras t  to  Secre tary  Rice, F rench  p o l i t ica l  advisor, 
Justin  Vaisse reasoned the  DoP led to tens ions  w i th  th e  Europeans, 
who did not  share  A m er ica ’s op t im ism  about  th e  possible  results  of
28 Condoleezza  Rice, “U.S. Foreign Pol icy  Agenda: U.S. N a t io n a l  S e c u r i ty  




the  G W O T .30 Vaisse contends  th a t  b e tw e e n  2002 and 2005, the  Bush 
ad m in is t ra t ion  developed  a ren e w e d  s t ra teg ic  app roach  to 
in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  w i th o u t  w o rry in g  about  leg i t im acy  or formal 
m ult i la tera l ism .
Francois Heisbourg,  the  In te rn a t io n a l  Securi ty  A dvise r  to the  
F rench  M in is te r  of  Defense,  took  a s im ila r  v iew po in t .  He ques t ioned  
the  ra t iona le  for, and legali ty  of th e  GW OT in “Is P reem p t ion  
Necessary?” Heisbourg  asserts th e  U.S. w ar  in  Iraq was a p reven t ive  
war,  not  a p reem pt ive  war,  and  h ig h l ig h ted  th e  c o n t rov e rsy  th a t  the  
s t ra tegy caused. 31
In The Choice, former U.S. N a t iona l  Securi ty  Advisor  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski  cha l lenged  the  m ethodo logy  of  P re s iden t  B ush’s polic ies 
dur ing  the  GWOT, descr ib ing  them  as u n i la te ra l  fear m onger ing  and 
global ly d iv is ive .32 In  S econd  Chance, Brzezinski  asserts  the  war  in 
Iraq damaged A m er ica ’s global s tand ing .  He recogn ized  th e  United  
States had th e  c u rrency  of pow er  to ignore  old allies, bu t  emphasized
30 Vaisse,  Justin. “The Rise and Fall of  the Bush Doctrine:  The Impact on 
Transatlantic Relat ions.” (Inst itute of  European Studies, University  of  
California,  2006) .  accessed March 22, 2011. ht tp:/ /reposi tor ies .cdl ib .org/ ies  
/060408.
31 Francois Heisbourg, “Is Preemption  Necessary? A Work in Progress:
The Bush Doctrine and Its Con sequences ,” Washington Quarterly,  vol .  26, No. 2 
(Spring 2003) ,  75.
32 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  The Choice: G loba l D om inance  o r  G loba l  
Leadersh ip  (New York: Basic Books), 2004, 219.
Europe had  the  resources and d ip lomatic  in f lu en ce  to make a posi t ive  
d ifference  in th e  G W O T .33 Brzezinski  c la imed t h e  Uni ted  States had  to 
choose w h e t h e r  to define  i tse lf  as a b e n e v o le n t  h e g em o n — a 
“superpow er  p lu s ,” or push  th e  boundar ie s  of m i l i ta ry  h a rd  pow er  and 
become v iew ed  as a u n i la te ra l  “superpow er  m in u s .”34 Ult imate ly ,  
Brzezinski st resses th e  U n i ted  States shou ld  tak e  a ba lanced  approach  
towards  issues of  its secur i ty  w hi le  w o rk in g  w i t h  allies to  c o n ta in  and  
e l im ina te  p o ten t ia l  t e r ro r i s t  threa ts .
As Am ericans  and Europeans w ere  seeking to rede f ine  th e i r  
re la t ionsh ip ,  Simon Serfaty penn ed  The V ita l P artnersh ip . He reasons 
the  t r an sa t lan t ic  divide was no t  on ly  due  to t h e  u n i la te ra l  posture  of 
the  Uni ted  States, bu t  also to a fai lure on  E u ro p e ’s p a r t  to cons t ruc t  a 
com pe ten t  m u l t i la te ra l  m il i ta ry  f ram ew ork  t h a t  th e  U n i ted  States 
could count  on w h e n  it was most  v u ln e rab le  a f te r  9 / 1 1.35 In 
“Coopera t ion  or F a i lu re ,” Serfaty argues th e  U n i ted  States and Europe 
should un i te  and enh ance  t h e i r  level o f  m ul t i la te ra l  coopera t ion  to
33 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  S econ d  Chance: Three P re s id e n ts  a n d  the  Crisis  
o f  A m erican  Superpow er ,  (New York: Basic Books, 2007) ,  146.
34 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  The Choice: G loba l  D om inance or  G loba l  
Leadersh ip  (New York: Basic Books, 2004) , 219.
35 Simon Serfaty, The Vital  Partnership: Power and Order (Rowman and 
Littlefield,  2005) ,  34.
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face the  global  war  on  t e r r o r .36 Serfaty makes a good case t h a t  n e i th e r  
the  Uni ted  States nor  Europe can accomplish  t h e i r  ob jec t ive  w i th o u t  
the  suppor t  of  each  o ther .
In  a speech, e n t i t le d  “A New N A TO ” Sec re ta ry -G enera l  Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer  spoke of N A TO ’s chal lenges  of co l labo ra t ing  for 
collect ive  defense in the  post-9/11 secur i ty  e n v i ro n m e n t .  He argued 
th a t  the  c i rcum stances  in Iraq and A fghan is tan  were  a tes t  n o t  just for 
the  U.S. bu t  also for the  in te rn a t io n a l  com m u n i ty .  He reasoned  th a t  
the  debate  over  t e r ro r i sm  should  focus n o t  on A m e r ic a ’s ove ra rch ing  
power,  b u t  on how  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  could c o n t r ib u te  to 
global o rder .  F u r th e rm o re ,  th e  Secre tary  sta ted, “We must  be p repa red  
to deal w i th  those  th rea ts  w h e n  and w h e re  th e y  emerge, or t h e y  wil l  
escalate  and land  on our do ors teps .”37 Scheffe r ’s com m ents  were  
po ignan t ly  in s t ra teg ic  a l ignm ent  w i th  th e  Bush A dm in is t ra t ion .  For 
instance,  d u r ing  the  speech to a jo in t  sess ion o f  Congress P res iden t
36 Serfaty, Simon S. “Cooperation or Fai lure” In Tod Lindberg, ed.,  
B eyon d  Paradise  a n d  Pow er: Europe, A m erica , a n d  the Future o f  a T rou b led  
P artnersh ip  (New York, Routledge, 2005) 189-191.
37 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “A New NATO,” Speech to the Norwegian  
Atlantic  Committee ,  Oslo, 3 March 3, 2006,  accessed November  21, 2011,  
w w w.n ato . in t /d ocu /speech /2006 /s060303a .h tm
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Bush sta ted ,  “The on ly  way to defeat  t e r ro r i sm  as a th r e a t  to the  
n a t ion  is to e l im ina te  it, and destroy  it w h e re  i t  g rows.”38
In W ar o f  N ecess ity , W ar o f  C hoice, U.S. d ip lom at  R ichard  N. 
Haass alleges th e  invas ion  of  Iraq was a war  o f  choice.  He chal lenged 
th e  necess i ty  of  the  GWOT, and alleged the re  were  o th e r  reasonable ,  
b u t  less a t t rac t ive  pol ices  available  to th e  Bush adm in is t ra t ion .  Haass 
infers the  w ar  in I raq  was the  most s ign i f ican t  d i sc re t io na ry  war 
carr ied  out  by the  U n i ted  States since V ie tn a m .39
As a lluded to by Haass, wars  can be unavoidable  acts of 
necessi ty, or se lec t ive  acts th a t  s t r ive  to ach ieve  pa r t icu la r  objectives.  
Ret i red  Arm y Chapla in  Colonel  F rank l in  Eric W es te r  regarded  the 
w ar  in Iraq as a se lective  confl ic t  the  Uni ted  States chose  to wage. In 
his ar t ic le  “P re em p t io n  and Just War:  C onsider ing  th e  Case of I raq ,” 
he m ain ta ins  th a t  the  A m erican  war  in I raq  was a p reven t ive  war  th a t  
set a p rec ed e n t  for pow erfu l  na t ions  to subdue  w eaker  na t ions ,  and 
does no t  meet  the  c r i te r ia  for w arfare  as e s tab l ished  by just  war  
th e o ry .40
38 Bush, George W. “Address to the Joint Session o f  Congress and the  
American People .” September 21, 2001.
39 Richard N. Haass, War o f  N ecessi ty ,  W ar o f  Choice: A M e m o ir  o f  Two  
Iraq Wars. (New York: Simon and Schuster,  2010),  13.
40 The origins of the concept of  just war theory can be traced to 
Augustine in the fourth century A.D.; Thomas Aquinas codif ied the concept  in
Just w ar  th e o ry  specifies th e re  are  several  leg i t im ate  condit ions  
for going to war:  first,  p ro pe r  au th o r i ty  must  o rd e r  th e  act ion;  second, 
the  cause m ust  be just,  and th i rd ly ,  the  w a r r in g  a u th o r i ty  must  have a 
r ight  in t e n t io n  of p rom ot ing  good, or avoid ing  evil .41 The  fundam en ta l  
and o f ten  con trove rs ia l  objective  of  jus t  war  th eo ry  is th e  need  for 
states to have moral  jus t i f ica t ion  for  us ing  m il i ta ry  force.
There  is no un iversa l ly  accepted  gu idel ine  for  going to war;  
however ,  th is  s tudy reveals th e re  are n u m ero us  subject ive  
perspect ives  on leg i t imate  uses of  force, and w h a t  is, o r  is not ,  a just  
cause for  war. For the  U n i ted  States, th e  a t tacks o f  9/11 were  the  
leg i t imizing  reason to w h y  W ash in g to n  im p lem en ted  t h e  DoP. During 
a W est  Po in t  co m m encem en t ,  in  June 2002, P re s id en t  Bush stated,  
“W e fight,  as we always f ight,  for a ju s t  peace—a peace  t h a t  favors 
hum an  l iber ty .  W e will w ork  for a ju s t  and  peaceful  w o r ld  beyond  the  
war  on te r ro r ,  (i talics a d d ed )”42 As a r t icu la ted  in  the  com m en c em e n t  
address P res iden t  Bush un d e rs to o d  the  im portance  o f  convey ing  to 
audiences  th a t  he fel t the  U.S. objectives were  just.
the th ir teenth  century.  Just war theory  is in essence a set of gu ide l ines  for when  
it is moral ly acceptable to go to war.
41 Franklin E. Wester,  “Preemption  and Just War: Considering the Case of  
Iraq,” Parameters (Winter 2004-2005) ,  29-31.
42 George W. Bush, “Presidential  Commencement  Speech at West  Po in t ,” 
June 2002.
Subsequent ly ,  in  Sep tem ber  2002, P re s id en t  B ush ’s NSS asserts 
th a t  th e  war  against  te r ro r ism  was a global  e n te rp r ise  of u n c e r ta in  
d u ra t io n  and th a t  A m e r ic a ’s un p a ra l le led  m il i ta ry  s t r e n g th  w ou ld  be 
the  best  tool  to defeat  th e  n a t i o n ’s enem ies  at hom e and  ab road .43 
Consequent  to the  2002 NSS, po l icym akers  in  W ash in g to n  re leased  a 
series of  d o cu m en ts  th a t  gave fu r th e r  ins igh t  on  the  Bush 
ad m in is t r a t io n  plan  to confron t  fu tu re  th re a ts  to the  U n i ted  States. 
For ins tance ,  the  U n ited  S ta te s ’ 2003  N a tio n a l S tra teg y  fo r  C om bating  
Terrorism  id en t i f ied  the  GWOT as a d i f fe ren t  k in d  of  war. It 
evaluated  the  n a tu re  of  the  t e r ro r i s t  t h rea t ,  th e  re la t ionsh ips  be tw een  
global t e r ro r i s t  o rganizat ions ,  and  th e  p ro l i fe ra t io n  of  WMD. In 
addit ion,  the  2004 U.S. N a tiona l M ili ta ry  S tra te g y  focused on  how the  
m il i ta ry  w ou ld  conduc t  un i f ied  missions and d is rup t  t e r ro r i s t  
organizat ions.
Domest ic  polit ics  in the  U n i ted  States also affected pe rcep t ions  
during  the  GWOT. In  a Boston Globe a r t ic le  e n t i t led  “T ru th ,  Lies, and 
In te l l igen ce ,” U.S. Senator  John Kerry c r i t ic ized  th e  re l iab i l i ty  of  
in te l l igence  th a t  the  United  States used to jus t i fy  going to w a r  w i th
43 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of America,” September 2002,  introduction.
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I raq .44 These ques t ions  of re l iab i l i ty  led to th e  U.S. Senate  in i t ia t ing  
an inves t iga t ion ,  w h ic h  p roduced  The U n ited  S ta tes S e n a te ’s R ep o rt  
on th e  U.S. In te llig e n c e  C o m m u n ity ’s P rew ar In te llig e n c e  A sse ssm e n t  
o f  Iraq. This do cu m e n t  u l t im a te ly  fau l ted  the  U.S. in te l l igence  
com m uni ty  for n o t  c lar ify ing  I raq ’s W M D capabil i ties .
In response  to fai lures w i th in  the  U.S. in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  
P res iden t  Bush enac ted  the  2004 In te llig e n c e  R eform  and  Terrorism  
P reven tio n  A c t. This act c rea ted  th e  office of t h e  D irec to r  of  Nat ional  
In te l l igence ,  w h ic h  was headed  by Jo h n  N egroponte .  As the  first 
Direc tor  of N a t iona l  In te l l igence ,  N e g rop o n te  pub l ished  the  2005 
N a tio n a l In te llig e n c e  S tra tegy, w h ic h  cal led for in te rag e n cy  and 
in te rn a t io n a l  co l labo ra t ion  on  na t iona l  in te l l igen ce  issues.
N at iona l  Securi ty  exper t  Mark L o w en th a l ’s book  t i t led  
In te llig en ce : From Secre ts to  P o licy  gives an overv iew of  the  U.S. 
in te l l igence  com m uni ty .  It  expla ins h o w  in te l l ig en ce  in te ragency  
coord ina t ion  forges the  vita l  l ink  b e tw e e n  pol icymakers ,  the  mil i ta ry ,  
and o th e r  agencies w i th in  the  U.S. g ov e rn m e n t .  L o w e n th a l ’s w ork  
explains how  the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  supports  U.S. na t iona l  
securi ty  objectives.  O th e r  works on in te l l igence  include,  A n tic ip a tin g
44 Scot Lehigh, "Truth, Lies, and In te l l ige n c e ,” Boston Globe,  November  
25, 2005, accessed February 27, 2011, ww w.b oston .com /new s /g lobe /ed i tor ia l_  
opin ion /op ed /ar t ic le s /2005 /1 l /2 5 / truth_ l ie s_and_ inte l l igence / .
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Surprise  by Cyn th ia  Grabo, a v e te ran  U.S. in te l l igence  analyst  w ho  
summarizes how  th e  d eve lopm en t  o f  in te l l igence  analysis  is a 
th eo re t ica l  ac t iv i ty  based on a process of logic and  deduct ion .
Former N at iona l  Securi ty  Advisor  and Secre ta ry  of State  H enry  
Kissinger provide  f u r th e r  h is to r ica l  analysis  in  Does A m erica  N e ed  a 
Foreign P olicy. K iss inger’s w ork  alleges the  United  States has the  
t en d e n cy  to push  its way in to  s i tua t ions  t h r o u g h o u t  the  world  
w h e th e r  inv i ted  or n o t .45
Career  g o v e rn m en t  executive  and  Noble  Peace Prize  w in ne r ,  
Thomas Schell ing p e n n ed  A rm s and  In flu e n c e , w h ic h  made a s imilar  
po in t  as Kissinger. Schell ing asserts th a t  a l th o u g h  m i l i ta ry  force has 
the  po ten t ia l  to in f luence  countr ies ,  force cou ld  be used  sk il lfully ,  or 
clumsily,  for evil,  se l f -p ro tec t ion ,  or pu rsu i t  o f  peace. In The S tra teg y  
o f  C on flic t, Schell ing p resen ts  a com prehens ive  look at game th eo ry  
and concludes th a t  competing  actors base t h e i r  decis ions on  “focal 
p o in ts” of w h a t  t h e y  expect  from the  o th e r  actors,  so th e y  have a 
c o u n te r - s t ra teg y  to gain an advan tage .46 S ch e l l in g ’s pe rspec t ive  reveals
45 Kissinger, Henry. D oes A m erica  N e e d  a Foreign P o licy?  T ow ard  a 
D ip lo m a c y  fo r  th e  2 1 s t  C en tu ry  (New York: Simon and Schuster) 2001,  18.
46 Thomas C. Schel l ing,  The S tra tegy  o f  C o n fl ic t  (New York: Oxford 
University Press) 1963, 207.
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how game th e o ry  can be used to develop  s t ra teg ies  to u n d e rs tan d  
th rea ts  be t te r .
SUMMARY
This l i t e ra tu re  rev iew  frames th e  body of  work  in  th is  s tudy and 
provides con tex t  for th e  resea rch  un d e r ta k en .  It provides  the
theo re t ica l  basis for the  research,  w h ic h  is g rounded  in  l i t e ra tu re  
cen te red  on empir ica l  U.S. na t iona l  secur i ty  policy,  and  in te rn a t io n a l  
re la t ions theo ry .  The l i t e ra tu re  dem ons t ra te s  the  use  of effect ive
na t ional  secur i ty  polic ies are a key co m p o n e n t  of n a t i o n ’s success or 
fai lure in in te rn a t io n a l  polit ics .
There  are m any variances  in th e  com pi led  l i t e ra tu re  th a t  show 
the skil lful  use of na t iona l  secur i ty  policy  necess i ta tes  an
u nd e rs tan d in g  of th rea ts  and developing  s t ra teg ies  to enhance
nat ional  securi ty ;  however ,  the  d ivers i ty  of l i t e ra tu re  show ed  there  
w here  l im i ted  th eo re t ica l  linkages among th e  f luc tua t ing  views put  
fo r th  by th e  authors .  Lastly, the  th eo re t i c a l ly  and e x p e r ien t ia l  text  
were  resourcefu l  bu t  all the  l i t e ra tu re  was subject ive  to academic, 
polit ical,  or  ideological  leanings of pa r t icu la r  au thors ,  and  audiences.
72
CHAPTER III
FUNCTIONS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE COLD
W AR TO THE GW OT
“The gravest  danger  our Nat ion  faces lies at th e  crossroads of 
radical ism and technology .  Our enem ies  have o p en ly  declared  
th a t  th e y  are seeking weapons of mass des t ruc t ion ,  and evidence  
indica tes  th a t  th ey  are doing  so w i th  de te rm in a t io n .  The Uni ted  
States wil l  no t  a l low these  efforts  to succeed . . . .H is to ry  will  
judge h a rsh ly  those  who  saw th is  com ing  danger b u t  fai led to 
act. In  the  n e w  w o r ld  we have en te red ,  th e  on ly  p a th  to peace 
and secu r i ty  is the  p a th  of  a c t io n .”
— George W. Bush, Sep tem ber  20021
BACKGROUND
There  are a n u m b er  of op in ions  on  the  de f in i t ion  of  na t iona l
power,  and  the  concept  of na t iona l  pow er  can be an imprecise
concept.  For the  purposes of th is  s tudy,  A m erican  n a t io n a l  pow er  is
1 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United  States of  
America,” September 2002, introduction.
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rep resen ted  by th e  associat ion o f  d ip lomatic ,  in fo rm at iona l  
( in te l l igence) ,  m il i ta ry ,  and economic  (DIME) e lements  of  p o w e r .2 3 
Sam C. Sarkes ian  in U.S. N a t iona l  Securi ty  gives a succ inc t  d e f in i t ion  
of  na t iona l  p o w e r :  P olicym akers, P rocesses, and P o litic s , w h ich  
describes n a t io n a l  pow er  a c o u n t r y ’s ab i l i ty  to  carry ou t  its na t ional  
securi ty  policies , and  its ab il i ty  to use th a t  p o w e r  e ffec t ive ly .4
This c hap te r  dem ons tra tes  h o w  diverse  U.S. p res iden t ia l  
adm in is t ra t ions  used  d is t inc t ive  s tra tegies  to guide the  use of 
Am erican  na t io na l  power to achieve  specific  n a t io n a l  securi ty  
objectives.5 T h ro u g h o u t  its h is tory ,  th e  U n i ted  States has used 
na t ional  po w er  to p ro tec t  and fu r th e r  its domestic  and  in te rn a t io n a l  
interests . Dur ing  th e  f irs t  Seminole W a r  in  1818, P re s id e n t  James 
Monroe in s t ru c ted  General  A ndrew  Jackson to  use m i l i ta ry  pow er  to 
in i t ia te  a p re v e n t iv e  campaign against  Na t ive  Americans ,  escaped
2 David A. Deptula “Toward Restructuring Nat ional  Security ,” S tra teg ic  
Studies Q u a r te r ly  (Winter  2007): 7, accessed January 10, 2010, t tp: / /oai .dt ic .  
mil/oai /oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identif ier=ADA510489
3 John R. Mills,  “All  Elements of  National  Power: Re-Organizing the 
Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War,” Strategic  
Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 (July 2006) , accessed May 10, 2011, h t tp : / /oa i . 
dtic. mil /oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identif ier=AD A 5 19822.
4 Sam C. Sarkesian and others,  U.S. N a t io n a l  S ecu r ity :  P o licym akers ,  
Processes, and P o l i t ic s  (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,  2002), 33.
5 See table 3, appendix B for a list o f  Major Nationa l  Security Council  
Authorities .
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slaves, and Bri t ish  subjects  in  Spa in’s Flor ida  t e r r i to ry ,  to  jus t i fy  U.S. 
advances into  Florida.
In 1823, the  Monroe  Doctr ine  was used  to slow E uropean  efforts  
to colonize t e r r i to r y  in the  W e s te rn  H em isphere .  In 1904, Pres iden t  
Theodore  Roosevelt  took th e  Monroe D o c t r in e  a step fu r th e r ,  and 
added the  Roosevelt  Corollary, w h ic h  asser ted  the  r igh t  of  th e  Uni ted  
States to in te rv en e  p reven t ive ly  a n y w h e re  in  Latin A m erica  to stop 
the  spread of E uropean  inf luence .  This m ark ed  a defin ing  po in t  in the  
successful  rise o f  U.S. power.
H is to r ian  W al te r  Russell Mead, in Specia l P rov idence , a t t r ibu tes  
the  his tor ic  success of U.S. foreign policy  to four  po l i t ica l  t rad i t ions  
rooted  in  A m erican  in te res ts .  Mead asserts the  H am il to n ian  t r ad i t io n  
(p ro tec t ion  of commerce) ,  th e  Jeffersonian t rad i t io n  (m a in tenance  of  a 
democrat ic  system), the  Jacksonian t r a d i t io n  (populis t  va lues,  m il i ta ry  
s t rength) ,  and the  W ilson ian  t r ad i t io n  (moral  p r inc ip le )  aptly  
describes the  h is to r ic  ideological  f lex ib i l i ty  of U.S. fo re ign  po l icy .6
Pr io r  to the  m od ern  era Am erica  lacked  a c lear  s t ra tegy  to 
develop na t iona l  secur i ty  policy. As such, U.S. pol icy  objectives
6 Walter R. Mead, “American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk,” Orbis,  
49 no4 (Fall 2005) ,  589-98,  accessed March 11, 2012 ,http :/ /web.c las .uf l .edu /users  
/zselden/Course%20 Readings/Mead. pdf.
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f luc tua ted  f rom periods of  peace to periods o f  w ar .7 In  the  past,  the  
State D e par tm en t  was responsib le  for m anag ing  foreign affairs, and 
the  Navy and W ar  D epar tm en ts  p rosecu ted  major  wars .  By the  late  
1930s, m any  po l icym akers  argued th a t  this approach  was outdated ,  
and asser ted  America  needed  new procedures  for  h igh- leve l  
co l labora t ion  b e tw ee n  the  c iv i l ian  and  m il i ta ry  b ran c h es  of the  
g o v e rn m e n t .8 The surpr ise  a t tack  at Pearl  H a rbor  su bs ta n t ia ted  the  
wisdom of these  a rguments .
During  W o r ld  W ar  II, the  U n i ted  States tes ted  var ious  policy 
co ord ina t ion  m ethodologies ;  however ,  th e  most  s ignif icant  miles tone  
for the  a d m in is t ra t iv e  conso l ida t ion  of U.S. g o v e rn m e n ta l  powers  was 
the  N at iona l  Securi ty  Act of 1947, w h ic h  reorgan ized  the  U.S. 
mil i ta ry ,  th e  State D epar tm ent ,  the  in te l l igence  co m m un i ty ,  and 
es tabl ished th e  Nat iona l  Securi ty  Council .
H is tory  has show n  th a t  every  U.S. p res iden t ia l  a d m in is t ra t io n  
has im p lem en ted  polic ies to respond  to  var ious  t h r e a t s .9 Over the  
years, the  com m onal i ty  b e tw ee n  each p re s id e n t  was th e i r  ab il i ty  to 
create  s tra tegies  to shape global  events  in  ways favorable  to Am erican
7 Cody M. Brown, The N a tion a l  S e c u r i ty  Council: A Legal H is to r y  o f  the  
P residen t's  M o s t  P o w er fu l  A dvisers ,  Center for the Study of the Presidency,  
Project on National  Security Reform, 2008, i.
8 Ibid.
9 See table 3, appendix B for a list of  National  Security Counci l  
Authorit ies .
pr incip les  and in te r e s t s .10 The  s t reng ths  and weaknesses  of each 
adm in is t ra t ion ,  as wel l  as the  pe rso na l i ty  and m an a g em en t  style  of the  
each P res iden t  p layed an  in tegra l  p a r t  in  A m e r ic a ’s h is to r ica l  rise to 
global p reem inence .
T h rou g h o u t  the  Cold W ar ,  the  U n i ted  States g rappled  w i th  
im p lem en t in g  a m ix tu re  of  c o n ta in m en t ,  de te r ren ce ,  and  global  proxy 
wars  to encu m b er  th e  g ro w th  o f  the  Soviet  U nion .  How ever ,  w i th  the  
fall of the  Soviet  Union,  the  Uni ted  States s tood alone as the  w o r l d ’s 
only superpower .
Despite  th e  end  of  the  Cold W ar,  U.S. g o ve rn m en t  officials 
co n t inu ed  to have confidence  in  the  Cold W ar  d e te r re n c e  f ram ework .  
After  a re la t ive ly  peaceful  decade of th e  1990s, the  a t tacks  of 9/11 
destabi l ized  global  o rder  and changed  the  focus of U.S. na t iona l  
secur i ty  policy.
10 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and P ow er:  A m erican  and E urope in the  
N e w  W orld  O rder  (New York: Random House,  2003) , 61.
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COLD WAR NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The U n i ted  S ta tes’ atomic d e to n a t io n  on  H irosh im a  in  1945 
signaled the  beg inn in g  of a new na t ion a l  secur i ty  pe rspec t ive  in 
America.  The stra tegies of c o n v en t ion a l  land,  air, and  sea warfare  
became rel ics of  a s impler  age. Atomic  weapons  formed a p ro found ly  
new  basis of  l e tha l i ty  in warfare ,  and U.S. po l icym akers  had  to 
d e te rm in e  h o w  to balance t h e i r  p o s t -W o r ld  W a r  II global  leadership  
responsib i l i t ies  w i th  the  des t ruc t ive  capaci t ies  o f  nuc lea r  power.
After  W o r ld  W ar  II, the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  was ham pered  
by w ar-w ear iness ,  bu t  had a p ro found  desire  to r e tu rn  to peace t im e  
pursui ts .  As Europe re s t ru c tu red  itself ,  America  fo u nd  i tse l f  in  a 
global leadersh ip  posi t ion.  As such, U.S. foreign  policy focused  on two 
tenets .
The f irst  t en e t  organized  a ro un d  the  concepts  of d e te r r e n c e  and 
con ta inm en t ,  w h ic h  m ain ta ined  the  p o s t -W o r ld  W ar II global  balance 
of  power  and p rov ided  a c o u n te rw e ig h t  to th e  Soviet Union.  The 
second te n e t  was l iberal  m u l t i la te ra l i sm  and was c e n te r e d  on the  
r ec o n s t ru c t io n  of  the  world  econom y th ro u g h  th e  Marshall  Plan. The 
Marshall  P lan  sought  to bu i ld  an in te rn a t io n a l  order  in in teg ra ted  
global m arke ts  and sought  to avoid re tu rn in g  to reg iona l  European
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t rade  confl ic ts .  Both com ponen ts  of A m e r ic a ’s s t ra tegy  set the  stage 
for the  rise of  an A m erican  global power.  It a l lowed th e  U n i ted  States 
to use its DIME e lem ents  of pow er  to  f u r th e r  U.S. in te res ts ,  and 
offered pa r tne rsh ip s  bu i l t  on comm on values,  m utua l  se l f - in teres t ,  
and the  p rese rva t ion  of s tabil i ty .
Successive U.S. adm in is t ra t ions  c o n t in u a l ly  reassessed Am erican  
na t iona l  secur i ty  polic ies to mit igate  th rea ts  th a t  deve loped  in the  
anarch ic  global system. During  the  early  days of  th e  Cold W ar  
P res iden t  T rum an  a llowed for th e  de v e lo p m e n t  of  a U.S. nuc lear  
arsenal  to de te r  Soviet  aggress ion. However, before  th e  Soviet  Union  
gained a tomic  weapons b e tw een  1945 and 1948, severa l  U.S., and 
in te rn a t io n a l  policy makers advocated for  p rev en t ive  w a r  against  the  
Soviet Union.  Bri t ish  scholar  Ber trand  Russell be l ieved  th a t  the  W est  
should  go to w ar  w i th  the  Soviet  Union  before  Moscow could  acquire  
subs tan t ia l  nuc lea r  s t r e n g th .11 Russell and o the rs  reasoned  tha t  a 
p reven t ive  w ar  w i th  the  Soviet Union  would  ensu re  a W e s te rn  v ic to ry  
w i th  fewer casualties th a n  if the  U.S. w a i te d  u n t i l  th e re  were  
num erous  nuc lea r  bombs on bo th  s ides .12
11 Nicholas  Griffin, S e le c te d  L e t te rs  o f  B er tran d  Russell:  The Public
Years , 1914-1970 (New York, Routledge,  2001),  482.
12 Ibid.
In one o f  the  most  s ign if ican t  s ta te m e n ts  of A m er ic an  policy  
du r ing  the  Cold W ar ,  the  T ru m a n  ad m in is t r a t io n  d e f in ed  A m e r ic a ’s 
Cold W ar  s t ra tegy  in  NSC 68. The m em o ran d u m  was essen t ia l ly  the  
o pe ra t io na l iza t ion  o f  the  c o n ta in m e n t  polic ies espoused in George 
K e n n an ’s “Long T e leg ram ” from Moscow in  1946. U l t im ate ly ,  on 
August  29, 1949, th e  Soviet  Union  tes ted  its f i r s t  a tom ic  bomb, and 
the  response in  the  U n i ted  States was one  of a p p reh en s io n .  The loss of 
the  A m erican  m onopoly  on nuc lea r  weapons shook W a sh in g to n  and 
the  A m erican  publ ic  to its core; how ever ,  the  U n i ted  Sta ted  did not  
in i t ia te  a p rev en t iv e  war  against  the  Soviet  Union.
Pre s id en t  D w ight  E isenhow er  kep t  T r u m a n ’s p r inc ip le s  of 
co n ta in m e n t  in  place and im p lem en ted  NSC 162/2, w h ic h  cal led for 
th e  d eve lopm en t  and m ain tenance  of “A strong m il i ta ry  pos ture ,  w i th  
emphasis  on th e  capabil i ty  of  in f l ic t ing  massive r e ta l ia to ry  damage by 
offensive s t r ik ing  p o w e r .” Moreover ,  NSC 162/2 declared:
In th e  event  of host i l i t ies ,  the  U n i ted  States wil l  consider  
nuc lear  weapons to be as available for use  as o th e r  m uni t ions .  
W h e re  the  consen t  of an ally is r e q u i r e d  for th e  use of these 
weapons from U.S. bases on  the  t e r r i to r y  of  such  ally, the
80
U n i ted  States shou ld  p ro m p t ly  o b ta in  the  advance  consen t  of 
such  ally  for such use. The U n i ted  States should  also seek, as 
and w h e n  feasible, the  u n d e rs t a n d in g  and approva l  of this 
pol icy  by free n a t io n s .13
T hro ug h  the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of  NSC 162/2 P res iden t  
E isenhow er  sought  a long - te rm  approach  to secur i ty  p lan n in g  th a t  
would  m a in ta in  a cons tan t  level of  m i l i ta ry  p reparedness  and  not  
d im in ish  the  A m erican  economy. E isenhow er  also im p le m e n te d  NSC 
5440, w h ic h  is also cal led the  “New Look” policy. This policy 
recognized  th a t  an equal  ded ica t ion  to co nv en t io na l  and  n uc lea r  force 
was unsus ta inab le .  The New Look became th e  cen te rp iece  of  U.S. 
secur i ty  pol icy  du r ing  E is e n h o w e r ’s ten u re ,  causing con v en t ion a l  
weapons to be subord ina ted  to nuc lea r  weapons .  In add i t ion ,  the  New 
Look em bodied  the  doc t r ine  of “Massive R e ta l ia t ion ,” w h ic h  decreased 
U.S. c o n v en t io na l  force com m itm en ts  abroad and  c leared  th e  way for 
the  m il i ta ry  to use tac t ical  n uc lea r  weapons .  The goal was to m ain ta in
13 United States Department of State, Off ice  of  the Historian,  National  
Security Council  162, October 30, 1953, accessed January 20, 2011,  http:/ /  
his tory . s ta te .gov /h is tor ica ld ocu m ents / fru s l952 -54v02p l /d l  00.
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enough  m il i ta ry  pow er  to de fend  th e  U n i ted  States and  W es te rn  
Europe.
E is e n h o w e r ’s b ipo lar  f ram ing  of th e  Cold War m an ifes ted  i tse lf  
in the  c o n t in u a t io n  of polic ies of d e te r ren c e  and  co n ta in m e n t .  
However,  his polic ies spurred  debate  by  those  who c o n t in u e d  to call 
for p rev e n t iv e  w ar  against  the  Soviet  U n io n .14 In S e c u r ity  in  th e  
N uclear A ge, Jerome Kahan e labora tes  on the  e x te n t  to w h ich  
E isenhow er  d ep ended  on  n uc lea r  weapons  to ex tend  A m e r ic a ’s U.S. 
power  abroad. Kahan reasons th a t  nuc lea r  weapons p layed  a crucial  
role in  U.S. fo re ign  policy, and the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of “Massive 
R e ta l ia t ion” a l lowed the  U.S. to p rov ide  secur i ty  to i tse l f  and its 
a l l ies .15
In 1961, P res iden t  John F. Kennedy  im p lem en ted  the  “Flexible  
Response ,” s t ra tegy  because his ad m in is t ra t io n ' s  was skeptical  of 
E isenhower 's  polic ies. K e n n ed y ’s s t ra tegy  gave the  U n i ted  States th e  
capabil i ty  to respond to aggress ion across th e  range of  m il i ta ry  
opera t ion;  how ever ,  it was not  focused p r im ar i ly  on n u c le a r  arms.
14 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note,  No.  F49642-01-C-0003 .Santa 
Monica,  California: (RAND, 2006) , 121.
15 Jerome H. Kahn, S e c u r i ty  in the  N u clear  Age: D e v e lo p in g  U.S. 
Stra teg ic  A rm s  Policy ,  Washington,  D.C.: Brookings Inst i tution,  1975,  9-13.
John Lewis G add is’s Stra teg ies o f  C o n ta in m en t  a r t icu la te s  how 
Pres iden t  K ennedy  fel t a need to d is tance  h im se l f  f rom E is e n h o w e r ’s 
policies. Kennedy  advoca ted  a d e te r re n c e  s t ra teg y  th a t  was adaptab le  
and could e x ten d  across st rategic , ope ra t iona l ,  and tac t ica l  levels of 
warfare .  K e n n e d y ’s s t ra tegy  encom passed  ta i lo r ing  th e  app rop r ia te  
am ount  of m i l i ta ry  force to achieve the  des i red  end s t a te .16
During  the  p res idency  of Lyndon B. Johnson,  th e  U n i ted  States 
believed th a t  the  Soviet Union  was ca tch in g  up  in te rm s of  nuc lear  
weapons capabil i ty .  The prob lem  of the  n a r ro w in g  missile gap 
in tens if ied  du r ing  the  Vie tnamese  W ar ,  and by  the t im e Pres iden t  
Nixon came in to  office, the  Uni ted  States w a n te d  to end  the  Vie tnam  
conflict.
Nuclear  weapons  were  a major  p i l la r  of N ix o n ’s po l icy  of 
de ten te ,  w h ic h  m arked  a fu r th e r  rev is ion  o f  c o n ta in m e n t  and a 
substant ia l  shif t  in  A m er ica ’s na t iona l  secu r i ty  s t ra tegy .  The key 
feature  of N ix o n ’s “d e t e n t e ” s tra tegy; was the  re laxat ion  of  tens ions  
b e tw een  th e  U n i ted  States and th e  Soviet Union. His “l in kage” 
stra tegy a imed to l in k  agreements  in  one  area to  ag reem ents  in o ther  
areas. The l inkage s t ra tegy  aimed to persuade  the Soviet U n ion  to
16 John Lewis Gaddis, Stra teg ies  o f  C o n ta in m en t  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) , 197.
cooperate  in re s t ra in in g  revo lu t ions  in the  T h i rd  W o r ld  in r e tu rn  for 
concessions in n uc lea r  a rm am ents  and economics .  N ix o n ’s polices led 
to the  Stra tegic  Arms L im ita t ion  Talks (SALT), because th e  Uni ted  
States and  th e  Soviet Union  real ized th a t  n uc lea r  w eapons  could 
destroy  ev e ry th in g  they  w ere  m ean t  to p ro tec t .  By engaging  in arms 
contro l  negotia t ions ,  the  U n i ted  States and  th e  Soviet U n io n  tac i t ly  
acknowledged  the  excesses of th e  arms race.
P res iden t  J immy Car te r  sought  to de f ine  a n ew  A m erican  
foreign policy  based on consis ten t  values.  C a r te r  hoped  to  im p lem en t  
com m itm ents  th ro u g h  n o n in te r v e n t io n  and th e  red u c t io n  of m il i ta ry  
power.  In 1977 he declared ,  “W e desire  a f reeze on fu r th e r  
m odern iza t ion  and p ro d u c t io n  of  w eapons  and a con t inu ing ,  
subs tan t ia l  r ed u c t io n  of s t ra tegic  nuc lea r  w eapons  as w e l l . ”17
Pres iden t  Ronald  Reagan reversed  th e  polic ies of  th e  Carter  
adm in is t ra t ion ,  in i t i a ted  an A m erican  m i l i ta ry  pow er  rena issance  th a t  
accelera ted  the  end  of th e  Cold W ar ,  resu l t in g  in the  collapse  of the  
Soviet U n ion  in 1991 un d e r  the  p res idency  of George H. W. Bush.
During th e  P res idency  of  W il l iam  J. C l in ton ,  the  U n i ted  States 
con fron ted  in te rn a t io n a l  confl icts  in Somalia, Rwanda,  Bosnia-
17 John Lewis Gaddis, Stra teg ies  o f  C o n ta in m en t  (New York: Oxford  
University Press, 1982) , 237.
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Herzegovina ,  Kosovo, and Haiti .  The C l in ton  a d m in is t r a t io n  endorsed  
a doc t r ine  of in te rv e n t io n  in wor ld  affairs t h a t  shaped  events  th a t  
affected U.S. secur i ty .  In 1993, P re s id en t  C l in to n  o rdered  a p reven t ive  
a t tack  on Somali leader  Moham ed Farah  Aidid in Mogadishu,  and in 
1995, he signed P res iden t ia l  Decision D irec t ive  NSC-39, addressing 
c o u n te r te r ro r ism ,  w h ic h  s ta ted,  “The U n i ted  States w o u ld  seek to 
iden t i fy  groups or states th a t  sponsor  or suppor t  such  ter ror is ts ,  
isolate  th em  and ex trac t  a heavy  price  for t h e i r  a c t io n s .” Moreover,  
NSC-39 declared:
W e shall  have the  abi l i ty  to respond  rap id ly  and  decis ively  to 
te r ro r i sm  d i rec ted  against  us w h e re v e r  i t  occurs,  to p ro tec t  
Americans ,  a rres t  or  defeat  the  pe rpe t ra to rs ,  respond  w i th  all 
a ppropr ia te  in s t ru m en ts  against  th e  sponsor ing  organiza t ions  
and governm en ts  and provide  recovery  re l ief  to vict ims,  as 
p e rm i t te d  by l a w .18
18 Wil l iam Jefferson Clinton, “Presidential Dec is ion  Direct ive  NSC-39,”. 
June 1995, accessed February 3, 2009,  ht tp:/ /www.fas .org/ irp/offdocs /pdd/pdd-  
39.pdf.
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In  addit ion ,  the  C l in ton  adm in is t ra t io n  o rdered  a p reven t ive  
a t tack against  an Iraqi weapons  fac i l i ty  in  1998, and  bom bed  a 
p h a rm aceu t ica l  p lan t  in Sudan th a t  had ties w i th  a l-Qaeda.  P res iden t  
C l in ton  recognized  th a t  m i l i ta ry  force was necessary in  s i tua t ions  th a t  
pose a th r e a t  to U.S. na t iona l  in teres ts .  C l in to n ’s 1999 NSS stated:
W e wil l  do w h a t  we must  to  defend  these  in te res ts ,  inc lud ing ,  
w h e n  necessary  and  appropr ia te ,  using our m il i ta ry  might  
u n i la te ra l ly  and dec is ive ly .19 Our use of  force w i l l  be decisive 
and, i f  necessary,  un i la te ra l .  In s i tua t ions  posing  a th re a t  to 
im p o r ta n t  na t iona l  in te res ts ,  m i l i ta ry  forces shou ld  only  be used 
if  they  advance  U.S. in teres ts ,  t h ey  are  l ikely to accomplish  
t h e i r  objectives, the  costs and risks o f  th e i r  e m p loy m en t  are 
com m en su ra te  w i th  the  in te res ts  at stake, and  o th e r  n o n ­
m il i ta ry  means are incapable  of  ach iev ing  our objectives. Such 
uses of m il i ta ry  forces should  be selective  and l imited,  
re f lec t ing  the  im por tance  of  the  in te res ts  at s take.  W e act in
19 Wil l iam J. Clinton,  “The National  Security Strategy o f  the United  
States of  America,” December 1999, accessed Apri l 4, 2011,  ht tp:/ /www.au.af .mil  
/ au /a w c/a w cgate /n ss /nssr-1299.pdf,  1.
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c o n ce r t  w i th  the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  w h e n e v e r  possible,  
bu t  w i l l  no t  hes i ta te  to act u n i la t e ra l ly .20
Clearly ,  P res iden t  C l in ton  was not  opposed to m il i ta ry  
in te rv en t io ns ,  as ev idenced  by his  1999 NSS, and n u m ero u s  m il i ta ry  
campaigns t h a t  took place dur ing  his p res idency .  In th e  l igh t  of  these  
p recedents ,  one  can make a s t rong  case th a t  the  U n i ted  States has 
undergone  reo c cu r r in g  pa t te rns  of  conf l ic t  a n d  coopera t ion  t ied  to 
pe rcep t ions  of  t h r e a t  from an tagonis t ic  actors.  One can  h is to r ica l ly  
trace such p a t te rn s  of  conflict ,  back to th e  bipolar  re la t ionsh ips  
be tw een  Sparta  and A thens  d u r ing  the  Pe loponnes ian  W ar ,  w h ic h  
reveals ongoing  p a t te rn s  to obta in  and use na t iona l  po w er  to p ro tec t  
na t ional  in te r e s t s .21 One  can make a s t rong  case tha t  th e  U n i ted  States 
and Soviet U n ion  fo l lowed the  same p a t t e r n  during  th e  Cold War.  
Indeed, w i th  the  benef i t  of  h inds igh t ,  one  can make a s t ro n g  case th a t  
this reoccu r r in g  p a t t e rn  of emerging  th rea ts ,  and  inev i tab le  confl icts  
wil l be an e v e r -p re sen t  rea l i ty  of th e  in te r n a t io n a l  system.
20 Ibid, 19.
21 Kenneth N. Waltz,  Man, the  State, a n d  War  (N ew  York: Columbia  
University Press, 1959) 14-16.
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POST-9/11: A NEW  GRAND STRATEGY
In due course, every  U.S. P re s id en t ia l  a d m in is t r a t io n  sought  to 
use m i l i ta ry  pow er  to shape regional  and  global  events;  the re fo re ,  the  
DoP appears cons is ten t  w i th  a h a l f  a c e n tu ry  of  hab i tu a l  A m erican  
na t ional  secu r i ty  policy,  w h ic h  regu la r ly  used m il i ta ry  p o w e r  to shape 
global pol i t ics  in  ways th a t  favor A m erican  in te res ts .  The rea l i ty  of 
9/11 necess i ta ted  a reeva lua t ion  of  U.S. n a t io n a l  secur i ty  pol icy, and 
the  U n i ted  States genera ted  a new vis ion  for t h a t  s t ra tegy  in  the  pages 
of the  2002 NSS. The secur i ty  s t ra tegy  o u t l in e d  global te r ro r i sm  and 
rogue regimes as the  highes t  p r io r i ty ,  and  it c learly  a r t i cu la te d  how  
America w ou ld  p rosecu te  the  war  on  te r ro r i sm ,  se t t ing  in m o t io n  a 
sweeping d e p ar tu re  from the  Cold W ar  s t ra teg ies  of  d e te r re n c e  and 
con ta inm en t .
The GW OT began in O c tober  2001, and  proc la im ed  
W a sh in g to n ’s d e te rm in a t io n  to de fend  A m erican  in te res ts  from 
terror is ts ,  and rogue na t ion-s ta te s  t h a t  suppor t  te r ro r ism .  Secre tary  of 
Defense Donald  Rumsfeld declared  th a t  the  GWOT “w o u ld  be a war  
unl ike  the  U n i ted  States has ever faced in  th e  past .”22 This asser t ion
22 Donald Rumsfeld, “A New Kind of  War,” N e w  York T im es , September  
2 7 ,2 0 0 1 .
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was p rophet ic ,  as th e  GWOT con ta ined  e le m e n ts  of w ar  and  e lements  
un l ike  war. In th is  same l ine  of th o u g h t ,  Col in  Gray’s M a in ta in in g  
E ffe c tiv e  D e terren ce  proclaimed:
The confl ic t  w i th  global te r ro r ism ,  even  in  its more  res t r ic ted  
form in th e  guise of the  w e l l -n e tw o rk e d  al-Qaeda,  bears more 
resem blance  to a p ro t rac ted  h u n t  t h a n  it  does to w h a t  most  
people  u n d e rs tan d a b ly  call a war .  The cu t t ing  edge of  the  
c o u n te r te r ro r i s t  effor t  is l ike ly  to be in te l l igence ,  especial ly  
m u l t in a t io n a l  coopera t ion  on in te l l igence ,  and m uscu la r  police 
work. All of  w h ic h  is plausible,  b u t  it is by no means cer ta in  
th a t  U.S. n a t io n a l  secur i ty  s t ra tegy  reduces  to chas ing  te r ro r is ts  
of no fixed abode. Terror is ts  and th e i r  backers  do prov ide  some 
targets  for m i l i ta ry  action,  and the  ju ry  w i l l  long be out  on just  
how  sign if ican t  a chal lenge  th e y  pose to A m er ican  vi ta l  
in teres ts ,  inc lud in g  the  world  o rder  of w h ic h  th e  U n i ted  States 
is the  p r inc ipa l  gu a rd ian .23
23 Colin S. Gray, M ain ta in ing  E ffec t ive  D e te r r e n c e  (Carlisle,  Pa.: 
Strategic Studies Insti tute,  U.S. Army War College,  2003) ,  5.
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The 2002 NSS c lear ly  s ta ted  th a t  the  U n i ted  States would  not  
rem ain  idle as the  danger  of t e r ro r i sm  grew, and  drew  coro l la r ies  from 
the  risk of  in ac t ion  to th e  necess i ty  of tak ing  an t ic ip a to ry  act ion.  As 
sta ted ear l ie r ,  the  Bush secur i ty  s t ra tegy  b ro ad en ed  th e  t rad i t iona l  
in te rp re ta t io n  of p ree m p t io n  to inc lude  concepts  g e n e ra l ly  regarded  
as the  p rev en t ive  use of  fo rce .24 This is c lear ly  a r t i c u la te d  in the  
fo l lowing passage:
The U n i ted  States has long m a in ta in ed  th e  op t ion  of  p re e m p tiv e  
act ions to cou n te r  a suff ic ien t  t h r e a t  to our n a t io n a l  securi ty . 
The g rea te r  the  th re a t ,  th e  g rea ter  is the  risk of  i n a c t io n — and 
the  more  compell ing  the  case for tak ing  a n tic ip a to ry  ac tion  to 
defend  ourselves, even  if  u n c e r t a in ty  rem ains  as to th e  t ime and 
place of th e  e n e m y ’s a ttack.  To fores ta l l  or  p r e v e n t  such  host i le  
acts by our  adversaries,  the  U n i ted  States will,  i f  necessary ,  act 
p re e m p tiv e ly , (i talics added)25
24 Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention,  Not Preem pt ion ,” W ashington  
Q u arte r ly  (Spring 2003) , 113. Freedman describes the 2002 NSS “as a doctrine of  
prevention,  not preempt ion .”
25 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002,  14-16.
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The em ergence  of suicidal  te r ro r i sm  on 9/11 caused m any  in the  
U.S. dom estic  p opu la t ion  to c lamor for an  aggressive n a t io n a l  secur i ty  
s tra tegy to p ro tec t  the  c o n t in en ta l  U n i ted  States; h o w ev er ,  the  DoP 
left some na t ions  in the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  deep ly  in t im id a ted  
over th e  prospec t  of an u n c o n s t r a in e d  Uni ted  States seeking 
r e t r ib u t io n  for th e  a ttacks of  9/11.
The 2002 NSS added, “H is to ry  will  judge h a rsh ly  those  who saw 
this  coming danger  but  fai led to act. In th e  new w o r ld  we have 
en te red ,  the  on ly  pa th  to peace and  secur i ty  is the p a th  of a c t io n .”26 
The secu r i ty  s t ra tegy  made it c lear  th a t  th e  DoP w ou ld  be a 
s ignif icant  e lem en t  in defeat ing  te r ror is ts ;  hence ,  th e  secur i ty  
s t ra tegy  sta ted ,  the  “U.S. wil l,  if  necessary, act  p re e m p t iv e ly .”27 It 
descr ibed t e r ro r i sm  as the  most serious th re a t  facing th e  U n i ted  States 
and conf i rm ed  th a t  America  would  act against  em erg ing  th re a ts  before 
th ey  could  ful ly  form, and act  against  rogue states t h a t  considered  
WMD “as weapons  of choice,  tools  of  in t im ida t ion ,  and m il i ta ry  
aggress ion.”28
The Bush adm in is t ra t io n  iden t i f ied  Iraq, Iran, and  N o r th  Korea 





p repa red  to stop these  te r ro r i s t  c l ien ts  be fo re  t h e y  are  able to 
th re a te n  or use weapons  of  mass d e s t ru c t io n  against  t h e  U.S. and our 
allies and f r i en d s .” As such, it is c lear  the  s t ra tegy  was th e  in i t ia l  
p rescr ip t ion ,  and p recu rso r  to a long, vigorous,  and p ro t rac te d  
struggle.
U n b e k n o w n s t  to many,  the  GW OT w e n t  well b e yond  m il i ta ry  
opera t ions  in  Afghan is tan  and Iraq. The war  encompassed  m il i ta ry  
opera t ions  in Africa,  Colombia, and the  Ph i l ipp ines .  The U n i ted  States 
im p lem en ted  six specific m il i ta ry  campaigns u nd e r  th e  u m b re l la  of 
the  GWOT. The f i rs t  effort ,  dubbed  “O p e ra t io n  Act ive  E n dea v o r ,” 
began on  O ctober  4, 2001, and was an im m edia te  naval  response  to 
9/11. This effort ,  exh ib i ted  so l idar i ty  b e tw e e n  the U n i ted  States and  
NATO in  f igh t ing  te r ro r i s t  ac t iv i ty  in  t h e  M e d i te r r a n e a n .29 In 
addit ion,  the  Bush adm in is t ra t io n  was co n ce rned  abou t  Afr ica 
becom ing a b reed in g  ground  for t e r ro r i s t s  due to its vast  u n g o v e rn ed  
spaces and u n p ro te c te d  borders , and  in s t i tu te d  a Combined Joint  Task 
Force in  the  H orn  of  Afr ica .30
29 North Atlantic  Treaty Organization Homepage,  "Operation Act ive  
Endeavour," November 10, 2010,  accessed February 15, 2011, 2 0 1 1 .ht tp:/ /  
w w w .n ato . in t /cps /en /na to l ive / top ic s_7932 .h tm .
30 Department of  Defense,  “U.S. Africa Command,  Combined Joint Task 
Force-Horn of  Africa, Fact Sheet ,” accessed March 15, 2011,  h t tp : / /w w w .h o a . 
africom.mil/pdfFiles/Fact%20Sheet.pdf .
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The confl ic t  in  Colombia is the  leas t  w e l l -k n o w n  b ran c h  of the  
GWOT. Colombia  occupied  a u n iqu e  po s i t io n  w i th in  the  GWOT in 
th a t  its ta rg e ted  t e r ro r i s t  groups were  Marxist  r a th e r  t h a n  Islamic, but  
they  did  not  have any rep o r ted  l inks to  a l-Qaeda or o th e r  Islamic 
groups. The U n i ted  States and the  C o lom bian  g o v e rn m e n t  fought  
against  the  R evo lu t ionary  Arm ed Forces of Colombia  (FARC), the  
Nat ional  L ibera t ion  Arm y (ELN), and t h e  U n i ted  Self-Defense Forces 
of  Colombia (AUC), who  were  all cons idered  v io le n t  c r im ina l  
organizat ions  th a t  fund th e i r  ac t iv i t ies  t h ro u g h  il legal  drug 
ac t iv i t ies .31
The GW OT in the  Phi l ipp ines  was p a r t  of  a g rea te r  U.S. s t ra tegy  
to combat  Islamic te r ro r i sm  th ro u g h o u t  Sou theas t  Asia. U.S. m il i ta ry  
opera t ions  in th e  Ph i l ipp ines  were  l im i ted  because U.S. forces were  
not  p e rm i t ted  to pa r t ic ipa te  in combat  in  the  coun try ;  th e re fo re ,  the  
Uni ted  States was cons t ra ined  to t ra in in g  and advis ing F i l ip ino  u n i t s .32
The g o v e rn m e n t  of the  Ph i l ipp ines ,  a longtim e  major  non-  
NATO ally of th e  U n i ted  States faced insurgencies  f rom the  Moro 
Islamic L ibera t ion  Front ,  the  Moro Nat iona l  L ibera t ion  Front ,  Abu
31 Andrew Feickert,  “U.S. Mil itary Operations in the Global  War on 
Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Phil ippines,  and Colombia ,” Congressional  
Research Service report, February 2005.
32 Department of  Defense,  “Operation Enduring Freedom, Phi l ip p in es ,” 
accessed March 15, 2011, h t tp : / /w w w .defense .gov /h om e/ fea tures /2010 /0210_  
Phil ippines/ .
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Sayyaf, and  the  Rajah Sulaiman M o vem en t .33 T he  Abu Sayyaf group 
has rep o r ted  f inanc ia l  and t r a in in g  l inks to a l-Qaeda  and  has become 
the  focus of U.S. c o u n te r te r r o r  efforts  in th e  reg ion .34 The Moro 
Islamic L ibera t ion  F ron t  has r ep o r ted ly  p rov id ed  t r a in in g  faci l i t ies  to 
an Islamic group aff i l ia ted  w i th  a l-Qaeda based largely in  Indones ia .35
On September  20, 2001, P res iden t  Bush gave an u l t im a tu m  to 
the  Tal iban go v e rn m e n t  of A fghan is tan  to  tu rn  over Osama b in  Laden 
and o th e r  a l-Qaeda leaders .36 The Tal iban  refused,  and  in October  
2001, U.S. forces invaded  Afghanis tan .  The invas ion  was designa ted  as 
“O p era t ion  E ndur ing  F reedo m ,” and  it sought  to cap tu re  Osama bin  
Laden, des t roy  al-Qaeda,  and e l im ina te  th e  Tal iban  regime.
A f te r  the  rapid  demise of the  Taliban,  th e  Uni ted  States tu rn e d  
its a t t e n t io n  towards  Iraq, asser t ing  th a t  th e r e  were l inks be tw een  
Saddam Hussein  and al-Qaeda.  At the  time, i t  was suspec ted  th a t  
Saddam Hussein  had  prov ided  suppor t  to a l -Qaeda  for 9/11,  and  had a 
WMD deve lopm en t  p rogram  th a t  m ight  p rov ide  add i t iona l  suppor t  to
33 Rommel C. Banlaoi,  “The Abu Sayyaf  Group: From Mere Banditry to 
Genuine Terrorism,” Southeast  Asian Affairs, Volume 2006,  247-262,  accessed  
March 10, 2011,  ht tp:/ /www.js tor .org /d iscover /10 .2307/27913313?uid=3739936  
&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101281974817.
34 Ibid.
35 Andrew Feickert,  “U.S. Mili tary Operations in the Global  War on 
Terrorism: Afghanistan,  Africa, the Phil ippines,  and Colombia ,” Congressional  
Research Service report, February 2005.
36 Bush, George W. “Address to the Joint Session o f  Congress and the  
American People ,” September 21, 2001.
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t e r ro r i s t  o rgan izat ions .  In addit ion ,  B aghdad’s p o s t -G u lf  W a r  defiance  
dur ing  the  late  1990s consis ted of n um erou s  fai lures to coopera te  w i th  
a series of  in te rn a t io n a l  inspec t ions  c o n d u c ted  by th e  In te rn a t io n a l  
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), causing the  U n i ted  States to believe 
Iraq was h id in g  or developing  WMD. As Iraq co n t in u ed  its defiance  of 
pos t -G u lf  W ar  UNSC resolutions,  the  p ro b ab i l i ty  of a U.S. invas ion  
grew.
The UN la ter  d e te rm ined  th a t  Saddam Hussein  was legally 
neg l igen t  u n d e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law, and in  November  2002, th e  UNSC 
adopted  Reso lu t ion  1441, giving Iraq an  u l t im a tu m  to  coopera te  in 
d isa rm a m e n t .37 Secre tary  of Defense Rumsfeld spoke c an d id ly  about  
the  dangers of  I r a q ’s W MD programs and its t ies to te r ro r i s t  
o rganizat ions .  Rumsfeld sta ted,  “There  was an em ergence  o f  a nexus 
b e tw een  t e r ro r i s t  ne tw orks ,  te r ro r i s t  states,  and w eapons  of  mass 
d es t ruc t ion  t h a t  can make m igh ty  adversaries of  small or 
im pover ished  sta tes and even re la t ive ly  small groups o f  in d iv id u a ls .”38 
Rumsfeld a r t i cu la ted  his jus t i f ica t ion  for p reem p t ive  act ion,
37 United Nations Security Council ,  Resolution 1441 (2002) ,  accessed,  
May 10. 2011, h t tp :/ /w w w .un .org /D epts /unm ovic /new /docum en ts /reso lu t ions / s -  
res-1441 .pdf.
38 Jeffrey Record, “The Bush Doctrine and War w i th  Iraq,” P aram eters  
(Spring 2003) , 4-16.
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ind ica t ing  t h a t  the  “absence of  ev idence  is no t  ev idence  of  absence  of 
weapons of mass d e s t ru c t io n .”39
In a speech  given to the  In te rn a t io n a l  In s t i tu te  for  Strategic  
Studies (IISS), D eputy  Secre tary  of  Defense  Paul  W olfowitz  reached  a 
similar  conc lus ion  w h e n  he suggested,  “The n o t io n  th a t  we can w ai t  
to p repa re  assumes tha t  we k n ow  w h e n  th e  th rea t  is im m i n e n t . ” 
W olfowitz  r e in fo rced  his po t ion  by declar ing  t h e  fol lowing:
W h e n  w ere  th e  at tacks of Sep tem ber  11 imm inen t?  Cer ta in ly ,  
th e y  w ere  im m in en t  on Septem ber  10, a l tho u gh  we d id n ' t  know  
it. A nyone  w ho  believes th a t  we can  w ai t  un t i l  we  have  ce r ta in  
knowledge  th a t  a t tacks are im m in e n t  has failed to co nnec t  the  
dots t h a t  led to September  l l . 40
On February  5, 2003, Secre tary  of State  Colin Pow ell  addressed 
a p lena ry  sess ion of the  UNSC to argue in  favor of m il i ta ry  ac t ion  in
39 Raja Menon, W eapons o f  Mass D estru ction ,  Sage, 2005, 157.
40 Paul W ol fow itz ,  U.S. Department of  Defense,  Office of  the Assistant  
Secretary of  Defense,  Speech to International  Inst i tute  for Strategic Studies,  
accessed May 20, 2012, h t tp : / /w ww .i i s s .o rg /recent -key-addresses /wo l fow it z -  
address/.
Iraq, asser t ing,  “There  can be no doub t  th a t  Saddam Hussein  has 
biological  weapons  and  the  capabil i ty  to rap id ly  p roduce  more,  m any  
m ore .”41 F u r th e rm o re ,  Secre tary  Powell  a r t i cu la ted  he had no doub t  
th a t  Saddam was w o rk in g  to ob ta in  k ey  c o m p o nen ts  to p roduce  
nuc lear  w e ap o n s .42 A l though  S ec re ta ry  Powell  u l t im a te ly  had  
diff iculty  e s tab l ish ing  and com m u n ica t ing  a credible  co nn ec t io n  
be tw een  Saddam Hussein  and a l-Qaeda,  th e  Bush adm in is t r a t io n  did 
not  waver  f rom  its convic t ion  th a t  Sad d am ’s regime po ten t ia l  
possession of W M D was d e t r im e n ta l  to U.S. securi ty .  P re s id en t  Bush 
declared:
You c a n ’t d is t ingu ish  b e tw ee n  a l-Qaeda  and Saddam w h e n  you 
ta lk  abou t  the  war  on terror ism.  T h e y ’re  both  equal ly  as bad, 
and equal ly  as evil,  and equally  as d e s t ru c t iv e .”43 He added, “The 
danger  is th a t  a l -Qaeda becomes an ex tens ion  of  Saddam ’s
41 Colin Powell ,  U.S. State Department, Remarks to the United Nations  
Security Council  (February 5, 2003),  accessed January 20, 2012, w w w .s ta te .gov /  
secretary/former/po we l l / rem arks /2003 /17300.htm.
42 Ibid.
43 Jeffrey Record, “The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq,” Param eters  
(Spring 2003) , 4-16.
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madness and his h a t red  and his capaci ty  to ex tend  weapons  of 
mass d e s t ru c t io n  a ro u nd  the  w o r ld .44
In his w eek ly  radio  address on March  8, 2003, P re s id en t  Bush 
l inked th e  case for w ar  against  Iraq to the 9/11 a ttacks,  suggesting 
th a t  Saddam Hussein  would  in i t ia te  a similar  a t tack  against  the  Uni ted  
States once  he possessed a n uc lea r  w eapon .  P res iden t  Bush conveyed:
If  the  w or ld  fails to co n fron t  the  th r e a t  posed by th e  Iraqi 
regime, refus ing  to use force, even as a las t  resor t ,  free na t ions  
w ould  assume im m ense  and unaccep tab le  risks. The attacks of 
Sep tem ber  11th, 2001, show ed  w h a t  the  enem ies  o f  America  did 
w i th  four  airplanes.  W e  will  not  w ai t  to  see w h a t  te r ro r is ts  or 
te r ro r i s t  states could do w i th  weapons o f  mass des t ruc t ion .  We 
are d e te rm in ed  to con fron t  th rea ts  w he rev e r  t h e y  arise. I wil l
44 Quoted in Mike Allen,  “Bush: Hussein,  A1 Qaeda Linked,” W ashington  
Post, September 26, 2002.
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no t  leave the  A m erican  people  at th e  m ercy  of th e  I raqi  d ic ta to r  
and his w eap on s .45
These dec la ra t ions  c lear ly  d em on s t ra te s  how th e  ca tas t roph ic  
attacks of 9/11 had  increased  U.S. pe rcep t io n s  o f  th rea t ,  and  genera ted  
a consensus of  d e te rm in a t io n ,  and seriousness  o f  purpose  in  the  Bush 
adm in is t ra t ion .  The attacks were  so shocking  th a t  th e y  p ro du ced  an 
equal ly  s tu n n in g  reac t ion  from W ash ing ton .
Perhaps  the  most  appropr ia te  th e o ry  to descr ibe  the  Bush 
a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s d isposi t ion  is S tephan W a l t ’s “ba lance  of  t h r e a t ” 
theory ,  w h ic h  claims th a t  th e  behav io r  of  na t ions  is d e te rm in e d  by 
the  level of th r e a t  th a t  it perceives f rom its enem ies .46 Thus,  the  
U ni ted  States, suppor ted  by over 30 c o u n t r ie s  re fe r red  to as the  
“coal i t ion  of the  w i l l in g ,” a t tacked  I raq  d u r ing  “O p e ra t io n  Iraqi 
F reedo m ” on March  20, 2003.47 48
45 “Administration Comments on Saddam Hussein and the Sept. 11 
Attacks,” W ashington  P o s t , archives September 6, 2003, accessed March 26,
2012,  w w w .w ash in g to n p o st . c o m /w p -s r v /p o l i t i c s /p o l l s /9 - l l _ sa d d a m _ q u o tes .h tm l .
46 Stephen M. Walt,  “All iance Formation and Balance of  World  Pow er ,” 
International  Security,  vol .  9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985) , 3 -43.
47 France, Germany, and Russia, “the coal i t ion of  the u n w i l l i n g ,” opposed  
the United States and the United Kingdom, mainta ining that the UNSC would  
not authorize the use of  force w i thout  UN approval.
In ad d i t io n  to forcing regime change  in  Iraq, t h e  U n i ted  States 
sought to  t r an s fo rm  the  co u n t ry  in to  a democracy .  The Bush 
adm in is t ra t io n  did no t  w an t  s imply to defea t  te r ro r is ts ,  i t  w a n ted  to 
remove ideologies th a t  fostered te r ro r i sm  a n d  replace  th em  w i th  
democracy. The a d m in is t ra t io n  be l ieved  th a t  he lp ing  coun tr ies  in the  
Middle East t r a n s i t io n  in to  democracies  was essentia l  to des troy ing  
the  fu n d am e n ta l  source of Islamist  te r ro r ism .
Toppling  foreign  regimes to emplace  democra t ic  g overnm en ts  is
not  a new  s t ra tegy  for the  Uni ted  States. Dur ing  the  Cold W ar ,  the
United  States p u rsued  a s imilar  pol icy  o f  d em o cra t iza t ion  w i th  the  
ov e r th ro w  of var ious  regimes in Sou th  America .  For in s tance ,  in  1958 
the  U n i ted  States assisted Venezuela  t r an s i t io n  to  dem ocracy  w h e n  its 
cit izens ousted  m i l i ta ry  d ic ta tor ,  Marcos Perez  J im enez .49
Nationa l  Securi ty  Adviser  Condoleezza  Rice argued in 2003, “A 
t rans fo rm ed  Iraq  can become a key e le m e n t  in a very d i f f e ren t  Middle 
East in w h ic h  th e  ideologies of ha te  w i l l  n o t  f lour ish .”50 Using an
48 See table 4 in appendix C for a l ist of the coal i t ion of  the w i l l i n g ” 
countries.
49 Judith Ewell ,  “The Extradition o f  Marcos Perez Jimenez,  1959-63:
Practical Precedent for Administrative Honesty?”, Journal o f  Latin  A m erican
Studies, Volume9,  Issue 2 (November 1977)  291-313.
50 Condoleezza  Rice, “Transforming the Middle East ,” W ashington  Post, 
August 7, 2003,  accessed,  April 20, 2012, ht tp:/ /pqasb.pqarchiver.com/  
washingtonpost /resul ts .html?st=advanced&uid=&MAC=50a23aal f3f5c6104e90e36  
051420d61 &QryTxt=&s or tby=RELE VANCE&datetype=68tf  rommonth=07&fromday
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e qu iva len t  ca lcu la t ion ,  U nder  Secre ta ry  o f  Defense W olfowitz  
p roc la im ed  in July 2003, “The ba t t le  to w in  th e  peace in  I raq  now  is 
the  cen t ra l  ba t t le  in th e  war  against  t e r r o r i s m .”51
The them es  o u t l in e d  in the  2002 NSS o u t l in e d  th e  p lan  to create  
a stable and sus ta inab le  post-9/11 global  system. The them es  of the  
secur i ty  s t ra tegy  were  g rou n db reak in g  in  t h a t  th ey  c o n ta in e d  several  
s ignif icant  innovat ions .  First,  the  secu r i ty  s t ra tegy  sough t  to p reem pt  
te r ro r is ts  th a t  were  th rea ts  to the  U n i ted  States. Second, it  embraced  
m il i ta ry  dom inance  ra th e r  th an  re ly ing  so le ly  on de te r ren c e  or 
co n ta in m e n t  to  m it iga te  global  threa ts .  Lastly, it sough t  to p rev en t  
acquis i t ion  of  W MD th ro u g h  regime change  and  p rev en t iv e  m il i ta ry  
act ion  against  rogue n a t io n s .52
For the  Bush adm in is t ra t ion ,  the  war  on  t e r ro r i sm  was not  a 
conven t iona l  w ar  in w h ic h  m il i ta ry  v ic to ry  t ran s la te d  in to  a pol i t ica l  
imposi t ion  of te rm s of  a peace t rea ty .  C om bat ing  t e r ro r i sm  for the  
U ni ted  States was a chal lenge  to t r ad i t io n a l  m i l i ta ry  d o c t r in e  because
=01 &fr omy e ar=2003&t om on t h=08 & to day=30&toyear=2 00 3 &By=&Title=Trans form 
ing+the + Middle + East&Sect=ALL.
51 Quoted in Walter Pincus, “Wolfowitz:  Iraq Key To War on Terrorism;  
DOD Official  Cites Links to al-Qaeda,” W ashington  Post,  July 28, 2003,  accessed  




52 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W in n in g  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003),  9.
the  U.S. m il i ta ry  had  always t r a in ed  to f igh t  c o n v en t io n a l  wars. 
Conven t iona l  wars b e tw ee n  t rad i t io na l  na t ion -s ta te s  are  governed  by 
rules of  warfare ,  b u t  te r ro r is ts  do not  accept  or abide  by W es te rn  
terms o f  war  and peace. T rad i t iona l  confl icts  p rov ided  c lear  s tandards  
of  m easur ing  success t h ro u g h  th e  d e s t ru c t io n  of e n em y  assets and 
c la iming en em y  te r r i to ry .  These W e s te rn  v iews are n o t  applicable  to 
te r ror is ts .  G eorge tow n  professor ,  Bruce Hoffman u n d e rp in s  th is  
premise as he asserts:
Terror is ts ,  however ,  do not  fu n c t io n  in th e  open as a rm ed  units ,  
and  genera l ly  do no t  a t t em p t  to seize t e r r i to ry ;  they  
d e l ib e ra te ly  avoid engaging en em y  m il i ta ry  forces in combat,  
and  rare ly  exercise any d i rec t  co n tro l  or sove re ign ty  over e i ther  
t e r r i to r y  or p o p u la t io n .53
In the  ear ly  1990s U.S. Army Major Ralph Peters ,  a foreign  area 
officer  for Eurasia  in the  office of th e  Deputy  C h ie f  of  Staff for
53 Bruce Hoffman, Inside  Terrorism  (New York: Columbia Univers ity  
Press, 2006) ,  41.
In te l l igence  was responsib le  for eva lua t ing  emerging  th rea ts  in 
Eurasia. He la te r  a u th o re d  an art ic le  t i t l ed  “The  New W a r r io r  Class,” 
in w h ic h  he emphasizes th a t  the  fu tu re  enem ies  of th e  U.S. w ou ld  be 
( te rror is t )  w ar r io rs  seeking to des t roy  order .  He ind ica ted  these  
w arr io rs  w ou ld  no t  adhere  to ru les  of m o d e rn  warfare  and  would  not  
fol low the  E u ropean-A m er ican  rules of th e  Geneva C onven t ion .  Major 
Peters  surmises:
Unl ike  soldiers , [ terror is t ]  w ar r io rs  do n o t  play by our  rules , 
th ey  do not  respect  t rea ties ,  and do not  obey orders  th e y  do not
l ik e  You e i th e r  w in  or you lo se  This  kind of w arfare  is a
zero-sum  game. And it takes guts to  p lay .54
Peters  suggested th a t  the  fu tu re  enem ies  of th e  U n i ted  States 
would  not  d iver t  from th e i r  ideological  mission because th ey  would  
be f igh t ing  for s t rong  e thnic ,  rel ig ious ,  or na t iona l  convic t ions .  He 
added tha t  the  most  dangerous group o f  w arr io rs  w ou ld  be homeless
54 Ralph Peters, “The New Warrior Class ,” Param eters  (Summer 1994),
16-26.
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m il i ta ry  m en  w ho  had lost  th e i r  jobs due  to a collapse in  g overnm en t .  
In v iew of  th e  confl ic ts  in  Iraq and A fghan is tan ,  P e te r s ’ forecas t  o f  an 
age of t e r ro r i s t  w arr io rs  is rem arkab ly  fo re te l l ing .
Pr ior  to 9/11, acts of t e r ro r i sm  w ere  regarded  as c r im ina l  acts 
ra the r  t h a n  acts of  war. Law e n fo rc e m e n t  officials focused on 
cap tur ing  te r ro r i s t s ,  or p reven t ing  fu tu re  attacks.  How ever ,  this 
dynamic changed  after  9/11 as the  Bush a d m in is t r a t io n  judged th a t  
the  u t te r  scale of  th e  a t tack  com bined  w i th  t h e  global  reach  of al- 
Qaeda requ i re d  rep lac ing  old paradigms w i th  n e w  tactics , techn iques ,  
and procedures .
The 2002 NSS had several  advantages. The  first  advantage  was 
tha t  it  sough t  to defeat  A m er ica ’s enem ies  th ro u g h  a vigorous 
response  to ex is ten t ia l  th rea ts .  Second, i t  enab led  the U n i ted  States to 
act u n i la te ra l ly  for its global  ends, and  en su red  U.S. in te res ts  were  
not  su bord ina ted  to o ther  na t ions  or o rgan iza t ions  w i th  d i f fe ren t  
goals.
The s t ra tegy  was disadvantaged because  it r isked  imperia l  
overreach  as it  re l ied  heavily  on m il i ta ry  power ,  w h ich  requ ires  large 
quanti t ies  of  people ,  money, and regu la r  ideological  su p po r t  from the  
public. A n o th e r  d isadvantage  of the  s t ra tegy  lay in th e  fact  it  a larmed 
the  in te rn a t io n a l  com m uni ty ,  w h ic h  d readed  the  c re a t io n  of  a new
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in te rn a t io n a l  no rm  for us ing m il i ta ry  force as the  p rev a i l ing  option. 
The 2002 NSS u n ve i led  its ou t look  on  rogue s ta tes,  and declared:
W e must be p rep a red  to stop rogue s ta tes  and th e i r  te r ro r i s t  
c l ients  before  th ey  are able to t h r e a t e n  or use w eapons  of  mass 
d es t ruc t ion  against  the  U n i ted  States and  our allies and  fr iends.  
. . . .Given th e  goals of rogue sta tes and  te r ro r i s t s ,  th e  Uni ted  
States can no longer  solely re ly  on a reac t ive  p os tu re  as we have 
in the  p a s t— Because our  enemies see W M D  not  as means  of last
resort ,  b u t  r a th e r  as weapons of  c h o ic e  as tools  of
in t im id a t io n  and m i l i ta ry  agg ress ion . . . the  Uni ted  States will,  if 
necessary, act p ree m p t iv e ly .55
Analysis  of  th e  DoP raises quest ions  on  th e  ove ra rch in g  u t i l i ty  
of the  s trategy.  The DoP has s tra tegic  l im i ta t ions  based in  its r igidness 
of fu n c t io n  and cost of im p lem en ta t ion ,  th e r e b y  making its lo ng - te rm  
u t i l i ty  un ce r ta in .  For instance,  the  b lu e p r in t  for s t ra teg ic  success
55 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002, 15.
105
against  t e r ro r i s t  in  Afghan is tan  does not  necessar i ly  equa te  to success 
against  t e r ro r i s t  in Somalia. Moreover ,  the  DoP does n o t  guaran tee  
success in the  d e te r ren c e  of s t rong  na t io n -s ta te s  tha t  seek WMD. For 
example, a successful  regime change  in Iraq does no t  g ua ran tee  the  
same success in  N o r th  Korea, or Iran.
O thers  quest ions  come to m ind  w h e n  one  considers  w h e th e r  
th e re  was an a l te rn a t iv e  post-9/11 s t ra tegy  for th e  U n i ted  States. Was 
it  feasible for pol icymakers  in W ash in g to n  to exclude the  m il i ta ry  
op t ion  and  focus on o th e r  DIME e lem ents  of power? W as it  possible 
th a t  a d ip lom atic ,  economic,  or in te l l igence  s t ra tagem  could  have 
p ro tec ted  America  from fu tu re  t e r ro r i s t s  a t tack? These quest ions  are 
open to debate;  how ever ,  w h a t  is k n o w n  is th e  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  
judged d e te r re n c e  to be inef fec t ive— the 2002 NSS asserts:
In th e  Cold W ar ,  we faced a genera l ly  s ta tus -quo ,  r isk-averse  
adversary .  D e te r rence  was an effect ive defense. But d e te r ren ce  
based on ly  on the  t h re a t  of  re ta l ia t ion  is less l ike ly  to work  
against  leaders of  rogue states more wil l ing  to take risks, 
gambling  w i th  the  lives of th e i r  people , and  the  w e a l th  of the i r  
nations.  T rad i t iona l  concepts  of d e te r ren ce  wil l  no t  work
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against  a te r ro r i s t  enem y w hose  avowed tactics are  w a n to n  
d e s t ru c t io n  and the  ta rge t ing  of  innocen ts ;  w h ose  so-cal led  
soldiers  seek m ar ty rdo m  in  d ea th  and  whose  most p o ten t  
p ro te c t io n  is s ta te lessness .56
Suppor te rs  of the  GW OT alleged tha t ,  i f  th e  U n i ted  States could 
disrup t  global  te r ro r i s t  ne tw orks  such  as a l-Qaeda and  remove 
d ic ta tors  such  as Saddam Hussein ,  i t  w ou ld  essen t ia l ly  be p rom ot ing  
th e  global  in te res ts  of the  in te rn a t io n a l  com m un i ty  at large. The 
a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s assumptions  received  mixed reviews from scholars 
and poli t ic ians .
P a r t ic ipan ts  in the  2003 Stanley F o u n d a t io n ’s In d e p e n d e n t  Task 
Force, t h a t  suppor ted  the  GWOT, asser ted  th e  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s 
s t ra tegy “vigorously  responds to th e  ex is ten t ia l  th rea ts  to the  Uni ted  
States posed by te r ro r i s t  ne tw orks  w i th  a global  reach and  the  ‘axis of 
e v i l ’ s ta te s .”57 O th e r  pa r t ic ipan ts  of th e  task force, c r i t ica l  of the  
GWOT, argue th a t  the  U n i ted  States risks “imperia l  o v e r s t r e t c h ,” 
dur ing  a war  on ter ror .  They  added, re ly ing  on such a s tra tegy,  “is
56 Ibid, 15.
57 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael Kraig. “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  32.
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exhaust ing  scarce economic  resources  by tak ing  on  too  many 
s im ultaneous  in te rn a t io n a l  com m itm en ts ,  w h ic h  may c rea te  bat t le  
fat igue among the  Am erican  people  w h o  are n o t  equ ipped  to bear  the  
f inancial  and psychological  costs of w h a t  some have cal led  ‘empire  
l i t e ’.”58
Reliance  on m il i ta ry  dom inance  caused m any  U.S. allies to v iew 
e lements  of  th e  GW OT w i th  disdain, v iew ing  it  as a fu r th e ra n c e  of an 
A m erican  empire .  O th e r  skeptics of  the  w a r  inc luded  fo rm er  Nat ional  
Securi ty  Advisors Brent  Scowcroft  a n d  Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  and 
former sec re ta ry  of state  Madele ine  A lb r ig h t .59 They a rgued  th a t  a war  
of choice against  I raq  w eakened  the  case for a w ar  of necess i ty  against  
a l-Qaeda. Stapling to g e th e r  th rea ts  f rom rogue  states and  te r ro r i s t  
organ izat ions  u n d e r  a single um bre l la  conf la ted  the  in ev i tab le  danger  
from Saddam Hussein  and the  th r e a t  f rom al-Qaeda.
58 Ibid, 31-32.
59 Brent Scowcroft,  “D o n ’t Attack Iraq,” W all S t r e e t  Journal,  August  15, 
2002; Madeleine  K. Albright,  “Where  Iraq Fits In on the War on Terror,” N e w  
York Times, September 13, 2002.
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THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The th re a t  of  te r ro r i sm  is ever  r e le v a n t  w h e n  one  th inks  
specifically of  the  horr i f ic  attacks of 9/11. In  the  con te x t  o f  tha t  
moment ,  the  p e rc e p t io n  of th rea t  in  W a s h in g to n  was e x t rem e ly  high.  
The Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s secur i ty  s t ra tegy  declared  th a t  th e  Uni ted  
States w o u ld  adapt  its na t iona l  secur i ty  s tra tegies  to con fron t  
inevi tab le  and im m in e n t  th rea ts .60 For th e  Bush adm in is t ra t ion ,  the  
im m in en t  th re a t  of  te r ro r i sm  just i f ied  th e  use o f  the DoP.
As s ta ted  ear l ie r ,  num erous U.S. P res iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t ion s  
have used m i l i ta ry  pow er  to shape reg iona l  and global  events.  By 
exam ining  the  h is to r ica l  record,  th e re  are c o n te m p o ra ry  paralle ls  
be tw een  the  9/11 attacks and th e  1941 bom b ing  of Pearl  Harbor ,  such 
as s ignif icant  casualties, and the  fact th e y  w ere  both su rp r ise  attacks.  
However,  for th e  purposes of this s tudy  a more  useful h is to r ica l  po in t  
of  compar ison  to 9/11, as it relates to  the  pe rcep t ion  o f  an emerging  
threa ts ,  is th e  Soviet U n io n ’s d e to n a t io n  of  its first a tom ic  bomb on 
August  29, 1949.
The Soviet  d e to n a t io n  caused a larm in  America  because it ended  
the  Uni ted  S ta te s ’ m onopoly  on nuc lea r  weapons,  ren d e r in g  it
60 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America ,” March 2006.
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vu lnerab le  to n u c lea r  a ttack.  In react ion ,  the  U n i ted  States in t rod u ced  
the  Cold W ar  s t ra tegy  of de te r rence .  Similar ly ,  the  a t tacks  of 9/11 
caused alarm in  America  by exposing its v u ln e ra b i l i ty  to te r ro r ism ,  
causing W a sh in g to n  to im p lem en t  the  DoP. In  bo th  cases, the  T rum an  
and Bush adm in is t ra t io n s  sought  to c rea te  effect ive  and  ra t ional  
global s t ra teg ies  in  a w or ld  radica l ly  a l te red ,  one  by a tomic  weapons,  
and the  o th e r  by ter ror ism .
During  the  Cold W ar,  d e te r ren c e  focused on conv inc ing  
adversaries th a t  an aggressive act ion  w ould  provoke a reac t ion  
resu l t ing  in unaccep tab le  damage.  One can reasonably  assume th a t  
de te r rence  may rem ain  effective against  na t ion -s ta te s  such  as I ran  and 
North  Korea because n e i th e r  coun try  w ou ld  in te n t io n a l ly  pursue  
m il i ta ry  ac t ion  against  the  Uni ted  States t h a t  m ig h t  lead to a 
des t ruc t ive  U.S. re ta l ia t ion .  This assum ption  is no t  th e  case for 
t e r ro r i s t  n o n -s ta te  actors.  For d e te r ren c e  to w o rk  th e  U n i ted  States 
would  have to t h r e a te n  som eth ing  te r ro r is ts  value;  ho w ev er ,  t e r ro r i s t  
actors do not  have  assets of w h ic h  the  U n i ted  States could  th rea ten .
In addit ion ,  d e te r ren ce  would  not  p ropaga te  an im m edia te  sense 
of “shock and aw e ,” and would  no t  d e m o n s t ra te  to w o r ld  th a t  the  
Uni ted  States was acu te ly  de te rm in e d  to defea t  te r ro r ism .  In th is  
context,  it  is c lear the  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  im p le m e n te d  the  DoP
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because it assumed the  s t ra tegy  best  served  i ts  im m edia te  na t ional  
secur i ty  in te res ts .  W a s h in g to n ’s shif t  f rom d e te r r e n c e  to the  DoP is 
d em o n s t ra ted  in  f igure  1.
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Figure 1. Strategic O pt ions
The s tra tegic  op t ions  i l lu s t ra t ion  depic ts  th e  DoP as th e  leading 
op t ion  for the  U n i ted  States, and displays the  DoP h a v in g  a shor te r ,  
results  d r iven  t im e - l in e  th an  de te r rence .  The DoP is advantageous  in 
th e  sh o r t - t e rm  because it de l ivered  m ore  im m ed ia te  resul ts ,  un l ike  
de te r rence ,  w h ic h  was a res t ra ined  s t ra tegy  th a t  took a longer  t ime to
I l l
achieve resu l ts  d u r in g  the  Cold W ar .  Again, one  canno t  overs ta te  the  
im p o r tan ce  of the  pe rcep t io n  of t h r e a t  in  th e  Uni ted  States a f te r  9/11. 
The Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  be l ieved  th a t  d e te r ren ce  was ineffect ive  
against  Saddam Hussein. As a resu l t ,  W a sh in g to n  chose to im p lem en t  
the  DoP because it  a llowed th e  U n i ted  States to  take advan tage  of its 
p re p o n d e ra n t  m i l i ta ry  power.
SUMMARY
This chap te r  dem o ns t ra ted  how  diverse  U.S. p res iden t ia l  
adm in is t ra t ions  used d is t inc t ive  s t ra teg ies  to guide  th e  use of  na t ional  
power to achieve  specific results .  T h ro u g h o u t  its h is to ry ,  th e  Uni ted  
States has successfully  ca r r ied  ou t  its n a t io n a l  secu r i ty  policies  by 
using th e  DIME elements  of  pow er  to s t r e n g th e n  its pos i t io n  on the 
global stage. 61 His tory  has show n  th a t  from the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of  the  
Monroe  doc tr ine ,  to the  p os t -W o r ld  W ar  II Cold W a r  securi ty  
e n v iro n m en t ,  th ro u g h  to th e  a t tacks o f  9/11, the U n i t e d  States has 
used a v a r ie ty  of s t ra tegies  to ensure  its survival  in  th e  anarchic
61 Sam C. Sarkesian and others,  U.S. N a tion a l  Security :  P o licym akers ,  
Processes, and P o l i t ic s  (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) ,  33.
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in te rn a t io n a l  system. From H arry  T ru m a n  to George W. Bush, U.S. 
P res iden ts  have c o n tend ed  w i th  c rea t ing  the  opt imal  p rocedures  for 
p ro tec t in g  U.S. in teres ts .  One c o m m o n a l i ty  b e tw ee n  all the  p res iden ts  
is th e i r  ab i l i ty  to crea te  s t ra teg ies  to shape global even ts  in  ways 
favorable to A m er ican  pr inc ip les  and  in te r e s t s .62 63
The Unites  States has of ten  de fau l ted  to th e  m i l i ta ry  e le m e n t  of  
power as an ex tens ion  of poli t ic  discourse.  Indeed,  one of the  most  
famous edicts  on w ar  is Baron Carl von C lausew itz ’s On War, w h e re  
the  concep t  o f  w ar  is recognized  as a pol i t ica l  i n s t r u m e n t— “a 
co n t in u a t io n  o f  poli t ics  by o ther  m ean s .”64 Consequen t ly ,  as s t rong 
case can be made th a t  A m er ica ’s e x t r a o rd in a ry  m il i ta ry  po w er  shapes 
its pol i t ica l  v iew  of global securi ty .
Robert  Kagan contends  th a t  the  U n i ted  States perceives the  
world  as an e n v i ro n m e n t  fi lled w i th  p o ten t ia l  th rea ts  to be con tro l led  
using m il i ta ry  force .65 Fur th e rm o re ,  Robert  A r t  and K e n n e th  W al tz  in 
The Use o f  Force, assert  fungible  pow er  con t in uu m s  d e m o n s t ra te  how
62 Ibid.
63 See table 3, appendix B for a l ist  of  Major National  Security Council  
Authorities.
64 Peter Paret, C lau sew itz  and th e  S tate  (London: Oxford Univers ity  
Press, 1976),  25.
65 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and Pow er: A m e r ic a n  and Europe in  the  
N e w  W orld  O rder  (New York: Random House,  2003),  61.
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the  funct ions  of  pow er  can fores ta l l  poss ible  c o n f ro n ta t io ns  from 
o th e r  n a t io n s .66 The au thors  assert:
M il i ta ry  pow er  is fungible  to a degree  because its physica l  use, 
its th re a te n e d  use, or s imply its m ere  p resence  s t ru c tu re  
expec ta t io n  and in f luence  and  po l i t ica l  ca lcula t ions  of actors. 
The grav i ta t iona l  effects m il i ta ry  po w er  means th a t  its in f luence  
pervades  the  o ther  pol icy  rea lm s .67
After  9/11, the  United  States used  its fungible  m i l i ta ry  po w er  to 
mit igate  t e r ro r i s t  th rea ts  to its global  p re e m in e n c e .68 The  DoP allowed 
the  U n i ted  States to dem ons t ra te  the  seriousness of  its in t e n t  to 
combat  global  te r ro r ism .  A m er ica ’s ra t iona le  for choosing  the  DoP 
r a th e r  t h a n  de te r ren ce ,  s tem from th e  differences b e tw ee n  the  
threa ts ,  a ssumptions  on how  to c o n f ro n t  those  th rea ts ,  and  the
66 Robert J Art and Kenneth N. Waltz ,  The Use o f  Force: M i l i ta r y  P o w e r  
and In tern a t io n a l  P o lit ics ,  6th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlef ield,  2004),  7.
67 Ibid.
68 U.S. Department of  Defense,  Q u adren n ia l D efense  R e v i e w  R e p o r t  
(September 30, 2001) ,  30, 62.
am ount  of t im e  (or urgency)  needed  to  o b ta in  resu l ts  from each 
st rategy.
From th e  Cold W ar  to 9/11, each  p res iden t ia l  a d m in is t r a t io n  
adapted  its n a t ion a l  securi ty  polic ies to address  specific chal lenges .  
The DoP was the  top p r io r i ty  of th e  Bush a d m in is t ra t ion ,  as 
d e te r rence  was the  top p r io r i ty  du r ing  the  Cold W ar ,  and b o th  
stra tegies w ere  fo rm ula ted  to address specific  th rea ts .  U l t im ate ly ,  
bo th  s t ra teg ies  had  th e  comm on goal of safeguarding  th e  U n i ted  States 
and p rese rv ing  its global  primacy.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY ANTICIPATORY ACTION: CONDITIONS FOR 
PREEMPTION OR PREVENTION
“W e must  adapt  the  concep t  of  im m in en t  t h r e a t  to the  
capabil i t ies  and  objectives of t o d a y ’s adversaries. Rogue sta tes 
and te r ro r i s t s  do not  seek to a t tack  us using co n ven t io n a l  
means. They  know  such at tacks w ou ld  fail.  Instead,  t h e y  re ly  on 
acts of  t e r ro r  and, po ten t ia l ly ,  the  use  of weapons  of mass 
d e s t ru c t io n — weapons th a t  can be easi ly  concealed, de l ivered  
covert ly ,  and used w i th o u t  w a r n in g .”
--—George W. Bush, Sep tem ber  20021
BACKGROUND
The 2002 NSS combines the  s t ra tegic  premises of  p ree m p t io n  
and p rev e n t io n  in to  one stra tegy o f  m i l i ta ry  an t ic ip a to ry  a c t io n .2 
Accordingly ,  th is  chap te r  examines the  concept  of m il i ta ry
1 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States of  
America,” September 2002, 15.
2 Ibid.
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an t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion ,  and discusses t r ad i t io na l  and  nuanced  percep t ions  
of  th e  concepts  of  p ree m p t io n  and p rev e n t io n .  I t  also provides 
tangible  h is to r ica l  ev idence  ind ica t ing  the  advantages  of  using such 
stra tegies as wel l  as the  risks associated w i th  im p le m e n t in g  them.
Strategies of  m i l i ta ry  s tra tegies  are in te re s t in g  topics  of  debate,  
and th ro u g h o u t  h is tory ,  na t ion -s ta te s  have used  various offensive and 
defensive s t ra teg ies  to p ro tec t  th e i r  n a t io n a l  in te res ts .  This in tu r n  
bols tered  the  ro ta t io n  of  num erous  balances o f  pow er  t h r o u g h o u t  the  
in te rn a t io n a l  system. C on tem porary  concepts  of  in te rn a t io n a l  law th a t  
re la te r  to w h a t  a n a t io n  can do in its ow n se lf -defense  began w i th  
pr incip les  th a t  resu l ted  f rom the  1837 Caro l ine  Affa ir .3
During  a Canadian  revol t  against  th e  British,  a U.S. ship named 
the  Caroline sailed per iod ica l ly  from U.S. t e r r i to r y  in to  Canada, to 
re inforce  and resupply  Canadian  rebels.  To s top  this ,  Bri t ish  forces 
e n te red  the  U n i ted  States, and  seized and des t royed  the  Caroline, 
k i l l ing two U n i ted  States ci t izens.  The U.S. Secre ta ry  of State, Daniel  
W ebs te r  argued the  Bri t ish  v io la ted  U.S. sovere ign ty .  W ebs te r  
reasoned th a t  the  use of  force in  se lf-defense  was jus t i f ied  only  if the  
“necessi ty  of se lf -defense  is ins tan t ,  ov e rw helm ing ,  and  leaving no
3 D.P. O'Connel l ,  In tern a t io n a l  Law, (London: Oceana Publications,  Inc. 
1965), 343.
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choice of means,  and  no m o m en t  for d e l ib e ra t io n .”4 A f te r  receiv ing  
the  p ro tes t  from W ash in g ton ,  the  Bri t ish  m a in ta ined  th e y  had  acted 
in lawful se l f -defense .5 The Bri tish even tu a l  apologized for the  
Caroline inc iden t ;  however ,  th is  case d em ons t ra te s  the  fact th a t  
na tions always do w ha t  is best  to  p ro tec t  th e i r  in te res t .
More c on tem poraneous  examples inc lude  the  G erm an  invas ion  
of Norway  in 1940, and G e rm a n y ’s subsequen t  invas ion  of  the  Balkans 
in 1941 to s t r e n g th e n  the  German h om elan d  against  possible  All ied 
c o u n te ra t tack s .6 O th e r  examples of offensive m i l i ta ry  ac t ion  include  
the  Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the  Arab-Israe l i  Six-Day W ar  in 
1967, the  Israel i  b o m b ard m en t  of th e  Iraqi  nuc lea r  reac to r  at Osirak 
in 1981, Kosovo in 1999, O pera t ion  E ndur ing  Freedom A fghan is tan  in 
2001, and O p e ra t io n  Iraqi Freedom in  2003.
These examples of  offensive m i l i ta ry  ac t ion  are cen t ra l  to realis t 
theories  of pow er  in in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions.  A p reem pt iv e  s t ra tegy  of 
power p ro jec t ion  is one based on in co n t ro v e r t ib le  ev idence  th a t  an 
enemy a t tack  or invas ion  is im m in en t ,  and is used w h e n  a t tacking
4 Jack S. Levy, “Preventive War and Democratic  Po l i t ic s ,” In te rn a t io n a l  
Studies Q uarterly ,  (2008) 52, 1-24.
5 Ibid.
6 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive  Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note, No.  F49642-01-C-0003 Santa 
Monica, California,  (RAND, 2006) , 13.
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would  give a s t ra tegic  advantage  in  an unavo idab le  co n f l ic t .7 
Conversely ,  a n a t io n  would  use a p re v e n t iv e  s t ra tegy  of  pow er  
p ro jec t ion  to mit igate  th e  fu tu re  deg rada t ion  o f  its m il i ta ry  
advantage.  A p reven t ive  s t ra tegy  is less u rg e n t  and focuses on a 
confl ic t  th a t  is not  im m in en t  bu t  is inevi tab le .  This ap p roach  preven ts  
an adversary  from acquir ing  more  s t r e n g th ,  because a de lay  in confl ic t  
would  involve  grea te r  risk in  the  fu tu re .  One can  make a s t rong case 
th a t  this  is th e  l ine of reasoning  W ash in g to n  seized u p o n  after  9/11. 
The 2002 NSS emphasized  the  U n i ted  States was d e te rm in e d  to 
confron t  th rea ts  w he rev e r  they  arise and n o t  wai t  to see w ha t  
te r ro r i s t s  w o u ld  do in the  fu tu re  as it m igh t  involve g rea te r  r isk in 
the  f u tu re .8
THE 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE DISCUSSION
The p r inc ipa l  debate  over the  DoP and its applica t ions ,  
pa r t icu la r ly  conce rn ing  t e r ro r i sm  and com ba t t ing  W M D  in Iraq  is
7 Jo in t  P u b lica tion  1-02, Department of Defense  Dict ionary and 
Associated Terms, Washington,  DC: U.S., 2012.
8 “Administration Comments on Saddam Hussein and the Sept. 11 
Attacks,” W ashington  Post, archives September 6, 2003, accessed March 26,
2012, ww w.w ash ingtonpost .c om /wp-srv /po l i t i c s /po l l s /9 -1  l_saddam_quotes .html.
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grounded  in  the  2002 NSS. The secu r i ty  s t ra tegy  p rom pted  
in n u m erab le  discussions on m il i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  act ion  as i t  rela tes  to 
the  d i f fe rence  b e tw een  p reem p t iv e  and  p rev en t ive  s t ra teg ies  of  
warfare.
One  can make a s t rong  case th a t  m any  nat ions  can accept the  
use of force  against  kn o w n  te r ro r i s t s  t h a t  destabi l ize  th e  status quo. 
However ,  t h e re  remains  a cons iderab le  debate  over  th e  use of the  DoP 
in a larger  con tex t  to  im p lem en t  reg ime change,  pa r t i cu la r ly  against  
Iraq, and  the  poss ibi l i ty  of fu ture  use of  the  DoP against  o th e r  rogue 
na t ion-s ta tes .
A l th ou g h  the  2002 NSS c lear ly  descr ibed  te r ro r is ts  and rogue 
na t ions  as the  most  serious th re a t  th a t  faced the  U n i t e d  States, the  
th rea t  of  te r ro r i sm  was n o t  new for U.S. pol icymakers .  Certa in  
ideological  concepts  of the  2002 NSS dates back to th e  ad m in is t r a t io n  
of George H. W. Bush, w i th  th e  1992 release o f  the  “Defense  P lann ing  
Guidance  for th e  Fiscal Years 1994-1999.” This  p lann in g  guidance  is 
also k n o w n  as the  W olfowitz  Doctr ine .  The in te rn a l  po l icy  s ta tem ent ,  
au tho red  by th e n  Under  Secre tary  for  Policy, Pau l  W olfowitz ,  
p rovided  guidance  to m il i ta ry  leaders  and civi l ian leaders  of the  
D ep ar tm en t  o f  Defense on how  to p repa re  t h e i r  forces, budgets ,  and 
stra tegies  for the  decade.
The Defense P lann ing  Guidance  su p p o r te d  mil i ta ry  in te r v e n t io n  
an y w here  in th e  w or ld  w henever ,  the  U n i ted  States be l ieved  it  was 
necessary.  The W olfowitz  do c t r ine  r e ta in e d  th e  p re e m in e n t  
responsib i l i ty  for  address ing wrongs ,  w h ic h  th re a te n e d  U.S. in te res ts .  
In addit ion ,  it sought  to shape, r a th e r  t h a n  reac t  to chal lenges  to U.S. 
hegem ony,  and  urged  m il i ta ry  in t e r v e n t io n  in  the Middle  East and 
Sou thwest  Asia “to rem ain  the  p r e d o m in a n t  outside pow er  in the  
region  and  p reserve  U.S. and W e s te rn  access to the  r e g io n ’s o i l .”9
Again, th e  proposed  p lan n in g  guidance  had  s im ila r i t ies  to the  
2002 NSS, as i t  called for th e  use of U.S. po w e r  to e n c u m b e r  rogue 
nat ions  from develop ing  WMD. I t  asserts ,  “The  U.S. may be faced 
w i th  th e  ques t ion  of  w h e th e r  to take  m i l i ta ry  steps to p re v e n t  the  
deve lopm en t  or  use of  weapons o f  mass d e s t ru c t io n .”10 F u r th e rm o re ,  
W o lfo w i tz ’ p lan n in g  guidance  sough t  to p rec lude  th e  em ergence  of 
any fu tu re  global  com pe t i to r  to U.S. power .  More specif ically ,  th e  
p lann ing  guidance  advances the  following:
9 Patrick E. Tyler,  “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals  
Develop A One-Superpower World ,” N e w  York T im es , March 8, 1992, accessed  
July 15, 2011, h t tp : / /w ork .c o lu m .e du/~am i l ler /W olfow it z  1992.htm.
10 Ibid.
Our first  objec t ive  is to p r e v e n t  th e  re -e m erg en ce  of a new  
rival ,  e i th e r  on the  t e r r i to ry  of th e  fo rm er  Soviet  U nion  or 
e lsew here ,  t h a t  poses a th re a t  on  the  order  of  th a t  posed 
fo rm er ly  by the  Soviet Union.  This is a d om in a n t  con s id e ra t ion  
u n d e r ly in g  the  new  regional  defense  s t ra tegy  and  requ ires  th a t  
we en deavor  to p r e v e n t  any hos t i le  p o w e r  from d o m in a t in g  a 
reg ion  w hose  resources  would ,  u n d e r  conso l ida ted  con tro l ,  be 
suff ic ien t  to genera te  global  power .  These regions inc lude  
W e s te rn  Europe,  East Asia, the  t e r r i t o r y  of th e  fo rm er  Soviet 
Union,  and  Southwest  Asia. There  are th re e  add i t io n a l  aspects 
to this  objective:  First,  the  U.S. must  show th e  leadersh ip  
necessary  to es tab l ish  and p ro tec t  a n e w  order  th a t  holds the  
promise  of convinc ing  po ten t ia l  c om p e t i to rs  th a t  th ey  need  not  
aspire to a g rea te r  role  or pursue  a more  aggressive pos tu re  to 
p ro tec t  th e i r  leg i t im ate  in teres ts .  Second, in th e  n on-defense  
areas, we must  accoun t  suf f ic ien t ly  for  the  in te res ts  of the  
advanced  indus t r ia l  na t ions  to  discourage  th em  from 
cha l leng ing  our  leadership  or seek ing  to o v e r tu rn  the  
es tab l ished  poli t ica l  and  econom ic  order .  Finally , we must  
m ain ta in  the  mechanisms for d e te r r in g  po ten t ia l  competi to rs  
from even aspir ing to a larger  reg iona l  or global  role. An
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effect ive r ec o n s t i tu t io n  capabil i ty  is im p o r ta n t  here ,  since it  
implies th a t  a p o ten t ia l  r ival  could no t  hop e  to qu ick ly  or easily 
gain a p re d o m in a n t  m il i ta ry  pos i t ion  in  the  world ,  (i talics 
a d d ed )11
The ad m in is t r a t io n  of P res iden t  George H. W. B ush ’s viewed 
the  W o lfo w i tz ’ Defense P lann ing  Guidance  s t ra tegy  as so m ew h a t  of an 
overreach ,  and it  was never  adopted  in to  p o l i c y .12 However ,  a n um b er  
of indiv iduals  w ho  la ter  p a r t ic ipa ted  in the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  of  George 
W. Bush (to inc lude  W olfowitz) ,  kep t  concepts  o f  th e  Defense 
P lann ing  Guidance  alive th ro u g h  th e i r  a f f i l ia t ion  w i th  the  Project  for 
the  New A m erican  C en tu ry  (PNAC), a W ash in g to n -b ased  th in k  tank.  
PNAC m em bersh ip  in  the  adm in is t ra t io n  of George W . Bush, inc luded  
Vice P res iden t  Cheney,  Secre tary  Defense Rumsfeld, and Deputy  
Secre tary  of  Defense Paul  W olfowitz .  In Sep tem ber  2000, PNAC 
publ ished  a 90-page repor t  en t i t le d  “Rebu i ld ing  A m e r ic a ’s Defenses:
11 Ibid.
12 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael Kraig, “W in n in g  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) , 22.
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Strategies,  Forces, and Resources for a New C e n tu r y .”13 Similar  to the  
W o lfo w i tz ’ Defense P lan n ing  Guidance ,  th e  r e p o r t  suppor ted  
increas ing  U.S. defense spend ing  so th a t  the  U.S. m il i ta ry  could be 
p repared  to perform  global pos t -Co ld  W a r  dut ies ,  inc lud ing  
cons tabu lary  e n fo rcem en t  of w or ld  affa i rs14. More specif ically ,  the  
Defense P lan n in g  Guidance  declares the  following:
As the  20 th  c e n tu ry  draws to a close, th e  U.S. s tands  as the  
w o r ld ’s most  p re e m in e n t  power .  Having led the  W es t  to v ic to ry  
in the  Cold W ar,  America  faces an o p p o r tu n i ty  and  a chal lenge:  
Does th e  U.S. have the  v is ion  to bu i ld  u p o n  th e  ach iev e m e n t  of 
past decades? Does the  U.S. have the  resolve to shape  a new 
c e n tu ry  favorable  to Am erican  p r inc ip le s  and in te res ts?  [W hat  
we requ ire  is] a m il i ta ry  th a t  is s t rong and ready  to meet  bo th  
p resen t  and fu tu re  challenges;  a foreign  policy th a t  bo ld ly  and 
purposefu l ly  p rom otes  A m erican  p r inc ip le s  abroad; and  na t ional  
leadership  th a t  accepts  the  U n i ted  S ta te s ’ global
13 Thomas Donne l ly .  Project for a N ew American Century.  “Rebuilding  




resp o n s ib i l i t ie s .15
The PNAC rep o r t  reco m m en d ed  the  fo rw ard  d ep lo y m en t  of U.S. 
forces at new  st ra tegic  locations,  and s t r e n g th e n in g  U.S. m il i ta ry  
power  far in to  the  fu tu re  as possible.  Moreover ,  th e  repor t  
emphasized  the  U n i ted  States should  m a in ta in  the d o m in a n ce  of its 
m il i ta ry  forces to p rev en t  the  em ergence  of a n y  rival pow er ,  so th a t  
o th e r  na t ions  w ou ld  not  dare  em bark  on  fu t i le  arms races once they  
realize the  p re -do m in an c e  of U.S. m i l i ta ry  p o w e r .16
In add i t ion  to PNAC, the  prem ises  of t h e  DoP had 
u n d e rp in n in g s  in Vice P re s id en t  Dick C h e n e y ’s One P e rc e n t  doc tr ine .  
The concept ,  f irst  revealed  in  Novem ber  2001 dur ing  a b r ie f ing  given 
by Centra l  In te l l igence  Agency (CIA) D irec to r  George T ene t ,  w ho  was 
respond ing  to r is ing concerns  over a Pak is tan i  sc ien t is t  offering 
nuc lear  weapons  expert ise  to a l -Q a ed a .17 After h ea r ing  the  
in fo rm at ion ,  Vice Pres iden t  Dick C heney  stated:
16 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  22.
17 Ron Suskind, The One P e rc en t  D oc tr in e ,  (New York: Simon & Schuster  
Trade), 2006, 62.
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If t h e r e ’s a one p e rc e n t  chance  t h a t  Pakis tan i  sc ien t is ts  are 
h e lp ing  a l-Qaeda  bui ld  or develop a n u c le a r  w eapon ,  we have to 
t rea t  it  as a ce r ta in ty  in  te rm s of  our  response.  I t ’s no t  about  
our  analysis; i t ’s about  ou r  re sp o nse .18
W i th  var ied  inf luences ,  the  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s approach  to 
the  post-9/11 secur i ty  e n v i ro n m e n t  b ro u g h t  fo r th  many d if ferences  of 
op in ion  b e tw ee n  the  Uni ted  States and  Europe th a t  w e n t  w e l l  beyond  
de f in i t iona l  in te rp re ta t io n s  of p reem p t iv e  or a p rev en t ive  use of force 
against  te r ro r is ts ,  and  Saddam Hussein. Many Europeans agreed th a t  
some ac t ion  was necessary  regard ing  I r a q ’s fai lure to p e rm i t  UN 
inspect ions;  how ever ,  th e re  was d isag reem en t  on  w h e t h e r  Iraq 
possessed WMD, or had  l inks to t e r ro r i s t  o rgan iza t ions  such  as al- 
Qaeda.
For the  Bush adm in is t ra t ion ,  th e re  w ere  only two sides in the  
GWOT, th e  suppor te rs  of te r ro r ism ,  and those  who desire  to destroy  
it. In a speech  to the  Joint  Session of Congress and  th e  Am erican  
People, P re s id en t  Bush stated, “Every n a t io n  in  every reg ion  now  has 
a decis ion  to make: E i ther  you are w i th  us or you  are  w i th  the
18 Ibid.
126
t e r ro r i s t s .”19 The P re s id e n t ’s stance,  w o n  s t rong  domestic  approval  in  
the  a f te rm a th  of 9/11; however ,  th e  genera l iza t ion  abou t  m il i ta ry  
p reem pt ion  and the  universa l  app l ica t ion  o f  U.S. power a l iena ted  and 
u nn e rv e d  m any  t rad i t io n a l  U.S. allies.
A l th o ug h  P re s id en t  Bush’s “w i th  us or against  u s ” assessment  
received im m ense  c r i t ic ism in te rn a t io n a l ly ,  his v iews are no t  
pa r t icu la r ly  u n iq u e  in  con tex t  of  ho w  tw o  opposing  actors 
ideologically  co m m it  themselves to defeat  one  another .  Dr. M artha  
Crenshaw, in  “The Causes of T e r ro r i sm ,” asserts  te r ro r is ts  o f ten  take a 
“w i th  us or against  u s” a t t i tude .  C ren shaw  argues th a t  t e r r o r i s t ’s 
co n fro n ta t io n a l  ideologies wil l  plague socie ty  for  years to come. She 
posits,  t e r ro r i sm  is a s ignif icant  pa r t  of  the  h is to ry  of  the  Arab ian  
Peninsula ,  da t ing  back h u ndreds  o f  years, a n d  as its co n te m p o ra ry  
p rac t i t ioners  w i l l  not  l ikely stop using  it as a form of  poli t ical  
express ion and m i l i ta ry  aggress ion.20
The in tran s igence  of te r ro r i s t  is f u r th e r  exemplif ied  w h e n  one 
analyzes Osama b in  Laden’s 1996 fa twa (Islamic decree) ,  t h a t  called 
for A m erican  soldiers  to get ou t  o f  Saudi Arabia ,  or suffer
19 Bush, George W. “Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the  
American People .” September 21, 2001.
20 Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of  Terrorism.” Comparative Pol it ics  
13: (1981),  379-99.
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consequences .21 In  1998, he issued a second  fatwa d i rec t in g  his 
fo llowers to kill  Americans  a n y w h e re .22 The same fa twa sum m ar ized  
his objections to A m erican  foreign policy  tow ards  Israel ,  as well  as 
res ta t ing  his h o s t i l i ty  towards  the  p resence  o f  A m erican  troops in 
Saudi Arabia. Professor  Bruce Hoffman,  th e  a u th o r  of In s id e  
Terrorism , suggests the  two cen tra l  d i f f e ren t ia t in g  factors of  t e r ro r is ts  
are t h e i r  ded ica t ion  to religious or p o l i t ica l  causes, and th e i r  
in s t ru m en ta l  re l iance  on violence.
Consequently ,  the  2002 NSS recognizes  th e  danger  of  t e r ro r i sm  
and calls for th e  de s t ru c t io n  of  a l-Qaeda because  it is c lear ly  an an t i -  
W es te rn  organ iza t ion .  The leaders of  a l -Qaeda believe i t  was the  U.S. 
th a t  “th ru s t  [Islamic] na t ions  in to  w h ir lpo o ls  and laby r in th s  for 
decades since d iv id ing  it in to  states and  s ta te le t s .”23 Similar  to al- 
Qaeda, m any  t e r ro r i s t  be lieve  th a t  the  ills of the  Muslim world  stem 
from a Z ionist  a l l iance spearheaded  by the  U n i ted  S ta tes .24
A lthough ,  the  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  chose to express  its 
sovereign r igh t  to p ro tec t  U.S. in te res ts  agains t  a l-Qaeda,  th e re  has
21 Osama bin Laden’s 1996 Fatwa, accessed August  10, 2011,  w w w .p b s . 
org/newshour/t  err or is m/in ter national/ fa twa_1996 .html.
22 Osama bin Laden’s 1998 Fatwa, accessed August  10, 2011, w w w .p b s . 
org/newshour/t  error ism/international / fatwa_ 1998.html .
23 Michael Scheuer, Through Our E n em ies '  Eyes: Osama bin Laden,
Radical Islam, a n d  the  Future o f  A m erica  (Washington,  D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002) ,
49.
24 Ibid.
been  subs tan t ia l  debate  over  th e  legal i ty  a n d  leg i t im acy  of  U.S. 
act ions in  Iraq. Lawrence  F re e d m a n ’s “P reven t io n ,  Not  P r e e m p t io n ,” 
argues th a t  the  Bush adm in is t r a t io n  pushed  fo r  war  w i th  Iraq and 
purposefu l ly  b ro ad en ed  the  in te r p r e t a t i o n  of p reem p t iv e  w arfare  to 
inc lude  concepts  regarded  as a p rev e n t iv e  use o f  force .25 In addit ion ,  
F reedm an makes a valid  po in t  th a t  m erg ing  p ree m p t io n ,  and  
p rev e n t io n  in th e  2002 NSS made it  d i f f icu l t  to  d is t ingu ish  be tw ee n  
the  two stra tegies .  The fol lowing excerp t  from t h e  se cu r i ty  s t ra tegy  is 
an example  of th e  am algam ation  of p ree m p t io n  and  p reven t ion :
Given the  goals of rogue sta tes and te r ro r is ts ,  th e  U n i ted  States 
can no longer  solely re ly  on a react ive  pos tu re  as we have in the  
past.  The inab i l i ty  to d e te r  a po ten t ia l  a t tacker ,  th e  imm ediacy  
of  to d a y ’s th rea ts ,  and the  m agni tude  o f  p o ten t ia l  h a rm  th a t  
could be caused by our  adversa r ie s ’ cho ice  of weapons ,  do not  
p e rm i t  th a t  opt ion .  W e c anno t  let  our enemies  s t r ike  first.  The 
grea ter  the  th rea t ,  the  grea te r  is th e  r isk  of i n a c t io n — and the  
more compell ing  the  case for tak ing  a n tic ip a to ry  ac tion  to
25 Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention ,  Not Preem pt ion ,” W ashington  
Q u a rte r ly  (Spring 2003) ,  113.
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d e fe n d  ourselves, even i f  u n c e r t a in ty  rem ains  as to  th e  t im e  and 
place of  th e  e n e m y ’s a t tack. To fo re s ta ll o r  p r e v e n t  such  host i le  
acts by our  adversaries, the  U n i ted  States will, i f  necessary,  act 
p re e m p tiv e ly , (i talics added) 26
Clearly , the  2002 NSS merges p re e m p t io n  w i th  p re v e n t io n  un d e r  
the  auspices of  th e  DoP. This amalgam at ion  may  have been  
u n in te n t io n a l ;  however ,  a c o u n te rv a i l in g  a rg um en t  is t h a t  the  au thors  
of  the  secu r i ty  s t ra tegy  merged the  te rm s in ten t io n a l ly ,  because w h e n  
p ree m p t io n  is merged  w i th  p rev en t ion ,  th e  DoP is sub jec t  to a w ide r  
in te rp re ta t io n  of m il i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  act ion.  This in  t u r n  expanded  
accepted  p receden ts  and in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  the  leg i t im ate  use of force, 
leaving room for a s t ra tegic  convergence  of  m il i ta ry  and secur i ty  
im p l ica t ions .27 The 2002 NSS val idates  th is  assessment by  declaring:
26 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States  
of  America,” (September 2002) , 15.
27 Francois Heisbourg, “Is Preemption  Necessary? A Work in Progress: 
The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences ,” W ashington  Q uarterly ,  vol.  26, No. 2 
(Spring 2003),  75.
W e m ust  adapt the  concep t  o f  im m in e n t  t h r e a t  to  the  
capabil i t ies  and objectives of  to d a y ’s adversaries. Rogue states 
and  te r ro r i s t s  do not  seek to a t tack  us using co nv en t io na l  
means.  They  know  such at tacks w o u ld  fail.  Instead,  t h e y  re ly  on 
acts of  t e r ro r ,  and po ten t ia l ly ,  th e  use of w eapons  of  mass 
d e s t ru c t io n — weapons tha t  can  be easily concealed,  de l ivered  
covert ly ,  and  used w i th o u t  w a rn in g ,  ( i ta l ics  added)28
Consequen t ly ,  it  is c lear  to see the  deba te  over p re e m p t io n  and 
p rev e n t io n  is more  th an  an a rgum en t  of  semantics. The debate  also 
has pol i t ica l  consequences;  it  is a form o f  s t ra tegic  d ip lom acy ,  w h ic h  
has the  p o ten t ia l  to establ ish p rec eden t  for t h e  fu ture  use of force. 
Consequently ,  one can u n d e rs tan d  w h y  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  
reacted  d i f fe ren t ly  about  th e  use of  force in  A fghanis tan  in  2001 
versus th e  invas ion  of Iraq in  2003. In add i t ion ,  on can co m p re h en d  
w hy  the  U n i ted  States received o v e rw h e lm in g  in te rn a t io n a l  backing 
from its t rad i t io n a l  allies for m i l i ta ry  opera t ions  in  Afghanis tan ;
28 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002, 15.
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however ,  th e  a l l ied  response to the  p rev e n t iv e  invas ion  of  Iraq was 
quite  d ifferent .
W h i le  th e  2002 NSS focused p r im ar i ly  on  th e  t e rm  preem ption ;  
e.g. the  “D oc tr ine  of P re e m p t io n ,” most  scholars  and  po l icym akers  
define a p reem p t iv e  use of force more  res t r ic t ive ly ,  d i f f e ren t ia t in g  it 
from a p reven t ive  use of  fo rce .29 30 31 F u r th e rm o re ,  i n te r n a t io n a l  law 
suggests th a t  a p reem p t ive  use of force is acceptable  for se lf -defense  
whi le  a p rev e n t iv e  use of  force is an act of  aggress ion. As such,  the  
d is t inc t ion  b e tw ee n  p ree m p t io n  and p r e v e n t io n  is c ruc ia l  to the  
debate  on the  legal i ty  and leg i t imacy of th e  DoP.
W hereas  in te rn a t io n a l  law holds p reem p t ive  a t tacks are 
acceptable  for se lf -defense  and p reven t ive  a t tacks  are no t ,  p reem ptive  
and p reven t ive  s t ra teg ies  have m uch  in comm on.  T hey  b o th  share  a 
comm on s t ra tegic  logic, to  give an advantage  to the  a t t ac k e r  and allow 
them  to in i t ia te  confl ic t  on terms th a t  are  more  favorable.  The abil i ty  
to d e te rm ine  w h e t h e r  a pa r t icu la r  ac t ion  was p reem p t iv e  or 
p reven t ive  rem ains  ambiguous,  because ques t ions  rega rd ing  im m inen t
29 Lawrence Freedman,  “Prevention,  Not Preem pt ion ,” W ashington  
Q u a rte r ly  (Spring 2003) ,  113.
30 Francois Heisbourg,  “Is Preemption Necessary? A Work in Progress:
The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences ,” Washington  Quarterly,  vol.  26, No. 2 
(Spring 2003) , 75.
31 Franklin E. Wester,  “Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of  
Iraq,” Param eters  (Winter 2004-2005) ,  20.
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or inev i tab le  th rea ts  from adversaries  are se ldom absolute .  For 
instance,  a na t io n -s ta te  may believe  th a t  a n o th e r  n a t io n  wil l  a t tack  
bu t  may no t  know  if  th a t  aggression wil l  take  place in  two or t en  
years. If  an inev i tab le  a t tack  accelerates  to just  a few weeks,  does it 
sudden ly  become im m inen t?  In  such cases, assigning a p reem p t iv e  or 
p reven t ive  s t ra tegy  label may be chal lenging .  M oreover ,  for  a n a t ion  
th a t  is p o ten t ia l ly  u n d e r  th re a t  of an a t tack,  th e  d i s t in c t io n  b e tw een  
the  terms wil l  not  stop a n a t ion  u n d e r  t h re a t  of  a t tack  f rom defending  
itself.
D i f fe ren t ia t ing  b e tw een  p ree m p t io n  and p r e v e n t io n  s t ra teg ies  is 
even more  diff icu l t  w h e n  variables associated w i th  pe rcep t ions  of 
th rea ts ,  and w i th  how  to use pow er  to reac t  to  those  th re a t s  are taken  
into  account.  Consider ing  all these  factors,  one can  see th a t  the  
d is t inc t ion  b e tw een  an inev i tab le  and  im m in en t  th r e a t  can be 
subjective, and imprecise .  A l though  i t  is useful  to  d i f fe ren t ia te  
be tw een  p reem p t ive  and p reven t iv e  s trategies w h e n  analyzing 
percep t ions  of legali ty u n d e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law, empir ica l ly ,  the 
d is t inc t ion  b e tw een  the two stra tegies  is of ten  n a r ro w  or vague.
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CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ANTICIPATORY ACTION
The d i s t in c t io n  be tw een  p re e m p t io n  and p rev e n t io n  has led to 
considerable  d e l ibe ra t ion ,  and more  co n s id e ra t io n  is n e ed ed  on  w h e n  
and ho w  these  s t ra teg ies  are accep tab le  uses of force. A grea ter  
openness  to m i l i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  ac t io n  may be n e ed ed  to give 
t rad i t iona l  n a t ion -s ta te s  the  ab i l i ty  to reac t  e ffect ively  to asym m etr ic  
th rea ts  from te r ro r i s t  actors.
P reem pt ive  and p reven t ive  wars  have occurred  f r e q u e n t ly  in 
in te rn a t io n a l  polit ics . A classic example  of a p reem ptive  s t ra tegy  is 
Is rae l ’s a t tack  against  Egypt in 1967, w h ic h  began th e  Six-Day W ar.  
Israel,  pe rce iv ing  th e  benef i t  of a su rp r ise  s t r ike  against  the  th rea ts  
su r rou n d ing  it, in i t ia ted  the  c o n f ro n ta t io n  by  a t tacking  Egypt and 
Syria to aver t  a coord ina ted  assault  f rom  th e  two coun tr ies .  Israel 
w en t  on to seize the  Sinai Peninsula ,  th e  Golan Heights ,  and  the  W est  
Bank, o v e rw h e lm in g  the Arab air  fo rces .32
A p rev en t ive  s t ra tegy  is insp ired  n o t  by th e  desire to a t tack  first 
bu t  by the  desire  to have a confl ic t  sooner  r a th e r  th a n  la te r ,  because 
the  balance  of  m i l i ta ry  capabil i t ies  is expec ted  to sh if t  to w ard  the
32 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note,  No.  F49642-01-C-0003,  Santa 
Monica,  California,  (RAND, 2006) , 7.
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enemy over t ime due to growing  a rm am en ts  or  m il i ta ry  t e c h n o lo g y .33 
The classic model  of  p reven t iv e  war  is th e  P e loponnes ian  W ar ,  w h ic h  
reshaped th e  an c ien t  Greek world .  The conf l ic t ,  as w i th  most  wars,  
was roo ted  in  pe rcep t ion s  of an inev i tab le  th re a t .  More specifically,  
the  expec ta t ion  of  fu tu re  confl ic t  on th e  Pe loponnesus  was caused by 
the  g row th  of  A thens ,  w h ic h  set the  cond i t ion s  for Sparta  to fear  the  
rise of A th e n ia n  p o w e r .34 For Sparta, p rev e n t iv e  war  was an a t t rac t ive  
strategy, as m i t iga t ing  th e  r ising pow er  of A thens  was p re fe rab le  to 
wai t ing  for an inev i tab le  fu tu re  confl ic t  on  less favorable  terms.
A n o th e r  example of  p reven t ive  w a r  occu rred  in  1914, w h e n  
Germany assumed th a t  rapid in d us t r ia l iz a t io n  in  Russia w ou ld  make 
the  Russians too form idable  to defeat  in  t h e  long term .  G erm any  
believed th a t  w ar  w i th  Russia was inev i tab le ,  so it reasoned  going to 
war  in 1914 appeared  to offer a b e t t e r  poss ib i l i ty  of  success th an  
wai t ing  several  years and f igh ting  a more  form idable  Russian 
m i l i ta ry .35
A more  co n te m p o ra ry  example of p rev en t ive  w ar  was the  
Japanese a t tack  on Pearl  Harbor.  T h ro u g h o u t  th e  1930s, the  Japanese
33 Ibid, 22-26.
34 Rex Warner,  Thucydides, H is to ry  o f  the  P e loponnesian  W ar  
(Baltimore,  Maryland: Penguin,  1954), 49.
35 Paul M. Kennedy,  “The First World War and the International  Power  
System,” In te rn a t io n a l  Security ,  vol . 9, No. 1 (1984) , 7 -40 .
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empire  sough t  to  dom ina te  Asia. It  was successful  in  conso l ida t ing  
colonies in  Southeas t  Asia, Singapore,  Ind o ch ina ,  th e  D u tch  East 
Indies, and  M anchur ia ;  however ,  the  U n i ted  States and  its Pacific  
f leet posed a t h r e a t  to Japan’s s t ra tegic  a m b i t io n s .36 Consequen t ly ,  th e  
Japanese a t tacked  Pearl  Harbor  was no t  on ly  a d e m o n s t ra t io n  of 
allegiance to th e  Axis powers,  it  was a p re v e n t iv e  a t t em p t  to disable 
the  U.S. Pacific fleet,  and d im in ish  A m er ic an  in f luence  in  Asia .37
Analysis of  p reem ptive  or p rev e n t iv e  stra tegies,  en ta i l  the  
eva lua t ion  of an a c to r ’s capabil i t ies  and  in ten t io n s .  Assessing an 
ac to r ’s i n te n t io n s  tends  to be the  la rger  cha l leng e  of th e  two,  because 
ris ing pow er  in a n a t ion  does no t  e n t i r e ly  in d ica te  w h a t  th a t  n a t io n  is 
actual ly  co m m it ted  to do in  fu r th e r in g  its in te res ts .  For ins tance ,  
whereas  Spar ta ’s aggress ion b e n ef i ted  its regional  hegem onic  
prospects ,  Japan’s gamble u l t im a te ly  led to the  decl ine  of  the  Japanese 
empire.
W h e n  co n fron t in g  lon g er - te rm  th rea ts  t h a t  m igh t  call for war, 
e s t im at ing  and analyzing  the  in ten t ion s  and  capabil i t ies  o f  adversar ia l  
actors involves a large degree of  u n c e r ta in ty .  This  issue of  adversar ia l
36 Scott D. Sagan, “From Deterrence to Coercion to War: The Road to 
Pearl Harbor,” in Alexander L. George, Wi l l iam E. Simons,  and David Kent Hall,  
eds., The L im its  o f  C oerc ive  D ip lom acy ,  2nd ed. (Boulder,  Colorado: W es tv iew  
Press, 1994) 57 -90 .
37 Ibid, 57 -90 .
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u n c e r ta in ty  was p a ra m o u n t  in the  ru n -u p  to  th e  2003 U.S. invas ion  of 
Iraq. During  a 2002 press confe rence  at NATO Headquar te rs ,  
Secretary  of  Defense Donald  Rumsfeld expla ined:
The message is th a t  the re  are no “k n o w n s .” There  are  th ings  we 
know  th a t  we know. There  are k n o w n  u nk n o w n s .  That  is to  say 
th e re  are th ings  th a t  we now k n ow  we d o n ’t know. But th e re  
are also u n k n o w n  unknow ns .  There  are th ings  we do no t  know  
we d o n ’t know. So w h e n  we do the  best  we  can and we pull  all 
th is  in fo rm a t io n  toge ther ,  and we t h e n  say well  t h a t ’s basically  
w h a t  we see as th e  s i tua t ion ,  th a t  is real ly  on ly  the  k no w n  
knowns and the  k n o w n  unknow ns .  And  each year, we discover  a 
few more  of  those  u n k n o w n  u n kn o w n s .  I t  sounds like a r iddle . 
It  i sn ’t a r iddle .  It  is a very serious,  im p o r tan t  m at te r .  T h e r e ’s 
a no th e r  way to phrase  th a t  and th a t  is tha t  th e  absence of 
evidence  is not  ev idence  of absence.  I t  is basically  saying the 
same th in g  in a d i f fe ren t  way. Simply because you do no t  have 
ev idence  th a t  som eth ing  exists does n o t  mean th a t  you have 
evidence  th a t  it d o e sn ’t exist.  And yet  almost  always,  w h e n  we 
make our  th re a t  assessments, w h e n  we look at th e  world ,  we
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end  up basing it  on the  first  two p ieces  o f  tha t  puzzle ,  r a th e r  
t h a n  all t h r e e . 38
It may be th a t  Secre tary  R um sfe ld ’s concerns  regard ing  
te r ro r ism  and p a r t icu la r  regime types were  based n o t  on specific  
in fo rm at ion ,  b u t  on subjective models  or geopoli t ica l  p a t t e rn s  of  
p red ic t ive  behav io r  of enemies w ho  m ig h t  pursue  W M D. In th is  
instance,  p rev e n t iv e  stra tegies may be appea l ing  even in cases w h e re  
the  poss ib i l i ty  of enem y a t tack  does not  appear to be p la in ly  
inevi table ,  b u t  s imply too dangerous  to leave to chance.
W h e n  th e re  is an ex trem ely  h igh  l ik e l ih o od  of im m in e n t  a t tack  
and d e te r ren c e  has failed, m il i ta ry  an t ic ip a to ry  action w ou ld  c learly 
be an opt ion .  During  the  GWOT, the  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  believed 
th a t  d e te r ren c e  was ineffect ive  against  rogue sta tes and  te r ro r i s t s  who 
were no t  r isk-averse .  As a resul t ,  the  ad m in is t r a t io n  t u r n e d  to the  
DoP. In  his 2002 State of  the  U n ion  address , P res iden t  Bush stated:
38 Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Department of  Defense  News Transcript,  June 6, 
2002, accessed February 20, 2012, ht tp :/ /w ww.defense .gov /T ranscr ipts/  
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3490.
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I wil l  n o t  wai t  on  events ,  w hi le  dangers  ga ther .  I w i l l  not  s tand 
by, as per i l  draws closer  and c loser.  The  U n i ted  States of 
Am erica  wil l  n o t  p e rm i t  the  w o r l d ’s most  dangerous  regimes to 
th r e a te n  us w i th  the  w o r ld ’s most d e s t ru c t iv e  w eap o ns .39
Similarly ,  w h e n  addressing the  g ra d u a t in g  cadets  at the  U.S. 
Mil i ta ry  Academ y at W est  Point ,  P re s id en t  Bush re i t e ra te d ,  “If we 
wai t  for th rea ts  to ful ly  m ater ia l ize ,  we wil l  have  w a i ted  too long .”40 
Both of  these  speeches a rt icu la te  a w i l l ingness  to in i t i a te  m il i ta ry  
an t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion  against  possible  th rea ts  to th e  U n i ted  States. The 
fol lowing exce rp t  from the 2002 NSS exhibi ts  th e  Bush 
a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s ra t iona l iza t ion  for th e  DoP, a long w i th  the  
condit ions  t h a t  call for its use:
Given th e  goals of rogue states and te r ro r is ts ,  th e  U n i ted  States 
can no longer  solely  re ly  on a react ive  pos tu re  as we have in the
39 George W. Bush, State of  the Union Address,  2002,  accessed March 10, 
2012, h t tp : / /georgewbush-w hitehouse .arch ives .gov /n ew s /re leases /2002  
/ 0 1 /2 0 0 2 0 1 2 9 - l l .h t m l .
40 George W. Bush, “Presidential  Commencement  Speech at West  Po in t ,” 
June 2002.
past.  The inab i l i ty  to d e te r  a po ten t ia l  a t tacker ,  the  immediacy  
of  to d a y ’s th rea ts ,  and  the  m a g n itu d e  o f  po ten t ia l  h a rm  th a t  
could  be caused by our  adversa r ie s ’ cho ice  of w eapons ,  do no t  
p e rm i t  th a t  opt ion .  W e c an n o t  let  our  enem ies  s t r ike  first.  The 
grea te r  the  th rea t ,  the  g rea te r  is th e  r isk  of in a c t io n — and the  
more  com pel l ing  th e  case for tak ing  a n tic ip a to ry  action  to 
defend  ourselves,  even  if  u n c e r t a in ty  rem ains  as to the  t ime and 
place of th e  e n e m y ’s a ttack.  To foresta l l  o r  p rev en t  such  host i le  
acts by our adversaries,  the  U n i ted  States will,  i f  necessary ,  act 
p re e m p tiv e ly ,  (italics added)41
The war  against  te r ro r i sm  became the n e w  n o rm  in  the  post-  
9/11 secur i ty  e n v iron m en t .  N a t ion-s ta te s  no longer  had  a m onopoly  
on violence,  as te r ro r i s t  actors,  and  c r im ina l  en te rp r ises  p resen ted  a 
p r inc ip le  chal lenge  the  status quo, and global s tabil i ty .  Consequently ,  
the  2002 NSS made it  c lear  th a t  Am erica  would  use m il i ta ry  
an t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion  to s tr ike enem ies  before  t h e y  could  th r e a te n  U.S. 
in teres ts .  The s t ra tegy  draws a d i rec t  l ink be tw een  th e  risk of
41 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of the United States 
of  America,” September 2002, 15.
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inac t ion ,  and  th e  wil l ingness  to con d uc t  a n t ic ip a to ry  opera t ions  
against  th rea ts  to America,  of fer ing  a c lear  p ic tu re  o f  th e  cond i t ions  
th a t  necess i ta ted  the  DoP.
SUMMARY
The U n i ted  States, and o the r  coun tr ies  have used  p reem pt ive  
and p rev en t iv e  s tra tegies  for  years,  and th e  h is to r ica l  ev idence  s ta ted  
above has dem o n s t ra ted  th a t  such  s tra tegies  have advantages ,  and 
disadvantages. The 2002 NSS combines  th e  s t ra teg ic  premises  of 
p reem p t io n  and p re v e n t io n  in to  one s t ra tegy  o f  m i l i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  
ac t ion .42 This chap te r  exam ined  the  DoP as s t ra tegy  of  m il i ta ry  
an t ic ipa to ry  act ion,  and discussed t rad i t io na l  and  n u an ced  percep t ions  
of  the  concep ts  of  p ree m p t io n  and p rev e n t io n .  It p ro v id ed  tangible  
h is tor ica l  ev idence  ind ica t ing  the re  are risks associated w i th  
im p lem en t ing  such st rategies.
42 Ibid,  15.
Karl Marx a rgued th a t  ind iv idua ls  c rea te  the i r  ow n  h is to ry  but  
not  in  the  c ond i t ions  of the i r  choos ing .43 The attacks o f  9/11 c rea ted  
the  cond i t ions  for the  in i t ia t io n  of  the  GW OT and  laid th e  fo u nd a t ion  
for the  DoP. It  is clear  th a t  the  Bush ad m in is t r a t io n  chose  to express 
forcefully  the  U n i ted  S ta tes’ sovere ign  r ig h t  to se l f-defense  post-9/11.
This c h ap te r  also dem ons t ra ted  th a t  i t  could be cha l leng ing  
d i f fe ren t ia t ing  b e tw een  p ree m p t io n  and p rev e n t io n  s t ra teg ies  due to 
variables associa ted w i th  percep t ions  o f  th rea ts .  F u r th e rm ore ,  w h e n  
one t r ies  to d is t ingu ish  how  to use na t io n a l  pow er  to reac t  to 
amplified  levels  of  th rea t ,  d is t inc t ions  b e tw e e n  an in ev i tab le  and  an 
im m inen t  th re a t ,  or be tw een  p re e m p t io n  an d  p rev en t ion ,  become 
vague and imprecise . The d i s t in c t io n  b e tw een  p r e e m p t io n  and 
p rev en t io n  has c o n t r ib u te d  to cons iderab le  de l ibe ra t ion  on  acceptable  
uses of force. Consequently ,  th e re  rem ains  a need for un iversa l ly  
accepted de f in i t ions  of p reem p t io n  or p reven t ion .  T h ere  are many 
conceptua l  p rob lem s and some define  the  concepts  so b road ly  th a t  
they  lose ana ly t ic  u t i l i ty .  Perhaps  the  UN (w h ich  wil l  be discussed in 
the  nex t  chap ter)  should  address the  issue; o therw ise ,  the  accepted
43 Karl Marx, The E igh teen th  Brum aire o f  Louis Bonaparte  (Wildside  
Press, 2008) .
jus t i f ica t ion  for th e  use of  an t ic ipa to ry  force wil l  be cha l leng ing  
de te rm ine .
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CHAPTER V
DIPLOMACY: PERCEPTIONS AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND LEGITIMACY
W e the  peoples  o f  the  Uni ted  Nat ions  d e te rm in e d  to es tabl ish  
cond i t ions  u n d e r  w h ic h  just ice  and respec t  for th e  obl iga t ions 
aris ing f rom t rea t ies  and o th e r  sources o f  in te rn a t io n a l  law can 
be m ain ta ined .
— UN P re a m b le 1
BACKGROUND
There  are num erous  h is tor ica l  cases w h e re  the  an t ic ip a to ry  use 
of force has b een  used in warfare;  how ever ,  th e re  rem ains  confus ion  
as to w h a t  is a legal use of  force u n d e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law. This chap te r  
examines how  th is  p h e n o m e n o n  has affected global  p e rcep t ion s  of the  
GWOT. In addit ion ,  th is  chap ter  evaluates  h o w  in te rn a t io n a l  law, as
1 Charter  o f  the  U n i t e d  Nat ions ,  acc es sed  February  16, 2 011 ,
h t t p : / / w w w . u n . o r g /  e n / d o c u m e n t s / c h a r t e r / i n d e x . s h t m l .
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i n te rp re te d  by th e  UN, fai led to de l inea te  d isc repancies  on the  legal 
use of m i l i ta ry  force p r io r  to the  war  in Iraq.
The UN was unab le  to d raw  c lear  and  un ive rsa l ly  applicable  
de l inea t ions  b e tw ee n  p ree m p t io n  and p re v e n t io n ,  or to de f ine  levels 
of aggress ion th a t  w ou ld  prov ide  an accep ted  ra t io na le  for  the  use of 
m il i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  force by the  U n i ted  States du r ing  the  GWOT. In 
re t rospec t ion ,  it  appears the  U N ’s rules on the  use o f  force  were  not  
s t rong enough  to aver t  im p le m e n ta t io n  of  the  DoP in Iraq.  This issue 
is ex t rao rd in a r i ly  s ignif icant  because t h e  e ffec t iveness  of 
in te rn a t io n a l  law and  the  p e rcep t ion  of the  legal i ty  of w ar fa re  have a 
p ro found  effect  on the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m un i ty .  Not  on ly  was the  
lawfulness of the  U.S. DoP in quest ion,  its im p le m e n ta t io n  signaled a 
pivota l  p o in t  in  h is tory ,  as the  Uni ted  States decided  on  its own how  
it would  engage th rea ts  to its secur i ty  w i th o u t  th e  consen t  of  th e  UN.
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The UN has long been  a symbol o f  global,  m u l t ipo la r  
coopera t ion ,  and  its sheer  exis tence su b s ta n t ia ted  the  im por tance  of 
in te rn a t io n a l  law, econom ic  deve lopm ent ,  in te rn a t io n a l  securi ty ,  and
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social progress.  The o rgan iza t ion  was fo un d ed  in  1945 by the  
v ic tor ious  All ied  powers  in th e  hope  th a t  i t  w ou ld  act as an 
in te rv en ing  m echan ism  be tw ee n  na t ions  and th e r e b y  p re v e n t  fu ture  
wars.
Nat ions  a ro un d  the  w or ld  m ain ta in  t ru s t  in  the  U N ’s mission to 
p reserve  peace. The ph i losophica l  founda t ion  of  the  UN is based on 
collect ive  secur i ty  and a jo in t  c o m m itm en t  o f  its m em b er  states to 
adhere  to t en an ts  of  in te rn a t io n a l  law. Ever s ince th e  end  of W orld  
W ar II, the  UN has been  the  symbol of  the  accep tance  of m odern  
in te rn a t io n a l  law, in co rp o ra t ing  th e  p r inc ip le s  of sovere ign  equali ty  
be tw een  nations .  His tor ica lly ,  the  UN has b e en  valued for  its abil i ty  
to c o n s t ra in  na t ions  w i th in  its s t ru c tu re  into more  order ly  
assemblage.
The UN C ha r te r  has as a p r inc ipa l  th em e ,  to m a in ta in  peace and 
secur i ty  b e tw een  nations .  The provis ions  of th e  UN C h a r te r  have been 
the co rn e rs to ne  of  th e  m u lt i la te ra l  secu r i ty  sys tem since its 
foundat ion .  However ,  one of th e  UN’s most  vexing p red icam en ts  has 
been its inab i l i ty  to  enforce  the  general  p r inc ip les  of  in te rn a t io n a l  
law set fo r th  by its Charter .
As o u t l in e d  in th e  UN Char te r ,  the  UNSC focuses on the  
es tab l ishm en t  of  peacekeeping  opera t ions ,  the  e s tab l ish m en t  of
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in te rn a t io n a l  sanct ions,  and the  a u th o r iza t io n  o f  m i l i ta ry  action. The 
UNSC exercises its pow er  t h ro u g h  resolu t ions .  All  s igna to ry  coun tr ies  
pledge to se t t le  th e i r  in te rn a t io n a l  disputes peacefu l ly  t h ro u g h  the  
UN and aff irm th a t  no m em ber  na t ion  should  use  m il i ta ry  force except  
for co l lec t ive  se lf-defense.  Chap te r  I, Ar t ic le  2 of t h e  UN C har te r  
stipulates:
All Members  shall re f ra in  in th e i r  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  from 
the  th r e a t  or  use of  force against  th e  t e r r i to r ia l  in te g r i ty  or 
po l i t ica l  in d epend en ce  of  any  sta te ,  or  in  any  o th e r  m an ne r  
incon s is ten t  w i th  th e  Purposes of th e  U n i ted  N a t io n s .2
In C hapter  VII, Art ic le  51, th e  UN C har te r  declares  “the  
in h e re n t  r igh t  of  ind iv idual  or co l lec t ive  se l f-defense  if  an armed 
attack occurs against  a M em ber  of  the  Uni ted  N a t ions .” I t  continues :
2 Charter o f  th e  U n i ted  N ati ons ,  ac ces sed  February 16, 2 0 1 1 ,
h t t p : / / w w w . u n . o r g / e n / d o c u m e n t s / c h a r t e r / i n d e x . s h t m l .
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Measures tak e n  by Members  in  th e  exercise  of th is  r igh t  of  self- 
defense shall  be im m edia te ly  rep o r te d  to  the  Securi ty  Council  
and  shal l  no t  in  any way affect  th e  a u th o r i ty  and respons ib i l i ty  
of th e  Securi ty  Council  u n d e r  the  p re sen t  C har te r  to take  at any 
t ime such  ac t ion  as it deems necessary  in  order  to m a in ta in  or 
res to re  in te rn a t io n a l  peace and secu r i ty .3
It shou ld  be no ted  th a t  Ar t ic le  51, w i t h  its language: “if  an 
armed a t tack  occu rs ,” does not  ques t ion  the  r ig h t  of a n a t io n  to act in 
se lf-defense a f te r  an attack; how ever ,  th e  UN C har te r  does res t r ic t  the  
t rad i t iona l  r ig h t  of  se lf-defense on occasions w hen  an a rm ed  a t tack  
has no t  tak e n  place. These provis ions  are pa r t i cu la r ly  applicable  in 
expla ining w h y  th e  UN viewed the  U.S. invas ion  of A fghan is tan  as a 
legal re ta l i a t io n  for 9/11.
Pr io r  to the  invas ion  of Afghanis tan ,  th e  Unites States received  
ove rw helm ing  suppor t  from the  UN Genera l  Assembly.  UNSC 
Resolu t ion  1373, da ted Sep tem ber  28, 2001, co n dem n ed  the  t e r ro r i s t  
a ttacks of  9/11, and rea ff i rm ed  the  need  for com ba t  act ion,
3 Ibid.
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sanc t ion ing  the  U n i ted  S ta tes’ invas ion  of  A fghan is tan  in O ctober  
2001 .4
After  the  swif t  collapse of th e  T a l iban  in A fghan is tan ,  the  
Unites States t u r n e d  its a t t en t io n  tow ards  Iraq, asser t ing th e re  were  
l inks b e tw ee n  Saddam Hussein  and a l-Qaeda.  O n  Septem ber  12, 2002, 
P res iden t  Bush b ro u g h t  his a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s case against  Iraq to th e  
UN Genera l  Assembly and reques ted  th e  UN to take ac t ion  against  
Saddam H u sse in .5 The Bush a d m in is t r a t io n  argued t h a t  the  Iraqi 
regime pu rpose fu l ly  refused to adhere  to 1991 Gulf  W a r  reso lu t ions .  
Iraq had repea ted ly  fai led to coopera te  w i th  m anda ted  in te rn a t io n a l  
inspect ions  co n d u c ted  by the  I n te rn a t io n a l  Atomic Energy Agency, 
causing m any  in  the  Bush ad m in is t ra t io n  to believe Saddam Hussein  
was hid ing ,  or deve lop ing  WMD.
The UN la te r  de te rm in ed  th a t  Saddam Hussein was neg l igen t  
und e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law, and in  N ovem b er  2002, the  UNSC adopted  
Resolu t ion  1441, giving Iraq an  u l t im a tu m  to coopera te  in
4 Charter of  the United Nations, accessed February 16, 2011,  
http :/ /w ww .u n .o rg /en /docum ents /char ter / index .sh tm l .
5 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,
September 12, 2002,  accessed May 10, 2010,  h t tp : / /ge or ge w b u sh -w h ite h ou se .
archives, gov /new s /re l ea s e s /2 0 0 2 /0 9 /2 0 0 2 0 9 1 2 -1 .html.
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d isa rm a m e n t .6 At the  same t ime,  th e  UNSC did n o t  san c t ion  the  
U ni ted  S ta te s ’ case for war, ind ica t in g  th a t  a U.S. invas ion  of Iraq 
would  not  be a w ar  of  se lf-defense,  b u t  a v io la t ion  of  in te rn a t io n a l  
law. This judgm en t ,  in tu rn ,  caused cons iderab le  c o n s te rn a t io n  w i th in  
the  UN Genera l  Assembly,  and th e  five p e rm a n en t  m em bers  of  the  
Securi ty  Council .  The U n i ted  States a rgued  for  its sovere ign  r igh t  to 
exercise se lf-defense,  as a r t icu la ted  in  Art ic le  51, reques t ing  the  UN 
to suppor t  its e n t r e a t  to invade Iraq, b u t  did get no t  o v e rw h e lm ing  
suppor t  f rom the  m ajor i ty  of th e  UN.
This c o n ten t iou s  scenario raised tw o  im p o r tan t  quest ions .  First,  
could the  U n i ted  States legally take m i l i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  in 
expec ta t ion  of fu tu re  te r ro r i s t  a ttacks? Second, cou ld  th e  Uni ted  
States act in  se lf-defense  if  th e  UNSC could no t ,  or did  n o t  have the  
mil i ta ry  capaci ty  to take measures  to res tore  peace, or m in im ize  
percep t ions  of  t h r e a t  to the  U n i ted  States?
There  are academic two schools of th o u g h t  on  th e  r igh t  to 
exercise se lf-defense,  w h ic h  addresses these  quest ions ,  th e  “res t r ic t ive
6 United Nations Security Council ,  Resolution 1441 (2002),  accessed,  May
10. 2011, h t tp :/ /w w w .u n .o rg /D epts /unm ovic /new /docum en ts /reso lu t ions / s -res -  
1441 .pdf.
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school ,” and the  “expansive  schoo l .”7 The res t r ic t ive  school  suppor ts  a 
n a r row  in te r p r e t a t i o n  of the  UN C har te r .  The expansive  school  judges 
th a t  Art ic le  51 pe rm its  th e  use of a n t ic ip a to ry  se l f -defense  in response 
to im m in e n t  a rmed a t t a c k .8
Critics of  th e  r igh t  of an t ic ip a to ry  se l f -defense  be long  to the  
“res t r ic t ive  schoo l .” They  believe t h a t  UN m em b er  s ta tes  on ly  have 
those r ights  g ran ted  by the  Char te r .  F u r th e rm o re ,  as a s igna to ry  of 
the  UN C har te r ,  t h e y  m ain ta in  UN m em b er  s ta tes  waive th e i r  r ights  to 
act in se lf-defense  in  response to an a rm ed a t tack  w i t h o u t  approval  
from th e  UNSC. P ro p o nen ts  for this  n a r ro w  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  of  Art ic le  
51 claim a th r e a t  of aggression would  n o t  be suff ic ien t  to jus t i fy  the  
u n i la te ra l  use of fo rce .9 This v iew m ain ta in s  t h a t  de te rm in in g  w h e th e r  
an armed a t tack  is im m in en t  is d i f f icu l t  to subs tan t ia te ;  the re fo re ,  
a llowing na t ions  to de te rm in e  the  a p p rop r ia te  c ircum stances  to use 
force is too dang e ro u s .10
Suppor te rs  of  th e  r igh t  of  an t i c ip a to ry  self-defense argue th a t  
cus tomary  in te rn a t io n a l  law (a fo rem en t io n ed  in the  1837 Caroline
7 Richard J. Erickson, “Legitimate Use of  Mil itary Force Against  State-  
Sponsored International  Terrorism” (Air University  Press, 1989), 114.
8 Ibid, 116.
9 Josef. L. Kunz, “Individual  and Col lec t ive Se lf -Defense  in Article  51 of  
the Charter of  the United Nations Charter: A Search for Original In ten t ,” The 
American Journal of  International  Law 41, No. 4 (October 1947), 878.
10 Richard G. Maxon, “Nature's Eldest Law: A Survey of  a Nation's Right  
to Act in Self  D efense ,” Parameters, (Autumn 1995), 64.
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case), endures  u n d e r  th e  UN Charter .  C u s to m ary  in te r n a t io n a l  law 
au thor izes  a sta te , t a rge ted  by a n o th e r  state , to employ  m il i ta ry  force 
as necessary  to p ro tec t  itself.  The I n t e rn a t io n a l  C ou r t  of  Justice 
Statute  de l inea tes  cus tom ary  in te rn a t io n a l  law in  th e  fo l lowing 
se lec tion  from A rt ic le  38 ( l ) (a ) (b ) (c ) :n
38(1) The Court ,  whose  func t ion  is to decide  in accordance  w i th  
in te rn a t io n a l  law such disputes as are sub m i t ted  to it, shall 
apply: (a) in te rn a t io n a l  conven t io n s ,  w h e t h e r  genera l  or
par t icu la r ,  es tab l ish ing  rules express ly  recognized  by the  
con tes t ing  states; (b) in te rn a t io n a l  custom, as ev idence  of a 
general  p rac t ice  accepted  as law; (c) th e  genera l  p r incip les  of 
law recognized  by c ivi l ized n a t io n s .12
The In te rn a t io n a l  Court  of  Justice  Statu te ,  Art ic le  38, 
recognizes the  r igh t  of a sta te  to act  to p ro te c t  against  th rea ts  to its
11 . The International  Court of  Justice based in The Hague, Netherlands is 
the principal  judicial  body of  the UN. It is. Its main functions are to se tt le  legal  
disputes provide advisory opinions on legal  quest ions submitted to it by 
international  organization,  agencies,  and the UN General  Assembly.
12 International  Court of  Justice, Article 38, accessed Sept 28, 2011,  
http:/ /www.ic j-c ij .org/documents/ index .php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II .
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poli t ica l  independ en ce ,  or te r r i to r ia l  i n t e g r i t y . 13 F u r th e rm o re ,  th is  
r igh t  is n o t  l im i ted  to ins tances  of actual  a rm ed  attack. States can also 
act w h e n  the  im m in en ce  of  a t tack  is of a h ig h  d eg re e .14
Chr is t ine  Gray in In te rn a tio n a l L a w  a n d  th e  Use o f  Force  
reasons th a t  th e  i n te n t  of th e  UN C h ar te r  was never  to  res t r ic t  the  
r igh t  of a n t ic ipa to ry  se l f -defense .15 Moreover ,  John N o r to n  Moore,  in 
"Law and the  In do -C h in a  W a r ” suggests  the  UN C h a r te r  was no t  
in te n d ed  to r e s t r i c t  the  r igh t  of a n a t io n  to tak e  defensive  ac t ion  in 
any mater ia l  w a y .16 In addit ion,  T im o thy  McCorm ack  argues th a t  
Article  51 allows n a t ion -s ta te s  to “have  th e  f reedom  to defend 
themselves against  the  th re a t  of an a t tack  t h a t  the  Securi ty  Council  
wil l  do no th in g  to  s to p .”17 He adds, “it w o u ld  be absurd to suggest th a t  
in te rn a t io na l  law requires  a State to ‘take  the  f irst  h i t ’ w h e n  it could 
effect ively  defend  i tse l f  by acting p re e m p t iv e ly .”18 Lastly, C hr is to ph er  
Greenwood reasons th a t  the  fai lure  of th e  UNSC to e f fec t ive ly  deal
13 Richard G. Maxon, “Nature’s Eldest Law: A Survey of  a Nation's Right  
to Act in Self  D e fe n s e ,” Parameters,  (Autumn 1995),  57.
14 Ibid.
15 Christine Gray, In tern a tio n a l  L aw  and th e  Use o f  Force  (Oxford  
University Press), 2004,  111.
16 John Norton Moore, L aw  and th e  Indo-C h ina  War, (Princeton  
University  Press, 1972),  367.
17 Timothy L. H. McCormack,  S elf-D efen se  in I n te rn a t io n a l  Law: The 




w i th  the  post-9/11 issue of im m in e n t  th re a t  negates  th e  p ro h ib i t io n s  
imposed by th e  UN C h a r te r .19
The expansive schoo l ’s conv ic t ion  th a t  Art ic le  51 perm its  the  
exercise of  a n t ic ip a to ry  se l f-defense  is comparab le  to A m e r ic a ’s 
ra t ionale  invad ing  Iraq. For the  U n i ted  States, the  u n c e r t a in ty  of 
th re a t  was no t  an op t ion  i t  was w i l l ing  to take,  as factors th a t  
co n tr ib u te  to the  l ike l ihood  of war  have a com m on u n d e r ly in g  
e lem en t  of u n c e r ta in ty .  These factors are applicable  to b o th  the  
capabil i t ies  and  the  in te n t io n s  o f  an adversary,  w h ic h  tends  to 
in tensify ,  as u n c e r t a in ty  increases.  As such, th e  2002 NSS c lear ly  
a r t icu la tes  a case for going to  w ar  against  rogue na t ions-s ta tes :
Given the  goals of rogue states and  ter ror is ts ,  th e  U n i ted  States 
can no longer  solely re ly  on a react ive  posture .  The  inab i l i ty  to 
de te r  a po ten t ia l  a t tacker ,  th e  imm ediacy  of  to d a y ’s th rea ts ,  and 
the  m agn i tude  of po ten t ia l  ha rm  th a t  could  be caused by our
19 Christopher Greenwood,  “International  Law and the Pre-Emptive Use  
of Force, Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq,” San Diego International  Law Journal  
No. 4, (2003),  16.
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a dv ersa r ie s ’ choice  of weapons ,  do no t  p e rm i t  t h a t  op t ion .  W e
c an n o t  let  our  enemies s tr ike  f i r s t .20
The concep t  of  in te rn a t io n a l  law looms large in th e  debate  over 
the  war  in Iraq. W h e n  one examines th e  debate  over th e  legal i ty  of 
th e  war, it  becomes clear  th a t  the  opposing react ions  to th e  confl ic t  
were  also based on d i f fe ren t  pe rcep t ions  and in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  the  UN 
Char te r ,  and Reso lu t ion  1441.
UN Resolu t ion  1441 offered Saddam Husse in  a f inal  o p p o r tu n i ty  
to comply  w i th  num erous  d isa rm am en t  reso lu t ions  and  obl iga t ions 
es tabl ished  after  the  first Gulf  war. Reso lu t ion  1441 s ta ted  th a t  Iraq 
was in  m ater ia l  b reach  of the  cease-f i re  te rm s p resen ted  u n d e r  the  
terms of  the  prev ious  resolu t ions .  It a sser ted  th a t  Iraq 's  mater ia l  
breaches  re la ted  no t  only  to developing,  but  also to the  c o n s t ru c t io n  
of  p ro h ib i t ed  missiles; as well  as th e  purchase  o f  p ro h ib i ted  arms, and 
the  refusal  to recom pense  Kuwait  for loo t ing  con d uc ted  by Iraqi 
troops du r ing  the  1990-1991 invasion and o ccu p a t io n .21 As a result,  
the  U n i ted  States argued tha t  an invas ion  of  Iraq was legal. The
20 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy o f  the United States  
of  America,” September 2002, 15.
21 Ibid.
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United  States c i ted  Chapter  I, Art ic le  1 o f  the  UN C ha r te r  to suppor t  
its posi t ion .  The prov is ion  cal led o n  th e  UN “to m ain ta in  
in te rn a t io n a l  peace and securi ty ,  and  to th a t  end: to take  effect ive  
collec t ive  measures  for the  p r e v e n t io n  a n d  removal  of  th re a ts  to the  
peace .”22
France ,  Russia, and Germany,  “th e  coa l i t ion  of  the  u n w i l l i n g ,” 
opposed the  U n i ted  States and the  U n i ted  Kingdom, m a in ta in in g  th a t  
the  UNSC w ou ld  n o t  au thor ize  th e  use of force.  T hey  argued  th a t  
m il i ta ry  ac t ion  was in d irec t  v io la t ion  o f  C hap te r  1, A r t ic le  2 of the  
UN Char te r ,  w h ic h  states, “All M em bers  shall se t t le  the i r  
in te rn a t io n a l  d isputes  by peacefu l  means in  such a m a n n e r  th a t  
in te rn a t io n a l  peace and securi ty ,  and  just ice,  a re  not e n d a n g e re d .”23 
Ironically ,  b o th  sides c ited Chap te r  VII, Ar t ic les  41 and  42 o f  the  UN 
Char te r  to suppor t  th e i r  posit ions.  A r t ic le  41 states:
The Securi ty  Council  may decide w h a t  measures no t  invo lv ing  
the  use of  a rmed force are to be e m ployed  to give effect  to its 
decisions,  and it may call upon  the  Members  o f  th e  Uni ted
22 Charter of  the United Nations, accessed February 16, 2011,  
h t tp : / /w ww .u n .o rg /en /docum ents /charter / index .s htm l .
23 Ibid.
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Nations  to apply such  measures.  These  may include  com ple te  or 
pa r t ia l  i n t e r r u p t io n  of econom ic  re la t ions  and of  rail ,  sea, air, 
postal,  te leg raph ic ,  radio, and o th e r  means  of com m un ica t ion ,  
and the  severance  of d ip lomatic  r e l a t io n s .24
The d isag reem en t  be tw een  in te r p r e t a t i o n s  of th e  UN C har te r  
out l ines  a key p o in t  of d ispute  over the  perce ived  leg i t im acy  of  the  
U.S. invas ion  of  Iraq; Art icle  42 declares:
Should the  Securi ty  Council  cons ider  th a t  measures p rov ided  for 
in Art ic le  41 would  be in ad eq u a te  or  have proved  to be 
inadequate ,  it  may take such ac t ion  by air,  sea, or  land  forces as 
may be necessary  to m ain ta in  or res to re  in te rn a t io n a l  peace and 
securi ty .  Such act ion  may inc lude  dem ons t ra t ions ,  blockade,  
and o th e r  opera t ions  by air, sea, or  land  forces of m em bers  of 
the  U n i ted  N a t ions .25
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
The U ni ted  S ta tes’ pu rsu i t  of reg ime change  in I raq  w i th o u t  UN 
approval caused m any  to ques t ion  the  UN’s re levance.  The U N ’s 
inab i l i ty  to a rb i t ra te  the  invas ion  o f  I raq  re in fo rced  th e  com m only  
held  be l ie f  th a t  i n te rn a t io n a l  laws have l i t t le  effect  u p o n  th e  behav io r  
of powerfu l  na t ions .  This is n o t  a n e w  p h e n o m e n o n .  Since its 
incep t ion ,  the  UN has been  be leaguered  by its inab i l i ty  to mediate  
global s tandards  of  confl ic t  and coopera t ion .  UN t rea t ies  are v iew ed as 
ins ign if ican t  because th ey  will  not  cons t ra in  sovere ign  na t ions  from 
doing w h a t  is in  t h e i r  best in teres ts .
In  re t rospec t ,  a s t rong  case can be made th a t  th e  UN fai led to 
establ ish adequate  c r i te r ia  to d e te rm in e  w h e n  a p reem p t iv e  or 
p reven t ive  use of  force is acceptable  or unaccep tab le .  The pr incip les  
of  the  UN C har te r  suggest th a t  a rm ed force shou ld  be a last resor t  and 
th a t  the  a t tacker  must  have posit ive  k n ow ledge  t h a t  an adversary  
a t tack is im m inen t .  This may be a valid  cons t ruc t  for conven t iona l  
warfare  b e tw ee n  m o d ern  na t ion-s ta tes ;  how ever ,  for  the  Uni ted  
States, the  qu es t io n  was how  m ight  a n a t io n -s ta te  have posit ive  
knowledge of an im m in en t  te r ro r i s t  attack?
For the  U n i ted  States, 9/11 not only  des tab i l ized  th e  global  
securi ty  c l imate  b u t  also in i t ia ted  a sense of  vu ln e rab i l i ty ,  causing 
W ash ing ton  to adjust  its na t iona l  secu r i ty  p r io r i t ies .  The  h e igh ten ed
t h r e a t  level  was analogous to w h a t  th e  T ru m an  a d m in is t ra t io n  
e n c o u n te re d  w h e n  th e  Soviet  Union  exploded i ts  first n u c le a r  bomb. 
Just as th e  th re a t  of  a n u c le a r -a rm e d  Soviet  Union  u sh e red  in 
T r u m a n ’s polices of  d e te r ren ce  and c o n ta in m e n t ,  th e  th re a t  of 
te r ro r i sm  ushe red  in  the  DoP. The p e rcep t io n  o f  th rea t  f rom te r ro r i sm  
genera ted  a parad igm  shif t  in  how  th e  U.S. in te rac ted  w i th  the  
in te rn a t io n a l  co m m u n i ty  and  how  it used its m il i ta ry  power .  The 
p reva i l ing  v iew in th e  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  was tha t  c o u n tr ie s  were  
e i th e r  w i th  th e  U.S. or against  i t . 26
Num erous  scholars  have debated  w h e t h e r  co l lec t ive  secur i ty  
o rgan iza t ions  such as the  UN have t ru e  u t i l i ty  dur ing  cris is.  Critics 
claim collec t ive  secur i ty  is possible on ly  w h e n  i t  is least  needed,  and 
is most  effect ive  w h e n  the re  is peace. M earshe im er  cri t ic izes 
collec t ive  secur i ty  in  his art ic le ,  “The False Promise  of  In s t i tu t io n s ,” 
w here  he deems col lec t ive  secur i ty  regimes to be impract ica l ,  because 
nat ions  will  i n h e r e n t ly  d is t rus t  collec t ive  secur i ty  a l l iances  du r ing  a 
t ime of cr is is .27 This asser t ion  poses a cha l lenge  to the  e ffect iveness  of 
m ult i la te ra l  coopera t ion  and speaks d i rec t ly  to  the dismal  h is tor ical
26 Bush, George W. “Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the  
American People .” September 21, 2001.
27 Mearsheimer,  John. “The False Promise of Ins t i tu t ions .” International  
Security, vol . 19, No. 3 (1994-1995) ,  19.
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record  of co l lec t ive  secur i ty  w i t h in  in te rn a t io n a l  pol i t ics .  Two 
h is to r ica l  models offer p r io r  unsuccessfu l  examples of collec t ive  
secur i ty  regimes.  The first is the  C oncer t  of  Europe, e s tab l ished  at the  
end of the  Napoleonic  wars of the  ear ly  19th c en tu ry .  A second 
example  is the  League of Nations ,  fo rm ed  in 1919 a f te r  W o r ld  W ar  I. 
Both in s t i tu t io n s  fai led to l ive up to the  s tandards  of t h e i r  founding.
A l th o u g h  the  UN was es tab l ished  in  1945 as a r ep la cem en t  for 
the  League o f  Nations,  th e  UN has yet  b een  able  to establ ish  
un iversa l ly  accep ted  guidel ines  for the  use of p ree m p t iv e  or 
p reven t ive  force against  im m in e n t  or inev i tab le  th rea ts .  Common 
sense w ou ld  lead one to be lieve  the  UN ful ly  co m p re h en d s  the  
concept  of ac t ing  to p ro tec t  o n e ’s na t iona l  in teres ts ;  b u t  p r io r  to the  
invasion of I raq  th e re  was a b rea k d ow n  in  in te rp re t in g  th e  concep t  of 
collect ive  secur i ty  b e tw een  the  U n i ted  States, its t r a d i t io n a l  allies, 
and the  UN. In addit ion,  th e re  was a lack of shared  u n d e rs t a n d in g  as 
to the  p e rcep t io n  of th re a t  from te r ro r i s t s  and rogue na t ion -s ta te s .  In 
theory ,  i n te rn a t io n a l  law should  prov ide  app ropr ia te  guidel ines  for 
na t ions  to act  in se lf-defense.  T here fo re ,  the  im pend in g  chal lenge  is 
w h e th e r  lessons from the  GWOT can shed  l igh t  on fu tu re  scenarios  of 
confl ict ,  and c lar ify the  subject ive  perspec t ives  on leg i t im ate  uses of 
force, and w h a t  legally is, or  is not ,  a jus t  cause for war .
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W HAT IS A JUST WAR?
Ult im ate ly ,  th e re  remains  a q u es t io n  on  w h e t h e r  th e re  is a 
un iversa l ly  accep ted  guidel ine  for the  jus t i f ica t ion  of  war.  More 
specifically, in  the  con tex t  o f  this  s tudy, is t h e re  a gu ide l ine  on  the  
use of p reem p t ive  or p reven t ive  force against  im m in e n t  or inev i tab le  
threa ts .  Just w a r  th eo ry  is a set o f  guidel ines  for going to war.  The 
origins of  the  concept  of a just w ar  da te  back  to St. Augustine ;  
how ever ,  St. Thomas Aquinas codif ied  the  concept  in  th e  13th 
cen tury .  A l th o ug h  just w ar  th e o ry  is associated w i t h  Catholic  
scholars, da t ing  back to a t im e  w h e n  th e  Catholic  C h u rc h  p layed a 
more p ro m in e n t  role  in global  polit ics ,  i t  is a rel ig ious teach ing .  It  is 
a t r ad i t io n  of  theologica l  and  ph i losoph ica l  t h o u g h t  t h a t  emphasizes 
the  im p or tan ce  of  e th ica l  processes in  w a r fa re .28
Just w ar  th eo ry  specif ies the re  are severa l  leg i t im ate  cond i t ions  
for going to war:  first,  p roper  au th o r i ty  must  o rder  th e  ac t ion ;  second,  
the  cause m ust  be just ,  and th i rd ly ,  the  w a r r in g  a u th o r i ty  m ust  have a 
r igh t  in te n t io n  o f  p rom ot ing  good, or avoiding ev i l .29 The
28 Brian Orend,  “War,” Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy,  Fall 2008,  
accessed January 12, 2012 , ttp:/ /plato.s tanford.edu/entries/war/ .
29 Franklin E. Wester, “Preemption  and Just War: Considering the Case of  
Iraq,” Parameters (Winter 2004-2005) ,  29-31.
fundam enta l ,  and of ten  con trovers ia l ,  i n te n t io n  o f  just w a r  th eo ry  is 
that ,  states should  have moral  jus t i f ica t ion  for using m il i ta ry  force. 
The mere t h re a t  of  w ar  does n o t  suffice as an adequa te  ind ica to r  for 
war in the  just  war  t rad i t ion .  Some scholars argue t h a t  the  use of 
m il i ta ry  ac t ion  should  be c o n g ruen t  w i th  the  r e q u i r e m e n ts  of the  just 
war  t rad i t ion .  For ins tance ,  Neta  Crawford  in Just W ar T h eo ry  and  
th e  U.S. C o u n ter te rro r W ar asserts:
One  may th e n  jus t i f iab ly  rep ly  to a rm ed aggress ion w i th  force. 
And  one may also, in  cases of a c red ib le  th re a t  of im m in en t  
a t tack,  act p reem pt ive ly  to p rev e n t  such  a t h r e a t  from being 
real ized.  On th e  o th e r  hand,  p rev en t iv e  war,  w aged  to defeat  a 
p o ten t ia l  adversary  before  its m il i ta ry  pow er  can  grow to rival 
your  own, is n o t  ju s t .30
30 Neta C. Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War.” 
American Pol i t ical  Science Associat ion,  March 2003, vo l .  1/No. 1,7, accessed  
May 20, 2012,  h t tp : / /w w w .po l . i l l inois .edu/alumni/XTRACLINE/Crawford%  
20Just%20War%20T error.pdf.
The concepts  of just  war  th e o ry  have th ree  facets: just ice  in 
going to war  (jus ad bellum) and jus t ice  in w ar  (jus in  bello), and 
just ice d u r ing  th e  final stages of  war  (jus post  b e l lu m ) .31 32 By 
def in i t ion ,  th e  debate  over p ree m p t io n  and p re v e n t io n  fits in  the  
category of jus ad bel lum (justice in  going to war) .  The six c r i te r ia  for 
jus ad be l lum  are leg i t im ate  au tho r i ty ,  public  dec la ra t ion ,  jus t  in ten t ,  
p ropo r t io n a l i ty ,  last resort ,  and reasonable  hope  of success .33
Just w ar  th eo ry  w ar ran ts  f u r th e r  e labora t ion  because the  
concept  of moral  purpose  for war was re lev an t  for U.S. pol icym akers  
p r io r  to the  invas ion  of I raq  du r ing  the  GWOT. For in s tance ,  du r ing  a 
W est  Po in t  co m m en cem en t  address  P re s iden t  Bush w a n ted  to 
in f luence  audiences  th a t  U.S. objectives  post-9/11 w ere  just.  He 
an no u nced  the  following:
O ur  na t ion 's  cause has always been  larger  t h a n  our  n a t i o n ’s
defense. W e fight, as we always f ight , for  a ju s t  peace— a peace
th a t  favors h um an  l iber ty .  Building th is  ju s t  p e a ce  is America 's
31 Ibid, 28.
32 Brian Orend,  “War,” Stanford Encyclopedia of  Phi losophy,  Fall 2008,  
accessed January 12, 2012 ,t tp:/ /p lato .stanford.edu/entries/war/ .
33 Ibid.
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o p p o r tu n i ty ,  and America 's  duty .  America  has a g rea te r
objec t ive  th a n  con tro l l ing  th rea ts  and con ta in ing  resen tm en t .
W e  wil l  w o rk  for a ju s t  and  peacefu l  w o r ld  beyond  th e  war  on
te r ro r ,  ( ita lics added)34
As a r t i cu la ted  in the  co m m en c em e n t  address P re s id en t  Bush 
u nde rs to o d  th e  im por tance  of  convey ing  to  audiences  th a t  U.S. 
objectives w e re  just;  however ,  some scholars  favor a v iew  th a t  the  
only jus t i f iab le  cause for a rmed confl ic t  is to repe l  aggression. Reti red  
Army C hap la in  Colonel F rank l in  Eric W e s te r  fits th is  category.  His 
art icle  “P re em p t io n  and Just War:  C onsider ing  the  Case of  I r a q ” notes 
the  lack of  UN suppor t  for U.S. m i l i ta ry  opera t ions  in  Iraq was 
focused on d if fer ing  percep t ions  of  th rea t ,  and  the U.S. n o t  adher ing  
to the  six c r i te r ia  for  jus ad bellum. Colonel  W es te r  argues th a t  the  
invas ion  was not  leg i t im ate  and did no t  m ee t  th e  c r i t e r ia  for  w arfare  
as es tab l ished  in the  just  war  t rad i t ion ,  b u t  ra th e r ,  the  invas ion  set a 
p reced en t  for  powerfu l  na t ions  to subdue  w eaker  n a t io n s .35 W es te r
34 George W. Bush, “Presidential Commencement  Speech at West  P o in t ,” 
June 2002.
35 Franklin E. Wester, “Preemption  and Just War: Considering the Case of  
Iraq,” P aram eters  (Winter 2004-2005) ,  20.
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claims th a t  th e  GW OT and th e  DoP, as o u t l in e d  in the  2002 NSS, 
c reated  a m ora l  d i lemma for the  Bush adm in is t ra t io n .  He reasons th a t  
overre l iance  on  th e  DoP upset  th e  global  balance o f  po w er  by 
a t tem p t in g  to advance  W es te rn  values at t h e  t ip  of  a spear .36
Conversely ,  realis ts  argue th a t  m o ra l i ty  is n o t  th e  p r im ary  
conce rn  in an a rch ic  world  politics ; th e re fo re ,  deference  to just  w ar  
th eo ry  is inappropr ia te .  In P o litic s  am ong  N a tions, Hans M orgen thau ,  
fu r the rs  th is  assumption ,  asser t ing n a t ion s  do what  is in  th e i r  best  
in teres ts .  M o rg e n th au  quest ions w h e t h e r  n a t io n -s ta te s  can  always 
just ify th e i r  views in l ine w i th  w h a t  they  believe as a d iv ine  
sanct ion ing  of  just  war.  M o rgen thau  does n o t  ignore m ora l i ty ,  bu t  
proclaims:
To k n o w  th a t  na t ions  are subject  to  the  moral  law is one th ing ,  
whi le  to p re te n d  to know  w i th  c e r t a in ty  wha t  is good and evil 
in  the  re la t ions  among na t ions  is qu i te  ano the r .  T h ere  is a world  
of  d i f ference  b e tw ee n  the  be l ie f  t h a t  all na t ions  s tand  u n d e r  the  
ju d gm en t  of  God, insc ru tab le  to the  hum an  m ind ,  and the  
b lasphem ous convic t ion  th a t  God. is always on  o n e ’s side and
36 Ibid, 36.
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t h a t  w h a t  one  wil ls onese l f  c anno t  fail to be w i l led  by God 
also.37
A n o th e r  area of  debate  over  just  w a r  th e o ry  is w h e t h e r  forcible  
in te rv e n t io n  or regime change  in a n o th e r  n a t io n -s ta te  is just if iable  to 
reform th a t  s t a te ’s pol i t ica l  system. Again, W es te r  asserts tha t ,  in 
many cases, offensive m il i ta ry  ac t ion  does n o t  p ro m o te  democracy  
but, on the  co n tra ry ,  propagates  d i sc o n te n t  among th e  p o p u la t io n  it 
assumes to l ib e ra te .38
Just w ar  t h e o ry  provides  a u n iq u e  refe rence  p o in t  for e th ica l  
a rgum ents  about  the  conduct  of  war. A l th o ug h  its c e n t ra l  pr incip les  
are d is t inc t  from realism, just  w ar  t h e o ry  accepts w ar  as a pe rs is ten t  
charac te r is t ic  of  global  polit ics . This issue is p a ra m o u n t  to the  
discussion on the  DoP, g iven  the  co n f ro n ta t io n a l  n a tu re  of  the  w ar  on 
te r ro r ism  and th e  complexi t ies  t h a t  faced th e  in te rn a t io n a l  
com m uni ty  post-9/11.
37 Hans J. Morgenthau,  P o li t ic s  A m o n g  N ations: The S trugg le  fo r  P o w er  
and Peace, Fifth Edit ion,  Revised,  (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, 4-15.
38 Franklin E. Wester, “Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of  
Iraq,” Parameters (Winter 2004-2005) ,  29-31.
The use of th e  DoP rests on  its p e rc e p t io n  of  th e  chang ing  
na tu re  of  warfare  and the  p o ten t ia l  h a rm  te r ro r i sm  cou ld  un leash  
upon  th e  U n i ted  States. This p e rcep t ion  c h an g ed  the  U n i ted  S ta tes’ 
na t iona l  secu r i ty  objectives and its v iew  of h o w  it shou ld  exer t  its 
global power.  For the  U n i ted  States, the  a t tacks  of 9/11 jus t i f ied  th e  
DoP. T erro r is ts  de l ibera te ly  a t tacked  America;  th e re fo re ,  th is  gave th e  
Uni ted  States a legal and moral  r igh t  o f  se lf-defense.  Secre tary  of 
Defense Donald  Rumsfeld a r t icu la ted  the  following:
The on ly  way to deal w i th  the  te r ro r is ts  t h a t  has all the  
advantage  of offense is to take th e  ba t t le  to them ,  and f ind 
them ,  and  roo t  th em  out. And  th a t  is se lf-defense.  And  th e re  is 
no ques t ion  bu t  th a t  any n a t ion  on  E ar th  has th e  r ig h t  of self- 
defense. And  we do. And w h a t  we are doing  is going after  those  
people ,  and those  organizat ions ,  and those  capabil i t ies  w h e rev e r  
w e 're  going to f ind them  in  the  wor ld ,  and stop th em  from 
ki l l ing A m ericans .39
39 Donald Rumsfeld,  Interview with  W o l f  Bl i tzer,  CNN, October 28, 
2001, accessed July 22, 2012, h t tp :/ /w ww.defense .gov /transcripts /t ranscr ipt . 
aspx?transcriptid=2221.
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It  can be a rgued  th a t  U.S. ac t ion  in  A fghan is tan  fo l low ed the  
pr incip les  of  just  w ar  th eo ry  because the  Bush a d m in is t r a t io n  gave the  
Taliban regime two o ppor tun i t ie s  to t u r n  over Osama b in  Laden and 
members  of  a l -Qaeda  before the  U.S. invas ion;  however ,  w h e n  th e  
Taliban refused to do so, w ar  was inev i tab le .  Converse ly ,  the  case for 
regime change  in I raq  is not  as c lear -cu t .  Former Vice P re s id en t  
Cheney  adm i t ted  th is  fact in  the  fo l low ing  passage w h e n  he  indicated:
Many of  us are  conv inced  th a t  Saddam Hussein wil l  acquire  
nuc lea r  weapons  fa ir ly  soon. Just how soon, we  c an no t  real ly  
gauge. In te l l igence  is an u n c e r t a in  business,  even in  the  best  of 
c ircumstances .  This is especially t h e  case w hen  you  are deal ing 
w i th  a to ta l i t a r ia n  regime th a t  has made a sc ience  out  of 
dece iv ing  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty .40
40 Dick Cheney,  “In Cheney's Words: The Administration Case for 
Removing Saddam Husse in ,” N e w  York Times, August 27, 2002, accessed May 10, 
2012, w w w .n yt im e s .c om /2002 /08 /27 /w or ld /e ye s - i raq -c h e n e y - s -w or d s -  
administration-case-for -removing-saddam-usse in.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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A lth o ug h  the  2002 NSS emphasizes the  p o ten t ia l  t h r e a t  from 
rogue na t ions ,  th e  ra t iona le  for the  invas ion  of I raq  was n o t  as u rg en t  
as the  ju s t i f ica t ion  for invading  A fghan is tan .  F u r th e rm o re ,  in  
re t rospect ,  s ince no W MD were  found  in  Iraq, the  U.S. ra t iona le  for 
regime change  can be a t t r ib u te d  to its post-9/11 sense of  v u ln e ra b i l i ty  
and fear  of the  u n k n o w n .  A s t rong case can  be made th a t  the  
u n c e r ta in ty  of  possible  fu tu re  te r ro r i s t  a t tacks  became so pervasive 
th a t  it b lu r red  the  l ine be tw ee n  w h a t  was an im m in e n t  or an 
inevi tab le  th re a t  to U.S. securi ty .  Moreover ,  w h a t  was, or was not , a 
just or leg i t im ate  ra t iona l  for the  global  w a r  on ter ro r .
AN INQUIRY OF LEGITIMACY
The ques t ion  of leg i t imacy is a b road  and vague concept,  
in f luenced  by pub l ic  pe rcep t ions  of  legali ty ,  and affected by m any  
factors. For example ,  d if fer ing  geopoli t ica l  objectives and differ ing 
percept ions  of th r e a t  inf luence  how  a c o u n t r y  perceives w h a t  is or is 
not  a just  or leg i t im ate  ra t iona le  for going to war .
In ins tances  o f  se lf-defense,  a n a t io n  has the  leg i t im ate  r igh t  to 
use m il i ta ry  force. Moreover ,  it is reasonable  to assume th a t  fear of an
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im m in en t  a t tack  can cause a n a t ion  to im p lem en t  se l f-defense  
measures th a t  i t  m ig h t  not  have ta k e n  o th e rw ise .  However ,  ques t ion  
remains  on w h e t h e r  a h e ig h ten e d  p e rc e p t io n  of t h r e a t  just if ies 
an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  act ion.
Rober t  Kagan w e ighs- in  on this  q u e s t io n  in O f  Paradise and  
P ow er  w h e re  he asserts various n a t io n -s ta te s  have  d i f fe ren t  
pe rcep t ions  of th rea t .  Kagan analyzes th e  opposing geopoli t ical  
pe rcep t ions  of  the  Uni ted  States and  Europe a n d  reasons, “A m ericans  
are from Mars and  Europeans are f rom  V en us .” His analogical  
refe rence  to th e  m ytholog ica l  Greek  gods of  war  and  love acu te ly  
describes his views on th e  pol i t ica l  d i f fe rences  be tw ee n  A m erican  
policies of m i l i ta ry  power,  and E uropean  policies t h a t  give more 
la t i tude  for n ego t ia t ions  p r io r  to confl ict .
Hard po w er  policies , and d ip lom atic  polic ies, p lay  d i f f e ren t ly  to 
various audiences.  U lt imate ly ,  pe rcep t io n s  of th rea ts  form ideological  
real i t ies  for ind iv idua l  nations,  and  these  percep t ions ,  l ike beauty ,  are 
in the  eye of  the  beholder .  As such, it  is c lear  d i f fe ren t  audiences 
considered  the  DoP legi t imate  or i l leg i t im ate .  In  th is  subjective 
context ,  Kagan suggests A m e r ic a ’s ex t rao rd in a ry  m i l i ta ry  power 
shapes its po l i t ica l  v iew of global  securi ty .  Kagan m a in ta in s  th a t  the  
U ni ted  States perceives the  w or ld  as an e n v i ro n m e n t  f i l led  w i th
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poten t ia l  th re a ts  to be con tro l led  us ing  m i l i ta ry  force,  w h i le  the  
Europeans p re fe r  to  use soft pow er  and d ip lom acy  to manage t h e m .41
The th e o re t i c a l  d isc ip line  of rea l ism  endorses  ideologies of  self- 
p reserva t ion ,  in  w h ic h  the  use of m il i ta ry  p o w e r  against  enemies  is 
indispensable  to survival.  The Bush a d m in is t r a t io n  appears  to have 
believed t h a t  the  DoP was necessary  to p ro tec t  America.  Suppor te rs  of 
the  DoP argue  the  s t ra tegy  conveys th e  t r ad i t io n a l  u n d e rp in n in g s  of 
U.S. na t iona l  secu r i ty  policy  and lays a du rab le  foun d a t io n  for the  
fu ture  use of  m il i ta ry  force. Kagan a r t icu la te s  this po in t ,  w h e n  he 
emphasizes the  2002 NSS was just  a r e s t a t e m e n t  of over h a l f  a c e n tu ry  
of hab i tua l  A m erican  na t iona l  secu r i ty  pol icy ,  du r ing  w h ic h  the  
Uni ted  States cons is ten t ly  sought  to shape global  even ts  in ways 
favorable to A m erican  p r inc ip les  and  in te r e s t s .42
Many argue th a t  th e  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n  deserves c red i t  for 
p roducing  th e  most  coheren t ,  com prehens ive  in te rn a t io n a l  s t ra tegy  
since the  end  of th e  Cold W a r .43 Dur ing  a speech  to th e  M a n h a t tan  
Ins t i tu te  in  2002, Secretary  of State Condoleezza  Rice aff irmed her  
support  for  the  DoP w h e n  she stated, “P re s id en t  Bush’s n ew  N a tio n a l
41 Robert  Kagan, O f  Paradise and P ow er:  A m erica n  and Europe in  the  
N e w  W orld  O rder  (New York: Random House, 2003) , 61.
42 Ibid.
43 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael Kraig, “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  9.
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S e c u r ity  S tra teg y  offers a bold v is ion  for p ro tec t in g  our  N a t ion  th a t  
captures  to d a y ’s new  rea l i t ies  and new o p p o r tu n i t i e s . ”44 Moreover,  
former Secre ta ry  of  Defense Donald  Rumsfeld a r t i cu la te d  his 
jus t i f ica t ion  for  the  invas ion  of I raq  by s ta t ing  th a t  th e  “absence of 
evidence  is no t  ev idence  of  absence of weapons o f  mass d e s t r u c t io n .”45
A c o un te rva i l in g  v iew stresses th a t  the  DoP p layed  havoc w i th  
conven t iona l  in te rn a t io n a l  rules  of se lf -defense  and no rm s govern ing  
the  p roper  use of force against  sovereign  na t ions .  R ichard  N. Haass in 
W ar o f  N ecess ity , W ar o f  C hoice  alleges th a t  th e  invas ion  of Iraq was 
a war of  choice,  and was the  most s ign i f ican t  d isc re t io n a ry  war  
carr ied  out  by  the  U n i ted  States since V ie tnam . Haass reasons many 
na t ions  v iew ed  the  war  as i l leg i t im ate  and unnecessa ry  because 
America  had o th e r  viable  policy  options.
Youssef Choueir i ,  an exper t  on m o d e rn  Arab s ta tes  at the  
Univers i ty  of  E xe te r ’s In s t i tu te  of  Arab and Islamic Studies  in Great  
Brita in, claims, “The U.S. p resence  in I raq  is act ing  as a m agne t  for a 
range of  anti -U.S. t e r ro r i s t  g ro u ps .”46 Professor Choue ir i  adds:
44 Condoleezza Rice, The W alter  W ris ton  L ec tu re  o f  the  M anhattan  
In s ti tu te ,  1 O c to b e r  2002, N e w  York  (Washington,  D.C.: White  House Office of  
the Press Secretary, October 1, 2002) .
45 John Ikenberry,  L ibera l  O rder and  Im per ia l  A m b i t io n :  Essays on 
A m erican  P o w e r  and  W orld  P o l i t ic s  (Cambridge: Pol i ty  Press, 2006) .
46 Jeremy Bransten, “Iraq: Is Occupation Helping or Hindering the Global  
War Against Terrorism?” accessed 27 June 2011, h t tp :/ /w ww.g lobalsecuri ty
W h a t  [ the Americans]  did was s im ply  to o p e n  Iraq 's  
in te rn a t io n a l  borders  to i n te rn a t io n a l  te r ro r i s t s ,  in  th e  sense 
th a t  th ey  dissolved the  Iraqi  Army, th e  I raq i  secur i ty  forces, 
and now  anyone  can cross in to  Iraq from Iran ,  T urkey ,  even  
Syria, Saudi Arabia , and Kuwait  and n o b od y  will s top them .  And 
th is  is ac tual ly  a r id iculous  sta te  of  affairs th a t  a c o u n t r y  w h ic h  
was t ig h t ly  con tro l led  by a d ic ta to rsh ip  has descended  in to  
chaos as a resu l t  of  the  absence of any  p lann in g  for pos tw ar  
I raq .47
C h o u e i r i ’s e xp lana t ion  a r t icu la tes  a com m o n  v iew  th a t  the  
U ni ted  S ta tes’ fai lure  to establ ish  o rder  in post-Saddam Iraq  c rea ted  
ideal cond i t ions  for te r ro r i s t s  and foreign  f ighters  to  e n te r  the  
country .
. or g/wm d/lib rary /news/ iraq /2003/09 / i raq-030912-rfer l-3171315 .htm
47 Ibid.
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THE PUBLIC VIEW  OF LEGITIMACY
As the  GW OT escalated,  cri t ic ism o f  the  I raq  w a r  increased  in 
bo th  domest ic  and in te rn a t io n a l  popu la t ions ,  and th e re  was a 
d ow nw ard  t r e n d  of suppor t  for the  war. In  February  2003, jus t  before  
the  war  began, the  P rogram  on In te rn a t io n a l  Policy  A t t i tu d e s  (PIPA) 
found th a t  44 p e rc en t  of Americans  th o u g h t  invad ing  I raq  would  he lp  
the  war  on te r ro r i sm ,  w hi le  25 p e rcen t  t h o u g h t  it w o u ld  be ha rm fu l  
and a n o the r  25 p e rc e n t  th o u g h t  it  w o u ld  have  l i t t le  effect  e i th e r  
w ay .48
By Novem ber  2005, a Bri tish Broadcast ing  C orp o ra t ion  (BBC) 
poll found th a t  55 p e rc e n t  of people  po l led  said the  w a r  in  Iraq had  
increased the  l ike l ihood  of t e r ro r i s t  a t tacks  a round  th e  w o r ld .49 In 
Novem ber  2006, a Cable News N e tw o rk  (CNN) poll found  th a t  59 
pe rcen t  of  people  po l led  bel ieved  the  w a r  w i t h  Iraq had  made the  
Uni ted  States less safe from te r ro r i sm .50
John M uel ler ,  a scholar  of pub l ic  op in ion  at Ohio  State 
Univers i ty ,  l inked  the  decl in ing  to le ran ce  for the  w ar  to the
48 World Public Opinion,  “Americans Assess  US International  Strategy” 





casualties t h a t  it  genera ted .  Similar  to th e  U.S. wars in  Korea and 
Vie tnam, the  GW OT lost domest ic  suppor t  as casual t ies  increased.  In 
fact,  M uller  po in ts  out; domestic  suppor t  for t h e  GW OT eroded  more 
quickly  t h a n  i t  did in  the  o th e r  confl ic ts .51
A poll of  the  Iraqi public  co n duc ted  in  Sep tem ber  2006 found 
th a t  only  36 p e rc e n t  of Iraqis  fel t  th e i r  c o u n t ry  was h ead ing  in the  
r ight  d i rec t ion ,  w h i le  79 p e rcen t  of Iraqis  h ad  a “m ost ly  nega t iv e ” 
view of the  in f luence  th a t  the  Uni ted  States had  in  t h e i r  country .  
Fu r the rm ore ,  61 p e rcen t  of Iraqis  approved o f  at tacks on U.S.-led 
forces .52
These sta t is t ics are s ign if ican t  because t h e  wil l o f  the  people  has 
h is to r ica l ly  in f lu en ced  w h e th e r  a n a t io n  can susta in  a w ar  effort .  
Clausewitz  recognized  th is  p h e n o m e n o n  w h e n  he  sta ted ,  “The 
passions th a t  are i n h e r e n t  in war  must  a l ready  be k in d le d  in the  
peop le .”53 Public  suppor t  for a w ar  plays a s ign if ican t  role  and  has an 
impact  on pol icymakers .  Some argue the  global  p e rc ep t io n  of  the  war  
in Iraq th re a te n e d  to u n d e rm in e  A m e r ic a ’s ro le  as global  leader  and 
its o ppor tun i t ie s  for co n t in u ed  dom inance  by  fai ling to p ro jec t  a
51 Linda Feldmann,  “W h y  Iraq War Support Fell So Fast,” Christian  
Science M o n ito r , November  2005.
52 U.S. Insti tute of  Peace, The Iraq S tu d y  Group R epor t  2006, accessed 19 
June 2011, http:/ /media.usip.org/reports/ iraq_study_group_report .pdf , 29.
53 Michael  I. Handel,  M asters  o f  War: C lassical S tra teg ic  T hought  
(Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) .
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message of  global  inclusiveness .  For ins tance ,  in The C hoice , 
Zbigniew Brzezinski  asserts th a t  th e  war  in I raq  u l t im a te ly  damaged 
A m erica ’s global s tanding ,  he wri tes ,  “A m e r ic a ’s global  m il i ta ry  
c red ib i l i ty  has never  been  h igher ,  ye t  its global  pol i t ica l  c red ib i l i ty  
has never  been  lo w e r .”
Brzezinski  judges the  U n i ted  States and  the E u ropean  Union  
(EU) should  w ork  to g e th e r  to resolve th e  confl ic ts  in th e  Middle  East, 
he argues, “Act ing  separa te ly ,  America  can be p re p o n d e r a n t  but  not  
om nipo ten t ;  Europe can be r ich  but  im po ten t .  A c t ing  toge ther ,  
America  and Europe are  in effect  g lobal ly  o m n ip o te n t . ”54 W i t h  regard 
to U.S. un i la te ra l i sm ,  Brzezinski indicates  t h a t  the  U n i ted  States 
should  fac i l i ta te  al l iances w i th  l ik e -m in d e d  democrac ies  to develop a 
com prehens ive  s t ra tegy  to address  the  cond i t ions  in  cou n tr ie s  th a t  
foster  te r ro r ism .  In addit ion ,  th e  U n i ted  States should  take  a ba lanced 
approach  towards  secur i ty  by  m i t iga t ing  risks while  w o rk in g  w i th  
allies to con ta in ,  and e l im ina te  p o ten t ia l  t e r ro r i s t  th rea ts .  In o rder  to 
realize these  goals, the  U n i ted  States must  foster  a s t rong re la t ionsh ip  
w i th  the  EU, fac i l i ta te  the  r e s t ru c tu r in g  and e n la rg em en t  of  NATO, 
and have pa t ience  in the  Middle East.
54 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  The Choice: G lobal Dom inance or  G loba l  
Leadersh ip  (New York: Basic Books, 2004) , 96.
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Ambassador  James Dobbins tes t i f ied  before  the  U.S. Congress in 
2004 th a t  th e re  were  s ign if ican t  d i f ferences  b e tw ee n  th e  U n i ted  States 
and m any of its E uropean  allies regard ing  th e  DoP. The fai lure  to 
agree on  the  d i rec t io n  of m ul t i la te ra l  coopera t ion ,  he c o n tended ,  has 
com plica ted  the  abi l i ty  to forge a com m on U .S .-European  s t ra tegy  to 
combat  global  t e r ro r i sm .55 Dobbins s ta ted  th a t  th e  Europeans are open 
to com m on act ion  against  im m in e n t  th rea ts ,  b u t  the  key  to success in 
address ing in te rn a t io n a l  confl icts  rests in global  inc lusiveness  of 
collec t ive  secur i ty  organ iza t ions  such as the  UN.56 This  ques t ion  of  
leg i t imacy was a factor  in  the  t r an sa t la n t ic  rift  t h a t  developed 
b e tw een  the  Uni ted  States and its t r ad i t io n a l  E uropean  allies, w h ic h  
became ev iden t  w h e n  the  t rad i t io n a l  allies of  the  U n i ted  States did 
not  suppor t  th e  invas ion  of  Iraq.
A s t rong  case can be made th a t  a m u l t i la te ra l  p resence  was 
needed  to sof ten  the  p e rcep t io n  of  o v e rw he lm in g  U.S. m i l i ta ry  pow er  
du r ing  the  GWOT. The NATO allies are  the  logical cho ice  for th is  
role. Thomas Barnet t ,  in  The P en tagon 's  N e w  Map, advocates  for
55 James Dobbins, “The Effect of  Terrorist Attacks in Spain on 
Transatlantic Cooperation in the War on Terror,” (RAND Study CT-255, March 
31), 2004, accessed May 25, 2011,  www.g lobalsecuri ty .org/security/ l ibrary  
/congress /2004_h/040331  -dobbins.pdf.
56 James Dobbins,  “NATO's Role in N at ion -b u i ld ing ,” N A T O  R e v ie w  
(Summer 2005),  accessed May 25, 2019, ww w.rand .org /commentary
/ 1 20805NR.html.
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seeking m u l t i la te ra l  pa r t ic ip a t ion  in all  fu tu re  confl icts .  Barnet t  
argues for us ing  an ove rw h e lm in g  aggressive “l e v ia th a n ” force to 
dislodge an adversary ,  fo l lowed by a second w ave  of c o m p e te n t  allies 
to expand the  m om entum ,  and lastly,  an in te rn a t io n a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  
force to wage peace after  the  in i t ia l  confl ic t  and rebu i ld  th e  n a t io n .57
Perhaps  lessons from th e  f irst  h a l f  of  the  20th cen tu ry ,  du r ing  
W orld  W ar  II can dem on s t ra te  the  u rg en t  n eed  for n a t ion s  to band  
to g e th e r  to de te r  aggression. In The V ita l P artnersh ip , S imon Serfaty 
argues th a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  shou ld  w o rk  tog e th e r ,  and 
not  “embrace  an i l l -de f ined  bu t  t em p t in g  phob ia  k n o w n  as an t i -  
Am erican ism  whi le  the  U.S. responds to its o w n  t e m p ta t io n  to go it  
alone or w i th o u t  its allies of ch o ic e .”58 Se r fa ty ’s pos i t ion  of  w ork ing  
w i th  o th e r  na t ions  is not  a new concep t  in U.S. n a t io n a l  secur i ty  
policy. Dur ing  his fou r th  inaugura l  address in 1945, P res iden t  
Frankl in  Delano Roosevelt  stated:
57 Thomas Barnett,  The P en tagon's  N e w  Map  (N ew  York: Berkley Books,  
2004), 302.
58 Simon Serfaty, The V ita l  Partnersh ip:  P o w e r  a n d  O rder  (Rowman and 
Littlefield,  2005),  59.
In the  days and in the  years th a t  are to come we shal l  w o rk  for a 
jus t  and h onorab le  peace,  a durab le  peace,  as today  we w ork  and 
f igh t  for  to ta l  v ic to ry  in war. W e have lea rned  th a t  we c anno t  
l ive a lone  at peace. W e  have l ea rned  th a t  our  o w n  w e l l -b e in g  is 
d e p e n d e n t  on th e  w e l l -be ing  of  o th e r  na t ions  far away. W e  have 
lea rned  to be ci t izens of th e  wor ld ,  mem bers  of  the  hu m an  
c o m m u n i ty .59
Pres id en t  Roosevelt  recognized  th a t  success in th e  in te rn a t io n a l  
arena of global  confl ic t  depends  on  global  inclusiveness .  In to d a y ’s 
global con tex t ,  a res i l ien t  UN shou ld  be a cen t ra l  p a r t  of  th is  
inclusivism, h e lp ing  na t ions  w o rk  to g e th e r  to def ine  acceptable  
consensus and boundaries  w i th in  the  in te rn a t io n a l  system.
59 Franklin D. Roosevelt,  “Fourth Inaugural  Address ,” January 20, 1945,  
accessed May 25, 2012,  http :/ /w ww.re-ques t .ne t /h is tory / inaugurals / fdr /fourth . 
htm.
SUMMARY
This  c hap te r  exam ined  the  v a r ied  global  p e rcep t io n s  and 
responses to th e  U.S. GWOT, and th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  of  the  DoP. It  
h ig h l ig h ted  the  fact th a t  p reem p t ive  and  p reven t ive  s t ra teg ies  have 
been  used in  num erous  h is tor ica l  cases of  warfare .  This  ch ap te r  also 
no ted  th a t  confus ion  rem ains  as to w h a t  cons t i tu tes  a legal and  
leg i t im ate  use of offensive force u n d e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law. The UN has 
long been  a symbol of global m u l t ipo la r  cooperat ion;  how ever ,  its 
rules  on the  use of  force were  not  s t rong  e n o u gh  to ave r t  the  war  in 
Iraq. In t e rn a t io n a l  law fai led to a rb i t ra te  num erous  d isc repancies  and 
the  UN was unab le  to d raw  c lear  and un ive rsa l ly  applicable  
de l inea t ions  b e tw ee n  p reem p t io n  and  p re v e n t io n ,  or to de f ine  c r i te r ia  
for the  use of force in Iraq.
As the  symbol of global coopera t ion ,  the  UN can play a decisive 
role  in th e  global  order ,  and  play an essent ia l  role in  the  struggle  
against  in te rn a t io n a l  te r ro r ism .  The UN can encourage  na t ions  to 
w ork  th ro u g h  im p o r tan t  issues. More specifically the  UN can 
consolida te  formidable  coal i t ions to dem o n s t ra te  the m er i ts  of pow er  
w h e n  rogue na t ions  and te r ro r i s t  actors v io la te  in te rn a t io n a l  norms.  
Consequently ,  for th e  UN to rem ain  re levant ,  i t  has to w o rk  w i th  th e
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p e rm a n e n t  m em bers  o f  the  UNSC to d e te rm in e  rules for m u l t i la te ra l  
c oopera t ion  against  te r ro r ism ,  tak ing  in to  acc o u n t  the  pe rcep t ions  of 
th rea t  from all par t ies  involved.
The fu tu re  success of  the  UN wil l  lie not  on ly  in how  it 
a t tem pts  to a rb i t ra te  issues of i n te rn a t io n a l  confl ic t  and  coopera t ion ,  
b u t  also in how  it sets p receden ts  of in te rn a t io n a l  law regard ing  
global te r ro r ism .  C onsequen t ly ,  one can make a c red ib le  case th a t  just 
w ar  th eo ry  may provide  a un ique  po in t  of  re fe rence  for  e th ica l  
a rgum ents  about  the  c o n du c t  of war.
The Genera l  Assembly of th e  UN shou ld  agree u p o n  a de f in i t io n  
of t e r ro r i sm  to form the  basis of e n fo rcem en t  u n d e r  th e  UN Char te r .  
This wil l  a llow for the  deve lopm en t  of c red ib le  s tra tegic  guidel ines  
for in te rn a t io n a l  c o u n te r te r ro r i s m  procedures .  The  s t ra tegy  should  be 
based upon  the  in te rn a t io n a l  rule  of law a nd  not  sub ject  to the  
in te res ts  of any ind iv idua l  n a t io n -s ta te .60 An ag reed -u p o n  d e f in i t io n  
among UN m em ber  states should  inc lude  acts of  te r ro r i sm  l is ted as 
possible war  crimes by the  Geneva C onven t ions  of  1949.61 This 
approach may s t r e n g th e n  the  c red ib i l i ty  of  the  UN, increase  prospects
60 Hans Koechler,  “The United Nations and International  Terrorism:  
Challenges to Col lec t ive Security.  International  Progress Organization,” 




for global s tab il i ty ,  and mit igate  the  p rob lem  of  pe rce ived  ideological  
incons is tency .
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CHAPTER VI 
A QUESTION OF INTELLIGENCE
“W e c an n o t  defend America  and  our  f r iends  by h o p ing  for the  
best.  So we must  be p repa red  to defea t  o u r  e nem ies ’ plans, using 
the  bes t  in te l l igence  and p ro ceed in g  w i th  d e l ib e ra t io n .”
— George W. Bush, Sep tem ber  20021
BACKGROUND
Inte l l igence  is the  p roduc t  resu l t ing  from th e  col lec t ion ,  
processing, in teg ra t ion ,  analysis, evaluat ion ,  and i n te r p r e t a t i o n  of 
available in fo rm a t io n  conce rn ing  fore ign  g o ve rn m e n ts .2 It  is d i f fe ren t  
from o th e r  g o v e rn m e n t  funct ions ,  because  m u ch  of it  takes place in 
secret,  and i t  exists because leaders  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  seek to h ide  or f ind 
in fo rm a t io n  about  o th e r  na t ion-s ta tes .
1 George W. Bush, The National  Security Strategy of the United  States of  
America.  September 2002, introduction.
2 Jeffrey Richelson.  The U.S. In te l l ig e n c e  C o m m u n ity  (Boulder, CO: 
W e s tv ie w  Press), 1995.
Policymakers ,  scholars,  and the  public ,  have m ixed  views of  
in te l l igence  ga the r ing  and  the  U.S. in te l l igence  com m uni ty .  
I ronica l ly ,  secrecy is a source of m uch  of the  co ns te rn a t io n ;  how ever ,  
this  is expec ted  to some degree  in an open  soc ie ty  such as the  U n i ted  
States. Many v iew  in te l l igence  agencies as in e f f ic ien t  o rgan iza t ions ,  
or pow erfu l  bureaucrac ies  beyond  the  scope of  public  u n de rs tan d in g ,  
w hi le  o thers  see th e m  as tools  of h ig h - r a n k in g  g o ve rn m e n t  officials 
seeking pol i t ica l  advantage.
It is the  job of the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  to collec t ,  analyze, 
and d issem ina te  in te l l igence  to pol icymakers .  However ,  th e  U.S. 
gov e rn m en t  on ly  has a select  n u m b er  of  officials  who have  access to 
h igh- leve l  in te l l igence ,  and who are su f f ic ien t ly  in fo rm e d  to make 
sound policy  decisions.  The u t i l i ty  of  in te l l igence  ac t iv i ty  is m easured  
on  the  qua l i ty  of in fo rm a t io n  prov ided  to pol icym akers .  As such, th is  
chap te r  examines th e  diff icult ies  the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  faced 
dur ing  the  GWOT, and analyzes w h e th e r  the  re la t io n sh ip  b e tw een  the  
in te l l igence  c o m m un i ty  and U.S. po l icym akers  com pl ica ted  the  
im p le m e n ta t io n  of th e  DoP.
ENABLING ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
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From Sun Tzu to th e  A m erican  R ev o lu t ion ,  the  s ignif icance  of 
in te l l igence  as it re la tes  to na t iona l  secu r i ty  has been  v i ta l  to  th e  
successful a d van cem en t  of  all na t ion -s ta te s .  In te l l igence  provides  
vi tal  in fo rm a t ion  to gov e rnm en t  po l icym akers  about  the  complexi t ies  
of the  po l i t ica l  issues, and  allows officials to b e t t e r  assess th rea ts  to 
na t ional  securi ty .  Accura te  in te l l igence  con tr ibu te s  to the  
im p le m e n ta t io n  of m i l i ta ry  act ion,  and th e  deve lop m en t  of analy t ica l  
processes and  p roduc ts  associated w i th  the  DIME e lements  of power.  
This process of  co l lec t ion  and d issem ina t ion  o f  in te l l igence  data  is 
vital to  the  g o v e rn m e n t ’s ab i l i ty  to p ro tec t  its i n te r e s t s .3
Robust  in te l l igence  capabil i t ies  are crucia l  to a m o d ern  
g o v e rn m e n t ’s ab i l i ty  to im p lem en t  ra t iona l  d ip lom atic  polic ies and  
make sound lo ng - te rm  st ra tegic  m i l i ta ry  decisions.  N ow here  is 
C lausew itz ’s p roverb  th a t  “war  is an ex tens ion  o f  po l i t ics” t ru e r  t h a n  
w i th  regard  to th e  need  for accura te  in te l l igence  to e ffect ively  
im p lem en t  s t ra teg ies  of an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  act ion.  In  th e  case of th e  
GWOT, the  U n i ted  States requ ired  exce l len t  com m unica t ions  b e tw ee n
3 See appendices  E and F for i l lustrations of the United States National  
inte l l igence  structure.
185
pol icymakers  and  the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty .4 Successful  m il i ta ry  
an t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  depended  on hav ing  accura te  in te l l igence  re la t ing  
to the  capabil i t ies  and in te n t io n s  of global  te r ro r is ts ,  and rogue 
na t ion-s ta tes .
The u l t im a te  goal of th e  in te l l igence  co m m u n i ty  is to  op t im ize  
in fo rm a t ion  so th a t  it  can be used to suppor t  U.S. n a t io n a l  secur i ty  
objectives.  In te l l igence  est imates, h ow ever ,  at  times are  inaccura te ,  
because in te l l igence  analysts are es t im ators  o f  in fo rm at ion .  Even in 
the  best  c ircum stances ,  a w e l l - t r a in e d  analys t  is not  able  to answ er  
every  ques t ion  re la t ing  to a p a r t icu la r  issue. An ana lys t ’s best  efforts,  
no m at te r  h o w  robust ,  c anno t  p rov ide  so lu t ions  to eve ry  s t ra tegic  
dilemma. Vice P res iden t  C heney  acknow ledged  this fact  w h e n  he 
indicated:
Many of us are  conv inced  th a t  Saddam Hussein wil l  acquire  
nuc lea r  weapons  fairly soon. Just how  soon, we c an no t  rea l ly  
gauge. In te l l igence  is an u n c e r ta in  business ,  even in  the  best  of 
c ircumstances .  This is especial ly  the  case w h en  you  are deal ing
4 For an outl ine of  the United States National  Intel l igence  Leadership 
Structure, see appendix G.
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w i th  a to ta l i t a r ia n  regime th a t  has  m ade  a sc ience  out  of
dece iv ing  the  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty .5
C h e n e y ’s com m ents  a l low one to recogn ize  tha t  th e  in te l l igence  
c om m uni ty  does n o t  have a flawless  r e la t io n sh ip  w i th  pol icymakers .  
For instance,  th e re  are always issues of w h e t h e r  a po l icym ak e r  fully  
t rus ts  th e  re l iab i l i ty  of  the  in fo rm a t ion  p rov ided .  In add i t ion ,  there  
are also concerns  on how  pol icymakers  use th e  in te l l igence  th ey  are 
given. U l t im ate ly ,  th e  deve lopm en t  of in te l l ig ence  for  po l icym akers  
does not  equate  to its acceptance,  nor  does good in te l l igence  analysis  
equate  to the  deve lo pm en t  of  sound  na t ion a l  secur i ty  decisions.
Like most  inexact  discipl ines ,  o f ten  one does n o t  k n o w  w h a t  is 
u n k n o w n  u n t i l  after  the  fact,  or i t  is too late to  m it iga te  a specific 
th rea t .  For ins tance,  p r io r  to 9/11, the  in te l l ig en ce  c o m m u n i ty  did no t  
ful ly u n d e rs t a n d  a l-Qaeda  rep re sen ted  a d i f fe ren t  type  of t e r ro r i s t  
organizat ion .  A l-Qaeda  is less geographica l ly  a n ch o red  th an  
t rad i t iona l  te r ro r i s t  cells.  I t  is po l i t ica l ly  connec ted ,  em p o w ered  by
5 Dick Cheney,  “In Cheney's  Words: The Administration Case for 
Removing Saddam Husse in ,” N e w  York Times, August 27, 2002, accessed May 10, 
2012, w w w .n yt im e s .c om /2002 /08 /27 /w or ld /e ye s - i raq -c h e n e y - s -w or d s -  
administration-case-for-removing-saddam-ussein.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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global ization,  and  is fueled by a synergy  based  on  h a t r e d  of  the  
Uni ted  States.
This u n d e re s t im a te  of a l-Qaeda  exposed a fun d am e n ta l  weakness  
of the  U.S. in te l l igence  apparatus . Many in te l l igence  analysts  made a 
series of  fau l ty  pre-9 /11  assumptions  th a t  led to wide accep tance  th a t  
al-Qaeda was a m in im al  th rea t ,  and post-9/11 assum ptions  th a t  
asserted Iraq possessed WMD. Accord ing ly ,  th e  fo l low ing  sec t ion  
provides analysis  of the  debated  chal lenges  and fai lures  of the  
in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  du r ing  the  GWOT, th e  r e la t ionsh ip  b e tw ee n  
the  in te l l igence  co m m u n i ty  and po l icym akers ,  and  assesses how  
policymakers  pe rce ived  and u t i l ized  in te l l igence .
THE UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The in te l l igence  c o m m un i ty  faces th e  cons tan t  chal lenge  of  
prov id ing  t im e ly  and accura te  in te l l igence  to pol icymakers  in a 
m anner  th a t  fits the i r  in fo rm at ion  needs.  T h ere  have  been  m any  
instances of dysfunc t iona l  in te rac t io n  b e tw ee n  the  U.S. in te l l igence  
apparatus and pol icymakers .  To analyze th is  p rob lem , one  needs only  
to contras t  the  in te l l igence  c o m m un i ty  re la t ionsh ips  w i th  th e
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executive  b ranch ,  and  the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty ’s v e ry  d i f fe ren t  
re la t ionsh ip  w i th  th e  legislat ive b ranch  o f  the  U.S. go ve rnm en t .
The in te l l ig en ce  c o m m u n i ty  p rov ides  in fo rm a t io n  to help  the  
executive  b ran c h  im p lem en t  na t iona l  secu r i ty  policy, whereas  it 
provides l im i ted  in te l l igence  to th e  legis la t ive  b ranch  as repo r tab le  
summaries .6 These summaries  allow for Congress ional  overs igh t  and 
budge ta ry  acco u n ta b i l i ty  over the  polic ies of t h e  executive  b ranch .
Congressional  overs ight  of the  in te l l ig en ce  c o m m u n i ty  was 
essent ia l ly  ben ig n  du r ing  the  1950s and  1960s; however ,  du r ing  the  
1970s the  W a te rg a te  affair placed th e  executive  b ra n c h  u n d e r  a 
microscope of  sc ru t iny .  This con t inues  to p lay  a s ign if ican t  role in 
co n tem pora ry  A m erican  po l i t ics .7 Since W ate rga te ,  the  executive  
branch  has been  im pl ica ted  in num erous  abuses of power,  such  as th e  
I ran -C o n t ra  scandal , w h ic h  resu l ted  in th e  U.S. House of 
Representa t ives  form ing a P e rm a n e n t  Select  C om m it tee  on 
In te l l igence  to m ain ta in  awareness  of e x ec u t iv e -b ra n ch  po l ic ies .8 The 
U.S. Senate also has a Select Com mit tee  on  In te l l ig e n ce .9
6 Mark M. Lowenthal,  In te ll igence:  From Secre ts  to  Policy ,  (Washington  





The House P e rm a n e n t  Select C om m it tee  on In te l l ig en ce  has 
overs ight  over  th e  D irec tor  of  N a t iona l  In te l l igence ,  th e  CIA, the  
National  In te l l ig en ce  Council ,  and ju r isd ic t io n  over all  n o n-defense  
re la ted  in te l l ig en ce  programs.  The Senate  Select C om m it tee  on 
In te l l igence  has overs igh t  of D epa r tm en t  o f  Defense in te l l igence  
p ro g ram s .10
A l though  th e  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  sought  to provide  
accura te  in te l l igence  to the  executive  b ra n c h  to gauge th rea ts ,  and 
impar t  in fo rm a t io n  to the  House and Senate In te l l igence  Committees ,  
many U.S. po l i t ic ians  assigned s ign if ican t  b lam e  to th e  in te l l igence  
com m uni ty  for th e  9/11 attacks. Cri tics c la im ed  tha t  th e  in te l l igence  
com m uni ty  was n o t  able to an t ic ipa te  the  a t tacks  of 9/11 because U.S. 
in te l l igence  agencies had become com for tab le  w i th  an t iq u a te d  Cold 
W ar  m ethods  of ga the r in g  w arn in g  in te l l igence ,  w h ich  re l ied  heavi ly  
on techno logy  to ga the r  in fo rm a t io n .11
Pr io r  to 9/11, the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  was u n a b le  to keep up 
w i th  the  new  era  of global ization,  w h ic h  had  b lu r red  th e  boundaries  
be tw een  nations .  Global iza t ion  had  placed great  p ressure  on the
10 Ibid, 212-218 .
11 Warning inte l l igence  is largely a post -World  War II phenom enon ,  a 
product of  the Cold War, used to indicate aggression from the Soviet  Union or 
its communist  al lies.  Cynthia Grabo, A n tic ip a t in g  Surprise: A n a ly s is  fo r  
Stra teg ic  W arning  (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic Inte l l igence  Research,  
Joint Mil itary Intel l igence  College, 2002) , 1.
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in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  to sc ru t in ize  massive amounts  o f  in fo rm a t io n  
to d e tec t  n e w  and unfo reseen  th rea ts  to  the U n i ted  States. 
Accordingly ,  cr i t ic isms of th e  in te l l ig en ce  c o m m u n i ty  w ere  valid,  
because th e  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty ’s Cold W a r  t e c h n iq u e s  were  
inadequate  to p e n e t ra te  w h a t  w e re  cons idered  at the  t im e  to be 
ins ign if ican t  t e r ro r i s t  organizat ions .
C u r ren t ly ,  a d ispute  exists w i th in  th e  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  
b e tw een  analyst  w ho  value qua l i ta t ive  in te l l igence  analysis,  and  those 
w ho  em phasize  the  value of q u a n t i t a t iv e  t e c h n ica l ly  s t ru c tu re d  
sc ient if ic  approaches  to in te l l igence  analysis. Q u a l i ta t ive  analysis , is 
viewed more  as an a r t  t h an  a science,  and  is used  most  o f ten  in th e  
polit ical  and m il i ta ry  arena. Q u a n t i t a t iv e  analysis  is a s t ru c tu re d  
approach th a t  is genera l ly  applied  to  sc ient if ic  and  tech n ica l  
in te l l igence  chal lenges .  Of  the  tw o  approaches ,  qua l i ta t ive  analysis  
provides the  most  useful  in te l l igence  to p o l icym ak e rs .12
12 Robert D. Folker Jr., Inte l l igence  Analysis  in Theater Joint  
Intel l igence Centers: An Experiment in Applying  Structured Methods.  Joint  




The po l i t ic iza t ion  of  in te l l igence  is a n o th e r  p ro b lem at ic  issue. 
It  has been  alleged tha t  h igh - leve l  U.S. po l icym akers  m an ip u la ted  
in te l l igence  to h e ig h ten  th e  p e rcep t ion  of  im m in en t  t h r e a t  from Iraq 
to s t r e n g th e n  th e i r  jus t i f ica t ion  for going to w a r . 13 N um erous  pos twar  
reports  and in te rv iew s  ind ica ted  the  U n i ted  States and  the  Uni ted  
Kingdom presen ted  wors t-case  scenarios ,  for going to w ar  in Iraq. 
Senator  John Kerry made the  fo l lowing  observa t ion  in  an in te rv ie w  
w i th  the  Boston Globe:
In  Septem ber  of 2002, the  U.S. ad m in is t r a t io n  c i ted  sources 
from the  Bri tish g o v e rn m e n t  th a t  s ta ted  Iraq could  launch  a 
b iological  or chemical  a t tack  in less t h a n  45 m inu tes .  They  
made th a t  s ta tem en t ,  and i t  was in f luen t ia l  to us, w i th o u t  
c lear ing  it  w i th  the  CIA, w h ic h  m is t ru s ted  the  source  so much,
13 Paul Pillar, “Intel l igence,  Pol icy,  and the War in Iraq,” Foreign A ffa irs  
(March-April  2006),  19.
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t h a t  th e y  refused  to inc lude  it  in  th e  [October  2002] N at iona l
In te l l igence  Estimate . 14
Regardless if  one accepts the  n o t io n  th a t  po l icym akers  in 
W ash in g to n  c h e r ry -p ic k e d  in te l l igence  to jus t i fy  the invas ion  of  Iraq, 
the  u n re l iab i l i ty  of  p re -w ar  in te l l igence  assessments on I raq  p ro m p ted  
the  Senate Select  Com mit tee  on In te l l igence  to in i t ia te  an 
inves t iga t ion  as to w h y  the  in te l l igence  c o m m un i ty  was unab le  to 
evaluate  I r a q ’s W M D programs or its t ies  to t e r ro r i s t  o rg an iz a t io n s .15 
In July 2004, the  com m it tee  released its f ind ing  in  a m an usc r ip t  t i t l ed  
“Report  of  th e  Select  Commit tee  on  In te l l igence  on the  U.S. 
In te l l igence  C om m uni ty 's  Prew ar  In te l l igence  Assessments  on I raq .”
The rep o r t  conclusively  sta ted th a t  a s ignif icant  p a r t  of the  2002 
N ationa l In te llig e n c e  E stim a te  on Iraq  was inaccura te .  In  addit ion ,  
the  inves t iga t ion  c i ted  num erous  egregious in te l l igence  assumptions  
about  Iraq and  its ab i l i ty  to acquire or create  WMD. In  pa r t icu la r ,  the
14 Scot Lehigh, “Truth, Lies, and In te l l igence ,” Boston G lo b e , November  
25, 2005, accessed February 27, 2011, w w w .b oston .com /new s /g lobe /ed i tor ia l  
_opin ion /oped /ar t ic le s /2005 / l  l /25 / truth_ l ie s_and_ inte l l ig ence / .
15 U.S. Senate,  Select Committee on Inte l l igence ,  “The U.S. Senate ’s 
Report on the U.S. Intel l igence  Community’s Prewar Inte l l igence  Assessment of  
Iraq,” 108th Cong.,  9 July 2004, accessed November  20, 2010, ht tp:/ /  
in te l l igence .s enate .g ov /108301 .pdf.
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repor t  s ta ted  th a t  th e re  was no def in i t ive  ev idence  dem on s t ra t in g  th a t  
Iraq was r ec o n s t i tu t in g  its nuc lear  p rog ram  or develop ing  u n m a n n e d  
aerial vehic les  capable  of de l iver ing  biological  w e ap o n s .16 The repo r t  
specula ted  th a t  h igh - lev e l  gov e rnm en ta l  officials p ressured  
in te l l igence  analysts  to m an ipu la te  da ta  in a m anner  th a t  w ou ld  
support  going to war  in I r a q .17
A n o th e r  exp lana t ion  for the  in te l l igence  fai lures,  suggested th a t  
U.S. po l icym akers  conso l ida ted  th e i r  ow n  op in ions  on the  in te l l igence  
est imates t h e y  received,  because th ey  were  dissatisfied w i th ,  or 
skeptical  of processes w i th in  the  in te l l igence  com m uni ty .  This se l f ­
genera ted  in te l l igence  may have s h o r t - t e r m  advantages for the  
policymaker;  how ever ,  it p resen ted  lo n g - te rm  consequences .
In addit ion ,  the  Senate  Select Com m it tee  on  In te l l igence  rep o r t  
s tated, analysts  were  u n d e r  inc red ib le  p ressure  to make safe 
assumptions and thu s  were  inc l ined  to use caut ion ,  and  if any th ing ,  
overes t im ated  ra th e r  t h a n  u n de re s t im a ted  threa ts .  The repo r t  
acknowledged tha t  analysts  of ten  cap i tu la te  to the  cognit ive  biases of 
“group t h i n k , ” w h ic h  is d e t r im e n ta l  w h e n  one is evaluat ing  complex 
concepts . For ins tance ,  a f ter  the  f irst  G u lf  W ar ,  the  U n i ted  States, and
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
the  UN gave the  Iraqi g o ve rn m en t  nu m ero u s  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  to 
coopera te  w i th  in te rn a t io n a l  weapons inspectors .  Saddam Hussein  
forced th e  weapons  inspect ions  to end  in 1998. As a resu l t ,  analysts 
specula ted  t h a t  Saddam was h id ing  chemical  and  biological  weapons.  
This conc lus ion  qu ick ly  spread across the  in te l l igence  co m m u n i ty  and 
genera ted  a group consensus th a t  was d if f icu l t  to  change  once 
embedded.
Ult im ate ly ,  th e  in te l l igence  repo r t  fau l ted  th e  in te l l igence  
com m uni ty  for adop t ing  un tes ted ,  and u n w a r r a n t e d  assum pt ions  about  
the  ex ten t  of Iraq 's  WMD programs,  and  fa i l ing  to develop  h um an  
sources of  in te l l igence  inside  Iraq after  the w i th d ra w a l  of 
in te rn a t io n a l  weapons  inspectors  in  1998. The repor t  also e l im ina ted  
any b lame from any po l i t ic ian  in W ash in g to n ,  w h ic h  inc luded  the  
Bush adm in is t ra t io n ,  the  Republ ican- led  Senate , and th e  Democrat-  
led Congress.
The inaccuracies  h igh l igh ted  in the  in te l l igence  r e p o r t  led to 
imprecise  assessments for invading  Iraq. Fai lures in th e  in te l l igence  
com m uni ty  are  n o t  a new phen om en on .  In 1941, be fore  th e  Pearl  
Harbor  a t tack,  the re  was cons is ten t  da ta  t h a t  asserted  a Japanese 
a t tack was im m inen t .  However,  analysts  acquiesced to  “group t h i n k , ”
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suppor t ing  o th e r  hypo theses  th a t  invo lved  no a t t a c k .18 Roberta  
W h o ls te t t e r ,  in Pearl Harbor: W arn ing  a nd  D ecision , wr i tes :
[Rela ting to Pearl  Harbor]  for every  s ignal  th a t  came in to  the  
in fo rm a t io n  n e t  in  1941 the re  w ere  usua l ly  severa l  p lausible  
a l te rna t ive  explanat ions ,  and it  is n o t  surpr is ing  th a t  our  
observers  and  analysts  w e re  in c l in ed  to select  th e  exp lanat ions  
th a t  f i t ted  the  popu lar  h y p o th e s e s .19
More th an  50 years la ter ,  the  in te l l ig en ce  c o m m u n i ty  made 
similar  r isk adverse mis takes of m aking  the  most  u n p ro b lem at ic  
assessments to evaluate  I raq  W MD program. These  less t h a n  th o ro u g h  
assessments are labeled as “grasping for the  lo w -h an g in g  f r u i t . ” In 
“Reports , Poli tics,  and In te l l igence  Failures:  The Case o f  I r a q ,” Robert  
Jervis emphasizes th e  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  repea ted ly  fai led to 
realize th a t  ev idence  cons is ten t  w i th  t h e i r  i n te rp re ta t io n s  was 
cons is ten t  w i th  o th e r  views as well,  he writes:
18 Roberta Wholste tter,  Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decis ion  (Stanford,
CA: Stanford Univers ity  Press, 1962), 393.
19 Ibid.
A second facet  of the  fai lure  was th e  lack of  c o n s id e ra t io n  given 
to a l te rn a t iv e  explanat ions .  This is no t  to say th e r e  w ere  no 
d isagreements .  The A m erican  repor ts  d o cum en t  t h e  sharp  splits 
over  w h e t h e r  the  a lum inum  tubes  th a t  I raq  was su r rep t i t io u s ly  
im p o r t in g  ind ica ted  th a t  I raq was r ec o n s t i tu t in g  its nuc lear  
p rog ram  and w h e th e r  the  fact th a t  th e  sof tware  t h a t  Iraq 
p ro cu re d  for its U nm an n ed  Aeria l  Vehicles  (UAVs) inc luded  
maps of the  U.S. im plied  a t h re a t  to th e  A m erican  hom eland .  
Some people  also had doubts  about  th e  re l iab i l i ty  of the  
t e s t im o n y  of th e  now  no to r ious  in fo rm a n t  ‘C u rveba l l ’ th a t  Iraq 
had  mobile  facili ties for p roduc ing  biological  weapons .  But no 
genera l  a l te rna t ive  explana t ions  for  Saddam’s behav io r  were  
offered.  There  were  no ‘Red T eam s’ to a t tack th e  preva i l ing  
views;  no analyses comm issioned  from Devi l ’s Advocates;  no 
papers  t h a t  we ighed  com pe t ing  poss ib i l i t ies .20
20 Robert  Jervis, "Reports, Pol it ics ,  and In te l l ig ence  Failures: The Case Of  
Iraq." The Journal of Strategic Studies 29, No.  1 (February 2006): 15-16,  accessed  
January 4, 2013,  www.neurosc ience-arena .c om /journals /p df/ . . . /FJSS_LR_3-52 
.pdf.
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In response  to the  shor tcom ings  of the  in te l l igence  com m uni ty ,  
P res iden t  Bush enac ted  the  In te llig e n c e  R eform  a n d  Terrorism  
P reven tio n  A c t  of  2004. The act c rea ted  the  off ice  of  th e  D irec to r  of 
Nat ional  In te l l igence ,  and codif ied the  concept  on “na t iona l  
in te l l ig en c e ,” as a “far reach ing  re fo rm  of previous  in te l l igence  
prac t ices  and a r r a n g e m e n t .”21 As the  o rg a n iz a t io n ’s f irst  d i rec to r ,  John 
Negropon te  p ub l ished  the  N a tio n a l In te llig e n c e  S tra teg y  t h a t  asserted,  
“in te l l igence  is A m e r ic a ’s f irs t  line o f  de fense ,” and “in te l l ig ence  can 
and should  be used  to aid d ip lom acy ,” and  “ensure  v ic to ry  [in war]  in  
the  event  conf l ic t  is u navo id ab le .”22
The N a tio n a l In te llig e n c e  S tra teg y  also declared  the  p r im ary  
role of the  U.S. in te l l igence  com m un i ty  is to in tegra te  dom estic  and 
foreign d im ens ion  of U.S. in te l l igence  so th a t  there  are  no gaps in 
u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  th rea ts  to U.S. na t iona l  securi ty ,  by add ing  dep th  to 
in te l l igence  analys is .23This call for co l lab o ra t ion  w i th  th e  in te l l igence  
co m m u n i ty  a l lowed the  CIA, Defense In te l l igence  Agency,  N a t iona l  
Securi ty  Agency, Nat ional  G eospa t ia l - In te l l igence  Agency,  and o th e r
21 Office of  the Director of  National  Intel l igence ,  N ation a l  In te l l ig e n c e  
S tra te g y  o f  th e  U n ited  States o f  A m erica:  Transform ation  through In tegra tion  




in te l l igence  agencies to cooperate  on issues re la t ing  to na t iona l  
securi ty.
D irec to r  Negropon te  sought  to add d e p th  to in te l l igence  
analysis by e n h an c in g  in te l lec tua l  in te g r i ty  t h r o u g h o u t  domestic  and 
foreign in te l l ig en ce  organizat ions .  A ccord ing  to  A m erican  
in te l l igence  analys t  Cynth ia  G rabo’s book A n tic ip a tin g  Surprise, 
in te l l igence  analysis  is a theo re t ica l  ac t iv i ty  based on  a process of 
logic and deduct ion .  She suggests a p rem iu m  should be placed on 
m ain ta in ing  in te l lec tua l  in teg r i ty  w i th in  the  in te l l igence  com m uni ty ,  
and analysts  shou ld  speak t r u th  to p o w e r .24 The p ro d u c t io n  of h igh-  
qual i ty  analysis requires  a sym bio t ic  re la t io nsh ip  be tw een  
pol icymakers  and  the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  because  vigorous 
in te l l igence  capabil i t ies  are essentia l  to a m o d ern  g o v e rn m e n t ’s 
abil i ty  to develop  an effect ive na t iona l  secur i ty  s trategy.
It is u n k n o w n  how  th e  In te llig e n c e  R efo rm  a nd  Terrorism  
P reven tio n  A c t  w i l l  affect th e  fu tu re  of  in te rn a t io n a l  in te l l igence  
collection;  how ever ,  many argue th e  most  effective way  to p reem p t  
attacks by in te rn a t io n a l  te r ror is ts  is to w ork  w i th  o th e r  na t ions  to
24 Cynthia Grabo, A n tic ip a t in g  Surprise: A n a ly s is  for  S tra te g ic  W arning  
(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic Intel l igence  Research,  Joint Mil itary  
Intel l igence College, 2002) , 140.
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share in te l l ig e n c e .25 By s t re n g th e n in g  a l l iances  the  U n i ted  States 
increases its l ike l ihood  of success, because  it  does no t  have  to w o rk  
alone to defeat  global te r ror is ts  n e tw o rk s .26 Com bat t ing  global  
te r ro r ism  is the  major  secur i ty  issues of  our t im e  and th e  U.S. wil l  
have to re ly  on its t r an sa t lan t ic  p a r tn e r s  to m ee t  the  chal lenges  of  the  
21st cen tu ry .  In te rn a t io n a l  t e r ro r i sm  is a global  p h e n o m e n o n ;  
therefore ,  m u l t i la te ra l  in te l l igence  s t ra teg ies  should  be used to 
combat  it.
SUMMARY
This ch ap te r  assessed the  impact  of  th e  use of  in te l l igence  
dur ing  the  GWOT and judged th a t  in te l l igence  is an im p o r tan t  
e lem ent  of  U.S. na t io n a l  power.  This ch ap te r  analyzed  th e  cha l lenge  
the  U.S. in te l l igence  com m uni ty  faced m o n i to r in g  in te rn a t io n a l  
adversaries, and the  domestic  chal lenge  of  advis ing U.S. po l icym akers  
on inc ip ien t  threa ts .
25 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig. “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  15.
26 Ib id , 40.
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Beyond the  need  to have h ig h -q u a l i ty  in te l l igence  analysis ,  and 
in te r d e p e n d e n t  dialogue be tw ee n  po l icym akers ,  and th e  in te l l igence  
com m uni ty ,  im p o r tan t  lessons have em erged  from th e  problems 
h ig h l igh ted  in th is  chapter .  A deba te  cu r re n t ly  exists b e tw ee n  
analysts w h o  cons ider  in te l l igence  analysis  is an art, and  those  who 
emphasize  th e  value  of techn ica l ly  s t ru c tu re d  sc ient if ic  approaches  to 
in te l l igence  analysis.  These two approaches  are q ua l i ta t iv e  and 
q u a n t i ta t ive  m ethods  of analysis.
Q ua l i ta t ive  analysis , is v iew ed  m ore  as an  art t h a n  a science,  
and is used  most  often in  the  pol i t ica l  and m i l i ta ry  arena.  
Q uan t i ta t iv e  analysis is a s t ruc tu re d  approach  t h a t  is g e n e ra l ly  applied  
to sc ient if ic  and techn ica l  in te l l igence  challenges. O f  the  two 
approaches,  qua l i ta t ive  analysis provides the  most  useful  in te l l igence  
to p o l icym akers .27
The debate  over  w h e th e r  qua l i ta t ive  or q u a n t i t a t iv e  techn iques ,  
divides m any  in the  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty .28 Many analysts  argue 
th a t  s t ru c tu re d  q uan t i ta t ive  tech n iq u es  are n a r ro w ly  focused and 
cannot  accoun t  for the  in f in i te  n u m b e r  of variables  invo lved  in
27 Robert D. Folker Jr., In te l l ig e n c e  A n a ly s is  in Theater Jo in t  
In te l l ig en ce  Centers: An E xper im en t in A p p ly in g  S tru c tu re d  M eth ods .  Joint  
Military Intel l igence  College (Washington DC: Center for Strategic Inte l l igence  
Research) 2000,  2.
28 Ibid, 7.
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complex p rob lem s of hum an  in te r a c t io n .29 Conversely,  re sea rch  shows 
th a t  w h e n  qua l i ta t ive  judgm ents  based on  i n tu i t io n  and exper ience  are 
accepted as t rue;  analyst  grasp for low hang ing  frui t ,  and  are  r e lu c ta n t  
to change judgm en ts  even  in th e  face of n e w  ev id en ce .30
A great  deal  of  in te l l igence  in fo rm a t io n  deals w i th  h u m an  
in te rac t ion ,  w h ic h  is chal leng ing  to cap tu red  quan t i ta t iv e ly .  
Therefore ,  qua l i ta t ive  analysis  is w id e ly  used  in th e  in te l l igence  
com m uni ty .  Im prov ing  st ra tegic  qua l i ta t ive  analysis  has b een  a lon g ­
standing  goal of th e  in te l l igence  com m uni ty .  As such, the  fo l lowing 
chap ter  dem ons t ra te s  how  qua l i ta t ive  secu r i ty  analysis  can be 
improved by apply ing  a q uan t i ta t ive  s t ru c tu re  such as game theory .  
This analy t ica l  process allows analysts  to iden t i fy ,  and es t imate  
probabi l i t ies  o f  a th re a t  based on assessments o f  in fo rm a t ion  received.  
Ul t imate ly ,  it em pow ers  decis ion making  u nd e r  u n c e r t a in ty  by 
compell ing  analysts  and pol icymakers  to recognize re lev an t  
qua l i ta t ive  and q u a n t i ta t ive  factors, iden t i fy  assumptions ,  and expose 
u ns ta ted  assum ptions  to make decisions based on a l l -encom pass ing  





GAME THEORY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
“Stra tegy is the  essence of  pol i t ics ;  a n ons t ra teg ic  po l i t ic ian  
can no t  achieve  his or he r  aims. The  po l i t ica l  sc ien t is t  w ho  has 
n e i th e r  th e  time, the  t ra in ing ,  nor  th e  in c l in a t io n  for s t ra tegic
th o ug h ts  wil l  be poor ly  equ ipped  to  u n d e rs t a n d  th e  s t ra tegic
tw is t  an tu rn s  of  po l i t ics .”
— James M orrow ,  19941
INTRODUCTION
In the  wake  o f  9/11, the  need  for  effective in te l l igence  has 
become ev iden t .  G a ther ing  accura te  in te l l ig en ce  is a key co m p o nen t  
to iden t i fy ing  and  es t im at ing  th rea ts  to U.S. securi ty .  The object  of
this chap te r  is to  d em ons t ra te  th a t  game th e o ry  is a m e th o d  th a t  can
empower  in te l l igence  analysts to b e t te r  es t im ate  probab i l i t ies  of  a 
threa t .  Game th e o ry  is va luable  because it  compels in te l l igence
1 James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Pol i t ical  Scientists .  Princeton,  
(Princeton, NJ: Pr inceton  University Press),  1994, 1.
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analysts  to assess a range of th rea ts  by eva lua t ing  past  occurrences ,  
and assessing c o n te m p o ra ry  issues so th a t  fu tu re  p robab i l i t ies  may be 
iden t i f ied .2
MODELS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Stra tegy is the  essence of in te r n a t io n a l  polit ics ,  and game 
theo ry  provides  a model ing  m etho d o log y  on  analyzing  stra tegies  
be tw een  opposing  actors.  I f  used as a s t ra teg ic  tool, game th eo ry  can 
br ing fo r th  s ign if ican t  insights . Various  game th eo ry  models can 
evaluate a v a r ie ty  of s i tuat ions,  and the  possibi l i t ies  are  l imitless. The 
value of  game th e o ry  lies in the  fact th a t  it  gives analysts  and  
pol icymakers  the  ab i l i ty  to span a h o r i z o n  of p robab i l i t ies  th a t  affect  
the  DIME e lem ents  of  na t ional  power.  This  empowers  po l icym akers  to 
make advantageous decisions based on in te l l igence  assessments.
Obviously ,  specific in te l l igence  re la t in g  to specific  t e r ro r i s t  
plans is b e t t e r  th an  calculat ing  probab i l i t ies ;  how ever ,  w h e n  
specifici ty is no t  a t ta inab le ,  game th e o ry  is a cons t ruc t ive  m e tho d  to
2 Game theory has also received at tention in popular culture,  particularly  
through the prominence of  Nobel  P r i ze -w in n in g  game theorist  John Nash, who  
was the subject of  the 1998 film A B eau tifu l  M ind.
evaluate  a v a r ie ty  of  c ircumstances.  Game th e o r y  is n o t  a s t r ic t  or 
inflexible  d isc ip l ine;  i t  is a tool  to assess p robabi l i t ies .  James Morrow, 
in Game T h eo ry  fo r  P o litica l S c ien tis ts , asserts  there  is no exact  or 
correc t  design for a game th eo ry  model . Many possible design options 
enable  one to see th e  consequences for t h e  behav io r  of  actors dep ic ted  
in a m odel .3 Game th e o ry  models cap tu re  th e  b ro ad  charac ter is t ics  of  a 
s i tuat ion,  so th a t  one can u n d e rs ta n d  ho l is t ic  p r inc ipa ls  of reoccu r r in g  
events. F u r th e rm o re ,  he adds, the  tes t  of  a model  is w h e t h e r  i t  adds to 
the  u n d e rs tan d in g  of  the  evaluated  event .
A grea t  deal of  in te l l igence  in fo rm a t io n  deals w i th  hu m an  
in te rac t ion  and  in te rp re ta t io n ;  th e re fo re ,  game theo ry  can augm ent  
qua l i ta t ive  in te l l igence  analysis w i th  q u a n t i t a t iv e  analysis  to forecast  
the  s tra tegic  op t ions  of opposing actors.  In  S tra teg y  as Science, 
Bernard  Brodie reasons the  s tudy of  s t ra teg ies  should be a scient if ic  
enquiry;  a m ethodo log ica l  approach  to t h e  s tudy of  s tra tegic  
p rob lem s .4 Actors  must  t h in k  about  w h a t  o th e r  actors wil l  do, as th e i r  
own decisions affect  outcomes.  The success of fu tu re  n a t io n a l  secur i ty  
policy depends on how  well  po l icym akers  develop  s t ra teg ies  to adapt
3 Ibid, 57, 58.
4 Bernard Brodie,  “Strategy as an Art and a S c i en ce ” ( lecture de l ivered at 
the Naval  War College on December 18, 1958), N ava l  W ar College R ev iew ,  vol.
51 (Winter 1998) , 26-38.
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to un a n t ic ip a te d  th rea ts .  The p ro l i f e ra t io n  of te r ro r i sm  has in t rod u ced  
a new  era  of  asym m etr ic  w arfare  t h a t  makes  it im pera t ive  for 
pol icymakers  to lea rn  from the  past,  so th e y  can a n t ic ip a te  fu tu re  
securi ty  th rea ts .  Consequen t ly ,  th e  use of  game th eo ry  in  in te l l igence  
assessments can be an effect ive  m ethodo log ica l  app roach  th a t  can 
reduce  s t ra tegic  v u ln e ra b i l i ty .5
In The S tra teg y  o f  C on flic t, Thomas Schel l ing  also p resen ts  a 
comprehens ive  look at game th eo ry  and  concludes  t h a t  com pet ing  
actors base th e i r  decisions on “focal p o in ts” o f  w ha t  th e y  expect  from 
the o the r  actors,  so th ey  have a c o u n te r - s t r a teg y  to gain an 
advan tage .6 His pe rspec t ive  reveals how  game th eo ry  can assist one 
th in k  th ro u g h  possibil i ties .  Schell ing a r t icu la tes  the  va lue  of d iffer ing  
perspect ives  in an analogy th a t  is easy to unde rs tan d ;  he wri tes :
I f  I go downsta irs  to inves tigate  a noise at n ight,  w i th  a gun in 
my hand ,  and f ind myself  face to face w i t h  a b u rg la r  w ho  has a 
gun in his hand ,  th e re  is a danger  of  an ou tcom e th a t  n e i th e r  of
5 John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published The Theory of  
Games in 1944. The most  applicable component of  the ir  work deals w i th  the  
strategic probabil ity of  nuclear confrontat ion during the  Cold War.
6 Thomas C. Schel l ing,  The S tra te g y  o f  C o n fl ic t  (New York: Oxford 
Univers ity Press) 1963, 207.
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us desires.  Even i f  he prefers  to just  leave quie t ly ,  and  I w ish  
h im to, th e re  is danger  th a t  he  may t h in k  I w a n t  to  shoot ,  and  
shoot  first.  W orse ,  the re  is danger  th a t  he  may t h in k  th a t  I 
t h in k  he wan ts  to shoot. And so o n .7
A l th o ug h  th e  example  above is a s imple  case of  d if fer ing  
perspect ives u n d e r  a h e ig h ten e d  state  of th rea t ,  i t  dem ons t ra te s  how  a 
h e ig h ten e d  p e rcep t io n  o f  th re a t  wou ld  cause one  to act  in ones best  
in te res t .  As such,  game th e o ry  offers o p p o r tu n i t ie s  to  analyze 
s i tuat ions  of confl ic t  b e tw een  actors , and  allows one to t h in k  th ro u g h  
st ra tegic  possibil i ties . This l ine  o f  reason ing  is c e n t ra l  to the  
t r ep id a t ion  of fu tu re  t e r ro r i s t  a t tacks th e  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n  
exper ienced  post-9/11,  w h ic h  in f luenced  the  d e v e lop m en t  of th e  2002 
NSS, and th e  DoP.
The game th eo ry  models in th is  c h ap te r  converge  on the  post-  
9/11 confl ic t  be tw ee n  th e  Uni ted  States and al-Qaeda.  They  provide  
an i l lus t ra t ive  u n d e rs tan d in g  of  the  d iam etr ica l ly  opposed ambit ions  
of the  two actors. During  the  ear ly  stages of the  GWOT, th e  objective  
of the  Uni ted  States was to defeat  global  t e r ro r i sm  and p ro tec t  the
7 Ibid, 57.
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status quo, w h i le  the  objec tive  of a l-Qaeda  was to des tab i l ize  the  
sta tus quo. Both actors sough t  to ach ieve  t h e i r  specific  objectives  
based on th e i r  ow n se lf - in teres ts ,  and b o th  actors had  l im ited  
d iverg ing  payoffs (desired ou tcom e)  available to th em  (depic ted  in 
table  l ) . 8
R a the r  th a n  using an exaspera t ing  co l lec t ion  o f  m athem at ica l  
examples to suppor t  the  effect iveness  o f  game th eo ry  analysis,  th is  
s tudy uses q ua l i ta t ive  in te l l igence  data  to develop  sequ en t ia l  game 
t rees  to c rea te  logical s t ruc tu res  th a t  i l lu s t ra te  the  con f l ic t  b e tw ee n  
the  U n i ted  States and al-Qaeda.  Complex  m athem a t ica l  formulas are 
no t  used because th ey  do no t  necessar i ly  im prove  the  re l i ab i l i ty  of th e  
analysis  for th is  body of work.  This p rem ise  is a r t i cu la te d  in 
A n tic ip a tin g  Surprise: A n a ly s is  fo r  S tra teg ic  W arning, by Cynthia  
Grabo w h o  argues the  app l ica t ion  of e labora te  s t ru c tu re d  
m athem a t ica l  techn iques  is no t  always necessary,  and  s t ruc tu re d  
techn iques  can sometimes make data seem more accura te  th a n  it  real ly  
is.9
8 An ordinal  payoff  is a system of  payoffs (returns received)  requiring  
that one option a preferred to another due to a higher payoff.
9 Cynthia Grabo, A n tic ip a t in g  Surprise: A n a ly s is  fo r  S tra teg ic  W arning  
(Wash ington D.C.: Center for Strategic Intel l igence  Research, Joint Mil itary  
Inte l l igence  College, 2002) , 150.
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The s ign if icance  of the  game th e o r y  in  th is  s tudy is based on the  
method ica l  in te rp re ta t io n s  th e  models  p rov ide  for  in te l l igence  
analysis. The  game trees  g raphica l ly  r ep re sen t  a sequent ia l  game th a t  
provides in fo rm a t io n  about  th e  outcom es ,  s t ra tegies ,  and  ord ina l  
p references  of  th e  Uni ted  States, and  al-Qaeda.  The game trees  are 
a c t io n - reac t ion  models  th a t  dep ic t  th e  a c to r ’s s t ra tegic  decis ions and 
th e i r  impact .  By em ploying  gaming t rees ,  one can a r t icu la te  concepts  
about  pa r t i cu la r  s trategies,  and  ra t iona le  for p a r t icu la r  decisions. The 
models u t i l ize  the  fo l lowing abs t rac t  q u e s t io n -a n d -an sw er  p a t t e rn  to 
establ ish the  game:
-  W h y  did a l-Qaeda a t tack  the  U n i ted  States and  a t tem p t  to
change  the  status quo?
-  How did th e  Uni ted  States respond  to th e  attack?
-  How did th e  t e r ro r i s t  cha l len g er  reac t  to  U.S. re ta l ia t ion?
-  W h y  did th e  actors acquiesce or choose to go to war?
The fo l lowing  symbols are used in the  game trees  to depic t  the  
confl ic t  b e tw ee n  th e  Uni ted  States and  al-Qaeda:
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-  US = U n i ted  States
- t  = terror is ts :  a l-Qaeda  and aff i l ia ted  ne tw orks
-  StQ, = sta tus  quo destabi l ized  by 9/11 te r ro r i s t  a t tack
-  W  = W ar
-  AQU = acquiesce, quit,  or  make concessions
-  Decis ion node = S
-  T erm ina l  node  = (§>
-  CWO = change  w or ld  o rder
-  ATKus = U.S. a t tack  or re ta l ia te ,  via  p ree m p t io n
-  ATKt = te r ro r i s t  a t tack  or re ta l ia te ,  via p re e m p t io n  or
te r ro r i sm
Table 1 dem ons tra tes  the  num er ica l  o rd ina l  payoffs in
sequent ia l  im por tance  for the  U n i ted  States and al-Qjaeda. The largest
num ber  represen ts  the  most  p re fe r red  ou tcom e  for each  actor;  the  
second- la rgest  n u m b e r  represen ts  th e  nex t  p refe rence ,  and  so on.
The ord ina l  payoffs w ere  deve loped  to solici t  a m yriad  of 
inquir ies  re la t ing  to th e  d isposi t ion  of a l-Qaeda.  For ins tance ,  how  
did a l-Qaeda emerge? W i th  w ho  are  th e y  affi lia ted? Does a l-Qaeda
210
receive suppor t  from t rad i t iona l  na t ion -s ta te s?  W h a t  are  t h e i r  s h o r t ­
term, m id - te rm ,  and long- te rm  goals?
These are  just  a f rac t ion  of  possible  inqu ir ies  th a t  could  be used 
to develop o rd ina l  payoffs; moreover ,  these  quest ions  exem plify  how  
in te l l igence  analysis can min im izes  mis takes by  tes t ing  appropr ia te  
questions.  First ,  i t  gives ins igh t  on a l-Qaeda,  to d is t ingu ish  if  t h ey  can 
at tack th e  U n i ted  States beyond  th e i r  in i t ia l  campaign  on  9/11, and  
second, it  fac i l i ta tes  the  d eve lopm en t  of the  bes t  s t ra tegy  combat  the  
terror is ts .
Uni ted  States a l-Qaeda  / t e r ro r i s t
5. StQ. 5. ATKt
4.ATK-us 4. CWO
3. W= war 3. W =w ar
2. AQU 2. AQU
1. CWO 1. StQ.
Figure 2 represen ts  the  pre-9/11 scenar io .  I t  depicts  the  sta te  of 
global affairs  as re la t ive ly  stable, w i th  th e  m a in ten an ce  of  the  s ta tus  
quo. The f irst  node represen ts  a s t ra teg ic  dec is ion  po in t  for  a l-Qaeda; 
w i th  two b ranches ,  rep re sen t ing  d is t in c t  ac t ion  a l-Qaeda could  take. 
The options avai lable  dep ic t  a decis ion  p o in t  w i th  tw o  ex trem e ly  
d if feren t  outcomes,  or payoffs for each t e rm in a l  node. The ou tcom e of 
one b ran ch  ends  w i th  the  m ain ta in ing  th e  s ta tus  quo, w h ic h  equates  
to a payoff  o f  StQj=(l). The o th e r  b ra n c h  i l lus t ra tes  a decis ion to 
a t tack the  U n i ted  States in an a t tem p t  to change  w o r ld  order . Al- 
Q aeda’s payoff  for th e  a t tack equates to ATKt=(5).
The eq ua t ion  dem onstra tes  th a t  a l -Q aeda  took a d o m in an t  
s t ra tegy to a t tack  because of the  p o ten t ia l  of upse t t in g  the  status quo 
and having a h ig h e r  payoff  of five. The q u es t io n  at th is  p o in t  of the  
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Figure  2. Pre-9/11 P os tu re
The ques t ion  of  r a t io n a l i ty  of the  ac tors  also comes in to  play. 
For the  purposes of  the  game t ree  models,  r a t io na l i ty  is d e te rm in e d  by 
the  goals set by the  actors.  If an actor  con s is ten t ly  does w h a t  is in its 
best in te res t ,  they  are cons idered  ra t ional .  The U n i ted  States is 
regarded  as a ra t iona l  ac tor  because it  seeks to p ro tec t  i tse l f  from 
fu ture  t e r ro r i s t  a t tacks and m a in ta in in g  th e  status quo. America  
benefi ts  f rom the  status quo and wants  to m a in ta in  its p re e m in e n t  
posi t ion  on the  w o r ld  stage. The b ru ta l i ty  o f  9/11 suggests th a t  the  
te r ro r is ts  are no t  ra t iona l  actors; how ever ,  hypo theses  of 
in te rn a t io n a l  re la t io n  th e o ry  suggest th a t  a l -Qaeda  is a ra t iona l  n o n ­
state actor  because it  cons is ten t ly  does w h a t  in  its best in te res t .
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Figure 3 depic ts  the  next  decis ion  at nod e  2, w h ic h  belongs to 
the  U n i ted  States. The  U n i ted  States can acquiesce, accep t  the  change 
in w or ld  order ,  or invade  Afghan is tan  to cap tu re  m em b ers  of al- 
Qaeda. Due to the  collapse of th e  W o r ld  Trade C en te r  and  the  damage 
to the  Pen tagon ,  America  took decisive act ion.  The game t ree  
i l lus t ra tes  the  U n i ted  States a t tack ing  the  te r ro r i s t s .  This is the  
d om inan t  s t ra tegy  w i th  the  h ighes t  payoff  of  ATK-us=(4). This 
s t ra tegy is advantageous  because it is th e  h igh es t  rem ain ing  payoff  on 
the  ord inal  table, and  it a l lowed the  U n i ted  States to take  advantage  
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Figure 3. Post-9/11 Pos tu re
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Eventual ly ,  a l-Qaeda must  decide w h e t h e r  it  w i l l  acquiesce, or 
fu r th e r  cha l lenge  the  Uni ted  States w i th  add i t iona l  t e r ro r i s t  attacks 
and risk increased  U.S. m il i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  action. The value of 
in te l l igence  is subs tan t ia l  at this  po in t ,  because an in te l l igence  
analysts or a n a t io n a l  secur i ty  s t ra teg is t  can evaluate  a l -Q a ed a ’s past 
act ions o f  to id en t i fy  t rends  of  b e h av io r .10
For ins tance ,  in  1996, Osama b in  Laden issued a fa twa th a t  
called for  A m erican  soldiers to  get out  o f  Saudi A rab ia .11 In 1998, he 
issued a second fatwa d irec t ing  his fo l low ers  to ki ll  Americans  
a n y w h e re .12 The fatwa sum m arized  his ob jec t ions  to A m er ican  foreign 
policy towards  Israel ,  as wel l  as res ta t in g  his h os t i l i ty  towards  th e  
presence  of  A m erican  troops in  Saudi Arabia . F u r th e rm o re ,  Osama bin  
Laden, rece ived  s ignif icant  in te rn a t io n a l  a t t e n t io n  after  9/11; 
there fo re ,  it is u n l ik e ly  he would  acquiesce, because “au d ience  costs” 
w i th in  his  sphe re  of  in f luence  w ou ld  be negat ive ly  im pacted ,  and 
jeopardize  his leadersh ip  posi t ion  w i th in  a l -Q aeda .13 As a resul t ,  the
10 See appendix D for a list o f  major terrorists act suspected of  or 
inspired by al-Qaeda.
11 Osama bin Laden’s 1996 Fatwa, accessed August  10, 2011,  w w w .p b s . 
or g/news hour/terror ism/inter national /fat  wa_1996 .html.
12 Osama bin Laden’s 1998 Fatwa, accessed August  10, 2011 .w w w .p b s . 
or g/newshour/terror ism/in ternationa l / fatwa_ 199 8.html.
13 The term “audience cos t ,” was first introduced in 1994 by James Fearon 
in “Domestic  Pol i t ical  Audiences and the Escalation of  International  Disputes .”
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model assumes a l-Qaeda  wil l  not  acquiesce due  to past  t rends  of  
behavior .
Ul t im ate ly ,  th e  U n i ted  States a n d  th e  te r ro r i s t s  seek to 
maximize gains and m in im ize  losses u n d e r  cond i t ions  of  u n c e r t a in ty  
and incom ple te  in fo rm at ion .  Both actors  base s t ra teg ic  decisions on 
the  most  advantageous  s i tua t ion  w i th  th e  h ighes t  payoff—as 
re fe renced  in t h e  sequen t ia l  num er ica l  o rd ina l  payoffs in  tab le  1.
At first glance, the  game t ree  m odels  seem qui te  simple; 
however ,  w h e n  coupled  w i th  re levan t  in te l l igence ,  and  d iverg ing  
ord inal  payoffs, num erous  h y p o th e t ica l  poss ib i l i t ies  are  exposed. For 
instance,  the  game t ree  in f igure 4 ind ica tes  a l -Qaeda p refe rs  to a t tack  
the  U.S. r a th e r  th an  to accept the  status quo ATKt(5) > S tQ ( l ) .  As th e  
most  powerfu l  n a t io n  in the  w orld ,  th e  U n i ted  States p refers  the  
status quo, to acquiescing, or a change  in world  o rd e r  (StQ(5) > 
AQU(2) + C W O (l ) .  However ,  Once the  s ta tus  quo is des tab i l ized  by 
the  at tacks of 9/11, the  Uni ted  States a t tacks  a l -Qaeda r a th e r  th an  
acquiescing or accep t ing  a change in w o r ld  order ,  (ATK-us(4) > 
AQU(2) > C W O (l)) .  At node 3, the  U n i ted  States and a l -Qaeda  reach  
Nash equ i l ib r ium .  This means th a t  bo th  actors  have id en t i f i e d  w h ic h
It describes s ituations where  leaders on the internat ional  pol i t ical  stage can 
damage their  reputation as a leader i f they  back down in an internat ional  crisis.
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s tra tegy wil l  best  serve th e i r  in te res ts ;  u n d e rs tan d in g  th a t  the re  is no 
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Figure 4. P ro t rac ted  GW OT
Nash equ i l ib r ium  is also the  p o in t  in  w h ic h  each ac tor  assumes 
to know  the  s tra tegies  of  the  o th e r  actor .  Both reasons th e y  canno t
gain a h ig h e r  payoff  by un i la te ra l ly  dev ia t ing  f rom  th e i r  own 
s t ra te g y .14 Both actors recognize th e  o th e r  ac to r  wil l  n o t  w i l l fu l ly  
acquiesce, and accept  the  second least  desi red  payoff, AQU(2). N e i th e r  
can benef i t  by changing  th e i r  s tra tegies  w hi le  the  o t h e r  keep the irs  
unchanged .  Consequently ,  b o th  p re fe r  w a r  to acquiescence  (W(3) > 
AQU(2)). This does not  necessar i ly  im ply  th a t  Nash eq u i l ib r iu m  is the  
most  advantageous  outcome for the  U n i ted  States or al-Qaeda.  
Instead,  Nash equ i l ib r ium  suggests conf l ic t  is th e  most  l ike ly  op t ion  
each ac to r  w i l l  t a k e .15 One can make a s t rong  case th a t  Nash 
equ i l ib r ium  ind icates  the  decis ion  p o in t  in  w h ic h  Am erica  resolves to 
im p lem en t  th e  DoP as a r t icu la ted  in  the  fo l low ing  passage of the  2002 
NSS:
[The U n i ted  States] wil l  not  hes i ta te  to act  alone, if  necessary, 
to  exercise our  r igh t  of  se l f -defense  by  acting p ree m pt ive ly  
against  such ter ror is ts ,  to  p rev e n t  them  from doing  ha rm  against
14 Thomas C. Schell ing,  The S tra te g y  o f  Conflic t ,  (New York: Oxford  
University Press, 1963), 287.
15 James D. Morrow, Game T h eory  fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Scien tis ts .  P rin ce ton ,  
(Princeton,  NJ: Princeton University Press),  1994, 81.
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our  people  and our c o u n t r y .”16 The  g rea te r  th e  th rea t ,  the  
g rea te r  is the  r isk  of in a c t io n — and the  more com pel l ing  the  
case for tak ing  a n tic ip a to ry  ac tion  to  de fend  ourselves, (i tal ics 
a d d ed )17
Game th e o ry  is most  effective, w h e n  a model has re lev an t  
in te l l igence  th a t  provides  facts and ind ica to rs  of  an opposing  actor. 
Modeling the  observable  and po ten t ia l  ou tcom es  be tw een  the  U n i ted  
States and  a l-Qaeda  dem ons tra tes  h ow  game theo ry  can benef i t  
analysts and  pol icymakers .  The model  c lear ly  d e m o n s t ra ted  th e  DoP 
was an act ive  s t ra tegy  of a n t ic ip a to ry  m i l i ta ry  action to combat  al- 
Qaeda. It  also i l lus t ra tes  th e re  w ere  l im i ted  s trategic  poss ibi l i t ies  
regard ing  coopera t io n  b e tw ee n  the  U n i ted  States and a l-Qaeda.  The 
ord inal  payoffs suppor t  this  assertion.  For example, i f  one  presumes 
th a t  a l-Qaeda be l ieved  an a t tack  w o u ld  in i t ia te  a U.S. r e ta l ia t ion  or 
war, the  fo l lowing premise  is establ ished:  (ATKt(5) | W(3) >
C W O (4)). The symbol ( j ) means givenj th e re fo re ,  the eq ua t ion  reads: 
attack,  g iven  th e  resul t  of war,  is g rea te r  or  equal to a change  in
16 George W. Bush, The N a tion a l  S e c u r i ty  S tr a te g y  o f  the  U n ited  S ta tes  o f  
A m erica , September 2002, 6.
17 Ibid, 15.
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world  o rd e r  in p re fe r red  va lue— m ean in g  a d ra w n  out  w a r  w i th  the  
U ni ted  States is e ssen t ia l ly  a change in w o r ld  order .
As the  game unfolds,  num erous  sub jec t ive  p h e n om en a  become 
more s ignif icant .  For example, an ana lys t  may assume th a t  a change  in 
world  o rd e r  means th a t  the  Uni ted  States loses it  super  po w er  status. 
However,  for a l-Qaeda,  a change in w o r ld  o rd e r  could d e n o te  d i lu t ing  
U.S. p r im acy  in  the  Middle  East, as cal led for in  b in  L aden ’s fatwa.
Again, th is  is w h e re  in te l l igence  plays a v i ta l  role. P r io r  to 9/11, 
Osama Bin Laden open ly  asserted in  his fa twa th a t  one of  a l -Q a ed a ’s 
ove ra rch ing  objec tives  was to drive th e  W es t  o u t  of Muslim lands,  and 
establish a new  cal ipha te  guided by Sharia  l a w .18 A ccord ing ly ,  this  
may lead analys t  to  assume th a t  bin  L ad e n ’s rel igious beliefs  were  the  
sole m ot iva t ing  fac tor  for 9/11. By making  assumptions  based on 
na rrow  da ta  points ,  analysts can miss im p o r ta n t  in tangib les .  This is 
know n  as m ir ro r  imaging, or assuming t h a t  a n a t io n - s t a t e  or 
indiv idual  w i l l  act  in  a c e r ta in  w a y .19
W i th  de ta i led  analysis, the  game t ree  model reveals  th a t  al- 
Qaeda had  several  objectives on 9/11. The f i rs t  was to p rom p t ly
18 Osama bin Laden’s 1996 Fatwa, accessed August 10, 2011,  w w w .p b s . 
or g/ne wshour/ t  err or ism/inter nation al /fatwa_ 1996.html.
19 Mark M. Lowenthal ,  In te l l igen ce:  From Secre ts  to  Po licy ,  (Washington  
D.C.: CQ Press, 2006) ,  8.
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destroy  th e  econom ic ,  mil i ta ry ,  and g o v e rn m e n ta l  in f ra s t ru c tu re s ,  of 
America, and rob it  o f  its posi t ion  as global  leader .  If  th is  goal p roved  
una t ta inab le ,  a n o th e r  goal was to d i lu te  U.S. p r im acy  th ro u g h  a 
d raw n -o u t  s truggle.  Thus, the  first two goals cou ld  seduce  the  U n i ted  
States in to  a n e v e r -e n d in g  expedi t ion  to de fea t  te r ro r ism ,  w h ic h  could 
lead to o v e rs t re tch ,  and u l t im a te ly  cause th e  U n i ted  States to reduce  
its p resence  in th e  Middle  East; w h ic h  meets  a n o th e r  objec t ive  of b in  
Laden’s fatwa.
David From kin ,  in  The S tra teg y  o f  T errorism , declares  th a t  
te r ro r is ts  use its o p p o n e n t ’s s t r e n g th  against  i tself .  T erro r is ts  a t tem p t  
to achieve goals n o t  solely  th ro u g h  v io len t  acts, but  also t h ro u g h  an 
o p p o n e n t ’s responses to te r ro r i s t  acts. T he re fo re ,  it is qu i te  possible  
th a t  a l-Qaeda had  several  objectives it w a n te d  to achieve.  First,  th ey  
w an ted  to acquire  pres t ige  among te r ro r i s t s  groups by  dem o n s t ra t in g  
the i r  ab i l i ty  a t tack  the  U n i ted  States on 9/11. Second, th e y  w a n ted  to 
d im in ish  U.S. in f luence  in the  Middle East, and  lastly t h e y  w a n ted  to 
lure W ash in g to n  in to  a long- te rm  b leed ing  w ar  tha t  could  erode its 
global inf luence .
The attacks of  9/11 caused the  U n i ted  States to increase  its 
defense expend i tu res  dras t ical ly ,  i n s t i tu te  onerous  and  un p op u la r  
domestic  secur i ty  procedures ,  and e n tan g led  i t  in  lo ng - te rm  overseas
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m il i ta ry  opera t ions .  Consequently ,  one can surm ise  th a t  a l -Qaeda  may 
have ach ieved  some of its objectives by c rea t ing  a geopoli t ical  
s i tua t ion  in w h ic h  U.S. and  a l -Q aed a ’s in te res ts  r e m a in  in s tark  
opposi t ion  for years to  come.
Thus, game th eo ry  model ing  dem ons t ra te s  its va lue  as a 
th eo re t ica l  tool  capable of iden t i fy ing  judgm en ts  of th e  long- te rm  
stra tegic  i n te n t  of adversaries.  This process a l lows analysts  to convey 
th e i r  judgm en ts  to po l icym akers  in te rm s th a t  a re  more encompassing  
and more  read i ly  unders tood .  More im p o r tan t ly ,  it  d im in ishes  the  
possibi l i ty  of igno r ing  c e r ta in  hypotheses ,  pa r t i cu la r ly  those  th a t  run  
c o u n te r  to the  p re d o m in an t  c l imate  of  opinion.
SUMMARY
Strategy is the  essence of in te rn a t io n a l  poli t ics  and  the  purpose 
of  this  ch ap te r  was to  display game th eo ry  as a useful  analy t ica l  tool  
th a t  can b r ing  fo r th  s ignif icant  insights . Various  game th e o ry  models 
can evaluate  a va r ie ty  of s i tuat ions ,  and the  poss ibi l i t ies  are vast.  
There  is no exact  or  co r rec t  design for game th eo ry  models. The 
design options enable  one to see the  consequences  for th e  behav io r  of
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the  actors  dep ic ted  in  the  model; how ever ,  the  real  tes t  for any  model  
is w h e th e r  it  adds to the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  the  eva lua ted  event .
Using a s t ru c tu re d  m ethodo logy  such  as game th e o r y  does no t  
guaran tee  specific results ,  because the  models do not  p e r fo rm  analysis  
for analysts,  b u t  assists th em  not  to over look  issues th a t  are c o u n te r  to 
the  p re d o m in a n t  c l imate  of op in io n .20 The models provide  a m eth o d  to 
iden t i fy  re levan t  factors and  assumptions ,  fo rm ula te  and  consider  
d i f fe ren t  outcomes,  weigh  evidence ,  and  make decisions based on 
available in fo rm at ion .
Game th e o ry  is va luable  in the  sense th a t  it may assist in  the  
p rep a ra t io n  of war  or d ist il l  the  pe rcep t io ns  of th rea ts .  Michael  
H ow ard  in  Causes o f  Wars, ap p rop r ia te ly  po in ts  out t h a t  “The causes 
o f  war  rem a in  roo ted  in pe rcep t ions  by s ta tesm en of  the  g ro w th  of 
host i le  p o w e r .”21 Game th e o ry  models p rov ide  a be t te r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
of  th rea ts  t h ro u g h  cons t ru c ted  gaming methodologies ,  w h ic h  give 
analysts  and  pol icymakers  th e  abi l i ty  to s tudy p robab i l i t ie s  th a t  affect  
the  DIME e lements  of na t iona l  power,  em pow ering  th em  to make 
advantageous decisions based on w e l l - t h o u g h t - o u t  assessments .
20 Robert D. Folker Jr., Inte l l igence  Analysis  in Theater Joint  
Intel l igence  Centers: An Experiment in Applying  Structured Methods.  Joint 
Military Intel l igence  College (Washington DC: Center for Strategic Intel l igence  
Research) 2000, 2.
21 Michael  Howard, The Causes o f  Wars and O th e r  Essays (Cambridge,  
Massachusetts: Harvard Univers ity  Press, 1983), 28.
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Obviously, specific  in te l l igence  abou t  th rea ts  to  U.S. secu r i ty  is b e t te r  
th an  ca lcu la t ing  probabi l i t ies  of game theory ;  h o w ever ,  w h e n  
specif ici ty  is no t  a t ta inable ,  game th e o ry  empow ers  in te l l igence  
organiza t ions  to th in k  th ro u g h  possibi l i t ies ,  and develop  re levan t  




For lack of  guidance,  a n a t ion  falls,  b u t  many advisers make 
v ic to ry  sure.
— Proverbs  11:14*
BACKGROUND
These f indings  offers specific acum en on  chap ters  III th ro u g h  
VII, to disclose re levan t  issues covered  in the  research .
FUNCTIONS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE COLD 
WAR TO THE GWOT
Nationa l  secur i ty  pol icies coord ina te  th e  d i rec t io n  o f  a n a t i o n ’s
resources tow ard  th e  a t ta in m en t  of pol i t ica l  goals. The exam ina t ion  of
past p receden ts  set fo r th  by n um erous  U.S. P res iden t ia l
1 Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., Life A p p l ic a t io n  Bible  (Wheaton,
I ll inois ,  1996), 1090.
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a dm in is t ra t ions  revealed  insights  on fu n c t io n s  of n a t io n a l  secur i ty  
pol icy, and how  U.S. polic ies have impacted  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  system.
Dis t inc t  U.S. p res iden t ia l  a d m in is t ra t ion s  have used  a va r ie ty  of 
s tra tegies to guide the  use of  A m erican  n a t io n a l  p o w e r  to achieve 
specific objectives.  From H arry  T rum an  to  George W. Bush, 
Pres idents  have  co n te n d ed  w i th  c rea t ing  th e  op t im al  p rocedures  for 
p ro tec t ing  the  U n i ted  States. One c o m m o n a l i ty  be tw ee n  all the  U.S. 
p res idents  was th e i r  ab i l i ty  to create  s t ra teg ies  to shape global events  
in  ways favorable  to Am erican  pr inc ip les  and in te r e s t s .2 3 The Uni ted  
States has successfully  ca r r ied  out  its n a t io n a l  secur i ty  pol icies , as a 
d irec t  resu l t  of how  it used the  DIME e lem en ts  of  power  to s t r e n g th e n  
its pos i t ion  on th e  w or ld  stage. 4 From th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  of the  
Monroe doc tr ine ,  to the  pos t -W orld  W ar  II Cold W a r  secur i ty  
e nv ironm en t ,  to th e  a ttacks of 9/11, Am erica  has used a va r ie ty  of 
s t ra tegy to ensure  its survival  in the  anarch ic  in te rn a t io n a l  system.
2 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and Pow er: A m e r ic a n  and E urope in th e  N e w  
W orld  O rder  (New York: Random House, 2003) , 61.
3 See table 3, appendix B for a list of Major National  Security Council  
Authorit ies .
4 Sam C. Sarkesian and others,  U.S. N a tion a l  Security :  P o licym akers ,  
Processes, and P o l i t ic s  (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,  2002),  33.
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A s t rong  a rgum en t  can be made th a t  A m e r ic a ’s e x t rao rd in a ry  
m il i ta ry  po w er  shapes its pol i t ica l  v iew  of  global  s e cu r i ty .5 Thus,  the  
United  States o f ten  defaults  to th e  m il i ta ry  e lem en t  pow er  as an 
ex tens ion  of in te rn a t io n a l  pol i t ic  discourse.  Indeed,  one  of  the  most  
famous edic ts  on war  is Baron Carl von  C lausew itz ’s On War, w he re  
the  concep t  of  war  is recognized  as a po l i t ica l  i n s t r u m e n t— “a 
co n t in u a t io n  of  pol i t ics  by o th e r  m eans .”6
Rober t  A r t  and K e n n e th  W al tz  in The Use o f  Force, posi t  a 
s imilar  asser t ion  as Clausewitz , by em phas iz ing  the  im po r tance  of 
na t iona l  power.  The au thors  suggest fungib le  pow er  con t in uu m s  
dem o ns t ra te  how  th e  func t ions  of  po w er  can in f luence  or foresta l l  
possible c o n fro n ta t io n s  from o th e r  n a t io n s .7 The au tho rs  add:
M il i ta ry  pow er  is fungib le  to a degree  because  its physica l  use, 
its t h r e a te n e d  use, or s imply its mere  p resence  s t ruc tu re  
e xpec ta t ion  and in f luence  and poli t ica l  ca lcu la t ions  of  actors.
5 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and  P ow er:  A m erican  and E u rope  in th e  N e w  
W orld  O rder  (New York: Random House,  2003),  61.
6 Peter Paret, C lau sew itz  and  the  S ta te  (London: Oxford Univers ity  Press,  
1976), 25.
7 Robert J Art and Kenneth N. Waltz ,  The Use o f  Force: M i l i ta r y  P o w er  
and In tern a tio n a l  P o lit ics ,  6th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) ,  7.
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The g rav i ta t io na l  effects  m i l i ta ry  pow er  means t h a t  its in f luence  
pervades  th e  o th e r  po l icy  realms.
During  the  Cold W ar,  the  U n i ted  States had c lear ,  c o h e re n t  
polic ies  t h a t  focused on con ta in ing  and d e te r r in g  the expans ion  of  the  
Soviet Union.  After  9/11, the  U n i ted  States found i tse l f  in  an 
unfam il ia r  posi t ion ,  forcing W a sh in g to n  to use m i l i ta ry  pow er  to 
mit igate  te r ro r i s t  th rea ts  to its global  p re e m in e n c e .8 The DoP allowed 
the  U n i ted  States to take advantage  of  its un r iva led  pow er  to 
d em ons t ra te  th e  seriousness of  its i n t e n t  to combat  global te r ro r ism .
A m e r ic a ’s ra t iona le  for choosing  th e  DoP r a th e r  th an  
de te r rence ,  s tem from th e  d if ferences  b e tw een  th e  th rea ts ,  
assumptions on how  to co n fron t  those  th rea ts ,  and  the a m o u n t  of  t ime 
(or u rgency)  needed  to o b ta in  results  f rom each st rategy.
From th e  Cold W ar  to 9/11, each p res iden t ia l  a d m in is t r a t io n  
adapted  its na t iona l  secur i ty  policies  to address  specific chal lenges .  
A l though  th e  DoP was the  top p r io r i ty  of  th e  Bush a d m in is t ra t io n ,  
and de te r ren c e  the  top p r io r i ty  dur ing  th e  Cold War,  b o th  s tra tegies
8 U.S. Department of  Defense,  Q u adrenn ia l D efense  R e v ie w  R e p o r t  
(September 30, 2001),  30, 62.
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were  devised to address specific th rea ts .  U l t im ate ly ,  b o th  stra tegies 
had th e  com m on  goal of sa feguarding the  U n i ted  States and  p reserv ing  
its global  pr imacy.
The DoP prov ided  a v igorous response  to a p ro l i fe ra t in g  
te r ro r i s t  t h r e a t .  It  a l lowed the  U n i ted  States to act  in its bes t  in te res t  
and not  su b o rd ina te  i tself  to na t ions  or o rgan iza t ions  whose  goals 
w here  d i f fe ren t .  Nevertheless ,  th e re  are  costs associated w i t h  using an 
an t ic ipa to ry  s t ra tegy  such as the  DoP. The s t r a tegy ’s ove r re l iance  on 
m il i ta ry  po w er  a l iena ted  t rad i t iona l  allies, leaving th e  U n i ted  States 
isolated and u n i la te ra l ly  b u rd en e d  d u r in g  the  GWOT.
A m erican  m il i ta ry  might  was on display dur ing  the  GWOT; 
however ,  quest ions  rem ain  on w h e th e r  th e  DoP is the  m ost  effective 
s tra tegy to p roduce  regime change.  This is pa r t i cu la r ly  t ru e  for 
na tions th a t  have formidable  mil i ta r ies .  In Iraq, th e  U n i ted  States 
defeated Saddam Hussein  in sh o r t  order ;  however ,  a f te r  the  Iraqi 
g ov e rn m en t  was decimated,  epidemic  of v io lence  se t t l ed  in the  
country .
M il i ta ry  encoun te rs  b r ing  w i th  them  a l i t a n y  of sp i l lover  effects 
such as civil  u n re s t  in a conquered  c o u n t r y .9 The case of  Iraq is an
9 Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz,  The Use o f  Force: M i l i ta r y  P o w e r  
and In tern a t io n a l  P o lit ics ,  6th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlef ield,  2004) , 14.
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example w h e re  regime change was an  u n d e r t a k in g  laden  w i th  
unexpec ted  costs and u n in te n d e d  corollar ies . Consequen t ly ,  
m ain ta in in g  the  peace was a d au n t in g  task causing s tab i l iza t ion  to 
take longer  th a n  expected.
The fa i lure  to an t ic ipa te  and p lan  for  I r a q ’s pos tw ar  chal lenges  
led to a n a rch y  and  the  emergence  of  in te n se  insurgencies ,  causing 
many Iraqis  to v iew  the  Uni ted  States as an invading  na t ion ,  and  long 
for a day w i th o u t  U.S. in f luence  in th e i r  c o u n t ry .  This p h e n o m e n o n  is 
not  new for  th e  U n i ted  States. Congressm an John  P. M u r th a  and John 
Plashal w ro te  abou t  th is  issue in From V ie tnam  to N in e  E leven . Thei r  
w ork  endorses  the  pe rcep t ion  th a t  “A force  in i t ia l ly  v iew ed  as 
l iberators  can rap id ly  be re legated to the  s ta tus  of invaders  should  an 
u nw elcom e  occu p a t io n  con t inue  for a p ro lo ng ed  t im e .”10
Pr io r  to Iraq, th e  w ar  in V ie tnam  p ro m in e n t ly  d isp layed  this  
defic iency,  and th e  negat ive  se n t im en t  expressed  regarding  the  use of 
an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  ac t ion  may be in p a r t  a d i rec t  express ion  of the  
legacy of  V ie tnam. The Vie tnam  W a r  is espec ia l ly  s ign if ican t  because 
con tem po ra ry  fore ign  policy issues are st i ll  v iewed and debated  
th rough  the  pr ism  of the  Vie tnam  confl ic t .  Since Vie tnam, Am erican
10 John P. Murtha and John Plashal, From V ietnam  to N in e  E leven  
(University Park: Pennsylvania Univers ity Press, 2006) ,  230.
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policymakers  are more sensi t ive  to th e  pol i t ica l  consequences  of 
p u t t ing  A m erican  lives at r isk in tenuous  m il i ta ry  o pe ra t io n s .11
Due to co n t in u ed  in s tab i l i ty  in th e  Middle  East,  the  Uni ted  
States may f ind  i tse l f  in a s i tua t ion  ve ry  s imilar  to  th e  one tha t  
occurred  in V ie tnam , w h e re  successive U.S. Pres iden ts  com m it  
America  to lo n g - te rm  m il i ta ry  ope ra t ions  to defeat  global  te r ro r ism ,  
the reby  m aking  an t ic ip a to ry  m il i ta ry  ac t io n  w e ig h ty  topic  of debate .
Using th e  DoP for regime change,  as d em o n s t ra te d  in Iraq, 
equated  to n um erou s  poli t ica l  consequences .  For  one, regime change 
is connec ted  to n a t io n  bu i ld ing  and peacekeeping .  N a t ion  bu i ld ing  is 
in h e re n t ly  m an p ow er- in ten s ive ;  th e re fo re ,  if t h e  Uni ted  States plans 
to use m i l i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  act ion  to accom plish  regime change  in the  
future,  it  shou ld  place a h igh  p r io r i ty  on  in co rp o ra t ing  m u l t in a t io n a l  
forces to share  the  burden .
The idea of using m ul t in a t io na l  forces in  fu ture  combat  has 
gained foot ing  in the  academic com m uni ty .  Thomas B a rn e t t ’s book 
The P en ta g o n ’s N e w  M ap  advocates in te rn a t io n a l  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in 
fu ture  confl ict .  Barnet t  calls for use of  an o ve rw h e lm in g  aggressive 
“l e v ia th a n ” force of U.S. pe rsonne l  and its com pe ten t  allies to subdue
11 Paul D. Wil l iams,  S e c u r i ty  S tud ies  (New York, Routledge 2008) , 59-67.
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enemies, and an “a d m in i s t r a t io n ” force (for example ,  th e  UN or 
NATO) to wage peace,  and rebu i ld  a n a t io n  a f te r  a c o n f l i c t .12
Some m em bers  of th e  Stanley F o u n d a t io n ’s In d e p e n d e n t  Task 
Force argue against  m u lt in a t io n a l  coopera t ion ,  and asser t  the  events  
of 9/11 did no t  fun d am e n ta l ly  a l ter  t h e  h ie ra rch ica l  o rd e r  of the  
in te rn a t io n a l  status q u o .13 They m a in ta in  t h e  U n i ted  States has 
suff ic ient  pow er  to p ro tec t  its v i ta l  in te res ts  w i th o u t  d e p en d ing  on 
o th e r  na t ions  or in te rn a t io n a l  in s t i t u t io n s .14
O thers  c au t ion  against  a p ro longed  use o f  U.S. m il i ta ry  pow er  
because it can lead to “imper ia l  o v e rs t r e t c h .” T hey  added,  re ly ing  on 
such a s tra tegy,  “is exhaust ing  scarce econom ic  resources  by  tak ing  on 
too many s im ultaneous  in te rn a t io n a l  co m m itm en ts ,  w h ic h  may crea te  
ba t t le  fat igue among the A m erican  people  w h o  are n o t  equ ipped  to 
bear  the  f inanc ia l  and  psychological  costs of w h a t  some have  cal led 
‘empire  l i t e ’.”15
In  The Choice, Zbigniew Brzezinski  argues th e  U n i ted  States 
should  take a ba lanced  approach  towards  issues o f  securi ty .  He 
emphasizes,  for  t Jig U m  ted  States to rea l ize  its goals it  m ust  foster a
12 Thomas Barnett,  The P en tagon's  N e w  M ap  (N e w  York: Berkley Books,  
2004) , 302.
13 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael Kraig. “W in n in g  the Peace in the 21st 




s t ronger  re la t io nsh ip  w i th  its t r ad i t io n a l  a l l ie s .16 A n o th e r  lesson 
learned  from Iraq lies in  how  the  invas ion  was p re s e n te d  to the  
in te rn a t io n a l  com m uni ty .  In A rc h ite c ts  o f  D elusion , S imon Serfaty 
asserts th a t  a l th ou g h  o th e r  U.S. P res iden ts  w o u ld  have ta k e n  the  same 
posi t ion  as George W. Bush after  the  9/11 at tacks;  P re s id en t  Bush, by 
his ow n admiss ion was m is taken  in in v i t ing  U.S. adversar ies  to “b r ing  
it o n ,” and  publ ica l ly  dismissing th e  conce rns  of t r a d i t io n a l  U.S. 
al l ies .17
The fa i lure  to agree on m u l t i la te ra l  co o pera t ion  in  th e  GWOT 
complica ted  the  abil i ty  to forge a com m on U .S .-European  s t ra tegy  to 
combat global  te r ror ism .  The war  caused a t r a n sa t la n t ic  r i f t  b e tw een  
the  U n i ted  States and  its European  allies, w h ic h  was e v id e n t  w h e n  the  
t rad i t iona l  allies of  the  U n i ted  States did  not  suppor t  th e  invas ion  of 
Iraq. In The V ita l P artnersh ip , Serfaty argues the  t r a n sa t la n t ic  r if t  
was due to fai lure  on the  par t  of  Europe as w el l  as the  U n i ted  States. 
He bases his ra t iona le  on an assessment of  E u ro p e ’s co n s i s ten t  fai lure
16 Zbigniew Brzezinski ,  The Choice: G loba l D om inance o r  G lobal  
Leadersh ip  /New York: Basic Books, 2004),  219.
17 Simon Serfaty, A r c h i te c ts  o f  D elusion: Europe, A m erica , and th e  Iraq  
War /Universi ty Park: Pennsylvania Univers ity  Press, 2008) ,  4.
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to c o n s t ruc t  a co m p e ten t  m u l t i la te ra l  m il i ta ry  f ram ew ork  on  w h ic h  
the  U n i ted  States could re ly  in a c r i s is .18
Serfaty  m ain ta ins  t h a t  w h e n  Europe depended  on  th e  Uni ted  
States for secu r i ty  du r ing  th e  Cold W ar,  it  benef i ted  f rom A m e r ic a ’s 
m il i ta ry  power;  however ,  w h e n  th e  U n i ted  States n e ed ed  European  
support ,  th ey  qu ick ly  forgot  th e i r  ind ispensab le  Cold W a r  pa r tne r .  
Serfaty suggests th a t  Europe and o th e r  na t ions  should  n o t  “embrace  an 
i l l -def ined  bu t  tem p t in g  phob ia  k n o w n  as an t i -A m er ican ism  w hi le  th e  
U.S. responds to its own t e m p ta t io n  to go it  a lone or w i t h o u t  its allies 
of cho ice .”19
In 2002, the  C en te r  for Research  and E duca t ion  on Stra tegy 
pub l ished  a paper  a paper  t i t led ,  “F u tu re  Mil i ta ry  Coali t ions  th a t  
inc luded  pa r t ic ipan ts  from the  U n i ted  States, the  U n i ted  Kingdom, 
France,  and  Germany.  The repo r t  con c lu d ed  th a t  the  U n i ted  States has 
the  m i l i ta ry  pow er  to combat  in te rn a t io n a l  th rea ts  un i la te ra l ly ;  
however ,  a f te r  war, a peace must  ensue.  M oreover ,  the  r e p o r t  asserts:
18 Simon Serfaty, The V ita l Partnersh ip:  P o w e r  and  O rder  (Rowman and 
Littlefield,  2005) ,  34.
19 Ibid, 59.
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A lth o u g h  th e  U.S. may be able to w in  w ars  w i th o u t  s ignif icant  
a ll ied c o n tr ib u t io n s ,  it is u n l ike ly  in m an y  si tuat ions  to be able 
to w in  the  peace w i th o u t  m i l i ta ry  (and n o n -m il i ta ry )  assistance 
from E uropean  allies, w h e th e r  those  s i tua t ions  develop  w i th in  
or ou ts ide  E urope .20
Ult im ate ly ,  one can argue th a t  s t rong  m u l t in a t io n a l  coopera t ion  
in fu tu re  confl ic ts  is a good s t ra tegy  to take. More specifically, t h e re  
are benefi ts  to a un i f ied  NATO presence  to sof ten  th e  p e rc ep t io n  of 
ove rw he lm in g  U.S. m il i ta ry  power.  Lastly, th e  Uni ted  States should  
con t inue  to em brace  the  s t ra tegy  of d e te r r e n c e  against rogue n a t i o n ­
states, bu t  r e ta in  the  op t ion  to inco rpo ra te  m il i ta ry  an t ic ip a to ry  
act ion  (w ith  the  assistance of its allies) to combat  t e r ro r i sm  w h e n  
necessary.
20 U.S.-CREST, Report of  a French,  German, UK, and U.S. Working  
Group, “Future Mili tary Coalitions: The Transatlantic Challenge ,” (September  
2002, xxi),  accessed January 20, 2011,  ht tp :/ /www.uscrest .org / f i l es /cesdp_final  
report.pdf.
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PERCEPTIONS AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
LEGITIMACY
There  are num erous  h is to r ica l  cases w h e re  p reem p t iv e  or 
p reven t ive  s t ra teg ies  have  been  used in w arfare .  The de f in i t ive  case of  
p reven t ive  w ar  is the  Pe loponnes ian  W ar.  The confl ic t ,  as w i th  most  
wars, was roo ted  in pe rcep t ions  of th rea t .  The expec ta t ion  of fu tu re  
confl ic t  on th e  Pe loponnesus  was due to th e  g ro w th  of  A thens ,  w h ic h  
set the  cond i t ions  for Sparta to fear the  r ise  of A th e n ia n  power.
In the  m o d ern  era, o th e r  examples inc lude  th e  Cuban  missile 
crisis in 1962, th e  Arab-Is rae l i  Six-Day W ar  in 1967, the  Israel i  
b om b ard m en t  of  th e  Iraqi  nuc lear  reac to r  a t  Osirak  in 1981, Kosovo in 
1999, O p e ra t io n  E ndur ing  Freedom in 2001, and O p e ra t io n  Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.
A l th o ug h  na t ions  have always used na t io na l  p o w e r  to p ro tec t  
th e i r  na t iona l  in te res ts  the re  rem ains  confus ion  over th e  legali ty  of 
p reem p t io n  and p re v e n t io n  in  war. The UN has yet  to  es tab l ish  c lear 
guidel ines  on the  legali ty  of these  stra tegies.  This  has d ra w n  cr i t ic ism 
of the  UN over its inab i l i ty  to draw clear and u n iversa l ly  applicable 
de l inea t ions  be tw ee n  p reem pt io n  and p re v e n t io n ,  or to de f ine  c r i ter ia  
for acceptable  use of  force in self-defense.
T here  is some va l id i ty  in the  c ri t ic isms leveled against  th e  UN, 
especial ly  over  its inab i l i ty  to enforce  com pl iance  w i th  its mandates .  
The prob lem  lies in  the  fact the  UN has a legal as w e l l  as a pol i t ica l  
funct ion ,  bu t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  system lacks an ex tens ive  judicial  
apparatus to en force  compliance  of i t  laws. Even th o u g h  th e  
In te rn a t io n a l  C our t  of Justice is th e  p r inc ipa l  judic ia l  o rgan  for the  
se t t lem en t  of d isputes  among na t ions ,  it  only has advisory 
ju r isd ic t ion ,  w h ic h  l imits  its effect iveness .  U l t im ate ly ,  na t ions  w i th  
grievances against  one an o th e r  re ly  upon  d ip lom atic  in te rch a n g e  to 
coerce coopera t ion .
The concep t  of in te rn a t io n a l  law is an im p o r ta n t  aspect  of  th e  
debate  over  th e  GWOT and th e  DoP, w h ic h  h igh l igh ts  th e  need  for a 
more real is t ic  w ork ing  concept  of in te rn a t io n a l  law w i th in  the  
in te rn a t io n a l  system. Chapter  VII of the  UN C har te r  au thor izes  the  
Securi ty  Council  to establ ish  b ind ing  in te rn a t io n a l  legal  obl igat ions 
needed for in te rn a t io n a l  peace and securi ty ,  w i t h  th e  a u th o r i ty  no t  
only to compel act ions of  m em ber  states b u t  also to m anda te  m il i ta ry  
action. In theo ry ,  these  b ind ing  ob l iga t ions  are im p o r ta n t  to 
in te rn a t io na l  s tabil i ty ;  how ever ,  they  are ve ry  diff icu l t  to im plem ent .  
For instance,  w h e n  the  U n i ted  States was dissat is f ied w i th  the  U N ’s
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posi t ion  regard ing  Iraq, the  U N ’s rules on  th e  use of  in te rn a t io n a l  
force w e re  n o t  s t rong  enough  to aver t  th e  war.
Rober t  K agan’s O f Paradise and  P o w er  posits t h a t  s t rong  and 
weak states v iew  pow er  d if feren t ly .  He reasons tha t  th e  U n i ted  States 
has a Hobbes ian  m ind-se t ,  seeing the  w or ld  as a dangerous  and 
anarch ic  place w he re  force may som etim es  be necessary,  w h i le  Europe 
is in a K ant ian  phase, em phas iz ing  the  ru le  of  law and  d ip lom acy  to 
solve d isputes  r a th e r  th a n  the  use of  fo rce .21
These d i f fe r ing  percep t ions  ou t l in e  a key  poin t  of  d ispu te  over  
the  leg i t im acy  of the  U.S. invas ion  of Iraq.  The invas ion  was v iew ed 
as i l leg i t im ate  u n d e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law by  m any  na t ions  in  the  UN. 
Consequently ,  the  Uni ted  S ta tes’ pu rsuance  o f  regime change  in I raq  
w i th o u t  UN approval  caused m any  to qu es t io n  the U N ’s re levance.  
The U.S. ac t ion  re inforced  th e  co m m o n ly  he ld  be l ie f  th a t  
in te rn a t io n a l  laws have l i t t le  effect  u p o n  the  behav io r  o f  pow erfu l  
nations. This is no t  a new p h e n o m e n o n ,  because  since its incep t ion ,  
the  UN has b een  beset  by its inab i l i ty  to m edia te  global  s tandards  of 
confl ic t  and coopera t ion .
21 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and P ow er:  A m erica  and E urope in  th e  N e w  
W orld  O rder  (Ne.w York: Random House,  2003) , 4.
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A l th ou g h  the  UN is not  pe rfec t  and  has n um erous  cr i t ics ,  i t  is 
the  best  available p la t form  for na t ions  to a r t icu la te  t h e i r  v iew po in ts  
on the  w o r ld  stage. The UN is va lued  for its ab il i ty  to  make na t ions  
w i th in  its s t ru c tu re  more order ly .  N at ions  a rou n d  the  w o r ld  m ain ta in  
t rus t  in  the  U N ’s mission to p reserve  peace.  Ever s ince  th e  end  of 
W orld  W a r  II, the  UN has been  th e  p rem ie r  symbol o f  th e  acceptance  
of m o d ern  in te rn a t io n a l  law, in co rp o ra t in g  the  p r inc ip le s  of sovereign  
equal i ty  b e tw ee n  nations.
The UN is c lear ly  a po l i t ica l  and  an ad jud ica t ing  body.  This 
rea l i ty  is a source of b o th  s t r e n g th  and  weakness ,  as it is t ru ly  
powerless  w i th o u t  the  suppor t  of its m em ber  states. This l im i ta t ion  
creates a pol i t ica l  com pet i t iveness  w i t h in  the  UN th a t  d is t rac ts  from 
its v i ta l  mission to establ ish  un iversa l ly  accep tab le  in te rn a t io n a l  
norms and laws of conduct .  The case of I raq  is a pr ime example  of the  
in h e re n t  d i lemma th a t  th e  UN faces, because th e re  are  no effective 
in te rn a t io n a l  legislatures to enforce  in te rn a t io n a l  law, and no 
effect ive in te rn a t io n a l  jud ic ia ry  to resolve disputes;  in s tead ,  th e  basis 
of in te rn a t io n a l  law relies  upon  based on  w i l l ing  consent .
The UN C har te r  is of ten  m iscons trued  as a legal co ns t i tu t io n ,  
but  it is in  fact an agreem en t  b e tw ee n  na t ion-s ta te s ,  based on a jo in t  
com m itm en t  to adhere  to the  in te rn a t io n a l  rules o f  law. The UN
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a t tem pts  to ba lance  the  pol i t ical  conce rns  of  sovere ign  n a t io n - s t a t e s — 
par t icu la r ly  th e  p e rm a n e n t  mem bers  o f  the  Securi ty  C ounc i l— to 
coerce coopera t io n  and enhance  th e  w i l l ingness  of n a t ions  to adhere  
to its m andates .
The in te r p r e t a t i o n  of UN Secur i ty  Council  R eso lu t ion  1441 
p r io r  to, dur ing ,  and after  the  in i t ia l  invasion o f  I raq  caused 
considerable  co n s te rn a t io n  amongst  the  m em b ers  of th e  UN, inc lud ing  
the  five m em bers  o f  the  Securi ty  Council .  This  emphasizes the  need  
for a more  rea l is t ic  w ork ing  concep t  of i n te rn a t io n a l  law.
The m em bers  of  th e  UNSC shou ld  fo rm u la te  an ag re em e n t  th a t  
can e ffec t ive ly  address the  p ro l i f e ra t in g  t h r e a t  of t e r ro r i sm ,  and 
th rea ts  posed by rogue na t ion-s ta tes .  The  ag reem en t  shou ld  not  be 
prone to subject ive  in te rp re ta t io n  by in d iv id u a l  states accord ing  to 
the i r  exclusive na t iona l  in teres ts ,  and  it shou ld  n o t  m it iga te  a n a t i o n ’s 
r ight  to use force in  se lf-defense. Advocates  o f  this a p p roach  p re fe r  
tha t  the  U n i ted  States coord ina te  fu tu re  m i l i ta ry  act ions t h ro u g h  th e  
UN as it  did p r io r  to the  f irst  Gulf  W ar  in  1991, and as it  a t t em p ted  in 
achieving  the  passage of UN Securi ty  Council  Reso lu t ion  1441.22
22 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig. “W in n in g  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  39.
Some argue th a t  this  approach  w o u ld  reaff irm the  U.S. 
co m m itm en t  to  the  UN and the  in te rn a t io n a l  com m uni ty .  In  addit ion ,  
it  would  s t r e n g th e n  A m er ica ’s capaci ty  to  in teg ra te  o th e r  na t ions  and  
in s t i tu t ions  in to  a r rangem en ts  th a t  are c o h e r e n t  w i th  U.S. in te res ts  
and values. T he  task force at the  Stanley F o u nd a t ion  asserts:
I f  the  Uni ted  States s t ren g th e n s  its a l l iances and  adapts 
i n te rn a t io n a l  rules to new real i t ies ,  it w i l l  not  need  to m a in ta in  
a cost ly  m il i ta ry  dominance .  It  can  reduce  its defense  budget,  
w h ic h  is a lready bigger in 2003 t h a n  the  m i l i ta ry  budge ts  of the  
nex t  20 largest  spenders  com bined ,  and consider  reduc ing  its 
global m i l i ta ry  presence.  The funds th a t  are f reed  up can be 
applied  to w ard  the  no n m il i ta ry  co m p o nen t  of  the  annual  
foreign affairs budget , inc lud ing  b i la te ra l  and  m u l t i la te ra l  
foreign lend ing  and assistance, as w el l  as increased  fund ing  for 
the  N un n-L u g ar  program, w h ic h  helps to con tro l  the  spread of 
fissile mater ia ls .  These prev ious ly  unavai lab le  m onies  can help  
a l levia te  those condit ions  in coun tr ies  t h a t  spawn radicalism,
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such as disease, poverty ,  and lawlessness ,  th e re b y  m aking a
signif icant  lo n g - te rm  c o n t r ib u t io n  to our  na t iona l  s e cu r i ty .23
This op in ion  advocates  for a m u l t i la te ra l  s t ra tegy  th a t  endorses  
coopera t ion  as the  most effect ive  way o f  m a in ta in in g  U.S. pr imacy,  
because in te rn a t io n a l  coopera t ion  enhances  pe rcep t ion s  of  legit imacy. 
In addit ion ,  it makes m ul t i la te ra l  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in n a t io n  bui ld ing,  
com bat t ing  global te r ro r is ts ,  and d e te r r in g  rogu e  n a t ion -s ta te s  more 
pala table  so th a t  th e  U n i ted  States would  n o t  have to  meet  these  
chal lenges alone. F u r th e rm o re ,  it  mit igates  r e s e n tm e n t  f rom nat ions  
th a t  may be t em p ted  to seek a balance of p o w e r  against  the  Uni ted  
States. Lastly, it  provides  a credib le  model  for r is ing  s tra tegic  
com pet i to rs  such as China  and Russia.24
Skeptics of this  approach argue tha t  a d h eren ce  to 
m ult i la te ra l i sm  subord ina te s  U.S. in te res ts  to  collect ive  in teres ts ;  




foreclose th e  op t ion  of m il i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  act ion,  or c o n s t ra in  the  
Uni ted  States from tak ing  d irec t  ac t ion  w h e n  n e e d e d .25
In th e  f ight  against  te r ro r i sm ,  the  Uni ted  States needs 
in te rn a t io n a l  coopera t ion  in all the  DIME e lem ents  o f  power. 
Therefore ,  r a th e r  th an  com bat ing  t e r ro r i sm  alone,  th e  U n i ted  States 
should recognize  th a t  A m e r ic a ’s secur i ty  is e n h a n c e d  th ro u g h  
m ult i la te ra l  p a r tn e rsh ip s  th a t  emphasizes  U.S. in te res ts  leveraged to 
preserve  the  U n i ted  S ta tes’ pos i t ion  as global  leader .
MILITARY ANTICIPATORY ACTION: CONDITIONS FOR
PREEMPTION OR PREVENTION
Since the  issuance of th e  2002 NSS, th e  DoP has a t t rac ted  
considerable  a t t e n t io n  as A m er ica ’s major  post-9/11 n a t io n a l  secur i ty  
doc tr ine .  The research  has d em o n s t ra te d  th a t  the  s t ra tegy  was a 
merger  of  p reem p t iv e  and  p reven t ive  s t ra teg ies  th a t  expanded  the  
boundaries  in  w h ic h  the  Uni ted  States could  applv  m i l i ta rv  force. TheX X V ✓
DoP a l lowed Am erica  to adapt  to th rea ts  from te r ro r i s t s  and  rogue
25 Ibid,  41.
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na t ion-s ta te s .  The 2002 NSS val idates  these  premises in  th e  fo l lowing 
quota t ion .
W e m ust  adapt the  concep t  o f  im m in en t  t h r e a t  to the  
capabil i t ies  and objectives of  to d a y ’s adversaries. Rogue states 
and te r ro r i s t s  do no t  seek to a t tack  us using co nv en t io n a l  
means. They  k n o w  such a t tacks  w o u ld  fail.  Instead, th e y  re ly  on 
acts o f  t e r r o r  and, po ten t ia l ly ,  the  use of w eapons  of mass 
d e s t ru c t io n — weapons th a t  can be easi ly  concealed, de l ivered  
covert ly ,  and used w i th o u t  w a r n in g .26
The def in i t iona l ,  and  legal d if ferences  o f  the  s t ra teg ies  u n d e r  
in te rn a t io n a l  law are qui te  clear , how ev er ,  s t ra teg ica l ly  p reem pt ion ,  
and p r e v e n t io n  share  a com m on logic. T hey  b o th  give an advantage  by 
p e rm i t t in g  th e  a t tacker  to in i t ia te  conf l ic t  on  terms th a t  are more  
favorable. Fu r the rm ore ,  the  u n c e r ta in t ie s  invo lved  in execu t ing  e i th e r  
s t ra tegy are s imilar  because quest ions  rega rd ing  w h e th e r  a th re a t  is 
im m inen t  or inev i tab le  are  se ldom answerab le  w i th  absolu te  ce r ta in ty .
26 Ibid, 15.
For ins tance ,  a na t io n -s ta te  may be c e r ta in  th a t  a n o th e r  n a t io n  wil l 
a t tack  but  may  not  know  w h e n  th a t  alleged a t tack  wil l  take place. 
Therefore ,  i f  an a t tack  occurs sooner  th a n  expected, w h a t  was ear l ie r  
considered  to an inevi tab le  poss ib i l i ty  can sudden ly  become an 
im m in en t  rea l i ty .  In such cases, assigning a p reem pt ive  or  p reven t ive  
s tra tegy label  may be chal lenging .  Moreover ,  for a n a t io n  th a t  is 
p o ten t ia l ly  u n d e r  th re a t  of an a t tack,  the  d i s t inc t ion  b e tw ee n  the  
terms wil l  n o t  stop a na t ion  u n d e r  th r e a t  of a t tack  from defending  
itself.
The DoP placed great  emphasis  on m i l i ta ry  supe r io r i ty ,  and it 
was an arguably  effective m il i ta ry  s tra tegy.  I t  advoca ted  a d is t inc t  
Am erican  v iew  of in te rn a t io n a l  o rder  t h a t  p rom oted  th e  d es t ru c t io n  
of te r ro r is ts  and of  rogue regimes th a t  suppor t  global te r ro r i sm ,  and 
accomplished  m uch  of w ha t  it  was designed to ach ieve .27 The DoP 
fac i l i ta ted th e  d es t ruc t ion  of n um erous  a l -Qaeda bases in  I raq  in  2004 
and caused the  dea th  of  Musab Abu a l-Zarqawi,  who was ki l led  by 
p reem ptive  U.S. air str ikes. In addit ion ,  th e  seco n d - in -co m m an d  of al-
27 George W. Bush, The National  Security Strategy of the United  States of  
America (September 2006) , ii.
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Qaeda in Iraq, Hamed Jumaa Farid ai-Saeedi,  was a r re s ted  n o r th  of 
Baghdad, a long w i th  a group o f  his aides and  fo l lowers  in  2006.28
Given th e  ex ten t  of  U.S. m il i ta ry  power ,  i t  is u n l ik e ly  th a t  the  
Uni ted  States wil l  take the  m il i ta ry  a n t ic ipa to ry  act ion  o p t ion  off the  
table; ra the r ,  it is l ike ly  to c o n t in u e  m i l i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  as 
long as t e r ro r i s t  th rea ts  are u n d e rm in in g  U.S. in te res ts .  The  ra t iona le  
for this  assessment can be va l ida ted  on the  sh e e r  m ag n i tu d e  of U.S. 
m il i ta ry  capabil i ty  and  expendi tu res .  The massive bu i ldup  of U.S. 
power,  as d isplayed in  table  2 seems far out  o f  p ro p o r t io n  to w h a t  is 
requ ired  for  p u re ly  defensive purposes.
The U.S. has the  abi l i ty  to p ro jec t  po w er  abroad and one can 
expect  th a t  it  wil l  use this power.  T here fo re ,  one can  reasonably  
specula te  th a t  an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  ac t ion  wil l be used w h e n  deemed 
necessary— as great  powers  have an incen t ive  to  act aggressively in 
securing th e i r  na t io na l  ob jec t ives .29
28 USA Today, “Suspected No.  2 al-Qaeda leader arrested,” September 4, 
2006,  accessed July 17, 2011, ww w .u satoday .c om /new s/w or ld / iraq /2006-09-03-  
al-qaeda-arrest_x.htm.
29 John Mearsheimer,  The Tragedy  o f  G reat P o w e r  P o l i t ic s  (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company,  2001)  21-22.
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■B BI B
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
USA 385.1 432.4 492.2 536.4 562.0 570.7 585.7 629.0 679.5
China 41.1 47.8 51.9 57.5 64.7 76.0 87.7 96.6 116.6
France 57.4 58.6 60.3 62.0 60.7 61.0 61.2 60.6 64.7
UK 46.0 49.0 52.6 53.2 53.6 54.0 55.7 58.2 59.3
Russia 32.2 35.7 38.0 39.5 43.1 47.2 51.2 56.8 59.5
Japan 55.3 55.9 56.0 55.5 55.3 54.6 53.8 53.1 54.3
German 46.4 46.5 45.9 44.5 43.8 42.8 42.8 44.1 45.7
U nquest ionab ly ,  th e  Uni ted  States has th e  m il i ta ry  pow er  to 
combat  te r ror ism ;  how ever ,  the re  are p e rc ep t ion a l  l im i ta t io n s  to the  
use of  its ov e rw h e lm ing  m il i ta ry  power.  As no ted  ear l ie r ,  m il i ta ry  
encoun te rs  resu l t  in  spi l lover  effects, p rob lem at ic  s i tua t ions ,  and 
poli t ical  consequences  th a t  in f luence  o th e r  domains.  T here fo re ,  as the  
th rea t  of t e r ro r i sm  con t inues  to be a d is rup t ive  and lo n g - te rm  th rea t  
to global  peace and s tabil i ty ,  l ike -m ind ed  n a t io n s  should  co l lec t ive ly
30 Stockholm International  Peace Research Inst i tute ,  SIPRI Mil itary  
Expenditure Database, 2011, Appendix 5A, assessed September 10, 2012,  
http:/ /milexdata.s ipri .org/f i les /?f i le=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2011 .xls.
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work  to g e th e r  because no n a t ion  is im m une  from th is  p ro l i fe ra t in g  
th rea t .
A QUESTION OF INTELLIGENCE
There  were  glar ing chal lenges  w i t h in  th e  in te l l igence  
co m m u n i ty  p r io r  to 9/11 and t h r o u g h o u t  the  GWOT. The 
dysfunc t iona l  re la t ionsh ip  b e tw een  th e  in te l l igence  c o m m u n i ty  and 
U.S. policy  makers  and  in te l l igence  fai lures w e re  obvious. Even today, 
the re  rem ains  a hea ted  debate  over  w h e th e r  h igh - le v e l  U.S. 
pol icymakers  m an ipu la ted  in te l l igence  and  h e ig h te n e d  th e  p e rcep t io n  
of th re a t  in o rder  to make a case for going to w a r  in Iraq.  Some have 
argued the  w ar  in I raq  was unnecessary ,  and it  was a w a r  of  cho ice .31
After  9/11, it  was obvious the  in te l l ig en ce  c o m m u n i ty  needed  
enhan cem en t .  After  recogniz ing  the  re la t ionsh ip  be tw ee n  the  
in te l l igence  com m uni ty  and po l icym akers  was dysfunc t iona l ,  
P res iden t  Bush st ressed th e  need  for reforms to a l low the  U n i ted  
States to p red ic t  the  dangers  posed by “shadowy ne tw orks  of
31 Richard N. Haass, W ar o f  N ecess i ty ,  W ar o f  Choice: A M e m o ir  o f  Two  
Iraq Wars. (New York: Simon and Schuster,  2010),  13.
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indiv iduals  [who] can br ing  great  chaos and  suffering to our  sh o re s .”32 
As a resu l t ,  P re s id en t  Bush enac ted  th e  In te llig e n c e  R e fo rm  a nd  
Terrorism  P re v e n tio n  A c t  in 2004. The re fo rm  act r e q u i re d  all U.S. 
in te l l igence  o rgan iza t ions  to forgo past  cu l tu res  of  au ton o m y  to 
establ ish g rea te r  in te ragency  co l labora t ion ;  in add it ion ,  it cal led for a 
proact ive  app roach  to in te rn a t io n a l  in te l l igence  co l labora t ion .  
Subsequently ,  John  N eg ro p o n te ’s N a tio n a l In te llig e n c e  S tra teg y  
declared the  p r im a ry  role of the  U.S. in te l l ig en c e  co m m u n i ty  was to 
in tegra te  dom est ic  and foreign d im en s ion  of U.S. in te l l igence ,  and  
br ing dep th  to in te l l igence  analys is .33
Beyond th e  need  to have h ig h -q u a l i ty  in te l l ig en ce  apparatus ,  a 
debate  em erged  b e tw ee n  in te l l igence  professionals .  Some in te l l igence  
analysts be l ieve  qua l i ta t ive  in te l l igence  analysis  is m ore  effective, 
while  o th e r  analysts  be lieved  q u a n t i t a t iv e  sc ient if ic  approaches  to 
in te l l igence  analysis  is more effect ive.  Q u a l i ta t ive  analysis,  is v iewed 
more as an a r t  t h a n  a science, and  is used  most often in  th e  pol i t ica l  
and m il i ta ry  arena.  Q uan t i ta t ive  analysis is a s t ru c tu re d  app roach  th a t  
is general ly  applied  to scient if ic  and  tech n ica l  in te l l igence  chal lenges .
32 George W. Bush, The National  Security Strategy of the United  States of  
America (September 2006) ,  introduction.
33 Office of  the Director of  National  Intel l igence .  N ation a l  In te l l ig e n c e  
S tra tegy  o f  the  U n ited  S ta tes  o f  A m erica:  Transform ation through In tegra tion  
and Innova tion .  Washington,  D.C.: Government  Printing Office, 2005,  1.
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Of the  tw o  approaches ,  qual i ta t ive  analysis  provides th e  most  useful  
in te l l igence  to pol icymakers .  U l t im ate ly ,  improving  analysis  is the  
long - te rm  goal of  the  in te l l igence  c o m m un i ty ;  the re fo re ,  th is  resea rch  
advocates for in te g ra t in g  qua l i ta t ive  and  qu an t i ta t iv e  tech n iq u e s  to 
produce  q ua l i ty  analysis  for pol icymakers .
GAME THEORY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
In the  wake  of 9/11, securi ty  analysis  has become more  complex; 
there fore ,  th e  co n tem p ora ry  secu r i ty  e n v i ro n m e n t  requires  
sophis t ica ted  ana ly t ica l  tools. Game th e o r y  is a va luab le  tool  in 
iden t i fy ing  th rea ts ,  and  a l lowing a m ode le r  to assess a range of  
securi ty  d i lemmas by evaluat ing  past  s t ra teg ies  and occu rrences  so 
th a t  fu tu re  p robab i l i t ie s  are considered .  S tra tegy  is th e  essence of 
in te rn a t io n a l  pol i t ics  and various game th e o ry  models can evaluate  a 
var ie ty  of  s t ra tegic  di lemmas b e tw een  actors .
Critics of game theo ry  assert th e  d isc ip l ine  does n o t  ref lec t  real-  
life. They argue th a t  game theo ry  tech n iq u es  canno t  accoun t  for the  
inf in i te  n u m b er  of  variables involved  in com plex  problems o f  hu m an
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in te r a c t io n .34 Suppor te rs  of game th eo ry  be l ieve  the  m e th o d  compels 
one to evaluate  past  and c u r re n t  events  to ga in  b e t t e r  ins igh t  in to  
specific occurrences  and p red ic t  outcomes.  Both a rgum en ts  have 
merit;  how ever ,  th is  research  supports  th e  premises t h a t  game th eo ry  
a llow modelers  to  a rr ive  at l ikely p robab i l i t ie s  of p a r t i c u la r  events,  
based on assessments of  re levan t  data. This asser t ion  is re in fo rced  
based on the  game th e o ry  analysis  in c h a p te r  VII  of  th is  s tudy.  The 
model of  the  confl ic t  b e tw een  the  U n i ted  States and  a l-Qaeda 
dem onstra tes  th e  value of  game th eo ry  as a tool  capable of  iden t i fy ing  
adversar ia l  in ten t .  In  addit ion ,  th is  d i s se r ta t io n  d rew  data  from a 
con tro l led  e x p er im en t  at the  National  In te l l igence  U n ive rs i ty  th a t  
suggested s t ru c tu re d  analy t ical  m ethodologies  such as game th eo ry  
improved qua l i ta t ive  in te l l igence  analysis .35
W h e n  c om bined  w i th  qua l i ta t ive  analysis ,  game th e o ry  allows 
analysts to convey  th e i r  judgments  to po l icym akers  in  te rm s th a t  are 
more encom passing  and more readi ly  unders tood .  More im p or tan t ly ,  it 
d iminishes  th e  possibi l i ty  of d iscoun t ing  cer ta in  hypotheses ,  
p a r t icu la r ly  those  th a t  run  coun te r  to th e  p re d o m in a n t  cl imate  of
34 Robert D. Folker Jr., In te l l ig en ce  A n a ly s is  in Theater Jo in t  
In te l l ig en ce  Centers: A n E x p er im en t in A p p ly in g  S tru c tu re d  M eth ods .  Joint 




opinion .  C onsequen t ly ,  a case be made th a t  game th eo ry  gives analysts  
and po l icym akers  th e  abil i ty  to span a h o r izo n  o f  probabi l i t ies ,  
em pow er ing  th em  to make advantageous  decisions based on well-  
t h o u g h t - o u t  assessments.  Obviously,  specific in te l l igen ce  is far b e t t e r  
th an  ca lcu la t ing  probabi l i t ies  and payoffs; how ever ,  w h e n  specif ic i ty  
is n o t  a t ta inab le ,  game th e o ry  can em pow er  d ec is io n -m ak ing  u n d e r  
un c e r ta in ty ,  a l lowing analysts  to develop r e le v an t  courses of ac t ion  to 





This c h a p te r  readdresses  the  resea rch  ques t ion  and  hypothes is ,  
m ethodology ,  data  co l lec t ion ,  and analysis . I t  includes ins igh t  on 
theo re t ica l  con t r ib u t ion s ,  in s t ru m e n ta t io n ,  research  l im i ta t ions ,  and 
recom m enda t ions  for fu ture  research .
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
The exam ina t ion  of secur i ty  s tra tegies  is n e i th e r  simple  nor  
unprob lem at ic ;  how ever ,  the  resea rch  ques t ion  p rov ided  d i rec t io n  for 
the  analysis and  the  impetus  for th is  q ua l i ta t ive  h is to r ica l  s tudy on 
the  2002 NSS. This research  did  no t  fo l low  a simple  check l i s t  to arr ive  
at feasible assumptions ,  but  de lved  in to  a w ide-range  o f  theo re t ica l  
and empir ica l  l i t e ra tu re  to answ er  th e  fo l lowing  research  quest ion:
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-  Research  Question: Was the  D oc tr ine  of  P re e m p t io n  a 
p reem pt ive  s trategy,  a p rev en t iv e  s t ra tegy ,  or an am algam at ion  
of b o th  strategies?
-  Nul l  Hypothesis :  HO = The D oc t r ine  of  P reem p t io n  was no t  a 
p reem p t iv e  s trategy,  or a p rev e n t iv e  s trategy. It  was an 
amalgam at ion  of st ra tegies  of p re e m p t io n  and p r e v e n t io n .1
-  A l te rn a t iv e  Hypothesis:  HA = The D oc tr ine  of P re e m p t io n  was 
solely  a p reem p t iv e  s trategy,  just  as its name d e n o te s .2
This research  was a h is to r ica l  inves t iga t io n  of th e  global post-  
9/11 secur i ty  e n v i ro n m e n t  from 2001 th ro u g h  2008. It  focused  on how  
the  2002 NSS m erged  w ha t  is t r ad i t io n a l  k n o w n  as a “p r e e m p t iv e ” 
securi ty  s t ra tegy  w i th  a “p re v e n t iv e ” s t ra tegy  to  create  a d is t inc t ive  
A m erican  s t ra tegy  of an t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion  cal led th e  DoP.
1 The null hypothesis  (symbolized as HO) is a hypothesis  set  up to be 
null i f ied or refuted in order to support an alternative hypothesis .  W h e n  used,  
the null hypothes is  is presumed true until  ev id ence  indicates otherwise .
2 The alternate hypothesis  (symbolized as HA) and the null  hypothes is  
are the two rival hypotheses .
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This r esea rch  establ ishes the  DoP was n o t  a p reem ptive  s tra tegy,  
or a p rev e n t iv e  s tra tegy,  bu t  an am a lg am at ion  of p re e m p t io n  and 
p rev e n t io n  stra tegies .  The fo l lowing passage from th e  2002 NSS 
clearly answers  th e  research  ques t ion  and  proves  th e  DoP was an 
am algam ation  of  p ree m p t io n  and p re v e n t io n  stra tegies.
[The U n i ted  States] wil l not  hes i ta te  to act  alone, if  necessary ,  
to exercise  our  r igh t  of se l f -defense  by  act ing p r e e m p tiv e ly  
against  such  ter ror is ts ,  to p r e v e n t  th em  from doing ha rm  against  
our  people  and our c o u n t ry .”3 The g rea te r  th e  th rea t ,  the  g rea te r  
is the  risk of in ac t io n — and th e  more  compel l ing  th e  case for 
tak ing  a n tic ip a to ry  action  to de fend  ourselves, ( ita lics a dded)4
To re in fo rce  th e  research  ques t ion  b e yo n d  w h a t  is a r t icu la ted  
the  passage above, th is  s tudy focused on the  h is to r ica l  aspects  of  U.S. 
na t ional  secur i ty  policies. This approach  dem o n s t ra ted  h o w  th rea ts  to 
na t ional  secur i ty  spurred  various U.S. P res iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t io ns  to
3 George W. Bush, “The National  Security Strategy of  the United States of  
America,” September 2002,  6.
4 Ibid, 15.
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create pol ic ies  to co n f ro n t  emerging  th rea ts .  In  addit ion ,  this  s tudy  
analyzed the  t rad i t io n a l  def in i t ions  o f  p reem ptive  and  p rev en t iv e  
strategies,  as w el l  as the  legal condit ions  u n d e r  w h ic h  th e y  are used.
METHODOLOGY
This r esea rch  fol lowed a qua l i ta t ive  research  design, w h ic h  
rel ied s ign i f ican t ly  on  deduct ive  logical  analysis  of h i s to r ic  l i t e ra tu re  
to establ ish facts regard ing  u n d e r ly ing  assumptions  and perspect ives  
of the  2002 NSS and the  DoP, w h ic h  to u ch e d  u p o n  many con trove rs ia l  
issues re la t ing  to the  U.S. GWOT.
DATA COLLECTION
The co l lec ted  data  for  this  s tudy came f rom  various p r im ary  and 
secondary sources.  The l i t e ra tu re  focused on  two re lev an t  areas: 
hypotheses o f  in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  t h e o r y  th a t  re la ted  to 
general ized concepts  of confl ic t  and  coopera t ion ,  and  specific  
opinions tha t  re la ted  to h is to r ic  U.S. na t iona l  secur i ty  d i lemmas and
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post-9/11 na t io na l  secur i ty  polic ies. The l i t e ra tu re  inc luded  
in fo rm a t io n  from gov e rn m en t  docum ents ,  databases,  h is tor ic  
l i t e ra tu re ,  and  co n te m p o ra ry  professional  journals .
DATA ANALYSIS
The level of analysis for th is  s tudy  focused  on  act ions of the  
U.S. in  the  post-9/11 secur i ty  e n v i ro n m en t .  T he  essence of the  data  
analysis came from the  qua l i ta t ive  t r i a n g u la t io n  of  h is to r ica l  and 
co n tem p o ra ry  events.  The research  analyzed  past s t ra teg ic  opt ions 
used by A m erican  Pres iden t ia l  adm in is t ra t ions ,  and  focused on 
co n tem p o ra ry  post-9/11 geopoli t ical  factors and cond i t ions  th a t  
affected the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of  the  DoP.
THEORETICAL AND EXPERIENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
STUDY
The th eo re t ic a l  l i t e ra tu re  rev iewed for th i s  s tudy was comprised  
of abstrac t  concepts  on in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions  th eo ry ,  w h ic h
257
expla ined  concep tua l  f ram eworks  th a t  fac i l i ta te  u n d e rs t a n d in g  of 
pheno m en a  in w or ld  politics . The  exper ien t ia l  po l icy - re la ted  
l i t e ra tu re  p rov ided  specifics on how  po l icym akers  im p lem en t  na t iona l  
securi ty  policy.
INSTRUMENTATION
Game th e o ry  is pa r t  of a larger  body of d ec is ion -m ak ing  theory .  
The model ing  of  events  th a t  led to th e  GW OT im p ar ted  an i l lus t ra t ive  
und e rs tan d in g  of the  d iam etr ica l ly  opposed goals of th e  U n i ted  States 
and al-Qaeda. The models d e m o n s t ra ted  th e  op t ions  t h a t  b o th  ent i t ie s  
had to f u r th e r  th e i r  agendas. Both actors aspired to ach ieve  ends 
based on se lf - in teres ts ,  w i th  l im i ted  s t ra teg ic  options.
CASE STUDIES
The case studies l is ted in  appendix  A provide  ev idence  of  how  
the  percep t ions  of th re a t  affect complex s t ra teg ic  di lemmas.  The case 
studies are Cold W ar  assessments th a t  provide  ins igh t  on  h is to r ic  U.S.
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nat iona l  secu r i ty  polic ies, w h ic h  offer  d i s c e rn m en t  on th e  theo re t ica l  
assumptions of  th e  research.
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
A lthough  th is  research  encom passed  num erous  l i t e ra ry  sources, 
th e re  w e re  no defin i t ive  conclusions  made on the  fu tu re  use of th e  
DoP. The l i t e ra tu re  p rov ided  specific in fo rm a t io n  re la t in g  to the  
def in i t iona l  m eanings  of p reem pt ion ,  p reven t ion ,  and  prov ided  
in fo rm a t io n  on the  concepts  of  im m in e n t  and inev i tab le  th rea t .  Much 
of  the  l i t e ra tu re  expressed conf l ic t ing  op in ions  re la t ing  to the  DoP. 
The fo l lowing assert ions are specific  l im i ta t ions  to  the  study:
-  The various scholar ly  perspec t ives  were  h igh ly  subject ive ,  and 
no d is t inc t  theo re t ica l  f ram ew ork  fully addressed  the  l i tany  of 
issues su r ro u nd in g  e i th e r  the  advantageous  or the  de t r im e n ta l  
n a tu re  of  the  DoP. This l im i ted  specif ic i ty  on m easur ing  the  
e ffect iveness  of  the  DoP.
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-  Not  all  aspects  of game th e o ry  w ere  explored.  The d isc ip l ine  is 
ever  evolving,  and th eo re t ica l  debates  in  th e  f ie ld  are ongoing.  
As such,  th is  s tudy focused on game th e o r y  at  an  e lem e n ta ry  
level.  To go beyond  th e  basics for this  s tudy  w o u ld  have been  
too ambitious.
-  Not all aspects of in te rn a t io n a l  law re la t ing  to  confl ic t  were  
addressed  in th e  s tudy; such  an endeavor  w ould  have  also been  
too ambit ious  an u nd e r tak ing .  Instead,  th is  s tudy focused on the  
norms of  in te rn a t io n a l  law th a t  re la ted  to the  GW OT and the  
post-9/11 secur i ty  e nv iron m en t .
-  The s tudy suggested th a t  the  UN should  develop  specific 
d e f in i t iona l  agreem ents  on how  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  c o m m u n i ty  
should  con fro n t  the  p ro l i fe ra t ing  t h r e a t  of te r ro r i sm ,  bu t  
neg lec ted  to give specif ics on how  to achieve  th is  goal.
-  This s tudy did  no t  examine  proposals  to  make global t e r ro r i sm  
an in te rn a t io n a l  crime,  or if  es tab l ish ing  an in te rn a t io n a l  cou r t  
to p rosecu te  te r ro r is ts  is feasible.
-  Also beyond  the  scope of th is  s tudy  are  o ther  m odal i t ies  to 
com b a t t in g  global te r ror ism ;  such  as funding  th e  cost of 
com bat ing  global  te r ro r ism ,  or us ing  economic  pow er  as a 
w eapon .  Ins tead ,  th is  s tudy focused  p r im ar i ly  on  th e  m il i ta ry  
e lem en t  of  power,  and e luc id a ted  u p o n  h o w  m u l t i la te ra l  
d ip lom acy  and rel iable  in te l l igence  suppor ts  th e  exp o r ta t io n  of 
U.S. p o w e r  abroad.
-  This s tudy  exam ined  the  DoP as an  o v e r t  s t ra tegy  of  m il i ta ry  
a n t ic ip a to ry  act ion,  but  was unab le  to  inc lude  cover t  or 
c landes t ine  opera t ions  used in  the  GWOT.
As th e  case w i th  all research ,  th is  s tudy  does have l im i ta t ions  
tha t  fu tu re  resea rch  efforts may im prove  upon.  In  l igh t  of  the  
l im ita t ions  of  th is  study, it  rem ains  c lear  t h a t  the  em ergence  of 
te r ro r ism  led the  Uni ted  States to d isregard  it  Cold W a r  s t ra tegy  of 
de te r rence  to em brace  m il i ta ry  a n t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  th r o u g h  the  DoP. 
Thus, th is  s tudy  on ly  touched  upon  a f rac t ion  o f  the  com plex i t ie s  th a t  
encompasses th e  ph en o m ena  of  U.S. n a t io n a l  secur i ty  policy.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This  resea rch  raised m any ques t ions  regard ing  th e  fu tu re  use of 
m il i ta ry  an t ic ip a to ry  act ion. At p resen t ,  it  is unc lea r  if  the  Uni ted  
States w il l  c o n t in u e  to use a n t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  as a staple of its 
na t ional  secur i ty ,  d i scon t inue  its use, or em p lo y  it  more selectively.  It 
is chal leng ing  to p red ic t  th e  fu tu re  s t ra teg ic  opt ion  th e  U.S. may 
im p lem en t  because one canno t  k n o w  w h a t  th re a t s  may emerge  in the  
coming decades. Areas of  fu tu re  research  inc lude:
-  W h a t  are the  fu ture  prospect ive  uses o f  mil i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  
ac t ion  in U.S. na t iona l  secur i ty  policy?
-  Can effect ive  in te l l igence  and  game th e o ry  provide  subs tan t ia l  
benef i ts  w i th  regard  to u n d e rs tan d in g  fu ture  adversar ies  and  
en h an c in g  p reparedness  to c o n f ro n t  them?
-  Game th e o ry  offers cons iderab le  opp o r tu n i t ie s  for fu tu re  
research  in th e  realm of s t ra teg ic  and  in te l l igence  analysis , 
because it  allows for u n re s t r i c te d  assessments of fu tu re
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adversar ies  and  causes modelers  to  t h in k  b e y o nd  s tandard  
assert ions.
-  W h a t  are  the  benefi ts  and def ic iencies  of us ing  m u l t i la te ra l  
organ iza t ions  in defea t ing  te r ro r i s t s  and rogue na t ion -s ta te s?
CONCLUSION
This  s tudy  re fe renced  a m u l t i tu d e  of  l i t e ra tu re  to evaluate  
w h e th e r  the  DoP was a p reem ptive  s tra tegy,  a p reven t ive  of s tra tegy,  
or an am algam at ion  of the  two stra tegies.  The re sea rch  c lear ly  
dem ons tra tes  t h a t  the  2002 NSS m erged  p ree m p t io n  w i t h  p re v e n t io n  
in to  a s t ra tegy  o f  a n t ic ipa to ry  a c t io n .5
The deba te  over p reem ptive  and p reven t iv e  s t ra teg ies  of  war  
long p receded  the  DoP; how ever ,  subs tan t ive  a rgum en ts  in the  
l i t e ra tu re  focused on w ha t  was v iewed as the  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s 
merging of  the  two stra tegies  u n d e r  the  um b re l la  of th e  DoP, despi te  
th e i r  d i f fe ren t  legal def in i t ions  in  in te rn a t io n a l  phraseology.  The
5 George W. Bush, The National  Security Strategy of  the United States of  
America (September 2002) ,  15.
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l i t e ra tu re  co n ta in e d  confl ic t ing  op in ions  on w h a t  w e re  cons idered  
inevi tab le  th re a t s  posed by rogue n a t ion -s ta te s ,  and  w h a t  was 
considered  im m in e n t  th rea ts  from t e r ro r i s t  actors. By conf la t ing  the  
th rea t  from Saddam H usse in ’s Iraq w i th  the  th r e a t  o f  a l-Qaeda,  the  
Bush a d m in is t r a t io n  made the  deba te  over  th e  th eo re t ica l  
u nd e rp in n in g s  of  legali ty, legi t imacy,  and  the  im p le m e n ta t io n  of the  
DoP a sus ta inab le  topic  of discussion.
Once  p reem pt iv e  and p reven t ive  s t ra teg ie s  were m erged  in  the  
DoP, th e  s t ra tegy  avai led i tse l f  to a w id e r  in te r p r e t a t i o n  u nd e r  
in te rn a t io n a l  law. A l though  the  two stra tegies  have  vary ing  
de f in i t iona l  pa r lance  of  in te rn a t io n a l  law, th ey  share a co m m o n  logic, 
as bo th  afford an advantage  to th e  aggressor. Both s t ra teg ies  are 
offensive in n a tu re ,  a l lowing na t ions  to in i t i a te  confl ic t  on te rm s th a t  
are more favorable.
Both s tra tegies  involve  executing  m i l i ta ry  a n t ic ipa to ry  ac t ion  
u nd e r  cond i t ions  of th rea t .  For ins tance ,  a n a t io n -s ta te  may be 
u n c e r ta in  of the  t im ing  of  an inev i tab le  a t tack  from a n o th e r  na t ion ,  
however ,  if t h a t  a t tack  occurs sooner  t h a n  expected;  a once 
considered  inev i tab le  th re a t  im m ed ia te ly  becomes an im m in e n t  
th rea t .  In  such cases, assigning a p reem p t ive  or  p reven t ive  label to 
mil i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  act ion  is chal lenging .  F u r th e rm o re ,
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di f fe ren t ia t ing  b e tw e e n  p ree m p t io n  and  p rev e n t io n  is even  more  
diff icult  w h e n  variables  associated w i th  percep t ions  of  th rea ts  are 
taken  in  to a c c o u n t— th e re b y  making  a d i s t in c t io n  b e tw ee n  an 
inevi tab le  and im m in e n t  t h re a t  imprecise .
Pr ior  to 9/11, th rea ts  to the  U n i ted  States had h is to r ica l ly  been  
cyclical,  in  scope, w hereas  con v en t ion a l  n a t io n a l - se cu r i ty  s tra tegies  
had allowed th e  U n i ted  States to keep its enemies  at a d is tance  to 
vary ing  degrees of  opposi t ion .  Accord ing ly ,  various U.S. P res iden t ia l  
adm in is t ra t ions  have c rea ted  na t iona l  secu r i ty  s tra tegies  to meet  th e  
emerging  th rea ts  of th e i r  eras. Robert  Kagan ar t icu la tes  th is  po in t ,  
w h e n  he emphasizes th a t  A m er ica ’s post-9/11 secur i ty  s t ra tegy  was a 
r e s ta tem en t  of over ha l f  a cen tu ry  of  h a b i tu a l  A m erican  na t iona l  
securi ty  pol icy, d u r in g  w h ic h  the  U n i ted  States cons is ten t ly  sought  to 
shape global  even ts  in ways favorable to  A m erican  p r incip les  and  
in te res ts .6
Fol lowing the  a t tacks of  9/11, the  Bush ad m in is t r a t io n  be l ieved  
th a t  the  Cold W ar  s t ra tegy  of d e te r re n c e  was  ineffec t ive  against  
te r ro r is ts  and  rogue nations.  Consequently ,  the  adm in is t ra t io n  chose 
to in s t i tu te  t h e  DoP, because it  a l lowed the  Uni ted  States to take
6 Robert Kagan, O f  Paradise and P ow er:  A m e r ic a n  and E urope in the  N e w  
W orld  Order (New York: Random House, 2003) , 61.
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advantage  of its o v e r -w h e lm ing  m il i ta ry  po w er  to p ro tec t  U.S. 
in teres ts .  A l though ,  the re  are nu m ero u s  h is to r ica l  cases w h e re  
m il i ta ry  an t ic ip a to ry  ac t ion  has b e en  used  in warfare ;  the  
im p le m e n ta t io n  of  th e  DoP s t im ula ted  deba ted  over  w h a t  is a legal use 
of force u n d e r  in te rn a t io n a l  law.
C urren t ly ,  pe rcep t ions  on the  use o f  the  offensive m il i ta ry  force 
are so broad  t h a t  th ey  have lost analytic  u t i l i ty .  The legal d is t inc t ions  
be tw een  p re e m p t io n  and p rev en t ion  have led to cons iderab le  
de l ibera t ion .  Those w h o  focus on th e  sho r tcom ings  of  the  DoP argue 
th a t  the  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s approach  to th e  G W O T produced  
serious divis ions b e tw een  th e  Uni ted  States and some of  its key 
European allies. It  can be argued th a t  th e  Bush a d m in i s t r a t io n ’s post-  
9 / 1 1 course of ac t ion  was n e i th e r  the  t r em en d o u s  success s to ry  tha t  its 
suppor te rs  cla im nor  the  im m ora l  consp iracy  its h a rsh es t  cri t ics  
charge.  As a s t ra tegy  of  an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  act ion,  th e  DoP a llowed 
the  Uni ted  States to gain a strategic  offens ive  advantage  and pu t  
te r ro r is ts  on not ice .  U lt im ate ly ,  the  DoP carved  out  a u n iq u e  n iche  in 
the  his tor ical  p a n th e o n  of U.S. secur i ty  stra tegies .
Fu ture  na t iona l  secur i ty  options for  the  Uni ted  States should  
include  a range of s t ra teg ic  options. First ,  the  Uni ted  States should  
re ta in  its op t ion  to use m il i ta ry  an t ic ipa to ry  act ion,  n o t  as a card inal
norm, bu t  only  w h e n  necessary. Second,  the  U n i ted  States should  
engage in  the  act ive  d e te r ren c e  and  c o n ta in m e n t  o f  rogue  n a t i o n ­
sta tes .7 A l th ou g h  d e te r ren ce  does not  offer  sus ta inab le  p ro tec t io n  
against  te r ro r is ts ,  i t  may be effective in  d issuading  ce r ta in  rogue 
na t ion -s ta te s  from upse t t ing  the  sta tus quo. T h ird ,  th e  U n i ted  States 
should  pursue  s t ra teg ies  of m ul t i la te ra l  coopera t ion  to address  the  
p ro l i fe ra t ing  t h re a t  of te r ro r ism ,  because,  in th e  long- te rm ,  
m ult i la te ra l i sm  builds  a global consensus  t h a t  favors norm s and 
in s t i tu t ions  th a t  suppor t  Am erican  values and in te re s t s .8
I n te rn a t io n a l  t e r ro r i sm  is a p h e n o m e n o n  em p o w ered  by 
g lobalization;  the re fo re ,  m ul t i la te ra l  s t ra teg ies  should  be used to 
eradica te  it. C om bat t ing  global te r ro r i sm  is one o f  the  major  secur i ty  
issues of  this  age, and  the  U.S. wil l  have to  re ly  on its vi ta l  
t ran sa t lan t ic  pa r tne rs  to meet  the  chal lenges  o f  the  21st  cen tu ry .  No 
na t ion ,  no t  even the  U n i ted  States, shou ld  p rosecu te  a co n t in u o u s  war  
of such global  s ignif icance by itself.  This m u l t i la te ra l  a pp roach  makes 
c oopera t ion  more  l ike ly  in  fu tu re  in te rn a t io n a l  chal lenges .
A s tab i l iza t ion  process w i th  all ied suppor t  has an  impact  on 
m ain ta in in g  global s tabil i ty ,  and enhances  the  l ike l ihood  th e  U n i ted
7 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W inn ing  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003),  25.
8 Ibid, 27.
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States w il l  n o t  have to act a lone  in defense  of its na t iona l  in teres ts .  In 
addit ion ,  m u lt i la te ra l i sm  reduces  th e  r isk  of in t e r n a t io n a l  r e sen tm en t  
to U.S. power ,  and provides a persuas ive  m odel  for r is ing  s t ra tegic  
com pet i to rs  to follow. Lastly, it  a llows the  U n i ted  States to reduce  
and share  the  economic  costs of  e nsu r ing  global  s ta b i l i ty .9
The U n i ted  States and Europe need  each o th e r ’s p a r tn e r sh ip  in 
deal ing w i th  em erg ing  te r ro r i s t  th rea ts  to  the  sta tus quo.  The United  
States and  its allies must  focus on  th e i r  h is to r ic  sense  of  comm on 
destiny.  M ain ta in ing  a sus ta inab le  t r a n sa t la n t ic  a l l iance  requires  
policies t h a t  ref lec t  and acknowledge  th is  m u tu a l  dependence ,  because 
w i th o u t  a sense of a W e s te rn  c om m uni ty ,  Am erica  and Europe  wil l  be 
weaker,  and  v u lne rab le  to fu tu re  t e r ro r i s t  attacks.
9 Lawrence J. Korb and Michael  Kraig, “W inning  the Peace in the 21st  
Century” (The Stanley Foundation,  October 2003) ,  40.
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The case s tudies  prov ided  in this  a p p en d ix  examine the  op in ions  
of suppor te rs  and  opponen ts  of p ree m p t iv e  and  p reven t ive  stra tegies  
of confl ic t  d u r ing  th e  Cold W ar .  The case studies e n l ig h te n  th is  
s tu d y ’s analysis  on the  quali t ies  of th e  DoP as a s t ra tegy  of 
an t ic ipa to ry  m i l i ta ry  action. F u r th e rm o re ,  t h e y  d e m o n s t ra te  how  
in te rn a t io n a l  crises develop w h e n  n a t io n -s ta te s  perceive  th a t  th e i r  
securi ty  is t h r e a te n e d  by the  act ions of  a n o th e r  actor .  In  every  
c ircumstance ,  na t ions  feel th ey  need  to defend  them selves  from the  
actions of o th e r  na t ion-s ta tes .  In  a crisis,  the  suddenness  and 
m agni tude  of  a th rea t ,  spurs the  wi l l ingness  to re ta l ia te  or negotia te .
The case s tudies suggest th a t  m ost  secur i ty  d i lemmas have 
similar dynamics  of escalat ion. At the  m ost  basic  level,  na t ion -s ta te s  
have two st ra tegies:  c o n fro n ta t io n  or  coopera t ion .  One ac to r  th rea te n s  
the  o the r  to force  accommodat ion ,  and t h e  th re a te n e d  ac tor  a t tem pts  
to cons t ra in  th e  o th e r  actors demands. This  p h e n o m e n o n  undersco res  
the  s tra tegic  di lemmas th a t  po l icym akers  co n te n d  w i th  du r ing  
strategic  di lemmas.
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CONTEMPLATIONS OF AN AMERICAN-SOVIET PREVENTIVE WAR
Soon after  th e  conclus ion  of W or ld  W a r  II, A m er ican  and  Soviet 
re la t ions  began to decl ine .  U.S. po l icym akers  w e r e  c o n ce rn e d  w i th  the  
growing s t r e n g th  of  th e  Soviet U n ion  and  saw the  spread of 
com m unism  as a th re a t  to the  Uni ted  States. Increas ing  inc iden ts  of 
Soviet expansion  in Eas te rn  Europe amplif ied  W e s te rn  anxieties,  as 
did advances in th e  Soviet  U n io n ’s nuc lea r  technology .
The poss ib i l i ty  of a p reven t ive  war  w i th  th e  Soviet U n ion  was a 
recu r r ing  them e  of  ear ly  Cold W ar  s t ra teg ic  thou g h t ,  and  num erous  
U.S. pol icymakers  and academics advoca ted  for  p rev e n t iv e  ac t ion  
against the  Soviet U nion  at several  ju n c tu res  d u r in g  the  late  1940s and 
early  1950s. B er t rand  Russell be l ieved  th a t  th e  W est  shou ld  go to war 
w i th  the  Soviet Union  before  it  acquired  an atomic bomb. Ber trand  
felt a W e s te rn  v ic to ry  would  come more  exped i t ious ly  w i th  fewer 
casualties th an  if  nuc lea r  bombs were  on b o th  s ides .1
After  the  Soviet U n ion  tes ted  its f irst  a tomic bomb in  1949, the  
response  in the  U n i ted  States was one of  ap prehens ion ,  and it 
unse t t led  the  T ru m an  a d m in is t ra t ion  and  th e  Am erican  public .  In
1 Nicholas  Griffin,  S e le c te d  L e t te rs  o f  B er tra n d  Russell: The P u b lic  Years, 
1914-1970  (New York, Routledge 2001).
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addit ion,  Josef S ta l in ’s regu la r  and aggressive rh e to r i c  enlarged 
W es te rn  fears and  raised u n c e r ta in t ie s  about  M oscow ’s r a t io n a l i ty .2
The range of na t iona l  secur i ty  op t ions  for  th e  U n i ted  States 
inc luded  increas ing  its co n ven t io n a l  m il i ta ry  s t r e n g th ,  re ly ing  on its 
all iances, d ip lomacy,  or tak ing  advantage  of A m e r ic a ’s techno log ica l  
air supe r io r i ty  to launch  a p rev en t iv e  s t r ike  against  the  Soviet U n io n .3
None  of th e  s tra tegies  was p a r t icu la r ly  appea l ing  to  the  U n i ted  
States. Develop ing  a large c o n v en t io na l  force was fiscal ly  impract ica l  
given the  rea l i t ies  o f  p o s t -W o rld  W ar  economics .  F u r th e rm o re ,  the  
U ni ted  States and its allies could not  l ikely m atch  the  combined  
p e rsonne l  of th e  Soviet  U n ion  and its a l l ies .4 T he  concep t  of  all iances 
was new at the  t ime and had not  se t t led  in the  minds o f  m any  pos twar  
po l icym akers— nor  had the  p r inc ip les  of d e te r ren ce  and  c o n ta in m e n t  
matured .  Most s ignif icant ly ,  the  U n i ted  S ta tes’ s tockpile  of a tomic 
weapons was exceedingly  small w h e n  calls for p reven t iv e  war  were  
most f requen t ;  there fo re ,  p rospects  of success in a p rev e n t iv e  war  
were  m eager .5
2 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive  Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note,  No. F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 




A n o th e r  fac tor  th a t  w e ighed  heav i ly  on  W ash in g to n  was the  
ques t ion  of w h a t  th e  Uni ted  States w o u ld  do a f te r  a co n f l ic t  w i th  the  
Soviet Union.  F u r the rm ore ,  the  Europeans w ere  in  opposi t ion  to 
an o the r  w ar  because th ey  reasoned  th e  des t ruc t ion  on  th e  c o n t in e n t  
would  be p ro found ,  and the  task of  occupying  the  vast  t e r r i to r ie s  of 
the  Soviet Union  w ou ld  be beyond  the  resources  of th e  U n i ted  States 
and W e s te rn  E uropean  nations.
P re s id en t  T r u m a n ’s 1950 NSC-68 ref lec ted  some of  these  
concerns .  The po l icy  inc luded  the  fo l lowing  s ta tem ent :
The abi l i ty  of  the  Uni ted  States to l au n c h  effect ive  offensive 
ope ra t ions  is now  l im i ted  to a t tack  w i th  a tomic weapons .  A 
p ow erfu l  b low could be de l ivered  upon  th e  Soviet U nion ,  bu t  it 
is e s t im ated  th a t  these  ope ra t ions  a lone  would  n o t  force or 
induce  the  Kremlin  to cap i tu la te  and  t h a t  the K rem lin  would  
sti ll  be able to use the  forces u n d e r  its con tro l  to  do m ina te  most  
or all of  Eurasia. This would  p robab ly  m ean  a long and  diff icu l t  
s t ruggle  dur ing  w h ic h  the free in s t i tu t io n s  of W e s t e r n  Europe
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and m any  f reedom -lov ing  people  w o u ld  be d e s t ro yed  and the  
r egenera t ive  capaci ty  of W e s t e r n  Europe deal t  a c r ipp l in g  b lo w .6
Some have argued th a t  a n o th e r  major obstacle for p reven t ive  
war was the  fact th a t  m any  A m er ican  po l icym akers  cons idered  
p reven t ive  w ar  an immoral  act, one  in co n s is te n t  w i th  U.S. values,  and 
t rad i t io n s .7 Again,  NSC-68 posits:
Apar t  f rom this , however ,  a surpr ise  a t tack u p o n  the  Soviet 
Union,  despi te  the  p rovoca t iveness  of recen t  Soviet  behav ior ,  
would  be rep ug n an t  to m any  Americans .  A l th ou g h  th e  Am erican  
people  w ou ld  p robably  ra l ly  in suppor t  of  the w a r  effort ,  the  
shock o f  responsib i l i ty  for a surpr ise  a t tack  w ou ld  be moral ly  
corrosive .  Many would  doub t  th a t  it  was a “just  w a r ” and th a t
6 NSC 68: United States Objectives  and Programs for National  Security,  
April 14, 1950, accessed July 25, 2012, ht tp :/ /w ww.fas .org / i rp /offdocs /nsc -  
hst /nsc-68 .htm
7 Karl P. Mueller,  S tr ik ing  First: P r e e m p t iv e  and  P r e v e n t iv e  A t ta c k  in 
U.S. N a tion a l  S e c u r i ty  Policy ,  RAND Note,  No. F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006) , 151.
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all reasonable  possibil i ties for  a peacefu l  se t t lem en t  had  been
explored  in  good fa i th .8
The p rom ote rs  of p reven t iv e  war  against  the  Soviet  Union  
bel ieved  tha t  war, w h i le  not  im m in en t ,  was inevi tab le ,  and  th a t  
delaying such ac t ion  would  involve  u n a cc ep tab le  r isk to the  West .  
However ,  t h ey  did not  have a ra t iona l  an sw er  as to w h a t  to do after  
the  war, and d id  not  account  for th e  second  and  th ird  o rd e r  effects  of 
the  conf l ic t .9
In  his memoirs ,  P res iden t  T ru m a n  w ro te ,  “I have always been  
opposed to even  the  th o u g h t  of such  a war .  There  is n o th in g  more 
foolish th a n  to t h in k  tha t  war can  be s topped  by war .  You d o n ’t 
‘p r e v e n t ’ a n y th in g  by war  except p eace .”10
Because th e  Uni ted  States never  in i t i a ted  a p reven t ive  w ar  w i th  
the  Soviet  Union,  it  m a in ta ined  a m ix tu re  o f  ra t ional  Cold W ar  
secur i ty  polic ies of con ta inm en t ,  d e te r rence ,  and  global  p roxy  wars 
un t i l  th e  Soviet  Union  fell in 1991. These  Cold W ar s t ra teg ies  cost
8 Ibid, 148.
9 Ibid, 152.
10 Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of  Trial and Hope  
(vol. 2), (New York: Doubleday,  1956), 383.
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years of t ime,  effort ,  and resources a long w i t h  thousands  of lives; 
however ,  h ad  the  U.S. con d uc ted  a p re v e n t iv e  war w i th  the  Soviet  
Union the  cost may have been  m uch  h ig h e r  and  the  resu l ts  dras t ical ly  
d ifferent .
CONTEMPLATIONS OF AMERICAN-CHINESE PREVENTIVE WAR
This case s tudy  examines events  of th e  ear ly  1960s th a t  
advanced or c o u n te re d  a rgum ents  for tak ing  m il i ta ry  ac t ion  to p rev e n t  
Chinese n uc lea r  deve lopm ent ,  and describes w h y  n e i th e r  P res iden t  
Kennedy nor  Johnson  chose to use force against  China.
By the  t im e  John  F. Kennedy shou lde red  t h e  P res idency  in 1961, 
the  P e o p le ’s Republic  of  China (PRC) was well on its way to 
developing nuc lea r  weapons. As such,  A m erican  po l icym akers  
w o n de red  h o w  a n u c lea r -a rm ed  PRC w ou ld  affect  global  balances of 
power.  Many inc i ted  a rgum ents  for and  against  m il i ta ry  ac t ion  to 
p reven t  Chinese  n uc lea r  a d v an c em en ts .11 P res iden t  Kennedy,  was 
pa r t icu la r  app rehens ive  about  the  PRC ob ta in in g  a n u c lea r  weapon.
11 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security P o l ic y .” RAND Note,  No.  F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) ,  141.
299
He suspected  once China  ob ta ined  a w eapon ,  C h a irm an  Mao Zedong 
would  be more  aggressive in asser t ing Chinese  in f lu en ce  on the  world  
stage, and w ou ld  also be less susceptib le  to d e te r re n c e  t h a n  th e  Soviet 
Union.
P res iden t  Kennedy  was conv inced  th a t  C ha irm an  Mao was a 
fanatic . It  was repo r te d  th a t  K ennedy  to ld  F rance ’s M in is te r  of 
Cul ture  Affairs, A n dre  Malraux th a t  th e  C hinese  “w ou ld  be perfec t ly  
p repa red  to sacrifice h un d red s  of  m il l ions  of t h e i r  own l ives” to carry  
th e i r  C h a i rm a n ’s m i l i ta n t  policies  and the  PRC would  be a “grea t  
menace  in th e  fu tu re  to hum an i ty ,  the  free w orld ,  and  freedom  on 
e a r t h .”12
China  began receiv ing  techn ica l  assistance on  its nuc lear  
program from the  Soviet Union  in 1955; how ever ,  th e  Kennedy  
a d m in is t ra t ion  de tec ted  a r i f t  in Sino-Soviet  r e l a t io n s .13 In te l l igence  
es t imate  NIE 1-61 asser ted  the  Soviet  U n ion  a n d  China did  no t  share  
many com m on in te res ts  beyond  th e i r  com m unis t  ideology, and
12 Ibid, 165.
13 NIE 1-61: “Estimate of  the World Si tuation,” January 17, 1961. Foreign  
Relations o f  the United States 1961-1963 ,  vol. V: Soviet  Union,  Doc.  6, U.S. 
Department of  State, accessed August  10, 2012, ht tp:/ /h is tory .s ta te .gov /  
his tor ica ldocum ents / frus l961-63v05/d6 .
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W ash in g to n  sought  to  use t h a t  d ivergence  to b en e f i t  U.S. in te r e s t s .14
The In te l l igence  es t im ate  NIE 1-61 asserts:
Over  the  nex t  decade at least,  th e re  appears  to be a g rea te r  
l ike l ihood  of f lex ib i l i ty  in Soviet th an  in  Chinese policy.  The 
Soviet leadersh ip 's  desire  to p rev e n t  a genera l  war ,  the  w ider  
range of Soviet  contac ts  w i th  the  ou ts ide  world ,  th e  c o n t in u in g  
p ressure  at home for l ibe ra l iza t ion ,  and th e  growing  capaci ty  of 
the  USSR to prov ide  its c i t izens w i th  a m o re  com for tab le  li fe— 
these  factors  taken  to ge th e r  may tend  to w ard  m o de ra t io n  in 
foreign policy and to w ard  a r ec o g n i t io n  of some areas of 
common in te res t  w i th  th e  West .  It  is even  possible  th a t  the  
Soviet leaders wil l  come to feel th a t  t h e  USSR has l i t t le  in 
comm on w i th  China  except  an ideology w h ic h  th e  Chinese  
in te rp re t  in th e i r  ow n  way, and  th a t  by 1970 C om m unis t  China, 
w i th  nuc lea r  weapons and a popu la t ion  o f  almost  900 mil l ion,  
wil l  be a dangerous  ne ighbor  and  assoc ia te .15
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Pol icym akers  in W ash in g to n  con c lu d ed  th a t  th e  U n i ted  States 
and th e  Soviet Union,  shared  a com m on goal o f  m a in ta in in g  peace and 
s tab i l i ty  in Europe and Asia, and  hoped  th a t  Moscow w o u ld  e n te r  in to  
a nuc lear  t e s t - b a n  t rea ty  w i th  the  U n i ted  States as a means to 
pressure  C h ina  to abandon  its nuc lea r  a sp i ra t ions .16 Some evidence  
suggests K ennedy  envis ioned  the  poss ib i l i ty  of  a combined  U.S.-Soviet 
m il i ta ry  s t r ike  on C h in a ’s n u c lea r  r esea rch  facili ty at  Lop Nor 
(W este rn  China)  if  China could  not  be coerced  by d ip lom atic  
p res su re .17
Pre s id e n t  Kennedy  met  w i th  Secre ta ry  Nikita  K hrush ch ev  in 
June 1961. K hrushchev  did no t  w e lcom e K e n n e d y ’s proposal  for 
nuc lear  t e s t -b a n  t rea ty ,  bu t  did take  the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to lec tu re  
Kennedy about  th e  Uni ted  States longs tand ing  refusal  to  recognize  th e  
PRC in  the  UN. This  d e n u nc ia t io n  tu r n e d  out  to be an ind ica t ion  of 
growing tens ions  b e tw een  W ash in g to n  and  Moscow. Over  the  next  
year , the  re la t io nsh ip  grew worse,  peak ing  in  in s tab i l i ty  du r ing  the  
Cuban missi le  crisis of O c tober  1962.
16 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note,  No. F49642-01 -C-0003 (Santa 
Monica,  CA: RAND, 2006) , 154, 166.
17 Ibid, 153.
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Sim ul taneous ly ,  Chinese-Sovie t  re la t ions  c o n t in u e d  to 
de te r io ra te ,  and  by 1963, the  Soviet U n io n  agreed to schedule  a 
conference  in Moscow to negotia te  a n uc lea r  t e s t - b a n  t rea ty .  During  
the  confe rence ,  Under  Secre tary  of  State  for Poli t ical  Affairs  Averel l  
H arr im an  r ep o r te d  (via telegram) th a t  d u r ing  a th ree  h o u r  m ee ting  
w i th  K hrushchev ,  C h in a ’s nuc lear  am bi t ions  w ere  not  a c en t ra l  topic  
of negotia t ions .  “K hrushchev  m ain ta ins  t h a t  i t  wil l  be some years off  
before China  is a nuc lear  power  and did n o t  ind ica te  pa r t icu la r  
concern  over  the  issue. He com m ented  th a t  on ly  U.S. and USSR can 
‘accumulate  n u c lea r  w eapo n s . ’ UK and  France  can ' t  and  China 
w o u ld n ' t  be able t o . ”18
The U.S.-Soviet  nuc lear  t e s t - b a n  t r e a ty  was signed on August  5, 
1963; how ever ,  l i t t le  was resolved abou t  China du r ing  th e  
n e g o t ia t io n .19 It is d if f icult  for one to specu la te  on w h a t  th e  Kennedy  
adm in is t ra t ion  w ou ld  have done to c o n s t ra in  Beij ing’s n uc lea r  w eapon  
program if  th e  Soviet  Union  was more  cooperat ive .  The records
18 Averi l l  W. Harriman, “Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet  
Union to the Department of  State ,” Moscow, July 15, 1963,  10:00 p.m., Foreign 
Relations of  the United States, 1961-1963 ,  vol .  VII: Arms Control and 
Disarmament,  Doc. 325, U.S. Department of  State, accessed August  25, 2012,  
http :/ /h is tory .s ta te .g ov /h is tor ica ldocum ents / frus l961-63v07 /d325 .
19 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security P o l ic y .” RAND Note,  No. F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) , 158.
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suggest t h a t  several  members  of  K e nn ed y ’s a d m in i s t r a t io n  doub ted  the  
p rac t icab i l i ty  of  a p reven t ive  m i l i ta ry  s t r ike  on  C h in a .20
After  P re s id en t  K e n n ed y ’s dea th  in N ovem ber  1963, the  Chinese  
nuc lear  issue lost  its u rgency.  In  A pri l  1964, a Po l icy  P lann ing  
Council  paper  p rep a red  for P res iden t  Johnson  s ta ted  China  would  
l ikely have its f irst  nuc lear  tes t  in  1964.21 The  paper  c la imed the  
Chinese were  c o n c e n t ra t in g  on m ed iu m -rang e  missiles, m ak ing  the i r  
sh o r t - t e rm  n u c lea r  ambit ions  reg iona l .22 The paper  asse r ted  th a t  no 
major pol icy change  was requ i red  and any p reem p t iv e  m il i ta ry  act ion  
against Chinese  nuc lear  faci lit ies w o u ld  be u n d e s i r a b le .23 
Fur the rm ore ,  it  was improbab le  the  U n i ted  States cou ld  successfully 
locate all  the  Chinese  nuc lea r  p ro d uc t io n  faci l i t ies  w i th  c e r t a in ty  and 
p reven t  China  from even tua l ly  p roducing  a n u c le a r  b o m b .24
In O c tober  1964, the  PRC exploded its first nuc lea r  device,  and 
the  Johnson adm in is t ra t io n  re leased  a publ ic  s t a te m e n t  to  m in im ize
20 Ibid, 159.
21 Robert Johnson, “Paper Prepared in the Pol icy  Planning Council : An 
Exploration of  the Possible  Bases for Act ion  Against the Chinese Communist  
Nuclear Faci l i t ies ,” Apri l 14, 1964, in U.S. Department o f  State, Foreign  
Relations of  the United States, 1964-1968 ,  vol.  XXX: China,  Doc. 25, U.S. 
Department of  State, accessed August 25, 2012 ,ht tp :/ /h is tory. s tate .gov/His tor ica l  
docum ents / frus l964-68v30/d30 .
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note,  No. F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) , 164.
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th e  e v e n t ’s global  im pac t .25 The Soviet U n ion  was re la t ive ly  quiet  on 
the  issue. Soviet Ambassador  A na to ly  D o b ry n in  d o w np lay ed  the  
m agn i tude  of the  nuc lea r  test,  and  Fore ign  M in is te r  A n d re i  Gromyko 
found  the  m om en t  o p p o r tu n e  to h ig h l ig h t  the  fact th e  Soviet  Union  
cons idered  it  was t im e  for the  U n i ted  States to reassess it  pol ices 
c o nce rn ing  Beij ing.26
A l th o ug h  some U.S. po l icym akers  were  in te re s te d  in  des t roy ing  
C h in a ’s nuc lea r  p ro d u c t io n  facili ties, o thers  m a in ta in ed  a m il i ta ry  
s t r ike  would  be po l i t ica l ly  cost ly  for an ins ign if ican t  p ro b ab i l i ty  of 
c e r ta in ty  of success. Launching  a p rev en t iv e  a t tack  on  any  sovereign 
sta te  w i th o u t  the  legal fo unda t ion  of a b road ly  accepted t r ea ty  or a 
m anda te  from the  UN was no t  an acceptable  p o l icy  opt ion .  Even w h e n  
the  Uni ted  States k n e w  the  Chinese  tes t  was fo r thcom ing ,  the  Johnson 
a dm in is t ra t ion  ru led  out  any  co ns idera t ion  o f  u n i la te ra l  A m erican  
act ion.
Perhaps  one th e  no tab le  effects of  C h i n a ’s em ergence  as a 
nuc lear  power  was its rise in global pres t ige .  Bei j ing’s nuc lear  




paved the  way  for th e  PRC to replace Taiwan in  the  UN China  seat in 
1971, and subsequen t  d ip lom atic  ties w i th  the  U n i ted  States in 1972.
It is d i f f icu l t  to  judge w i th  c e r ta in ty  w h a t  would  have resu l ted  
from an A m erican  p rev en t ive  a t tack  against  t h e  PRC; h ow ever ,  it  is 
un l ike ly  th a t  a successful a t tack  w ou ld  have done  m ore  t h a n  delay 
C h in a ’s p r o c u re m e n t  of nuc lea r  weapons .  F u r th e rm o re ,  the  a t tack  
w ou ld  have  resu l ted  in  num erous  spi l lover  effects. I t  may have 
resul ted  in pol i t ica l  cost on m any levels by an tag on iz in g  U.S. allies, 
and prov id ing  in te rn a t io n a l  com m unis t  o rgan iza t ions  w i th  p ropaganda  
to seduce nona l ign ed  states on to  th e  c o m m u n is t  arc of  in f luence .  In 
th is  case, th e  U.S. decis ion  against  a p reven t ive  a t tack  was a sensible  
course  of action.
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
The Cuban Missile Crisis was one o f  the  major  co n f ro n ta t io n s  of  
the  Cold War.  The th i r t e e n - d a y  d i lem ma b e tw ee n  th e  Soviet  Union 
and Cuba on one side, and the  U n i ted  States on th e  o ther ,  is 
com m only  considered  th e  closest occasion in  w h ic h  th e  Cold war  
could  have escalated in to  a n uc lea r  confl ict .  Thus, th is  case s tudy
306
explores h o w  Am erican  po l icym akers  r e sponded  to th e  crisis,  and 
offers ins igh t  on h o w  W ash in g to n  nav iga ted  t h ro u g h  an  epic  th re a t  to 
the  U n i ted  States.
The Cuban  missile crisis took place in  the  f ram ew ork  of 
num erous  Cold W ar  disputes th a t  inc luded  ex tens ive  aid to c l ien t  
states, espionage, the  arms race,  and cons iderab le  p ropaganda  
campaigns. One  of the  key areas of d ispu te  was over Ber l in  Germany. 
On several  occasions from 1958 to 1961, Secre ta ry  K hrushchev  
th re a te n e d  w ar  if the  U n i ted  States did no t  end  W e s te rn  p resence  in 
Berl in .27 For th e  Soviet Union,  th e  d iv ided  c i ty  was un accep tab le  to 
the  eas te rn  bloc. K h ru sh ch e v ’s inab i l i ty  to  force a favorable  
se t t lem en t  over  this  issue w eakened  his s tatus amongst  his allies and 
at home.
A l th ou g h  K hrushchev  fai led to get th e  W es t  to leave Berlin,  the  
Soviet Union  made s ignif icant  gains in Latin  America.  In  pa r t icu la r ,  
Moscow began prov id ing  aid to Cuba in  1960. A fter  th e  fa i lure  of the  
“Bay of  Pigs ,” Fidel Castro recognized  the  Soviets U n io n  had the  
economic and m il i ta ry  abil i ty  to aid Cuba, and em braced  the
27 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l ic y .” RAND Note,  No.  F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) , 171.
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com m unis t  agen da .28 Khrushchev  subsequen t ly  issued a pub l ic  w a rn ing  
th a t  a U.S. invas ion  of Cuba w ou ld  risk w ar  w i t h  the Soviet  U n io n .29
It was K h ru s h c h e v ’s fa i lure  in Berlin , h is  success in  Cuba, and 
the  p resence  of A m erican  missiles in  Turkey ,  t h a t  la ter  p ro m p te d  h im  
to send su r face - to -a i r  missiles (SAMs), and  c o n s t ru c t  m ed iu m -ran ge  
ball is t ic  missile (MRBM) sites in C uban .30
By August  1962, A m erican  U-2 reconnaissance  planes had  
establ ished  t h a t  th e  Soviet U nion  was in s ta l l ing  SAMs in  Cuba .31 On 
September  4, the  W h i te  House re leased  a s ta te m e n t  t h a t  P re s iden t  
Kennedy k n e w  of the  SAMs, and  had  rece ived  assurance  from the  
Soviet Union  th a t  the  missiles w ere  defensive  in  na ture .  The P res iden t  
added th a t  the  Soviet  arms t ransfers  to Cuba did n o t  c o n s t i tu te  a 
serious th r e a t  to th e  Uni ted  Sta tes .32 On O c tob er  1, an A m erican  U-2 
reconnaissance  a ircraf t  d iscovered  offensively  o r ien ted  SAM sites on 
the  i s land .33 The fo l lowing is an excerp t  of  the  in te l l igence  analysis:
28 Robert A. Pollard, “The Cuban Missi le  Crisis: Legacies and Lessons,” 
The Wilson Quarterly (1976-),  vol . 6, No.  4 (Autumn, 1982) , 149.
29 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security Po l icy .” RAND Note,  No.  F49642-01-C-0003 (Santa 
Monica,  CA: RAND, 2006) , 172.
30 Ibid.
31 Robert A. Pollard, “The Cuban Missi le  Crisis: Legacies and Lessons,” 
The W ilson  Quarterly (1976-) ,  vol . 6, No.  4 (Autumn, 1982), 149.
32 Ibid.
33 Robert A. Pollard, “The Cuban Missi le  Crisis: Legacies and Lessons,” 
The W ilson  Quarterly (1976-) ,  vol . 6, No.  4 (Autumn, 1982), 148-149.
The in te l l ig en ce  com m uni ty  has now  iden t i f ied  and  conf i rm ed  a 
to ta l  of  15 SA-2 (SAM) sites. From th e  loca t ion  of  these  sites, a 
d isce rn ib le  p a t t e rn  is deve lop ing :” “W h i le  this  r ep o r t  is still  
u n c o n f i rm e d  and th e re  are no o th e r  reports  c o n ce rn in g  the  
p resence  of e i th e r  SS-3 or SS-4 missiles, it  is s ign i f ican t  to no te  
th a t  by us ing  the  approxim ate  c e n te r  o f  the  re s t r i c te d  area 
re fe r red  to above as a po in t  of  o r ig in  and  w i th  a radius of  1100 
nm, the  accep ted  range of  the  SS-4 missi le,  the  arc  inc ludes  the  
cit ies  of Ph i lade lph ia ,  P i t t sburgh ,  St. Louis, O k lahom a  City, 
Fort  W orth -D a l la s ,  Houston,  San A n to n io ,  Mexico City, all of 
th e  capita ls  of th e  Centra l  A m er ican  na t ions ,  the  Panam a  Canal, 
and the  oil fields in Maricaibo,  Venezuela .  The presence  of 
o pe ra t iona l  SS-4 missiles in th is  loca t ion  would  give the  Soviets 
a grea t  m i l i ta ry  asset .34
On O ctober  14, an A m erican  U-2 reconnaissance  a irc raf t  
ob ta ined  the  f irst  ver i f ied  evidence  of th ree  Soviet offens ive  MRBM
34 John R. Wright,  Jr. “Analysis  of  SAM Sites,  October 1, 1962 ,” Foreign  
Relations of  the United States, 1961-1963 ,  Vo lume XI, Cuban Missi le  Crisis and 
Aftermath,  Doc. 1, U.S. Department of  State, accessed August 20, 2012,  
http :/ /h istory .s tate .gov/hi storicaldocuments/ frus 1961 -63v l  1/d 1.
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sites in Cuba. Two o th e r  U-2 missions,  f low n  o n  October  15 revea led  a 
four th  MRBM site,  and  two in te rm e d ia te - r a n g e  bal l is t ic  missile  
(IRBM) s i tes .35
A fter  rece iv ing  the  news,  P re s id e n t  Kennedy assembled  an 
Executive C om m it tee  to de l ibera te  on  possib le  options. The K ennedy  
a d m in is t ra t ion  faced immense  pressure  to make the r ig h t  decision. A 
mis take w ou ld  damage U.S. in te rn a t io n a l  c redib i l i ty ,  b u t  s tand ing  up 
to K hrushchev  w o u ld  benef i t  the  U n i ted  S ta te s ’ Cold W a r  status.  The 
a d m in is t ra t ion  co nc luded  it needed  to act to  remove th e  Soviet 
missiles, even  i f  do ing  so risked a n u c lea r  war.
W i th  the  m agn i tude  of th is  th r e a t  in  m ind ,  P res iden t  K e n n e d y ’s 
Executive C om m it tee  debated  n um ero u s  courses of  ac t ion  th a t  
t raversed  the  esca la tory  h ie ra rc h y .36 The Executive Com m it tee  
considered  hav ing  the  U.S. Air Force co n d u c t  p reven t ive  air s t r ikes  
against th e  missi le  sites; however ,  th is  o p t io n  was d iscoun ted  because 
the re  was no gua ran tee  the  air s t r ike  could  remove all th e  missi le
35 Kennedy Administration Volumes,  Foreign Relations of  the United  
States, 1961-1963 ,  Volume XI, Cuban Missi le  Crisis and Aftermath,  Doc.  16, U.S. 
Department of  State, accessed August 20, 2012, ht tp :/ /h is tory .s tate .gov/
his toricaldocume nts/frus 1961 -6 3 v l  1 /d 16.
36 Karl P. Mueller,  “Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in 
U.S. National  Security P o l ic y .” RAND Note,  No. F49642-01-C -0003  (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) ,  173.
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th rea ts .  F u r th e rm o re ,  the  air a t tack  r isked  p ro v ok in g  a re ta l ia to ry  
nuc lear  a t tack  from the  Soviet Union.
The co m m it tee  la ter  conc luded  t h a t  a g round  invas ion  would  
guaran tee  th e  removal  of the  missile th rea t .  This s t ra teg y  was not  
v iewed as th e  best  op t ion  because it w o u ld  re su l t  in h igh  A m erican  
casualties, and th e re  was a risk th a t  a Soviet  com m ander  in Cuba 
would  use th e  n u c lea r -a rm ed  MRBM as a measure  of  despera t ion .  
Moreover, a large-scale  invas ion  could inc i te  a Soviet  response in 
Europe w h e re  the  Soviets had  the  c o n v en t io n a l  m il i ta ry  advantage.  
The poss ib i l i ty  of escalat ion made a U.S. p rev e n t iv e  a t tack  precar ious.  
After  w e igh ing  th e  m il i ta ry  and po l i t ica l  risks, th e  Executive 
Committee  u l t im a te ly  agreed on the  naval  q u a ra n t in e ,  because it 
dem ons tra ted  s t reng th ,  and  a l lowed for m ore  t im e  for diplomacy.
On O c tober  22, P res iden t  Kennedy  a n n ou n ced  to the  U n i ted  
States public  th a t  he had  o rdered  a Naval b lockade  to in te rce p t  
sh ipm ents  of Soviet m ater ie l  to Cuba. He in v i ted  K hrushchev  to 
ref ra in  from any  action, w h ic h  would  expand  th e  crisis and  en te r  in to  
negotia t ions  to rec t i fy  the  s i tu a t io n .37 38 In  response  to th e
37 Robert A. Pollard, “The Cuban Missi le Crisis: Legacies and Lessons,”
The Wilson  Quarterly (1976-) ,  vol.  6, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982) ,  149.
38 See appendix G for Letters from the Cuban Missi le  Crisis and 
Aftermath.
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a n n o u n ce m e n t  of  the  blockade,  K hrushchev  w a rn ed  of  consequences  
if the  Uni ted  States invaded Cuba or i n te r f e r e d  w i th  Soviet  vessels .39
The h ig h p o in t  came on O ctober  24, as th e  U.S. b lockade  formed 
500 miles from Cuba, to in te rce p t  a pp rox im ate ly  tw e n ty - f ive  
incoming Soviet  sh ips .40 On O ctober  27, K hrushchev  acquiesced,  and 
offered to w i th d r a w  or to des troy  all l au n c h in g  pads and offensive 
weapons on  Cuba in  r e tu rn  for an end  to th e  b lockade and a pledge 
not to invade  Cuba, and th e  removal  of U.S. missi les in  Turkey.
The q u a ra n t in e  succeeded in c o n v in c in g  the Soviets th a t  the  
Uni ted  States was d e te rm in e d  to see th e  missi les removed.  A lthough  
the  Kennedy ad m in is t r a t io n  considered  a p rev en t iv e  a t tack  to stop 
Soviet nuc lea r  weapons  from reach ing  Cuba,  the  use o f  d ip lomacy 
combined w i th  a c red ib le  th re a t  of h a rd  p o w e r  offers useful  lessons 
th a t  d em ons t ra te  h ow  th e  Kennedy a d m in is t r a t io n  sk i l l fu l ly  stopped 
the  Cuban missile  crisis from escalat ing out  of  contro l .
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C.IRAQI W AR MILITARY COALITION
Nation 2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Afghanistan — — — — -- —
Albania Y Y Y ✓ Y ✓ —
Angola Y — — — — — — —
Armenia — — - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ —
Australia V" ✓ Y ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Azerbaijan ✓ Y ✓ Y ✓ Y —
Bosnia Herg — — — Y Y Y Y —
Bulgaria V" ✓ Y Y Y Y Y —
Colombia Y — — — — — — —
Costa Rica v ' — — — — — — —
Czech Republic v ' Y ✓ Y Y ✓ ✓ —
Denmark Y ✓ ✓ Y Y ✓ ✓ —
Dom. R. Y ✓ ✓ — — — — —
El Salvador Y ✓ ✓ Y ✓ Y ✓ Y
Eritrea Y — — — — — — —
Estonia Y Y _____ £ _____ Y______ Y Y ✓ Y
Ethiopia Y — — — — — — —
Georgia Y Y Y ✓ Y Y Y —
Honduras Y Y Y - — — — —
Hungary Y Y Y — — — — --
Iceland v ' — — — — — — —
Italy v' Y ✓ ✓ — - —
Japan Y ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ —
1 ProCon.org, “Coalit ion Forces in Iraq,” (checks indicate t ime in Iraq), 
accessed May 10, 2012 http:/ /usiraq.procon.org/view.resource.php7Resource  
ID=000677,
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Nation 2003 2003 [2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Kazakhstan — Ik ✓ V V V -
Kuwait v ' — [ - — — — — —
Latvia k V —
Lithuania k V' —
Macedonia k —
Marshall Islands v ' — I-- — — — — —
Micronesia -- - -- - - -- -- --
Moldova -- k --
Mongolia V' ✓ k v ' ✓ V --
Netherlands v ' k - / v" -- --
New Zealand -- v ' k -- -- — --
Nicaragua Ik -- -- -- -- --
Norway -- Ik -- "" -- --
Palau -- - -- - - -- --
Panama - -- - - -- --
Phil ippines W !✓ - - l~ -- --
Poland k Ik k k --
Portugal k Ik k - -- --
Romania k Ik k k v '
Rwanda - - - -- - - 1- -- --
Singapore k Ik k >/ k --
Slovakia k k k k --
Solomon Isds v ' -- 1- -- -- -- --
South Korea v ' k k k k --
Spain k k -- - - --
Thailand -- k k -- - -- --
Tonga k !✓ - " -- --
Turkey -- I- -- --
Uganda v' -- II-- -- - - -- --
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Nation 2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
UK ^  \ v' Y Y y'
United States ✓ ✓ V Y
Uzbekistan v' -- -- -- -- -- - - --
Total 49* 37 37 32 30 28 26 6
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D.MAJOR TERRORIST ACTS SUSPECTED OF OR INSPIRED BY AL- 
QAEDA
Source: Congress ional  Research  Serv ice1 and  In fop lea se .com 2
-  1992 (Dec) Three  bombs ta rge ted  at U.S. t roops  in Aden, 
Yemen,  no casualties.
-  1993 (Feb.): Bombing of W o r ld  Trade C e n te r  (WTC); 6 killed.
-  1993 (Oct.): Kil ling of  U.S. soldiers in Somalia.
-  1996 (Jun.): Truck  bom bing  at Khobar  Towers barracks in 
D hahran ,  Saudi Arabia, k i l led  19 Am ericans .
-  1998 (Aug.): Bombing o f  U.S. embassies in  Kenya and
Tanzania;  224 ki lled,  inc lu d ing  12 Americans .
-  1999 (Aug): Al-Qaeda  a t tem p ted  bom b in g  of th e  Los Angeles 
In te rn a t io n a l  Airport .
-  1999 (Dec.): Plot to bomb m i l len n iu m  ce lebra t ions  against  
U.S. and Israel i  tour is t  v is i t ing  Jordan for ce lebra t ions .
1 Audrey K. Cronin, “Terrorist Attacks by al -Qaeda ,” Congressional  
Research Service,  March 31, 2004, accessed January 10, 2013,  www.fas .org / i rp /  
crs/033104.pdf.
2 Infoplease websi te ,  accessed January 10, 2013,  h t tp : / /w w w . in fop le ase . 
com/ ipa/A0884893.html.
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-  1999 (Dec.): A rres t  of  an A lger ian  smuggling explosives in to  
th e  U.S.
-  2000 (Oct.): Bombing of  the  USS Cole in p o r t  in  Yemen; 17 
U.S. sailors killed.
-  2001 (Sept.):  D es t ruc t ion  of  WTC; a t tack  on Pen tagon ,  to ta l  
dead 2,992.
-  2001 (Dec.): Richard Covin Reid a t tem p ted  to deno te  shoe 
bomb on f l ight  from Paris to Miami.
-  2002 (Apr.): Explosion at h is to r ic  synagogue in  Tunis ia  left  21 
dead,  inc lud ing  11 German touris ts .
-  2002 (May): Car exploded ou ts ide  h o te l  in Karachi, Pakis tan,  
k i l l ing  14, inc lud ing  11 F rench  c it izens.
-  2002 (Jun.): Bomb exploded outside  A m erican  consu la te  in 
Karachi,  Pakistan,  k i l l ing  12.
-  2002 (Oct.):  Boat c rashed in to  oil t a n k e r  o ff  Yem en  coast, 
k i l l ing  one, in ju r ing  four.
-  2002 (Oct.): A t tack  on U.S. m i l i ta ry  pe rsonne l  in  Kuwait ,  
k i l l ing  one, and  in ju r ing  one.
-  2002 (Oct.): N ightc lub  bom bings  in Bali, Indones ia ,  k i l led  
202, most ly  Aus tra l ian  c it izens.
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-  2002 (Nov.): Suicide a t tack  on a h o te l  in Mombasa,  Kenya, 
k i l led  16.
-  2003 (May): Suicide bombers  k i l led  34, inc lu d in g  e ight  
Am ericans ,  at housing  compounds for W e s te rn e r s  in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia.
-  2003 (May): four bombs ki l led  33 people  t a rg e t in g  Jewish, 
Spanish, and  Belgian sites in Casablanca, Morocco.
-  2003 (Aug.): Suicide car bomb k i l led  12, in ju re d  150 at 
M arr io t t  Hote l  in Jakarta,  Indonesia .
-  2003 (Nov.): Explosions rocked  a Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 
housing  com pound,  k i l l ing  17.
-  2003 (Nov.): Suicide car-bom bers  s im u ltaneous ly  a t tacked  two 
synagogues in Is tanbul ,  Turkey ,  k i l l ing  25 and in ju r ing  
hund reds .
-  2003 (Nov.): T ruck  bombs de to n a te d  at London bank  and 
Bri t ish  consu la te  in Is tanbul,  Turkey ,  k i l l ing  26.
-  2004 (Mar.): 10 bombs on  four  t ra ins  exp loded  almost
s im ultaneous ly  du r ing  th e  m orn ing  rush  h o u r  in M adrid ,  Spain, 
k i l l ing  191 and in ju r ing  more th a n  1,500.
-  2004 (May): Terror is ts  a t tacked  Saudi oil  com pany  offices in 
Khobar, Saudi Arabia, k i l l ing  22.
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-  2004 (Jun.): T error is ts  k idnapped  and  executed  A m er ican  Paul 
Johnson,  Jr., in  Riyadh,  Saudi Arabia .
-  2004 (Sept.):  Car bomb ou ts ide  the  A us t ra l ian  embassy in 
Jakarta ,  Indones ia ,  k i l led  nine.
-  2004 (Dec.): Terror is ts  e n te re d  th e  U.S. Consula te  in Jeddah,  
Saudi Arabia ,  k i l l ing  n ine  ( inc lud ing  four a t tackers) .
-  2005 (Jul.): Bombs exploded  on th re e  t ra ins  and  a bus in 
London, England, k i l l ing 52.
-  2005 (Oct.):  22 ki l led  by th re e  suicide bombs in Bali, 
Indones ia .
-  2005 (Nov.): 57 k i l led  at th re e  A m er ican  ho te ls  in  Amman, 
Jordan.
-  2006 (Jan.): Two suic ide bom bers  ca r ry ing  police  badges blow 
them se lves  up near  a ce leb ra t ion  at th e  Police Academ y in 
Baghdad, k i l l ing  near ly  20 police  officers. A l-Q aeda  in Iraq 
takes responsib i l i ty .
-  2006 (Aug.): Police a rres t  24 B r i t i sh -bo rn  Muslims, most  of 
w h o m  have ties to Pakistan ,  w ho  had  a l legedly p lo t te d  to blow 
up as m any  as 10 planes us ing  l iquid  explosives. Officials say 
deta ils  of  the  p lan  w ere  s imilar  to o th e r  schemes devised by al- 
Qaeda.
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-  2007 (Apr.): Suicide bom bers  a t tack  a go v e rn m e n t  bu i ld ing  in 
Algeria 's  capita l ,  Algiers, k i l l ing  35, w o u n d in g  h u n d re d s  more. 
A l-Qaeda  in th e  Islamic M aghreb  cla ims responsib i l i ty .
-  2007 (Apr.): Eight  people, in c lu d in g  tw o  Iraqi legislators, die 
w h e n  a suic ide  bom ber  s tr ikes  ins ide  the  Pa r l iam en t  bu i ld ing  in 
Baghdad.  An organ iza t ion  th a t  includes  a l -Qaeda  in 
M esopotamia  claims responsib i l i ty .  In  a n o the r  a t tack,  th e  
Sarafiya Bridge th a t  spans th e  Tigris River is destroyed.
-  2007 (Jun.): Bri t ish  police f ind car  bombs in two vehicles  in 
London. The a t tackers  repo r ted ly  t r ie d  to  de tona te  th e  bombs 
us ing  cell  phones  bu t  failed. G o v e rn m e n t  officials say a l-Qaeda  
is l inked  to th e  a t tem pted  attack.  The fo l lowing day, an SUV 
c ar ry ing  bombs bursts  in to  flames a f te r  i t  slams in to  an en t ra n ce  
to Glasgow Airpor t .  Officials say th e  a t tacks  are connec ted .
-  2007 (Dec.): As m any as 60 people  are killed in two suicide 
at tacks near  Uni ted  Nations offices and go v e rn m e n t  bui ld ings  in 
Algiers , Algeria. The bombings occu r  w i th in  m inu tes  of each 
o ther .  A l -Q aeda  in the  Islamic M aghreb ,  fo rm erly  cal led th e  
Salafist Group for Preach ing ,  cla ims responsib i l i ty .  The w ors t  
a t tack  in  th e  Algeria  in more th an  10 years.
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-  2007 (Dec.): Benazir  Bhutto ,  fo rm er  Pakis tan i  p r im e  m in is te r  
assass inated in  a suicide a t tack  at a campaign  ra l ly  in 
Rawalpindi ,  Pakistan .  P res iden t  Pervez  M u sh ar ra f  b lames al 
Qaeda for the  a ttack,  w h ic h  kills 23 o th e r  people .  Baitul lah 
Mehsud,  a Tal iban leader  w i th  close t ies to al Qaeda is la ter  
c i ted  as th e  assassin.
-  2008 (Jan.): Suicide bom ber  kills 30 people  at  a home. The 
Iraqi  m i l i ta ry  blames th e  a t tack  on a l -Qaeda  in Iraq.
-  2008 (Feb.): Nearly  100 people  die  w h e n  two w o m e n  suicide 
bombers ,  who  are bel ieved  to be m en ta l ly  im pa ired ,  a t tack  
c row ded  pe t  markets  in  eas te rn  Baghdad.
-  2008 (Apr.): Suicide bom ber  a t tacks  the  fu n e ra l  for two 
n ephew s of  a p ro m in e n t  Sunni  t r iba l  leader, Sheik  Kareem 
Kamil a l-Azawi, kil l ing 30 people  in  I raq 's  Diyala Province .
-  2008 (Apr.): Suicide car  b om ber  kills 40 people  in  Baquba, th e  
capi ta l  of  Diyala P rovince  in Iraq.
-  2008 (Apr.): 35 people  die and  62 are in ju red  w h e n  a w om an  
de tona tes  explosives t h a t  she was ca r ry in g  und e r  h e r  dress in a 
busy shopping  d is t r ic t  in  I r aq ’s Diyala Province.
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-  2008 (May): 12 w orsh ipe rs  are k i l led  and 44 more  in ju red  
w h e n  a bomb explodes in  th e  Bin Salman mosque near  Sana, 
Yemen.
-  2008 (May): An a l-Qaeda suic ide  b o m b er  de tona tes  explosives 
in Hit ,  a c i ty  in  th e  A nbar  P ro v in ce  of Iraq,  k i l l ing  six 
po l icem en  and four civil ians, and in ju r in g  12 o th e r  people .
-  2008 (Jun.): Car bomb explodes ou ts ide  th e  Danish  Embassy in 
Pakis tan ,  k i l l ing  six people  and in ju r in g  dozens. A l-Qaeda  
claims responsib i l i ty ,  in re ta l ia t ion  for th e  2006 p u b l ic a t io n  of 
pol i t ica l  car toons  in the  Danish  new spaper .
-  2008 (Jun.): A female  suic ide bo m b er  kills 15 and  w ounds  40 
o thers ,  inc lud ing  seven Iraqi  pol ice  officers,  nea r  a c ou r thouse  
in Baquba, Iraq.
-  2008 (Jun.): A suic ide  bom ber  ki lls at 20 people  at a m ee t ing  
be tw ee n  sheiks and Americans  in  Karmah, a to w n  west  of 
Baghdad.
-  2008 (Aug.): A pprox im ate ly  24 w orsh ipp e rs  are k i l led  in th ree  
separa te  attacks. Iraqi  officials b lam e a l-Qaeda in  I raq  for th e  
attacks.
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-  2008 (Aug.): A bomb explodes and  tears  t h ro u g h  near  a bus 
ca r ry ing  Lebanese troops, k i l l ing  15 people ,  n in e  of them  
soldiers .
-  2008 (Aug.): 43 people  k i l led  w h e n  a suic ide  b o m ber  drives  an 
explos ives- laden  car in to  a pol ice  academ y in  n o r t h e r n  Algeria.
-  2008 (Aug.): Two car bombs explode at a m i l i ta ry  com m and  
k i l l ing  12 people.
-  2008 (Sept.):  A car bomb and a rocke t  s t r ike  th e  U.S. embassy 
in Yem en k i l l ing  16 people ,  in c lud in g  four  civil ians. At least  25 
suspec ted  a l-Qaeda m il i tan ts  were  a r re s ted  for th e  a t tack.
-  2008 (Nov.): 28 people  die w i th  60 m ore  in ju red  in  Baghdad,  
Iraq.
-  2009 (Apr.): Series of  six a t tacks  kills 36 people ,  and in jure  
m ore  th a n  100 in Shii te  ne ighborhoods ;
-  2009 (Apr.): 80 ki l led  in th re e  separa te  suicide bom bings  in 
Baghdad.
-  2009 (Dec.): A Nigerian  man a t t em p ted  to ign i te  an explosive 
device  h id d en  in his un de rw ea r .
-  2009 (Dec.): A suic ide bom ber  kills  e igh t  Am ericans  civil ians,  
seven of  them  CIA agents , at a base in  Afghanis tan .
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-  2010 (Oct.):  Two packages bombs from Yemen to th e  U n i ted  
States are discovered.
-  2011 (Jan.): Two F re n ch m en  k i l led  in Niger.
-  2011 (Jan.): Four suicide bom bings  occur  in  I raq  b e tw een  
January  18-20. At least 137 people  k i l led ,  230 are in ju red .
-  2011 (Apr.): Bomb explodes in  M arrakesh ,  Morocco, k i l l ing 15 
people ,  inc lud ing  10 foreigners ,  explodes in
-  2012 (Sept.):  Mil i tants  a rm ed  w i th  an t ia i rc ra f t  weapons  and 
ro ck e t -p ro p e l le d  grenades fire up o n  the  A m erican  consu la te  in 
Benghazi,  Libya, k i l l ing  U.S. ambassador  to Libya and  th ree  
o th e r  embassy officials.
E.THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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G.CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND 
AFTERMATH
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO CHAIRMAN
KHRUSHCHEV: WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 22, 19621
Dear Mr. Chairman:  A copy of  th e  s ta tem en t  I am m aking 
to n ig h t  co n ce rn in g  deve lopm ents  in  Cuba and  the r e a c t io n  of  my 
G overnm en t  th e re to  has been  h a n d e d  to your  Am bassador  in 
W ash ing ton .  In v iew  of the  grav i ty  of  th e  deve lopm en ts  to w h ic h  I 
refer, I w a n t  you  to know  im m edia te ly  and accura te ly  th e  pos i t ion  of  
my G o v e rn m e n t  in th is  mat ter .
In our  discussions and exchanges  on  Berl in and  o th e r  
in te rn a t io n a l  quest ions ,  th e  one th in g  th a t  has most  c o n c e rn e d  me has 
been  the  poss ib i l i ty  th a t  you r  G o ve rn m e n t  would  no t  co rrec t ly  
u nd e rs tan d  the  will  and d e te rm in a t io n  of  the  Uni ted  States in any 
given s i tua t ion ,  since I have no t  assumed th a t  you or  any  o th e r  sane 
man would ,  in  th is  nuc lear  age, d e l ibe ra te ly  p lunge th e  w or ld  in to
1 Kennedy Administration Volumes,  Foreign Relations of  the United  
States, 1961-1963 ,  Volume XI, Cuban Missi le  Crisis and Aftermath, Doc.  44, U.S.  
Department of  State, accessed August 20, 2012,  ht tp :/ /h is tory. s tate .gov /h is tor ical  
docum e n ts / fr u s l9 6 1 -6 3 v l  l /d44 .
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war w h ic h  it  is crys tal  clear  no c o u n t ry  could  win  and  w h ic h  could 
only  resu l t  in  ca tas trophic  consequences  to the  w ho le  w orld ,  
inc lud ing  th e  aggressor.
At our  m ee t ing  in V ienna  and subsequent ly ,  I expressed  our 
readiness and  desire  to find, t h ro u g h  peacefu l  nego t ia t ion ,  a so lu t ion  
to any  and all p rob lem s th a t  divide us. At  the  same t im e,  I made c lear  
th a t  in v iew  of  the  objectives of  th e  ideology to w h ic h  you  adhere ,  
the  Uni ted  States could not  to le ra te  any  ac t ion  on your  p a r t  w h ic h  in 
a major way d is tu rbed  th e  exis t ing over-a l l  ba lance  of  p o w e r  in  th e  
world. I s ta ted  th a t  an a t tem p t  to force a b a n d o n m en t  of our  
responsib i l i t ies  and com m itm ents  in  Berl in  w ou ld  c on s t i tu te  such  an 
act ion  and th a t  th e  Uni ted  States w ou ld  res ist  w i th  all th e  pow er  at its 
command.
It was in  o rder  to avoid any in co r re c t  assessment on th e  par t  of  
your  G o v e rnm en t  w i th  respect  to Cuba th a t  I public ly  s ta ted  th a t  if  
cer ta in  deve lopm ents  in Cuba took  place,  the  U ni ted  States w ou ld  do 
w h a tev e r  m ust  be done to p ro tec t  its ow n secur i ty  and  th a t  of  its 
allies.
Moreover ,  the  Congress adop ted  a reso lu t ion  express ing  its 
suppor t  of  th is  declared  policy. Despite  th is ,  the  rapid d ev e lo p m e n t  of 
long-range  missi le  bases and o th e r  offensive weapons systems in  Cuba
has proceeded .  I m ust  te l l  you th a t  the  U n i ted  States is d e te rm in e d  
th a t  th is  t h r e a t  to th e  secur i ty  of th is  h e m isp h e re  be rem oved .  At the  
same t ime, I w ish  to po in t  out  th a t  th e  ac t ion  we are  t ak ing  is the  
m in im um  necessary  to rem ove  the  t h r e a t  to the  secur i ty  of  th e  na t ions  
of this hem isphere .  The fact of th is  m in im u m  response  sho u ld  no t  be 
taken  as a basis, however ,  for  any m is judgm en t  on  your  part .
I hope  th a t  your  G o v e rn m en t  w i l l  re f ra in  f rom  any  act ion  
w h ich  w ou ld  w iden  or deepen  th is  a l ready  grave crisis and  th a t  we 




LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT 
KENNEDY: MOSCOW, OCTOBER 24, 19622
Dear Mr. Pres iden t:  I have rece ived  your  l e t te r  o f  O c tober  23, 
have s tud ied  it, and am answ er ing  you.
Just imagine,  Mr. P res iden t ,  t h a t  we had  p resen ted  you  w i th  the  
condit ions  of an u l t im a tum  w h ic h  you have p re sen ted  us by your  
action. How would  you have reac ted  to this? I t h in k  th a t  you would  
have been  ind ig n a n t  at such a step on  our  part .  And th is  w ou ld  have 
been  u nd e rs tan d a b le  to us.
In p resen t in g  us w i th  these  cond i t ions ,  you, Mr. P res iden t ,  have 
flung a chal lenge  at us. W h o  asked you to  do this? By w h a t  r igh t  did 
you do this? O ur  ties w i th  th e  Republic  of  Cuba, like our  re la t ions  
w i th  o th e r  states,  regardless of  w h a t  k in d  of  states t h e y  may be, 
conce rn  only  the  two coun tr ies  b e tw een  w h ic h  these re la t ions  exist. 
And if we now speak of the  q u a ra n t in e  to w h ic h  your  l e t t e r  refers , a 
qua ran t ine  may be establ ished,  accord ing  to accep ted  in te rn a t io n a l  
practice, only  by ag reem en t  of states b e tw een  themselves ,  and no t  by
2 Kennedy Administration Volumes,  Foreign Relations of  the United  
States, 1961-1963 ,  Volume XI, Cuban Missi le  Crisis and Aftermath,  Doc. 61, U.S. 
Department of  State, accessed August 20, 2012, ht tp :/ /h is tory. s tate .gov /h is tor ical  
docum ents/ frus l961  -6 3 v l  l / d 6 1 .
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some th i rd  par ty .  Q ua ran t in es  exist,  fo r  example ,  on  ag r icu l tu ra l  
goods and products .  But in th is  case the  q u e s t io n  is in  no way one of 
qua ran t ine ,  b u t  r a th e r  of  far more serious th ings ,  and  you yourse l f  
u n d e rs ta n d  this .
You, Mr. Pres iden t ,  are not  dec la r ing  a qu a ra n t in e ,  b u t  r a th e r  
are se t t ing  fo r th  an u l t im a tu m  and th r e a te n in g  th a t  if  w e  do not  give 
in to your  demands you wil l  use force. C ons ide r  w ha t  you  are  saying! 
And you w a n t  to persuade  me to agree to this! W h a t  w o u ld  it  mean to 
agree to these  demands? It would  m ean  gu id ing  o n ese l f  in  one 's  
re la t ions  w i th  o th e r  coun tr ies  no t  by reason,  bu t  by subm i t t ing  to 
arb i t rar iness .  You are  no longer  appea ling  to reason, but  wish to 
in t im ida te  us.
No, Mr. Pres iden t ,  I canno t  agree to th is ,  and I t h in k  th a t  in  
your  ow n h e a r t  you recognize  th a t  I am correc t .  I am conv inced  th a t  
in  my place you  w ou ld  act  th e  same way.
Reference  to th e  decis ion  of  the  O rgan iza t ion  of A m erican  
States canno t  in  any way subs tan t ia te  th e  demands  n o w  advanced by 
the  U n i ted  States. This O rgan iza t ion  has absolu te ly  no au th o r i ty  or 
basis for adop t ing  decisions such as the  one you  speak of in your  
le t ter .  Therefore ,  we do not  recognize  these  decisions.  In te rn a t io n a l  
law exists and un iversa l ly  recognized  norm s o f  conduct  exist. W e
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f i rmly  adhere  to the  pr inc ip les  o f  in te rn a t io n a l  law  and  observe 
s t r ic t ly  the  norm s w h ic h  regula te  nav iga t ion  on th e  h ig h  seas, in  
in te rn a t io n a l  waters .  W e observe these  norm s and en joy  th e  r ights  
recognized  by all states.
You w ish  to compel  us to ren ou n ce  th e  r ights  t h a t  every  
sovere ign  s ta te  enjoys, you are  t ry ing  to legislate in  ques t ions  of  
in te rn a t io n a l  law, and you are  v io la t ing  th e  un iversa l ly  accep ted  
norms of th a t  law. And you are doing all th is  n o t  on ly  ou t  of  h a t re d  
for the  Cuban  people  and its g overnm en t ,  but  also because  of 
cons idera t ions  of the  e lec t ion  campaign  in  th e  U nited  States. W h a t  
m oral i ty ,  w h a t  law can just ify  such an approach  by the  A m erican  
G overnm en t  to in te rn a t io n a l  affairs? No such m ora l i ty  or  law can be 
found, because th e  act ions of th e  U n i ted  States w i th  regard  to Cuba 
c ons t i tu te  o u t r ig h t  b an d i t ry  or, if you like, th e  folly of d egenera te  
imperia l ism. U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  such folly can b r in g  grave suffer ing  to 
the  peoples of  all countr ies ,  and  to no lesser degree to th e  A m erican  
people  themselves ,  since the  U n i ted  States has com ple te ly  lost its 
former iso la t ion  w i th  the  advent  of m o d ern  types  of a rm am en t .
There fore ,  Mr. Pres iden t ,  i f  you coolly  weigh the  s i tua t ion  
w h ic h  has developed,  not  giving way to passions,  you wil l  u n d e rs ta n d  
th a t  th e  Soviet  U n ion  canno t  fail to re jec t  th e  a rb i t ra ry  demands  of
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the  U n i ted  States. W h e n  you co n fron t  us w i th  such  cond i t ions ,  t ry  to 
pu t  y ourse l f  in  our place and consider  ho w  th e  Uni ted  States would  
react  to these  condit ions .  I do not  doub t  th a t  i f  someone a t t em p ted  to 
d ic ta te  s im ila r  cond i t ions  to y ou — th e  U n i ted  States— you would  
re ject  such  an a t tem pt .  And we also say— no.
The Soviet G o v e rn m e n t  considers  th a t  the  v io la t io n  of the  
f reedom  to use in te rn a t io n a l  waters  and in te rn a t io n a l  a ir  space is an 
act  of aggression w h ic h  pushes m an k ind  to w a rd  the abyss of a w or ld  
nuc lear -m iss i le  war. Therefore ,  the  Soviet G o v e rn m en t  canno t  
in s t ru c t  the  captains  of Soviet vessels bo u n d  for  Cuba to observe th e  
orders  of  A m er ican  naval  forces b lockad ing  th a t  Island.  O ur  
in s t ruc t ions  to Soviet m ar iners  are to observe s t r ic t ly  th e  un iversa l ly  
accepted norm s of nav iga t ion  in in te rn a t io n a l  waters  and not  to 
re t rea t  one step from them. And if  the  A m er ican  side v iola tes  these  
rules , i t  must  realize  w h a t  respons ib i l i ty  wil l  re s t  upon  it  in  th a t  case. 
N a tu ra l ly  we wil l  no t  s imply be bys tanders  w i t h  regard  to p ira t ica l  
acts by Am erican  ships on th e  h igh  seas. We w i l l  t h e n  be forced on 
our  par t  to take  the  measures  we cons ider  necessary  and  adequate  in 
o rder  to p ro tec t  our r ights .  W e  have e v e ry th in g  necessary  to do so.
Respectfully ,
[Nikita  S. Khrushchev]
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LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT 
KENNEDY: MOSCOW, OCTOBER 27, 19623
Dear Mr. P res iden t ,  I have s tud ied  w i th  great  sa t is fac t ion  your  
reply  to Mr. T h a n t  c o n ce rn in g  measures  th a t  should  be t a k e n  to avoid 
contact  b e tw e e n  our  vessels and th e r e b y  avoid i r reparab le  and fatal 
consequences.  This  reasonable  step on  yo u r  p a r t  s t ren g thens  my be l ie f  
th a t  you are show ing  conce rn  for th e  p rese rv a t io n  of  peace,  w h ic h  I 
note  w i th  sa t is fac tion.
I have a lready  said th a t  our  people ,  ou r  Governm ent ,  and  I 
personal ly ,  as C ha irm an  of th e  Council  of  Ministers ,  are con ce rn ed  
solely w i th  hav ing  our  co u n t ry  develop  and occupy a w o r th y  place 
among all peoples  of the  world  in  econom ic  com pet i t ion ,  in the  
deve lopm en t  of cu l tu re  and  the  arts,  and  in  ra is ing  the l iv ing s tandard  
of  the  people .  This  is the  most  noble  and  necessary  field for 
com pet i t ion ,  and b o th  th e  v ic tor  and  th e  vanqu ished  wil l  der ive  only  
benef i t  f rom it, because it  means peace and  an increase in  the  means 
by w h ich  m an  lives and finds en joym ent .
3 Kennedy Administration  Volumes,  Foreign Relations of  the United  
States, 1961-1963 ,  Volume XI, Cuban Missi le  Crisis and Aftermath,  Doc.  91, U.S.  
Department of  State, accessed August 20, 2012,  ht tp :/ /h is tory .s tate .gov/h is tor ica l  
docum en ts / fr u s l9 6 1 -6 3 v l  l /d91 .
In  yo u r  s ta te m e n t  you expressed  th e  op in ion  th a t  th e  main  aim 
was not  s imply  to come to an ag reem en t  and  take  measures  to p rev e n t  
con tact  b e tw e e n  our  vessels and c o n se q u e n t ly  a d e ep e n in g  of the  
crisis w h ic h  could,  as a resu l t  of  such  contacts ,  spa rk  a m i l i ta ry  
confl ict ,  a f te r  w h ic h  all nego t ia t ions  w o u ld  be  superf luous  because 
o ther  forces and  o th e r  laws w ou ld  th e n  come in to  p lay — the  laws of 
war. I agree w i th  you tha t  th is  is on ly  th e  f irst  step. T he  main  th in g  
th a t  must  be done  is to norm al ize  and s tabil ize  the  s ta te  of  peace 
among sta tes and  among peoples.
I u n d e rs t a n d  your  conce rn  for the  secu r i ty  of the  U n i ted  States, 
Mr. P res iden t ,  because this  is the  p r im a ry  du ty  o f  a P res iden t .  But we 
too are d i s tu rb ed  about  these  same quest ions ;  I b ea r  these  same 
obl iga t ions  as C ha irm an  of the  Council  of  Minis ters  of  th e  U.S.S.R. 
You have been  a la rmed by th e  fact t h a t  we have a ided  Cuba w i th  
weapons, in o rder  to s t r e n g th e n  its defense  capab i l i ty— prec ise ly  
defense capab i l i ty —because w h a te v e r  weapons  it may possess, Cuba 
canno t  be equated  w i th  you since the  d i f fe rence  in m agn i tu d e  is so 
great,  p a r t i cu la r ly  in view of  m od ern  means o f  des t ruc t ion .  O ur  aim 
has been  and is to he lp  Cuba, and no one can dispute  th e  h u m a n i ty  of 
our  motives, w h ic h  are o r ien ted  to w ard  enab l ing  Cuba to live 
peaceful ly  and develop  in the  way its people  desire.
You w ish  to ensure  th e  secu r i ty  o f  your  coun try ,  and th is  is 
unde rs tan d ab le .  But Cuba, too, w an ts  th e  same th ing;  all  coun tr ies  
w an t  to m ain ta in  th e i r  securi ty .  But h o w  are we, th e  Soviet  Union,  
our  G o vernm en t ,  to assess your  act ions  w h ic h  are expressed  in the  
fact th a t  you have su r ro u n d e d  the  Soviet  U n ion  w i th  m i l i ta ry  bases; 
su r ro u n d e d  o u r  allies w i th  m i l i ta ry  bases; placed m i l i ta ry  bases 
l i te ra l ly  a rou n d  our  country ;  and s ta t io n ed  y o u r  missile  a rm am en ts  
there?  This  is no secret .  Responsible  A m er ican  personages  openly  
declare  th a t  it  is so. Your missiles are located  in  Bri ta in ,  are located 
in  Italy, and  are  a imed against  us. Your  missiles are loca ted  in  Turkey.
You are d is tu rbed  over  Cuba. You say th a t  th is  d is tu rbs  you 
because it is 90 miles by sea from the  coast  o f  the U n i ted  States of 
America.  But T urkey  adjoins us; our  sen tr ies  pa t ro l  back and  fo r th  and 
see each o ther .  Do you consider , then ,  th a t  you have  th e  r igh t  to 
demand secur i ty  for your  own c o u n t ry  and the rem ova l  of  the  
weapons you call offensive, but  do not  accord the  same r ig h t  to us? 
You have p laced  des t ruc t ive  missile weapons,  w h ic h  you call 
offensive, in Turkey,  l i te ra l ly  next  to us. How t h e n  can recog n i t io n  of 
our equal m i l i ta ry  capaci ties be reco nc i led  w ith  such  unequa l  
re la t ions  be tw ee n  our  great  states? This is i r reconci lab le .
It  is good, Mr. Pres iden t ,  t h a t  you  have  agreed to have our  
r epresen ta t ives  m ee t  and begin  talks , ap pa ren t ly  t h ro u g h  the  
m ed ia t ion  of U Than t ,  Act ing  Secre tary  G enera l  of  th e  Uni ted  
Nations. Consequen t ly ,  he to some degree  has assumed the  role  of  a 
m edia tor  and we consider  th a t  he  will  be able  to cope w i th  th is  
responsible  mission, provided ,  of course,  th a t  each  p a r ty  d raw n  in to  
this  con trove rsy  displays good will.
I t h in k  it  w ou ld  be possible  to end the  co n t ro v e rsy  qu ick ly  and 
norm al ize  the  s i tua t ion ,  and th e n  the  people  could b re a th e  more 
easily, cons ider ing  th a t  s ta tesm en charged  w i th  respons ib i l i ty  are of 
sober m ind  and  have an awareness  of t h e i r  r e sp o n s ib i l i ty  combined  
w i th  the  ab i l i ty  to solve complex quest ions  and not  b r ing  th ings  to a 
m il i ta ry  ca tas trophe .
I the re fo re  make this  proposal:  W e are w i l l ing  to remove  from 
Cuba the  means w h ic h  you regard  as offensive.  We are  wil l ing  to 
carry  this  out  and to make th is  pledge in  the  U n i ted  Nations .  Your 
r ep resen ta t ives  will  make a dec la ra t ion  to the  effect  t h a t  the  Uni ted  
States, for its part ,  cons ider ing  th e  uneasiness  and a nx ie ty  of the  
Soviet State, wil l  remove its analogous means from Turkey .  Let us 
reach  agreem en t  as to the  per iod  o f  t ime needed  by you  and  by us to 
b r ing  this  about.  And, after  tha t ,  persons en t ru s te d  by th e  U ni ted
Nations Securi ty  Council  could inspect  on th e  spot  th e  fu l f i l lm en t  of 
the  pledges made. O f  course, the  perm iss ion  o f  the G o v e rnm en ts  of 
Cuba and of  T urkey  is necessary for th e  en t ry  in to  those  coun tr ies  of 
these rep re sen ta t ive s  and for the  in spec t ion  o f  the  fu l f i l lm en t  of the  
pledge made by each side. Of course  it w o u ld  be best  if these  
rep resen ta t ives  en joyed  the  conf idence  of th e  Securi ty  Council ,  as 
well  as yours  and  m ine— both  the  U n i ted  States and the  Soviet 
U nion— and also th a t  of Turkey  and Cuba.  I do not  t h in k  it  would  be 
diff icult  to se lect  people  w ho  would  en joy  the  t ru s t  and  respect  of all 
part ies conce rned .
W e, in m aking  th is  pledge, in o rd e r  to give sa t is fac t ion  and 
hope of the  peoples  of Cuba and T urkey  and  to s t r e n g th e n  th e i r  
confidence  in  th e i r  securi ty ,  wil l  make a s t a tem en t  w i th in  the  
f ram ework  of the  Securi ty  Council  to the  effect  t h a t  the  Soviet 
G overnm ent  gives a solemn promise  to respect  t h e  inv io lab i l i ty  of  th e  
borders and sovere ign ty  of Turkey,  n o t  to in te r fe re  in its in te rn a l  
affairs, no t  to invade  Turkey, no t  to make available  our  t e r r i to r y  as a 
b r idgehead for  such  an invasion, and t h a t  it  w o u ld  also res t ra in  those  
who con tem p la te  com m it t ing  aggress ion against  Turkey, e i th e r  f rom 
the t e r r i to ry  of  the  Soviet Union  or f rom th e  t e r r i to ry  of Turkey 's  
o ther  ne igh b o r in g  states.
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The U n i ted  States G o v e rn m en t  wil l  make a s im ila r  s ta tem en t  
w i th in  the  f ram ew o rk  of the  Securi ty  Council  regard ing  Cuba.  It wil l  
declare  t h a t  the  U n i ted  States w il l  respec t  th e  inv io lab i l i ty  of Cuba's 
borders  and its sovereignty ,  wil l  p ledge no t  to in te r fe re  in  its in te rn a l  
affairs, no t  to invade  Cuba i tse l f  or  make its t e r r i to r y  avai lable  as a 
b r idgehead  for such  an invasion,  and  wil l  also re s t ra in  those  w ho  
might  con tem p la te  com m it t ing  aggression against  Cuba, e i th e r  from 
the t e r r i to ry  of  the  U n i ted  States or from the  t e r r i to r y  of  Cuba's  o th e r  
ne ighbor ing  states.
O f  course,  for  this  we would  have to come to an a g reem en t  w i th  
you and specify a ce r ta in  t ime l imit .  Let us agree to some per iod  of 
t ime, bu t  w i th o u t  unnecessa ry  de lay— say w i th in  two or th re e  weeks, 
not  longer  th a n  a month .
The means s i tua ted  in Cuba, of  w h ic h  you speak  and w h ic h  
dis turb  you, as you  have stated,  are in the  hands  of  Soviet  officers. 
Therefore ,  any acc identa l  use of  th em  to the  d e t r im e n t  of  th e  Uni ted  
States is excluded. These means are s i tua ted  in Cuba at th e  reques t  of 
the  Cuban G o v e rn m en t  and are only  for defense  purposes. Therefore ,  
i f  the re  is no invas ion  o f  Cuba, or  a t tack  on th e  Soviet U n ion  or any 
of  our o th e r  allies, th e n  o f  course these  means are  not  and  w il l  not  be 
a th rea t  to anyone.  For t h e y  are no t  for purposes  of  a ttack.
If you are  agreeable  to my proposal ,  Mr.  P res iden t ,  t h e n  we 
would  send our  rep resen ta t ives  to New York, to  the  U n i ted  Nations, 
and would  give th e m  com prehens ive  in s t ru c t io n s  in  o rd e r  th a t  an 
agreem ent  may be reached  more quickly .  I f  you also se lect  you r  
people and give th em  the  co rrespond ing  in s t ru c t io ns ,  t h e n  th is  
quest ion  can be qu ick ly  resolved.
W h y  w ou ld  I like to do this? Because th e  whole  w or ld  is now  
apprehens ive  and  expects  sensible  act ions of us. The g rea tes t  joy for 
all  peoples w ou ld  be the  a n n o u n ce m e n t  of  our  ag reem en t  and of the  
e rad ica t ion  of  the  con troversy  t h a t  has arisen. I a t tach  great  
im por tance  to th is  ag reem en t  in so far as it  could serve as a good 
beg inn ing  and could  in p a r t icu la r  make it  easier  to reach  agreem ent  
on b ann ing  n uc lea r  weapons tests.  The q u es t io n  of the  tests  could be 
solved in para l le l  fashion,  w i th o u t  co nn ec t in g  one w i th  the  o ther ,  
because these  are d i f fe ren t  issues. However ,  it  is im p o r ta n t  th a t  
ag reem ent  be r eached  on bo th  these  issues so as to p re s e n t  h u m a n i ty  
w i th  a f ine gift,  and also to g ladden it w i th  th e  news th a t  ag reem ent  
has been  reached  on the  cessation of  nuc lea r  tests  and th a t  
consequen t ly  th e  a tm osphere  wil l no longer  be poisoned.  O ur  posi t ion  
and yours  on th is  issue are ve ry  close toge ther .
All of th is  could  possibly serve as a good  impetus  to w a rd  the  
f ind ing  of  m u tu a l ly  acceptable  ag reem ents  o n  o th e r  con trove rs ia l  
issues on w h ic h  you  and I have b e en  ex chang ing  views.  These views 
have so far  n o t  been  resolved,  b u t  th ey  are  aw ai t ing  u r g e n t  so lu t ion ,  
w h ich  w o u ld  c lear  up the  in te rn a t io n a l  a tm osphere .  W e  are  p repa red  
for this.
These are  my proposals,  Mr. P res iden t .
Respectfu l ly  yours, 
[Nikita  S. K hrushchev]
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